Talks and Meetings with Charles Hartshorne

Donald W. Viney

Pittsburg State University, dviney@pittstate.edu

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I knew Charles Hartshorne (June 5, 1897 – October 9, 2000) for the last two decades of his life. One does not easily forget a meeting with him: the smiling eyes behind wire-rimmed glasses; the disheveled eyebrows; the beak-like nose; the voice, pitched high with age, cracking with excitement at some philosophical insight; the slightly disconcerting sense of self-importance tempered by humility before the genius of Plato, Peirce, or Whitehead; the witty anecdotes; the fondness for birds; the blink and nod that bade a charming farewell. His small frame and mail-order clothes only served to bring into relief that one was conversing with a surviving member of the pantheon of twentieth century philosophers, many of whom he knew.
Hartshorne’s reputation for entertaining conversation was well-deserved. All who knew the man have their favorite “Hartshorne stories” and I am no exception. The following pages, culled from notes that I took over the years, chronicle my meetings and other encounters with the person that John B. Cobb, Jr. called “a strange and alien greatness.”1 I have added numerous footnotes and annotations to the original notes and I have included photographs. My major meetings with Hartshorne are listed below as a kind of table of contents:

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April 1976: I was an undergraduate student at Colorado State University (Fort Collins, Colorado), studying with Donald Crosby, still rather new to the world of philosophy. Crosby invited some of his students to attend a conference in Denver—I cannot recall whether it was at Iliff, Regis, or elsewhere. The conference was on Whitehead and Buddhism. The only well-known names at the conference that I recall were Robert Neville, John Wisdom (who was a visiting professor at Colorado State), and Hartshorne. Hartshorne’s paper is the only one I remember being read, but alas, I did not understand it.2 I recall that we sat in a large circle and after Hartshorne finished speaking a Japanese fellow stood up to respond. His accent was heavy—he called Hartshorne “Professor Hot-So”—and his response was so lengthy, so lengthy that I guessed the point he was trying to make was lost on most of those present.3 Hartshorne made some clever remark but again, unhappily, I do not remember it. Afterwards, Crosby related that someone had asked Wisdom what he thought of Hartshorne’s talk. His reply was, “I could make nothing of it.” I could have said the same thing, but from me, it would have been a mere

3 My good friend Grier Jefferis was in attendance. He reminded me of the funny pronunciation of Hartshorne’s name.
report; from an ordinary language philosopher like Wisdom, it may have been intended as a devastating criticism.4

My only exposure to Hartshorne, prior to the Denver meeting, was reading some of his writings for a paper I had written in March 1976 (in Crosby’s History of Philosophy class) on Descartes’ Fifth Meditation argument. I had read a little of Hartshorne’s *Anselm’s Discovery* (1965), the article in Hick and McGill’s anthology, *The Many-Faced Argument* (1967), and some of Eugene Peters, *Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics* (1970). It was a respectable paper but I was still being misled by Paul Tillich’s idea that God is not a being but Being-Itself. In Hartshorne’s philosophy, “[God’s existence] is not one among the facts of existence, for it pervades all facts, actual or possible.” That sounds a bit like Tillich, but Hartshorne argues that the full reality of God is the ways in which God knows and responds to the universe of creatures, and this he calls *God’s actuality*. The existence of God is, then, “the least common denominator of all possible contingent divine actualities—a class which cannot be empty, though it has no necessary members . . .”5

**November 1979**: Peter Hutcheson and I were graduate students at the University of Oklahoma. We had gone to Austin, Texas to a Southwestern Philosophical Society Meeting. The only two well-known philosophers that I remember at this conference were Alvin Plantinga and Hartshorne, although I’m sure there were many others. At lunch Peter and I drove around Austin trying to find some place to eat other than the school cafeteria. After an exasperating hour of hunting for a parking place we returned to the convention center to face cafeteria food. We happened to sit at a table adjacent to where Hartshorne was eating. When the people at his table left, Hartshorne brought his tray over to our table and asked if he could sit with us. For the next forty-five minutes he entertained us with philosophical remarks and humorous anecdotes.

If I had any doubts that I was in the presence of genius they were dispelled during the session when Plantinga gave his talk. I was spellbound by Plantinga’s ability to field difficult questions. Plantinga presented his paper—which had something to do with the ontological argument—in a very large lecture hall that would hold several hundred. A fellow far in the back of the room objected in a rather swaggering and self-confident manner, “Isn’t existence a strange sort of property? It’s like Russell said, if you were listing the properties of a Zebra you wouldn’t list existence.” Plantinga pointed out that this was no objection to the argument. Zebras have a

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5 The last two quotes are from *The Logic of Perfection*: 156 and 158.
lot of strange properties, like being over two inches tall, that we wouldn’t list. Hartshorne also stood up to make a comment on Plantinga’s presentation. Once again, I do not recall the specifics, although I believe it had to do with their different approaches to modalities. At any rate, it was clear that Hartshorne’s objection was not half-baked and there was not a hint of pretentiousness in his demeanor. When he sat down he and Plantinga had agreed to disagree.

It is one of my regrets that I knew so little philosophy, even at that time, that I could not follow the train of reasoning that Plantinga and Hartshorne pursued. Nevertheless, the exchange was transformative for me, for when I returned home after the conference I read everything I could find on Hartshorne’s philosophy. It was a turning point in my philosophical development.

**December 1979:** I wrote a rhyme titled “Ontological Sonnet” and sent it to Hartshorne. He responded within ten days and graciously refrained from criticizing my poetry.

**December 1980 – January 1981:** I chose Hartshorne’s work on the ontological argument for my dissertation topic. Unbeknownst to me, Robert Shahan, the chairperson of the philosophy department, sent my proposal to Hartshorne and invited him to be on my doctoral committee. Hartshorne agreed to be a committee member but he pointed out that George Goodwin had already written extensively on his treatment of the ontological argument. Hartshorne noted that no one had written on his global argument. I settled on this topic for my dissertation, amazed that Hartshorne had agreed to be on my committee.

**February 21-25, 1981:** Shahan invited Hartshorne to Norman. Hartshorne gave public lectures in Norman and at the Unitarian Church in Oklahoma City. I chauffeured him around and talked with him at length about philosophy. I recall taking him to a drug store to find medicine for a bug bite on his leg. We had a meal at Shahan’s house and then Hartshorne and I took a long walk around the neighborhood. The evening before he returned to Austin, Hartshorne invited me to his room where we talked for a little while. When I arose to leave he said, “You’re the kind of student teachers live for.” For several days thereafter, I hardly seemed to touch the ground when I walked.

I recorded the following notes from those meetings in Oklahoma on February 28, 1981. In the original notes, I included a preface expressing my admiration for Hartshorne and his importance to philosophy. I spoke of Whitehead as less rigorous in argument than Hartshorne, a judgment that today I would not make. Whitehead was as rigorous as any philosopher. On the question of conceiving God, he had a creative burst of thinking from about 1925 until 1933 that may be unprecedented in philosophical literature. What seemed to me in 1981 as a lack of rigor is more properly thought of as a development of radically new ideas about deity. In any event, it was Hartshorne thoughts, not Whitehead’s, that I was interested in highlighting.

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CH = Charles Hartshorne; DV = Don Viney

CH: Aristotle would have understood the ontological argument. He saw that the eternal is the necessary.
DV: True, but he would have proved too much. For he felt the spheres were eternal.
CH: Yes, Aristotle went beyond the empirical observation in that.

* * *

CH: If you’re a determinist, it’s your responsibility.

* * *

DV: If you could invite any five persons in history to dinner who would you invite?
CH: [As if thinking to himself] Well, I should certainly like to talk with [Charles] Peirce. Leibniz would also be good.
DV: Would you not invite Kant?
CH: Kant is the most overrated philosopher of all. Leibniz is the most underrated. [I don’t recall that Professor Hartshorne ever completed the list of five persons, although I remember that everyone he mentioned was a philosopher.]

* * *

DV: Gertrude Stein said that a bell went off in her head any time she met a genius. She said it went off twice in her life, once when she met Whitehead, and once when she met Picasso.
CH: Yes, I believe that bell went off also when I met Whitehead. He was certainly a genius. The bell did not go off when I met Husserl, although it did go off when I met Heidegger. I suppose Heidegger was a genius, in a grim sort of way. Husserl was not a genius, but he did work very hard.

* * *

DV: The idea of an actual infinite is crucial to your philosophy but there are some serious paradoxes in the idea. William Lane Craig has done a great deal to revive these problems.
CH: I maintain that time must extend infinitely into the past and indefinitely into the future. If the nature of reality is that the many become one and are increased by one [Whitehead], then the idea of a first moment of time is nonsense. There is absolutely no analogy in experience

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7 Hartshorne later made it clear to me that he was referring to Heidegger’s grim personality.
8 At the time of this conversation, Craig’s *The Kalam Cosmological Argument* (London: Macmillan, 1979) was a recent publication.
for the concept of creation *ex nihilo*. Some of the paradoxes of an actual infinite, such as the paradox of Hilbert’s Hotel, rest upon the mistake of spatializing time [Bergson]. I suspect that space is finite but time is infinite. My son-in-law is a mathematician and used to be a finitist. But now he is not so sure and leans towards the opposite view. I once asked [Bertrand] Russell if by adding a finite number to an infinite number one produces a new totality.\(^9\) He said yes. Although the two numbers are numerically identical, both being infinite, there is nevertheless a *qualitative* difference. There is a new totality. The many become one and are increased by one.

* * *

CH: The God that some say is dead was never alive.

* * *


DV: “The Structure of Experience” is maybe nearer to the mark. Creativity has no structure, there are only instances of it, but experience does have a structure, the most general feature of which is creativity.

CH: Yes, perhaps you are right. Maybe I’ll call it “The Structure of Experience.”\(^{10}\)

* * *

CH: My new book on the history of philosophy has an entire chapter on Wittgenstein.\(^{11}\) I went through the notebooks, *Zettel*, and marked everything I could agree with. There is actually quite a bit I agree with in Wittgenstein. I probably found more to agree with than most Wittgensteinians could find. My former student and good friend, James Devlin, is very excited about that chapter.

* * *

DV: Towards the end of *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* you make a comment in passing about the reason for death. Would you explain your views on death?

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\(^{10}\) In hindsight, I realized that the book we were discussing was one that he would never see published. It was my good fortune to be the main editor for that book, *Creative Experiencing: A Philosophy of Freedom*, edited by D. W. Viney and Jincheol O (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011).

CH: Oh, yes, I had forgotten that. The point is that the older a person becomes the fewer novel things there are to enjoy. I suppose a person could learn a new language in his old age. But there are only a finite number of languages. Pretty soon you run out of things to do.

DV: It strikes me that you are an exception, a counter-example, to your own thesis. You remind me of my great grandmother who always remained young at heart.

CH: Yes, there are differences among older people. But the differences are all finite. There is an infinite gap between ourselves and God. There are only a finite number of things open to a finite being. It is different with God.12

* * *

DV: Dr. Hartshorne, you claim that the future is indefinite while the past is definite. Knowledge of the future, except as possibility, is therefore impossible, even for God. What do you do with alleged cases of precognition?

CH: Well, I don’t know what to do with precognition. Michael Scriven believes he has experimental confirmation of precognition. A good friend of mine and a well-known statistician is unconvinced by Scriven’s example. For my part, I should hate to rest my entire metaphysics on one example.

* * *


* * *

CH: My daughter calls me a pre-Freudian. She says I have not taken Freud seriously enough.

* * *

CH: My son-in-law told me once that he is not a Hartshornean, but that he is a Buddhist. And then he added, “There’s really no difference.” Perhaps he is right. At least there is some truth to what he says.

DV: In *Creative Synthesis* you claim that necessary truths are known, if at all, only a priori. [Saul] Kripke thinks there are necessary truths which can be known *a posteriori.*

CH: What are Kripke’s examples?

DV: Kripke says that “The morning star is the evening star” is a necessary truth since it would be false only if Venus was not identical to Venus. But we learn the truth of the statement empirically, not by an examination of concepts.

CH: Ah, yes. But you see, Kripke’s example is only of a hypothetical necessity. If Venus had never existed then “The morning star is the evening star” would not have been a necessary truth. But what is true of all possible worlds could never be knowable empirically.

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CH: Meeting my wife was one of the luckier things that happened to me. Not all women would be compatible with me. No one should deny the reality of luck, both good luck and bad luck. Common sense recognizes the reality of luck. It is a shame so many philosophers have failed to take it into account.

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CH: The name “Hartshorne” means “deer’s horn.” It has nothing to do with “shorne.” The “s” is possessive. People back East say “Harts-horne.” Here in the west they are more likely to say “Hart-shorne.” I never really noticed the difference until my wife pointed it out to me. But the correct pronunciation is “Harts-horne.”

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DV: Whitehead never seems to have had much use for Kant. Somewhere in *Process and Reality* he says, “Kant founded the world on thought, apparently oblivious to the scanty supply of thinking.”

CH: Yes, that is typical. Once in a lecture he said that Kant did things backwards. He should have written the three *Critiques* in reverse order.

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14 Hartshorne also claims that natural laws are contingent. Like Whitehead, he accepts the idea of different cosmic epochs in which laws might change. “What scientist can speak for eternity?”
15 Whitehead’s words are: “Kant followed Hume in this misconception; and was thus led to balance the world upon thought—oblivious to the scanty supply of thinking.” *Process and Reality*, Corrected Edition, edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978): 151.
CH: Leibniz was one of the first to show that the distinction between Spirit and Matter is not very illuminating.

* * *

CH: My goal is to write the best philosophy of any octogenarian.  
DV: There aren’t many philosophers who have lived into their eighties, much less written philosophy then. Whitehead was fairly old when he began writing in philosophy.¹⁶  
CH: Yes, but he did not live to be eighty. But I am not trying to be greater than Whitehead.¹⁷

* * *

CH: I am as much a Peircean as a Whiteheadian. I learned as much from Peirce as I learned from Whitehead.

* * *

CH: Do you know what Whitehead said when he got the letter from Harvard asking him to come to the United States to teach philosophy? He said to his wife, “I’ve always wanted to teach philosophy.” Isn’t that a marvelously beautiful story?

* * *

DV: You mention Teilhard de Chardin only once in Creative Synthesis. Would you comment on this?¹⁸

[16] I would have been more accurate to have said that Whitehead was fairly old when he began writing about speculative philosophy or metaphysics.  
[17] I may have misremembered the first sentence, but I’m sure Hartshorne said that he wasn’t trying to be greater than Whitehead. Whitehead lived to the age of 86.  
CH: There is a good deal to agree with in Teilhard. But he is much too muddled. His main importance is in opening the eyes of many Roman Catholics, who might otherwise have remained within the Thomistic tradition, to the idea of a growing God.

* * *

[The school newspaper ran an article on Hartshorne the Friday before he arrived in Norman. The article mentioned several of Hartshorne’s books, but spelled The Divine Relativity as “The Divine Reality.” I had not noticed the misprint when I showed the article to Hartshorne.]

CH: There is only one mistake in this article. [Pointing to the typographical error] Any number of authors have talked about the divine reality. How many have seriously considered the divine relativity?

DV: There is actually quite a bit in Nietzsche which anticipates process philosophy. Nietzsche’s rejection of substance and his doctrine of the will-to-power I see echoed in Whitehead’s concept of concrescence.

CH: This is true. But Nietzsche ruined his insight with the eternal recurrence. The will-to-power is a celebration of creative activity. The eternal recurrence says there is nothing new under the sun. Nietzsche did not fully understand the cumulative nature of process. Each new reality
which becomes includes its predecessors. There could never be mere repetition in a Whiteheadian universe.

* * *

DV: Can there be any overlap between the physicist’s concept of time and the concept of time when applied to God?

CH: Relativity physics seems to pose a problem for neoclassical metaphysics. [Paul] Fitzgerald has written an article in *Process Studies* cataloguing the options open to a process theist. I think Fitzgerald may think relativity theory gives us the final word about time. I have a good friend in physics who said that our sole means of measuring time and distance is ultimately dependent on light signals. If there is a divine simultaneity it is something we could not make use of in physics. Also, there must be something like time between big bang explosions. What is a physicist going to do with that?

* * *

CH: Kant rightly saw that the cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument. What he didn’t see was that the ontological argument is dependent on the cosmological argument.

* * *

[The following two excerpts are from a discussion with Dr. Hartshorne which followed a service at the First Unitarian Church of Oklahoma City where he preached a sermon titled, “Taking Freedom Seriously” on February 22, 1981.\(^\text{19}\)]

Questioner (a man): In Mortimer Adler’s book *How to Think About God*, he speaks of the idea of God as the uncaused cause.\(^\text{20}\) How does this relate to your own views?

CH: The idea of an uncaused cause is a perfect example of a half-truth parading as the whole truth. A God who loves and is loved by his creatures is anything but unmoved. It is true that God’s existence is uncaused, but this does not mean God is *in all respects* uncaused.

* * *

\(^{19}\) Hartshorne later presented the same presentation as a Lowell Lecture in 1983, Cambridge Forum, taped lecture # 471 (June 25, 1983) (3 Church Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138).

Questioner (a woman): I can agree with everything you’ve said about freedom. But why bother with God?

CH: That is a fair question. Without God, life cannot be significant. No one can live as if God did not exist. The purpose of life is to contribute to future actualities.

Woman: Yes, but we can contribute to society.

CH: Like all things non-divine, societies are not immortal. They perish. But we live as if our lives mattered. Only God can guarantee the significance of our lives. As the Jewish saying goes, “He endows our days with abiding significance.”

December 1981: My father, Wayne Viney, invited me to accompany him to Harvard University and to pay my way! Dad was doing research on Dorothea Dix (1802-1887). At Harvard I obtained a photocopy of Hartshorne’s dissertation, *An Outline and Defense of the Argument for the Unity of Being in the Absolute or Divine Good* (May 1923). This would form the basis of the second chapter of my dissertation.

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February 1981 – April 1982: Correspondence with Hartshorne concerning my dissertation. I would send Hartshorne a chapter and he would respond with suggested revisions.\(^{22}\) He was always prompt and supportive. I shared Hartshorne’s letters with my dissertation advisor, Tom Boyd. On September 9, 1981, I received the following memo from Tom: “What can I say? If Hartshorne be for you, who can be against you? Well argued—cogent. What I will await is the remainder to determine how well you sustain the argument. (Note occasional corrections with check in margins.) See you this afternoon!” When it came time for my oral defense, Hartshorne was unable to attend, but he sent a letter of support on my behalf.

January 1983: J. Clayton Feaver (1911-1995), who had taught a course on Tillich, which I took, asked me what I was doing with the dissertation. I mentioned my unsuccessful attempt to publish a chapter from the work (on the moral argument) in the *American Journal of Theology and Philosophy*—the rejection notice arrived in November 1982. Feaver asked, “Why don’t you publish it?” I have often wondered why I didn’t think of that. Hartshorne agreed to write the foreword to the book and suggested State University of New York Press as a possible publisher.

Talks with Charles Hartshorne in Atlanta, Georgia at a meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology. Notes written between April 1-2, 1983 by Don Viney.

My father suggested that we find a conference that would be of mutual interest and that we could attend together. We found that the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology was meeting in Atlanta, so we arranged to meet there. I did not realize that Hartshorne would be at the conference, but as it turned out, the meeting with him was fortuitous. The following are my recollections from a conversation during breakfast on April 1, 1983 (Friday) that Wayne Viney and I had with Hartshorne.

Hartshorne said that he had been in the hospital because of an old ulcer that had flared up. Apparently a couple of women had suggested that he write a book for the non-philosopher on his thought. Before he knew it, he was writing the book. Before long it was finished, titled *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes*. However, writing the book had put such a strain on his body that he soon found himself in the hospital. He was given a blood transfusion and he told us that it is the closest thing to an actual miracle that modern medicine has to offer. Before the transfusion he felt tired and lethargic; afterwards his vitality had reappeared.

Hartshorne’s vitality and strength is truly remarkable. He is eighty-five years old. Yet his mind is as clear as any could be. I noticed that when we climbed the stairs to the lounge to eat breakfast, he did not hang on to the rail for support. This kind of strength for a man his age

\(^{22}\) I edited and published my correspondence with Hartshorne concerning the dissertation, as well as all of my later correspondence with him, as *Charles Hartshorne’s Letters to a Young Philosopher: 1979-1995*. Special issue of *Logos-Sophia*, The Journal of the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society 11 (Fall 2001).
probably comes from the fact that in all of his years he has never owned an automobile. His personal mode of transportation has always been a bicycle or walking.

Since I am currently trying to publish my dissertation (written on Hartshorne’s Global Argument for God’s Existence) I asked him which of his six theistic proofs he viewed as most compelling. The two most compelling arguments, to his own mind, he said, are the argument from order and the idea of objective immortality. In the first, the simplest and most satisfactory explanation of the order in the universe is that there is a divine ordering power. Hartshorne agreed that the argument is based on analogy with human ordering. This brought to my mind the passage in Thomas Aquinas’s writings where he uses the example of a group of soldiers being called into order by a commander. The second argument, from Objective Immortality, is that only God’s memory satisfactorily accounts for the preservation of past value. I think what Hartshorne had in mind is what he refers to as the Moral Argument for God’s existence.

Hartshorne sees his most original contribution to the global argument as the aesthetic argument—God’s nonexistence would be an irremediably ugly fact. But regrettable (evil) facts cannot be eternal. To regret that X is not the case is to imply that X could be the case. But if God does not exist, he could not exist. On the other hand, if God does exist, his existence is eternal. Therefore, God must exist. It would make no sense to regret an eternal truth. I imagined after our conversation what the atheistic response would be: since nothing necessary can be regrettable, God’s existence, if he does not exist, cannot be regrettable. Hartshorne would probably reply that necessities are not only not regrettable, they must be positively desirable. This, God’s nonexistence cannot be. I believe there is more than a little appeal to the viscera in Hartshorne’s argument. Perhaps this is one of the chief advantages of theism over atheism.

* * *

On the evening of April 1st, Hartshorne and Donald Sherburne stayed long after the banquet exchanging clever witticisms and anecdotes of famous persons. Hartshorne did most of the talking.

CH: Modesty is the one virtue you can’t boast about.

* * *

CH: Either during or after the editing of the Peirce papers, I had a dream in which I was talking to Charles Peirce. Said Peirce, “What do you know about me? Why are you editing my work?”
Hartshorne admitted that there might have been others, more acquainted with math and logic, better qualified to do the job.\textsuperscript{23}

The idea of numbering the paragraphs of the Peirce papers was suggested by Paul Weiss [Hartshorne’s co-editor] after he had seen the same thing done in Wittgenstein’s \textit{Tractatus}.\textsuperscript{24}

Hartshorne told a story about Weiss. Someone once asked Weiss if he ever philosophized in his dreams. “No,” he replied, “but sometimes when I philosophize I worry that I’m dreaming.”

* * *

Hartshorne also told a story which beautifully illustrates A. O. Lovejoy’s careful mind. Once when Lovejoy was being considered for an academic position, an interviewer asked him quite directly, “Do you believe in God?” Lovejoy asked to have a couple of minutes to think about the question. When he returned he had in his hand a list of about twelve or fifteen meaning of “God” and asked the questioner, “Which of these meaning of ‘God’ did you have in mind?”\textsuperscript{25}

* * *

On April 2\textsuperscript{nd}, Dad and I were discussing when to leave for the airport—whether on an earlier or later shuttle bus. As chance would have it, Hartshorne was waiting in the hotel lobby for the earlier shuttle. Dad and I decided to accompany Professor Hartshorne and eat lunch at the airport rather than the hotel.

Dad and Hartshorne exchanged stories, anecdotes, and quotations from Eliseo Vivas, William James, Sigmund Freud, and Gustav Fechner en route to the airport. The focus on psychologists made sense because my father is a psychologist and Hartshorne’s first book was on the psychology of sensation. In all of this, my father proved time and again to be a model of gracious magnanimity. Dad favors a rather modest determinism whereas Hartshorne is well-known for his (sometimes vitriolic) attacks on determinism. However, I could only be impressed by the fact that Hartshorne’s own ideas are often more deterministic than my father’s. For

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\textsuperscript{23} Here is Hartshorne’s published anecdote about the dream: People have sometimes asked me if I had met Peirce. I have said, “Yes, once. I was introduced to him as the man who was editing his writings. He looked at me with disapproval and said coldly, ‘What makes you think you are competent to edit my writings when you don’t know science and mathematics?’” This, of course, was a dream (Peirce died when I was seventeen years old)—one from which awoke a chastened man. “Charles Hartshorne’s Recollections of Editing the Peirce Papers” [an Interview with Irwin C. Lieb]. \textit{Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society} 6, 3-4 (1970): 149-159 (anecdote on page 159).

\textsuperscript{24} Hartshorne’s memory of whose idea it was to number the paragraphs was unclear. However, Weiss confirmed it was his (Weiss’s) idea and Hartshorne said that, for him, that settled the matter. Hartshorne, \textit{The Darkness and the Light: A Philosopher Reflects Upon His Fortunate Career and Those Who Made it Possible} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990): 175.

\textsuperscript{25} For Hartshorne’s published version of this anecdote, which is much clearer than my remembered version, see Hartshorne, \textit{The Darkness and the Light}: 320.
example, only yesterday Hartshorne claimed that music would always be greater and more influential than the visual arts—specifically, composers would always be more popular than painters. Hartshorne explained by saying that at a biological level, a painting in a gallery has far less effect on the human organism than the sound of a symphony. Presumably he meant to say that the sound of the symphony is louder to the ear than the light from a painting is bright to the eyes. Dad later told me that this bothered him. Shouldn’t it be possible for anyone to be as great as anyone else? I told Dad he seemed to be denying his determinism and Hartshorne his indeterminism. In any case, Hartshorne’s theory seems to me rather too simple. Greatness is much more complex than that. How to decide who is seen as greater or more influential, Beethoven or Da Vinci? Probably there are more reproductions of the Last Supper in the homes of Americans than there are albums of the Fifth Symphony.\textsuperscript{26}

Hartshorne’s plane was leaving from the same concourse as my father’s, making it convenient to see the old philosopher to his terminal. Hartshorne commented that he had had a most proper escort. “No,” I said, “it is we who have had the proper escort.” Hartshorne was flattered and looked at my father and said, “I think he’ll do alright in the world.” Hartshorne had earlier expressed concern about whether I had found a job. (See August 1984.)

We said our good-byes and Hartshorne gave us his quaint farewell nod and smile. I escorted Dad to his terminal, saw his plane off, and went to my own terminal gate.

I could not help reflecting that I had just left the two most important influences on my own thinking. These two men, more than any others, had shaped my thought into what it is today. I will never escape their influence. Nor would I want to. Both have a healthy attitude towards life. Indeed, I suspect that this is one of the chief reasons for Hartshorne’s longevity. My father has shaped me emotionally. My beliefs are colored by his values. This is why I will never have a problem with using masculine pronouns for God.\textsuperscript{27} This is not to say I have problems using feminine pronouns for God—quite the contrary. As to Hartshorne, I accept the better part of his metaphysics. Sometimes one plays a sort of mental game in which one wonders who, in all of history, one would most like to spend a meal with. For me, the answer is easy. And it is more than a day dream. I have had the privilege of Charles Hartshorne’s company.

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\textsuperscript{26} Today (2014) I would emphasize the role of repeated exposure to a work of art or of music as a factor in its perceived greatness or influence.

\textsuperscript{27} My view on this changed. Sometime after my book on Hartshorne’s theistic arguments was published, I began using inclusive language. Hartshorne, as usual, was ahead of me. He quite self-consciously used inclusive language in \textit{Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes} and explicitly addressed the question of sexist language. Would that I had paid more attention to his example and his arguments. I was finally swayed on my views on sexist language when in March of 1985 I read Rosemary Ruether’s \textit{Sexism and God-Talk} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) and met her when she visited Pittsburg, Kansas.
Although this was the only time that Hartshorne met my father, it is not a meeting that the philosopher forgot. In December 1985, he wrote to me asking if he thought my father would be interested in writing an essay on Hartshorne’s first book, *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* (1934) for the Library of Living Philosophers volume that was in preparation. Dad wrote the article and Hartshorne was pleased with it.\(^{28}\)

**May – October 1983:** In May, I received unofficial word from SUNY that they would publish my dissertation. In August Hartshorne’s Foreword arrived in the mail. About that time, SUNY gave me official word that they would publish the book, but only on the condition that Hartshorne’s foreword *not* be included. At this time no one at SUNY had seen the foreword. I sent the foreword to SUNY and appealed to them to reconsider. In October they reversed their decision.

**Talks with Charles Hartshorne in Lincoln, Nebraska, April 13-14, 1984, at a Research Conference in the Philosophy of Religion.**\(^{29}\)

**April 13, 1984:** It is a year since I have seen Charles Hartshorne. Our last meeting was in Atlanta, Georgia in April 1983. Happily, the eighty-seven year old philosopher is as spry and intellectually aware as ever. His greeting was cordial and familiar. He said he wondered if he


would see me at the conference. He also asked how my father is doing. It was a pleasant surprise to see that he remembered by father.

There are many well-known philosophers at the conference—William Alston, George Mavrodes, Stephen Davis, James Ross, Nelson Pike, Marilyn and Robert Adams, William Rowe, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Audi—but the only other philosopher of Hartshorne’s age and notoriety who is here is William Frankena, the great pioneer of classifying ethical theories. I overhead Frankena talking to someone about his (Frankena’s) lunch with Hartshorne. Frankena marveled at how someone ten years his senior could be so vital. Frankena was born in 1908 and would die in 1994.

Much of the conference is centered on questions surrounding evidentialism, foundationalism, and proper basicity. All of this, of course, stems from the work of Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and George Mavrodes (all of whom are present) who claim that belief in God can be properly basic; that is, one can be rational, within one’s epistemic rights, or what have you, in believing in God though one’s belief is not based on other beliefs. This is in response to the co-called evidentialist challenge (Bertrand Russell, Antony Flew, Michael Scriven, et al.) which demands evidence for God’s existence before the belief in God can be considered rational.

I think that Plantinga’s line of thinking is foreign to Hartshorne. Hartshorne told me that he has not made his peace with either foundationalism or evidentialism. Said Hartshorne, “If I disagree with the atheist, then one of us has a false belief. Natural theology can be of some use in deciding which of us has the false belief. I prefer to exhaust the logically possible alternatives to theism and show that theism is the most reasonable. I don’t know that anyone approaches the theistic question in quite the way I do. Of course, my approach only works for the relatively abstract proposition that God exists. To evaluate the specific claims of each religion—such as Jesus rising from the dead—it is more fruitful to see what the various religions have to say.”

A persistent complaint of Hartshorne is that philosophers too readily ignore the study of the history of philosophy or fail to learn the lessons it has to teach. In a conversation with Mavrodes he said that he always did philosophy as if he were in dialogue with the great philosophers of the past such as Leibniz and Aristotle. (Hartshorne’s Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers is a good example of what Hartshorne has in mind.) Mavrodes mentioned the example of Wittgenstein as someone who was great yet who had a minimal understanding of the

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30 Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.) Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). This book contains essays by, among others, Plantinga, Alston, Wolterstorff, and Mavrodes. During the summer 1986 I attended a six week NEH sponsored Chautauqua conference in Bellingham, Washington that was led by Plantinga and Alston.
history of philosophy. Hartshorne made it quite clear that he faulted Wittgenstein on this account. Wittgenstein could have been greater had he known more about philosophy’s past.

Hartshorne’s displeasure with the ignorance and neglect of the past was nowhere more apparent than when he was asked to chair a session in which William Rowe was to give a paper on the empirical argument from evil against theism. Hartshorne saw to it that someone took his place as chair during the discussion period so that he could comment on Rowe’s paper. The comment was, predictably, that Rowe’s argument presupposed that the theistic question could be settled empirically, a contention Hartshorne has long denied. Just as Hartshorne does philosophy by carrying on a dialogue with philosopher of the past, so, I had the impression, he expects nothing less from others. And here was Rowe, a well-respected philosopher of religion, developing his argument in an intellectual vacuum. What made matters all the more irritating to Hartshorne, I am sure, is that the one who Rowe should have been in dialogue with was sitting in the same room listening to him. It is like someone arguing about how many epicycles are needed to account for the motions of the planets while Kepler sit in the room listening. Rowe kindly deferred to Hartshorne by saying that Hartshorne’s *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* was sitting on his office desk and that he intended to read it upon his return.

A couple of interesting comments came up in the conversation between Mavrodes and Hartshorne. Hartshorne said he thought that it is safer to overlook Kant than to overlook Leibniz. This is due in large measure to Leibniz’s insight into the nature of matter. Unlike other philosophers, Leibniz did not commit the fallacy of division by supposing that the parts constitutive of material objects lack sentience because the objects considered as a whole do; for example, there is no feeling in a rock because the rock does not feel. Hartshorne would accuse most modern day materialists of committing this fallacy. Hartshorne has argued at great length for the psychicalist view of matter which says that every genuine individual has feeling. A rock is not a genuine individual but a special kind of collection of individuals (Whitehead called it a society), the members of which feel.

Hartshorne took up the relation between God and the world. He holds that if the creature is in pain and if God is all-inclusive, then God must, in some measure suffer also. However, this does not mean that if the creature is wicked God is, in some degree wicked. The reason is because wickedness is an act of will in a way that the experience of pain is not. Mavrodes asked Hartshorne if, when someone is drunk, God would thereby, in some degree, be inebriated. Of course, Hartshorne denied this, although for reasons that were not clear to me.  

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31 Hartshorne is a panentheist who holds that God includes the universe but is not identical with it. Without a particular location within the universe, God has no need of specialized perceptual organs but “prehends” every actual entity immediately. For this reason, Hartshorne argues that God knows how each individual feels without feeling as they feel. See Hartshorne, *Creativity in American Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984): 199.
April 14, 1984: This morning Greg Bassham (with whom I was attending the conference) and I went to breakfast with Hartshorne. As usual, chatting with Hartshorne was delightful. The conversation was sprinkled with anecdotes and philosophical reflections. He told us about the editing of the Peirce papers and the dream he had of meeting Peirce. A bearded Peirce greeted Hartshorne with the question, “what makes you think you know enough about my work to edit these papers?” (See note 23 above.)

Hartshorne worked with Paul Weiss on the Peirce project. As it was, Hartshorne was the third person the Harvard philosophy department had tried to hire to do the project. One of the persons was an alcoholic and ended up in jail; the other, I believe, Hartshorne said died. Hartshorne took the project and was later joined by Weiss. Neither philosopher expected this work to be their entrance to fame. Both were already doing their own work. Hartshorne had come to most of his views by 1923. Weiss was less clear about his philosophy at the time. The Peirce papers were edited between 1925 and 1928.

It was at this time that Hartshorne became Whitehead’s assistant. Being curious about the relations between their philosophies, I asked Hartshorne if Whitehead had read any of his material on the ontological argument. Hartshorne said he only knew that Whitehead had read his book on sensation, *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* (1934) and the essay “The Compound Individual” (1936). Neither of these works takes up the ontological argument. It later occurred to me that Whitehead died in 1947 and that Hartshorne’s development of the ontological argument in published form only began with *Man’s Vision of God* (1941) and with “The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument” published in the Philosophical Review for 1944. Hartshorne’s most well-known defenses of the argument came only after Whitehead was gone.

I told Hartshorne that I had been toying with the idea that ontological argument is the watershed that divides his and Whitehead’s philosophy. The difference lies in Whitehead’s distinction between real potentiality and general potentiality. Since Whitehead makes this distinction (and it seems crucial for his doctrine of eternal objects) he would have trouble accepting the ontological argument. Hartshorne can accept the argument only because he believes that all modal concepts are traceable to the temporal advance.

Hartshorne wasn’t sure about my argument. He seemed to think that, although real potentiality and general potentiality is a distinction Whitehead needs to make, Whitehead would not have made an absolute break between the two modalities. If, as Whitehead claims, “the truth itself is the way all things are together in the consequent Nature of God” then God’s non-existence could not be part of the general potentiality inherent in the universe.\(^\text{32}\) Reflecting on the

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\(^\text{32}\) Whitehead’s exact words are: “The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature. Such representations
problem later, it occurred to me that if, by truth, Whitehead was referring to what has occurred—
that is, what is Objectively Immortal—then Hartshorne’s counter-argument will not work. This is
something I will have to pursue in more depth.

Hartshorne noted that Plantinga told him that their versions of the ontological argument
are not so far removed. Yet, as I pointed out to Hartshorne, Plantinga’s ontological argument
relies on a very special concept of “possible worlds,” which is very far from what Hartshorne
means by a “possible world-state.” Hartshorne agreed and said that this had been his suspicion.
Possibility, he said, is always relative to an actually existing world. Thus, it is more accurate to
speak of possible world-states and possible worlds. Possibility always has its anchor on the shore
of actuality.33

Hartshorne said that he has four books in progress, one nearly complete. One of the
books is broadly autobiographical and tells about some of the people he has known.34 Because he
is so old and because he has traveled so widely throughout his life, he has met with many
philosophers, two of the most famous being Whitehead and Husserl. He said that he had read
Husserl’s Ideen (and some other work whose name I did not catch), as well as having been
invited to Husserl’s home and talking with the great phenomenologist. Hartshorne said that it
was probably his Harvard training that made him suspicious and rather unsympathetic to
Husserl’s project of divesting himself of presuppositions. The Cartesian project of finding an
original presuppositionless starting point is beyond human ability according to Hartshorne. He
said he did not understand how anyone, after having studied Husserl and Whitehead could
believe that Whitehead was not the greater genius.35

I related to Hartshorne how he had inadvertently offended my friend Peter Hutcheson
when he was at Southwest Texas State University in San Marco [now Texas State University]
and made some similarly nasty remark about Husserl. Peter, who knows Husserl’s work quite
well, was infuriated by something Hartshorne said. Peter wrote me that Hartshorne doesn’t know
much about Husserl. Hartshorne was delighted when I told him this story. “Philosophy,” he said,
“needs a little emotion to keep it lively.”

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33 I eventually defended this claim in print in a reply to Jay Wesley Richards and I took Hartshorne’s side:
Donald Wayne Viney, “How Firm a Possible Foundation? Modality and Hartshorne’s Dipolar Theism,” in
34 The autobiographical book is the previously cited The Darkness and the Light (1990).
35 Hartshorne compares Whitehead and Husserl in chapter 23 of Insights and Oversights. See also
Hartshorne’s “My Eclectic Approach to Phenomenology,” chapter 2 of Creative Experiencing.
Hartshorne believes that one of the advantages of studying the history of philosophy is that one can see the extreme positions taken on various issues and avoid them by taking a middle ground. For example, Hume and Russell and others have held that all relations are external. Spinoza and Blanshard hold the opposite extreme that all relations are internal. Hartshorne holds that some relations are internal and some are external. The boy is internally related to the child he once was but externally related to the man he is to become. Or again, is God wholly immanent or wholly transcendent? Hartshorne’s neoclassical metaphysics attempts to show how and in what sense God is both immanent and transcendent.

I told Hartshorne that one of the topics that is notable by its absence from his latest book, *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* is the issue of faith and reason. Hartshorne agreed and said that this is an area that demands more attention. I suggested that faith and reason might be treated by finding the middle ground between extreme fideism and extreme rationalism. Hartshorne seemed genuinely enthused by the suggestion. “Yes, I’ll have to do that. I’ll give you credit for the idea.” I was flattered, although the idea didn’t seem all that original to me.

The conference was well represented by members of the organization called The Society of Christian Philosophers. I asked Hartshorne if he considers himself a Christian. He did not respond directly with a yes or no. He said that he believes that the great commandments to love God with all of your heart, mind and soul and to love your neighbor as yourself (Mt 22:37-39) express the essential truth in religion. However, he added that he does not believe in the divinity of Jesus or that Jesus ought to be worshipped. Nor does he accept the idea of a personal career after death or any kind of afterlife in which rewards and punishments are apportioned. “If you can call that Christian,” he said, “then maybe I’m a Christian.”

Greg asked Hartshorne what he thought of John Hick’s criticism of the process theodicy. Hick argues that process theology does not have an adequate response to the problem of evil. The good life is lived only by a lucky élite. A great majority of humankind suffers the common ills of hunger, disease, broken relationships, and unhappiness. The Process God seems to be unable or unwilling to right these wrongs. Only an afterlife, with “rewards in heaven,” Hick believes, can compensate for the tragedy of so much human existence.

Hartshorne at once admitted that he has personally been very fortunate and that much of the human race has suffered unjustly. But he denied that an afterlife could solve the problem. If there is freedom in the afterlife then there will be the same chance of suffering and tragedy that we have here on earth. The idea that God could so arrange things to eliminate chance, even in an afterlife, Hartshorne believes to be impossible.

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Hartshorne also argued that the concept of an indefinite extension of our earthly careers beyond death is suspect. Our identity, he said, is defined by both spatial and temporal limits. It belongs to God alone to be eternal and without limits. The Jains, he said, didn’t need God because they believed that they all had the property of God, that is to say, the property of being immortal. A fragment of the cosmos, such as a human being, could undergo only a finite number of changes before becoming a different being. I pointed out that St. Paul speaks of acquiring a new, transformed body at the resurrection. However, Paul seemed to have believed that we remain the same person even after the transformation. Hartshorne acknowledge that his argument does not prohibit a limited afterlife (a point I make in my book); but it does call into question the possibility of an unlimited posthumous career.

After breakfast we attended the first paper of the day, “God, Creator of Kinds and Possibilities: Requisent universalia ante res” by James Ross. Among other things, Ross argued that possibility is always relative to a pre-existing state of affairs, that is to say, actuality is prior to possibility. This is a position with which Hartshorne agrees. During the discussion of the paper, Hartshorne provided the conference with its best entertainment. He prefaced his remarks to Ross with the comment, “Your paper is well argued and, I think, mostly correct. This is the second time I have heard you deliver such a fine paper. It has been some time since I heard the other paper.” When the laughter subsided, Hartshorne asked Ross whether he believed that his position entailed that God does not have knowledge of future free decisions. After Hartshorne explained his question at some length, Ross replied, with as much wit as respect, “With your commendation, I don’t want to risk saying something I may later regret.” When Hartshorne sat down he turned to me and said, “He is a capable fellow.”
August 1984: I begin work as an Assistant Professor at Pittsburg State University in Pittsburg, Kansas. Hartshorne wrote a letter for me.

January 1985: The book version of my dissertation, *Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God*, is published. Hartshorne’s suggestion to write on the global argument was inspired. My book received very positive reviews and it would remain, for many years to come, the only published secondary account of Hartshorne’s reasons for belief in God. (George Shields’ dissertation also addressed the issue, but was not published.)


The Saint Louis conference on Process theology promised to provide stimulating discussion on recent trends in philosophical theology. Appropriately, Charles Hartshorne was the key-note speaker. He is now eighty-eight years old and must classify in anyone’s estimation as one of the most important metaphysicians of our time. Indeed, he is the reason I made a special effort to attend the conference. Apparently, others were similarly motivated. When Hartshorne spoke, the conference room was packed with students and professors. No other paper was so well attended. I was accompanied by Rebecca Main, my fiancée, and three students from my Philosophy and Religion seminar, Joyce Bestor, Regina Kobak, and Debra Smith. As several of our class sessions had been devoted to Hartshorne’s work (through my book), the conference provided my students with a rare opportunity to meet the man behind the work.

Hartshorne did not disappoint his audience. He spoke in language that persons untrained in philosophy or theology could understand. A fellow seated next to me furiously jotted down notes while Hartshorne spoke. Every few minutes he would exclaim under his breath, “Oh, that’s beautiful,” or “excellent,” or “yes, yes, yes!” Hartshorne, it seems, had made another fan.

Hartshorne’s wife, Dorothy, also made a hit at the conference. It was the first time I had met Dorothy. She is as lively, spry, and witty as her husband. Before the talk began she helped Charles write some tables illustrating various metaphysical viewpoints on the blackboard. Shortly before Charles was to speak, one of them noticed that a letter was missing from one of the tables. Dorothy jumped to her feet and corrected the oversight. As she was returning to her seat she said, in a voice audible to all, “It’s a good thing I’m invisible.”

Dorothy played a vital role in her husband’s career, helping with his manuscripts and compiling bibliographies. It is clear they are very close and dear to each other. One has the impression that she watches over him to insure that others do not take advantage of his generous

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spirit and to insure that he gets a fair hearing. After one session Charles stood to comment on the paper. As he spoke, Dorothy yelled from the back of the room, “Louder.” Charles obediently walked to the podium and spoke into the microphone.38

I was surprised and disappointed to hear Dorothy say that she did not like the line drawing of Charles on the cover of my book. She said she thought it made him look like he was one-hundred and twenty years old. I kept my disagreement to myself and wondered what Charles thought of it. Later, I related this story to Lewis Ford. He simply smiled and said, “Yes, but have you seen Beth Neville’s drawing of Hartshorne?” I laughed, for I had seen the drawing.39

Not all of the papers were as clearly written and delivered as Hartshorne’s. In fact, with the exception of a couple of papers, I was disappointed. Part of my disappointment is purely personal. I had the opportunity to submit a paper to this conference and let it slip away. It is my own fault. I did not feel I had a paper, or even an idea worthy of such a conference. I now see that I was mistaken. The standard of excellence I set for myself was excessive. The papers were not spectacular; and if I may say so without sounding mean-spirited, some of the papers were unworthy of the conference. The reason is two-fold. First, the papers often spoke only to those initiated into Whiteheadian jargon. Process philosophy has already spawned its own scholastics. I believe that one of the values of process thought is its capacity to mediate opposing positions and contribute to the discussion of a variety of philosophical issues. It can achieve this end only by outgrowing its own neologisms and avoiding the philosophic narcissism of specialized pedants. Second, the papers tended to caricaturize opposing positions, especially classical theism. One of the participants fully admitted during the discussion period that his paper had made a straw man of Thomas Aquinas. This fellow’s presentation was not uncommon in this regard. Such uncritical scholarship is disappointing and unnecessary. Process Philosophy has resources aplenty to combat its detractors without succumbing to such carelessness, not to say, disrespect.40

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38 Dorothy was as I have described. What I did not know at the time was that she was suffering the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. She was a diligent proof-reader as one can see from reading her husband’s works. It is clear, however, that she was unable to proof-read Wisdom as Moderation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) which is marred by many mistakes.


I do not mean to be offering sour grapes. As a whole, the conference was worthwhile. Lewis Ford’s paper on the origin of subjectivity was impressive. He is one of process philosophy’s brighter lights. Also, it was encouraging to see Hartshorne’s accomplishments.
appreciated. When introducing Hartshorne, Professor Leonard Eslick said simply, “There have been three great metaphysicians in this century. Bergson was one. Whitehead was another. And we are privileged to have the other in our midst—Charles Hartshorne.” In his paper, David Tracy focused on what he considers Hartshorne’s two great contributions to philosophy. First is that Hartshorne has shown that the theistic question is not so much a question of fact as of meaning. God is either necessary and thus essential to the very fabric of existence or God is impossible and thus does not even possess the consolation of being conceivable. Second, Hartshorne is the one who discovered (not rediscovered) the distinction between existence and actuality. It is the distinction for which Hartshorne has said that he hopes he will be remembered. The existence and actuality distinction is the cornerstone of dipolar theism. In my view this distinction is what keeps Hartshorne’s philosophy from collapsing into a kind of Taoist or atheistic view of the interaction of opposites.41

My estimation of Hartshorne’s significance is admittedly one-sided. It is no secret that I admire his achievements. My book on Hartshorne has been criticized for being too supportive of neoclassical metaphysics. There is some justice in the remark. Becky Main told Hartshorne that he was one of my favorite people. Hartshorne replied, “He is one of my favorite persons too. He is one of my discoveries.” Hartshorne always had my respect, but how could I help but like him after such compliments?

My intellectual development cannot be understood apart from Hartshorne’s influence. As I told him, he saved me from atheism. He seemed surprised and pleased by the remark. Then he added, “You are not the first, you know.” At a time in my life when the intellectual respectability of theism was in doubt, Hartshorne’s thought showed me that belief in God, when properly formulated, puts atheisms (and many forms of theism) to shame. It also seems to me that if one is going to construct a metaphysic, as Hartshorne does, one will eventually find that deity is indispensable. Is it an accident that almost all metaphysicians of first-rate importance were theists? This is no argument for theism. But it puts to rest the fairytale that belief in God is a relic of past superstitions.42 A banquet was held on the evening of the first day. The banquet was, in

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42 In the many years since the Saint Louis conference took place, the opinions I expressed in this paragraph have not changed much. I wouldn’t be so strident, but I continue to marvel at the appallingly bad reasoning of much modern day atheism, especially from the movement known as “the new atheism.” It is possible to make a respectable philosophical case for atheism—a task at which the new atheists fail—but only if one has bothered to address in an honest way the best that theism has to offer, and this cannot exclude the work of Charles Hartshorne. My most thorough published response to the new atheists is: “How Not to be an Atheist: A Neoclassical Response to the New Atheism.” Concrescence: the Australasian Association of Process Thought (2008): 7-22. www.concrescence.org.
part, a celebration of the career of Professor Eslick, who was retiring. Eslick gave a paper after we ate. Hartshorne introduced his former student saying, “When I first met Leonard, I knew he was a remarkable young man. As the years have passed, he has grown even more remarkable.” Hartshorne did not say what it was about Eslick that he found remarkable. Certainly Eslick’s scholarship is beyond criticism. However, his paper was a ponderous and protracted examination of the problem of divine causality in process metaphysics employing many Whiteheadian terms. Moreover, he spoke in a monotone and made no eye contact with the audience. The lights in the room were low and midway through the presentation more than half of those in the room were nodding off. The single time Eslick looked up, he caught the Hartshornes napping. Dorothy’s forehead rested her folded arms on the table; Charles’ mouth was agape and his head was beginning to role backwards, apparently full of negative prehensions and simple physical feelings. Undaunted, Eslick continued to expound on the intricacies of the Whiteheadian metaphysics of causality. When Eslick finished, a priest said a closing prayer, thanking God for an intellectually stimulating evening. It is a shame the stimulation passed unnoticed. After the banquet, Hartshorne asked me what I thought of the paper. I confessed to not being able to follow it very closely. “Yes,” replied Hartshorne, “it was a bit much to digest after such a heavy meal.”

I came away from the conference feeling refreshed, emotionally and intellectually. Much of what was said was familiar to me. However, there were new insights. For example, Hartshorne, commenting on Dan Dombrowski’s paper, noted that Leibniz attempted to make sense of a being with all possible value. What Leibniz showed was that relatively abstract values like knowledge, power, and love are compatible. Leibniz did not show that concrete realizations of value are all compatible. Kant criticized Leibniz on this for the right reasons. According to Hartshorne, it is the best thing Kant has to say about classical theism. But Kant only saw this as a failure to prove classical theism, not as its disproof. In this, Kant did not go far enough.

Another new insight for me concerned the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Stanley Harrison raised the question during the panel discussion of why process thinkers believe that creation ex nihilo implies determinism. This is a question with which I have struggled ever since reading David Griffin’s “Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil” in Stephen Davis’ Encountering Evil. Lewis Ford replied to Harrison by noting that Whitehead’s theism was developed within the framework of an event ontology. Granting an ontology of events, God cannot create the event ex nihilo without depriving it of its own creative activity. One who holds to a substance ontology may conceive of the creation of a substance ex nihilo while apparently

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43 Dombrowski and I first met at this conference. We have fairly closely followed each other’s careers since that time, sometimes contributing papers to the same conferences and books.

preserving its freedom. God may create a substance *ex nihilo* which has the quality of being free. But an event, whose every essence is in its activity, cannot be brought into being out of nothing without depriving the event of its own internal activity.\(^\text{45}\)

It was good to see Professor Hartshorne once again and especially nice to meet Dorothy. Despite their ages they are alert, lucid and witty. Charles continues to struggle with the problems his philosophy faces. One of these problems is how the non-absoluteness of time in relativity theory squares with his theory of a divine time. For awhile it seemed that Hartshorne was attracted to Henry Stapp’s revised Whiteheadianism which postulates a single cosmic time-line (see my book, p. 137). Commenting on this at the conference Hartshorne said, “I’m not sure that it really could be true.” He remains perplexed by this vexing problem. Hartshorne’s continuing struggle with his own metaphysics is a model all philosophers would be well-advised to emulate.

**December 22, 1985:** Hartshorne hints in a letter that he would like my father to write the essay on *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* (1934) for the Library of Living Philosophers (LLP) volume on Hartshorne’s thought that was in preparation. I put the proposal to my father who read the book and wrote the essay. (See note 28.)

**April 1987:** For a second time I took students to see Hartshorne. Tony Graybosch at Central State University in Edmond, Oklahoma found out I was at Pittsburg State University and invited me to hear Hartshorne speak.\(^\text{46}\)

\(^\text{45}\) I agree with Ford, but I now hold that the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is too often confused with the idea that the past is finite, a confusion to which Thomas did not succumb but to which Hartshorne occasionally did. Creation *ex nihilo* requires that (a) God had the option of creating a temporally finite or a temporally infinite universe, (b) God’s act of creating the universe has no temporal location, and (c) the universe that is the object of God’s creation is the entire sweep of space-time and all, besides God, that is not in space-time. This entails that the decisions of the creatures, being part of creation, are created by God. Creation *ex nihilo* has precisely the implication that Hartshorne says that it does, for it means that God makes the decisions of the creatures. Thomas understood this and tried to escape the problem that it poses by maintaining that there are two sufficient explanations for a free act, the activity of God and the activity of the person making the supposedly free decision. My view, following Hartshorne, is that this is philosophical double-talk. See Donald W. Viney, “The Varieties of Theism and the Openness of God: Charles Hartshorne and Free-Will Theism,” *The Personalist Forum* 14/2 (Fall 1998): 199-238 (see especially pp. 214-225).

\(^\text{46}\) Hartshorne gave me a copy of the paper he presented, titled, “God as Composer-Director, Enjoyer, and, in a Sense, Player of the Cosmic Drama.” I eventually saw to the publication of the paper in *Process Studies* 30/2 (Fall-Winter 2001): 242-253. Dr. Graybosch gave me a video tape of the proceedings in Edmond so I was able to transcribe the audience discussion of Hartshorne’s paper, published in the same issue of *Process Studies*: 254-260.
February 1988: I attended a conference in Austin, Texas given in honor of Hartshorne and of the soon to be published *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*, in the LLP series. Schubert Ogden, David Griffin, Lewis Ford, Dan Dombrowski, Lewis Hahn (editor of the volume), Nancy Howell, Barry Whitney, George Nordgulen, George Shields, Jorge Nobo, and Robert Kane were present.47

47 Papers at the conference, with Hartshorne’s replies, were published. See Robert Kane and Stephen Phillips (eds.) *Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Theology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). Professor Kane invited me to contribute a paper, which I did. It was the second of four times during Hartshorne’s life when something I wrote was published in the same book or journal to which he had contributed something. The first time was when Shields contacted me to contribute a paper to the Eugene Peters’ festschrift, *Faith and Creativity: Essays in Honor of Eugene Peters*, edited by Nordgulen and Shields (St. Louis: CBP Press, 1987). My paper is titled “Faith as a Creative Act: Kierkegaard and Lequier on the Relation of Faith and Reason.” I believe that the Austin conference was the first time that I met George Shields. He and I have long-standing friendship that has involved some fruitful collaborative efforts.
Griffin told a story about Hartshorne’s absentmindedness. According to Griffin, Dorothy had counseled Charles to be friendlier to his students. One day Charles saw a student walking across campus with a baby stroller. When he asked about the student’s baby she replied, “But Professor Hartshorne, this is Emily, your baby, and I’m your baby sitter.” Hartshorne was clearly displeased with the story. He leaned over and said to me, “That never happened. I’d never forget my own baby.”

1990: Hartshorne’s autobiography, *The Darkness and the Light*, was published. Hartshorne included photographs of me (from April 1987) and of my father (from April 1983) standing with him.

September 29, 1991: The Center for Process Studies in Claremont, California hosted a celebration of the achievements of Hartshorne and of the publication of the LLP volume. John B. Cobb, Jr., David Griffin, Marjorie Suchocki, Mary Elizabeth Moore, and Charles Birch gave papers. Also present were John G. Arapura, Barry Whitney, and Santiago Sia.

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48 In his autobiography, Hartshorne admits to being absentminded, but dismisses as “absurd” and “untrue legends” stories about forgetting his daughter. See *The Darkness and the Light*: 20.
Hartshorne gave a presentation. He used an overhead projector to display a couple of diagrams and charts. At one point he got tangled in the electrical cords and Suchocki had to come to his aid. He stood directly between the projector and the screen and pointed at the screen as he spoke. This was all quite entertaining and somehow appropriate. After all, we had come not only to honor his ideas but to honor the man, and if this day the man eclipsed the ideas it was only fitting.\(^{49}\) I recall a quip that Hartshorne made during this meeting concerning his doctrine of dual transcendence. He said that when he is accused of denying the transcendence of God he replies that he believes in twice as much transcendence of everyone else.

**October 10, 1997:** Robert Kane, at the University of Texas-Austin, organized a celebration and conference honoring the centennial of Hartshorne’s birthday. Kane invited me, William Myers, Randy Auxier, Barry Whitney, and George R. Lucas to present papers.\(^{50}\) Hank Steuver, writing for the *Austin-American Statesman*, referred to us as “the Hartshorne fan club.”\(^{51}\) There is some truth in this description. Our excitement, however, was tempered with the knowledge that this would probably be the last time that we would see the master. And, indeed, for me, at least, it was.

Also present for the conference was William L. Reese, co-editor with Hartshorne of *Philosophers Speak of God* (1953), and Hartshorne’s grandson, Charles Goodman (at the time a graduate student in philosophy at the University of Michigan). I had the opportunity to speak at length with both Reese and Goodman. Reese later wrote to me asking for a written recommendation of *Philosophers Speak of God* which was to be republished by Humanity Books in 2000. He used my remarks in the Addendum to the Preface, though without mentioning my name (pp. x-xi), which, I admit, pains me. However, Reese kindly wrote the foreword to my second book on Jules Lequyer.\(^{52}\) Goodman, an intense and intelligent young man, but not unfriendly, had very little knowledge of his grandfather’s philosophy. He seemed much more interested in developing his own ideas. I asked myself if this is what the young Hartshorne was like.

\(^{49}\) With the exception of Birch’s paper, the papers from this gathering and Hartshorne’s remarks on them were published in *Process Studies* 21/2 (Summer 1992).

\(^{50}\) The papers were published in *The Personalist Forum* 14/2 (Fall 1998).


\(^{52}\) Hartshorne sparked my interest in Lequyer (or Lequier) (1814-1862) because of his many references and allusions to the little-known French philosopher in his writings. A paper I wrote on Lequyer and Kierkegaard for one of Tom Boyd’s classes was one of my earliest publications, in the festschrift for Eugene Peters, mentioned above. I’ve written more on Lequyer than any other English language philosopher. My most complete statement is “Jules Lequyer (Lequier) (1814-1862)” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. http://www.iep.utm.edu/lequyer/ (September 18, 2013).
After Lucas gave the key-note presentation, Charles Richey, Hartshorne’s caretaker entered the room pushing Hartshorne in a wheelchair. Hartshorne was wearing a broad-rimmed leather hat and Velcro tennis shoes. When Richey wheeled Hartshorne down the center aisle, the audience stood and applauded. Hartshorne said a few words into a hand-held microphone. He addressed the questions that had been on all of our minds. “Old age is almost a disease,” he said. “I have no nameable disease. I can’t think as fast as I used to. I can’t do anything as fast.” After this we had refreshments and I spoke briefly with him. I do not believe he recognized me.

Monday, October 9, 2000: Charles Richey reported that Hartshorne died in his sleep at his home in Austin. In light of Hartshorne’s admiration for certain elements of Judaism, it was fitting that October 9\textsuperscript{th} was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year on the Jewish calendar, a time of solemn repentance and fasting. I remember this because on that day I was singing as part of a small choir in the synagogue in Joplin, Missouri, as had been my practice for several years. \textit{The New York Times} incorrectly reported Hartshorne’s death as occurring on October 10\textsuperscript{th}. \textit{The Times} obituary used, without attribution, a photo I took of Hartshorne at Claremont in 1991. (The photo, with proper attribution, is on the cover of \textit{Creative Experiencing: A Philosophy of Freedom}, Hartshorne’s last book, edited by me and Jincheol O, published by SUNY in 2011.)
Publications by Donald Wayne Viney Concerning Hartshorne


