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SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON POTUS FOREIGN POLICY

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of History

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SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON POTUS FOREIGN POLICY

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SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON POTUS FOREIGN POLICY

An Abstract of the Thesis by
Daniel Clayton Hodges

History most often holds presidents as exclusively responsible for the success or failure of their foreign policies. The purpose of this study is to identify the environment that presidents operate within to develop and pursue their international relationship goals. It is this environment itself that forms a system that exerts a great influence and is largely responsible for and expresses the foreign policies that presidents choose. Five elements define this system: the geopolitical situation, the actions of the prior administration, Congress, the election cycle, and the American domestic situation (GPACED). This work demarcates the elements of GPACED, and their potential impacts on policies, followed by five historical case studies spanning six presidential administrations. The National Security Act of 1947, and its subsequent amendments, created the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This law altered the nature of foreign policy development by establishing a body for presidents to consult for policy development and decision making. President Eisenhower's administration embraced this law and established precedents that are still relevant and influence today's administrations. History holds presidents alone accountable for foreign policy outcomes, but these case studies demonstrate that GPACED does indeed wield a significant influence on foreign policy. This pressure often compels presidents to undertake strategies not of their choosing, or prevents them from executing their desired courses of action. Historical analysis further demonstrates that GPACED follows a predictable pattern within the term limits of each presidency.

Those policies judged as successes normally occur early in a president's term in office.

GPACED most often prevents presidents from implementing chosen policies near the end of their administrations. The case studies also demonstrate that the geopolitical environment, and Congress are the two most influential elements of the system on foreign policy. This study concludes that GPACED has greater influence over the direction of United States foreign policy than the stated goals of the president, who ultimately receives credit or blame for America's international relations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Seen from the perspective of a participant in a combat tour in Al Anbar province, Iraq, it appeared in the summer of 2004 that President George Walker Bush had needlessly endangered the lives of military service members deployed to Iraq for political gain. His transfer of sovereignty officially recognized the authority of the independent interim government of Iraq, which now held full responsibility for the country's governance and, most importantly, its security. A United Nations Security Council resolution authorized this policy as well. However, the war had rendered the Iraqis incapable of carrying out their responsibilities, predictably leading to an increase in coalition casualties. It was a hollow, costly move that ceded hard-won progress. By all appearances, the transfer of sovereignty was for domestic consumption; an effort to show President George W. Bush's progress in Iraq to American voters on the eve of his reelection campaign.

At the time, it was clear that there were insufficient numbers of American and coalition troops in Iraq to accomplish the mission. The marines and soldiers in Al Anbar province compensated for the lack of manpower by sustaining an exhaustive offensive posture. By aggressively patrolling and raiding the enemy, they degraded their enemy's

ability to mine roads and ambush forces in the open. After the transfer of sovereignty, coalition forces surrendered the initiative and adopted a more passive stance that allowed the enemy to resume the sabotage of roads critical to the support of coalition operations throughout the country. Thus, instead of hunting down and killing the enemy, those forces merely protected roads and support bases as best they could. Every military member in a vehicle became a mine detector and moving target for anti-Iraqi forces.

American presidents do select military foreign policy actions for domestic political purposes. Ample documentation exists of domestic political considerations guiding presidents in their application of military force, often at the cost of increased risk and danger to U.S. combat troops. The most widely accepted perception of presidential authority places the onus of responsibility for the success or failure of foreign policies on the president with little regard for the situation faced. Those who deal with clearly untenable circumstances are labeled failures if their policies do not succeed, even though a president's leadership is but one factor in a system that dates from the Eisenhower administration. That system's influence has grown and continues to grow through the present administration. It, rather than a succession of presidents, is the key determinant of American foreign policy.

Admittedly, presidents take the credit and the blame for their country's military actions and, more generally, foreign policies. Indeed, some of the latter bear the names of the initiating administrations. The Truman Doctrine clearly credits America's thirty-third president with a policy of supporting countries threatened by the Soviet Union or communism; one that long outlived his time in office. Even when not named after a president, some other foreign policies have been automatically attributed to specific

administrations. Vietnamization, for example, belongs to Nixon. Michael H. Hunt, in *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance* (2007), argues that Congress has taken a back seat to presidential authority ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt's final term in office. In such "imperial" presidencies, our presidents assume a degree of authority akin to that of prime ministers and kings. There have certainly been brief imperial periods, but the scope and complexity of U.S. foreign policy has increased exponentially since 1945. Government bureaucracy has grown to accommodate the expanded responsibilities of America's increased role in global politics, the sheer volume of tasks being far beyond any one individual's span of control.

Associating a foreign policy with a president not only implies ownership but connotes control. However, the degree of presidential control over the direction and implementation of foreign policy is often deceptively small -- small enough that responsibility and accountability are two distinct matters. This being the case, is it always reasonable to credit a president for a success or blame him for a failure? The answers to such questions hinge upon our definition of responsibility. If one is both responsible and accountable for an activity, that individual must possess sufficient means to determine its outcome. But how much actual control do presidents have over foreign policy? In *Presidential Command, Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy From Richard Nixon to George W. Bush* (2009), Peter W. Rodman tells us that presidents who are most successful in foreign policy are those who stay personally engaged in its execution and are, therefore, able to influence those who control the necessary resources and means. Rodman's assessment hardly evokes images of presidential command. In

fact, influence over those who control the means to act is not, in and of itself, control. Foreign policy is beyond the span of control of an individual president even though it remains within the president's sphere of influence.

History and recent historiography both underline the limits of presidential control over foreign policy. Ryan C. Hendrickson argues that sustained employment of military forces is the sole purview of Congress. In *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers* (2002), he contends that the president must consult with Congress before employing military force. When force is employed, we see Congress placing restrictions on how presidents may use those forces. William Bundy's *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (1998), shows Richard M. Nixon struggling to accomplish his goals after Congress denied him the ability to conduct operations in Cambodia. Philippe R. Girard shows us the opposite scenario. In *Girard's Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti* (2004), we see the Congressional Black Caucus pressuring a reluctant Bill Clinton into deploying combat forces to Haiti. So, too, can geopolitical realities force a president to drop his human rights principles and support a brutal dictatorship. This we see in John Dumbrell's *The Carter Presidency: A re-evaluation* (1995), when Carter aids the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to prevent them from turning to the communist powers for support.

These earlier scenarios have bearing on perceptions of George W. Bush's foreign policies in Iraq. The elephant that sat in on every planning session and every current operations section of his deployed military forces was the dearth of equipment and manpower needed to do the job. Nobody commented on it; it was just a given. Marines and soldiers carried on as every individual attempted to do the work of ten people so that

the mission would be accomplished. Terry H. Anderson's *Bush's Wars* (2011) provides some explanation for the military equipment and manpower shortages in 2004. While skewering Bush and Rumsfeld, he nevertheless points out that both inherited the military that they took to war -- another restriction placed on a president's foreign policy. Indeed, where foreign policy and, especially, the employment of military force is concerned, the title "Commander in Chief" is itself an overstatement. "Influencer in Chief" more accurately described the president's role. James Schlesinger, who filled key positions in three presidential administrations, shares his thoughts on presidential ability to enact foreign policy in *America at Century's End* (1989). Schlesinger contends that the executive branch can only lead through persuasion. The highest art for an American statesman, he argues, is the ability to forge consensus.

A pattern of foreign policy can be visualized. Presidents have the most influence early in their terms. Clark A. Murdock's *Improving the Practice of National Security Strategy: A New Approach for The Post-Cold War World* (2004), shows that the election cycle is likely to see administrations' foreign policies driven by domestic pressures. Murdock points out that presidential candidates often create unachievable expectations with their campaign rhetoric and that administrations may also set out to attain the unattainable once in power. In her analysis of several political science statistical studies, Brandice Canes-Wrone's *Who Leads Whom* (2006) finds that presidents sometimes cater to mass opinion and support policies with which they disagree or policies that are not in the best interest of the American public. Canes-Wrone notes that presidents engage the public on foreign policy issues only at certain points in election cycles; especially when they trail in the polls.

Sam Sarkesian's *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (1989) speaks of a national security system. Sarkesian describes the impact of American democracy and our political system on foreign policy development while faulting leaders whose understanding of national security interests and policy development is poor. Leaders who understand the complexities of the environment in which a foreign policy is developed are at an advantage as they can make wise decisions based on that understanding. Sarkesian argues this point effectively, yet the complex environment of which he writes is part of the same overall system that presidents cannot control.

Within this expanded context we can see the president less as the sole source of responsibility for foreign policy and more as a part of a system, albeit an important part. This system is an entity unto itself; one that ultimately determines which foreign policies are followed and how those policies are executed. Sarkesian lists the system's ingredients, but his focus is so narrow that a disagreement about those ingredients is apparent. He does not discuss some aspects of foreign policy development that others deem important to the process. Furthermore, his view of the president as only a part of a larger system of foreign policy development and implementation only gets touched on rather than analyzed and, most important, his writings still place the emphasis and burden of foreign policy squarely on the shoulders of the president. Presidents are usually judged as successes or failures based on how their personal actions and decisions affect the outcome of their administration's foreign policies. This emphasis on the personal dimension gives a distorted image of the presidency's true role. The sum of the parts is equal to the whole, but the president is only one of the parts.

The exact nature and dimensions of the system that includes the president but limits executive actions have not yet been established. As noted earlier, this system has grown since the Eisenhower administration and presently plays the dominant role in determining foreign policy. Five major components define this system: the geopolitical situation, the actions of the prior administration, Congress, the election cycle, and the American domestic situation. We may refer to the system as GPACED (Geopolitical Prior Administration Congress Election Domestic) to give it an identity. Each component of GPACED is multifaceted and has the potential to exert a significant influence on foreign policy. For instance, the domestic situation has confounded previous American diplomats who struggled to promote democratic principles abroad while simultaneously justifying the country's legalized racial discrimination to foreign emissaries.

This thesis will articulate the aspects of GPACED in concrete terms, elucidated by historical examples from the Eisenhower administration to the Carter administration that demonstrate how American commanders in chief are constrained and compelled. Identification of the GPACED will provide a foundation for the body of the work: in-depth discussions of its major components. The objective is to demonstrate how GPACED itself dictates the direction and outcomes of national foreign policy.

GPACED affects all aspects of presidential authority. Domestic initiatives, environmental policies, legal and justice reform, immigration, social initiatives, and economic policies are subject to the same pressures and constraints that GPACED imposes on foreign policy. But the scope of this study focuses on a president's ability to design, shape, and execute a foreign policy while fulfilling the duties of commander-in-

chief within the system of GPACED. In order to provide the reader with more recent and, therefore, familiar frames of reference, the explanation of GPACED in chapter two uses mostly post-Carter presidency examples. The case studies then focus GPACED's effects on each administration from Eisenhower through Carter.

Although they often weight presidential influence too heavily, extant secondary sources have nevertheless proved the existence of GPACED by noting other influences on foreign policy success and failure. Previously underemphasized primary sources demonstrate that presidents altered their foreign policies to accommodate GPACED. For instance, audio recordings capture Nixon telling Kissinger not to withdraw American troops from Vietnam lest the South Vietnamese government collapse prior to the 1972 U.S. presidential elections. Previously unexplored primary sources also establish a new explanation for Eisenhower's loss of trust in CIA Director Allen Dulles. And although most of the primary sources cited on the following pages are not unique to this work, other authors including those previously mentioned have overwhelmingly credited presidents with the successes and failures that occurred during their respective watches.

This thesis challenges that dominant historiographical paradigm; one that has become a common public perception. That perception not only holds the commander in chief responsible, which it should, but accountable and liable; a much more debatable stance when so many factors remain beyond his control. Presidents -- not legislatures -- get hanged or burnt in effigy, and popular perception often influences historiography whether professional historians care to admit it or not. Would that *all* causes of a foreign policy disaster attract the wrath of protesters and the criticism of historians more fairly.

Even if not a panacea, an understanding of GPACED is bound to put our presidents in a more accurate historical perspective.

CHAPTER II

GPACED (GEOPOLITICAL, PRIOR ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS, ELECTION, DOMESTIC)

Arguments against systemic constraints on presidential foreign policies can be found in analyses of presidential use of military forces. Ryan C. Hendrickson contends that Congress has neglected its authority to approve the use of the nation's military for combat operations and that Congress -- not the president -- has the power to decide as a body when to use military force. He further argues that a clear pattern of congressional deference to presidential authority is due to political partisanship among members of Congress.¹ In *Presidents of War* (2018), Michael Beschloss also argues that presidents have disrupted the Founders' plan, seizing the authority to launch conflicts on their own without consulting Congress.² Hendrickson and Beschloss make compelling arguments, but neither considers the impact of term limits on a president's ability to exercise control over foreign policy. Ratified in 1951, the Twenty-second Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits presidents from being elected to that office more than

¹ Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*. 1st ed. Nashville: (Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), xiii.

² Michael Beschloss, *Presidents of War* (New York: Crown, 2018), viii.

twice.³ Thus, election cycles since Eisenhower first took office in 1953 have often exerted more significant constraints on national foreign policy than before. Were presidential powers truly imperial, as Hunt proposes, presidents would do as they pleased with unlimited resources to achieve their goals. Some might construe notable foreign policy actions, such as Kennedy's "quarantine" of Cuba, Nixon's incursions into Laos and Cambodia, Reagan's dealings with the Iranians and Contras, or Bush's invasion of Panama as unilateral executive decisions made by a commander-in-chief with king-like powers. However, these decisions were constrained acts, each president having to contend with the will of an electorate whose position had been strengthened by term limits and expressed through the decisions of their elected representatives. A "Lame Duck" administration does not wield king-like authorities. Instead, term limits help define the parameters of GPACED by marking the start and end of a president's participation in the system. In the end, U.S. presidents are locked into a system that determines foreign policy possibilities and outcomes.

The first part of GPACED is geopolitics, an analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in international relations.⁴ Contemporary use of the term is generally in reference to international relations. With respect to GPACED, geopolitical encompasses the world situation at large, including all events that affect United States foreign policy. These include but are not limited to intentional actions, economic conditions, natural disasters and industrial accidents. Although identified as part of the

³ Wikipedia. "Twenty-second Amendment to the United States Constitution." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-second_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

⁴ "Geopolitics." Encyclopedia Britannica. Last modified August 9, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/geopolitics>

GPACED system, the geopolitical situation can be considered an environmental factor. Much like the weather, geopolitical conditions can be projected with varying degrees of accuracy. But although measures can be taken to mitigate anticipated circumstances, some events can remain beyond a president's control as if he were caught outside in an un-forecasted downpour without an umbrella. International settings for United States national security can present five dangers: (a) they are contradictory and complex, (b) they may be ill-defined and irrational, (c) they may develop quickly with little time for understanding and analysis, (d) policies may require secrecy and covert operations, and (e) international actors may have more freedom of action than Americans to move quickly and conduct covert actions. Not needing the support of either government or governed often works to their advantage.⁵

Any international happening that bears significantly on United States foreign relations is part of this system. The geopolitical situation presents extra challenges for American presidents, as America is in perpetual competition with the world. Most nations reasonably pursue policies that are in their own best interests. Not only do those policies often conflict or compete with United States foreign policy goals, but it is common practice for some nation-states to obscure their objectives – think national secrets – and methods to shield their efforts from other nations' reprisals or counterefforts. Even with capable intelligence assets, many an American president has been thoroughly surprised with a sudden change in the geopolitical environment. India's successful second detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1998, which prompted neighboring

⁵ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 17-18.

Pakistan to detonate its own nuclear weapon a few weeks later, was a shock to the Clinton administration.⁶ The South Asian political landscape was drastically altered as two bitter rivals habitually at war over border disputes suddenly developed a capacity for mass destruction.

The geopolitical situation does not respect term limits. On occasion, other governments take advantage of American election cycles. For example, the Trump administration is struggling to achieve a trade deal with China. As Trump's term in office nears its end, international political analyst Reva Goujon judges that China is waiting for a change of administrations before making any lasting trade agreements with the United States.⁷ World events can also generate domestic support for American action or intervention. Presidents can be compelled to react or face political consequences if they do not take action to mitigate the impact of sudden foreign political upheaval or environmental disaster. George Friedman aptly describes the geopolitical environment, arguing that a president's foreign policy is a function of the situation in which he finds himself and that those situations, rather than presidential will, dictate foreign policy decisions.⁸ Presidential reactions to unforeseen world events and the rest of the system of GPACED can also have lasting implications beyond the present administration, just as prior administration actions affect the current administration.

⁶

Richard A. Best, Jr., "U.S. Intelligence and India's Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned," *Every CRSReport.com* 98, no. 672 (August 1998): 2.

⁷ Reva Goujon, "US Adversaries and Allies: Start the Countdown to 2020" *Stratfor Worldview*, June 22, 2019. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-adversaries-and-allies-start-countdown-2020-presidential-election-iran-china-russia-north-korea-eu-japan-mexico-israel-poland> Accessed 4 September 2019

⁸ George Friedman, "The Trump Doctrine" *GPF Geopolitical Futures*, (Texas) July 11, 2018. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-trump-doctrine>

One of President Clinton's first term challenges was the fallout from the "Blackhawk Down" incident in Somalia. Clinton pulled the United States out of Somalia when eighteen American servicemen were killed in a fight with Somali warlord militiamen.⁹ But Clinton had not chosen to deploy America's military to Somalia in the first place -- that decision was made during the final year of George H.W. Bush's administration. The geopolitical environment -- part of the system -- set conditions that pressured Bush to ameliorate the human tragedy brought on by drought, famine, civil war and lawlessness in Somalia -- even if he had to deploy troops.¹⁰ Those troops were still in place when Clinton took over as commander-in-chief, so the system also compelled him to deal with a foreign policy issue not of his choosing.

But even without troops deployed in overseas combat situations, prior administrations leave a host of foreign policy constraints and limitations for incoming presidents. Previous resource and planning allocations matter as well. Any foreign policy goals or visions are tempered by the previous administration's accomplishments. Defense budgets, foreign aid allocations, weapons procurement, military personnel strength, prior diplomatic engagement with nation states, foreign territory usage, and basing rights are but a few of the factors that weigh heavily on subsequent administrations. The Department of Defense arranges for security cooperation programs that partner United States military forces in training and exchanges with foreign militaries. The Department of State conducts security assistance programs that help

⁹ Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 260.

¹⁰ Robert F. Bauman, and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, *My Clan Against the World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994*, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 23.


provide foreign governments military infrastructure, and financial/economic incentives. Both programs can take months and years of planning before an agreement to carry out the exchanges and activities ever goes into effect. Providing the resources for these activities is a complicated, ponderous process that is difficult to reverse once put in motion. Decisions made by presidents and supported by Congress set limits and constraints that can last for multiple presidential terms. Consider the current process for developing the national security strategy. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandates a methodical approach for the development of national security strategy, and requires the executive branch to produce a written plan that identifies America's national interests.¹¹

The president's published national security strategy relies heavily on America's military element of power to set in motion a series of actions that dictate America's worldwide military posture. The size of the military, the type of forces it generates, where those forces are based, its missions, and the skill sets of its members all hinge on the resources allocated by Congress to accomplish the approved security strategy. Once the resources are provided, the Department of Defense adjusts its forces to comply with the national security strategy. In some instances, minor adjustments suffice, but in most cases, significant effort is involved, entailing lengthy, time-consuming actions to build, prepare, and posture the force.

Figure 1 (below) illustrates the bureaucratic complexity of developing and resourcing the military to meet the requirements of the national security strategy.

¹¹ Steven Heffington, Adam Oler, and David Tretle Eds. *A National Security Strategy Primer*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2019), 4.

Consider the time span between the various documents that guide development and use of forces.



The national military strategy published in 2016 leads, in part, to a guide for the potential type of, and use of those forces needed in 2020. The Purple Pipeline illustrates the relationship between national strategic guidance to planning and employing forces.¹² This four-year planning time span depicted in Figure 1 clearly illustrates how the current administration's actions build the military used by future presidents. However, despite

¹² Brian Allen, *Lesson Plan for C204, Joint Planning Systems* (Ft. Leavenworth: CGSC, 2019), 1-4.

this planning process, the president's national security strategies are not necessarily provided enough resources to accomplish their objectives. Congress often demonstrates that Bulwer-Lytton was right about the pen being mightier than the sword, by either providing far less funding than the president's national security strategy requires or none altogether. Under such conditions, applying that strategy might be difficult, if not impossible. This procedure continues to evolve with each new administration. While this exact process did not exist during Eisenhower's administration, similar mechanisms exerted the same constraints on his and all subsequent administrations.

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2020 has yet to become law. This act is the primary legislation that will provide resources to carry out the national security strategy. In its current form, the bill contains provisions that would force President Trump to remove troops from Yemen and end support for the Saudi-backed forces there. It would also prohibit the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey.¹³ Both these provisions would prevent the Trump administration from executing aspects of its current foreign policy. Another challenge to Trump's defense appropriations legislation is an amendment, passed by the House of Representatives, calling for a formal investigation into allegations that secret military biological weapons experiments unleashed weaponized ticks that spread Lyme Disease to the American public.¹⁴ At the

¹³ Congress, House, *Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020*, 116th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 2968, *Congressional Record*, 116-103, (May 23, 2019). <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2968?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Department+of+Defense+Appropriations+Act%22%5D%7D&r=2&s=4>

¹⁴ Lia Eustachewich, "House Orders Pentagon to Reveal if it Turned Ticks into Biological Weapons," *New York Post*, (New York) July 17, 2019. <https://nypost.com/2019/07/17/house-orders-pentagon-to-reveal-if-it-turned-ticks-into-biological-weapons/>.

very least, this amendment will delay the passage of the Defense Appropriations Act, adding more uncertainty and friction to the process of funding the military.

Further complicating passage of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2020 is an additional provision that repeals the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force law. These provisions require removal of troops used under the 2001 law after 240 days of deployment. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Bill is an open-ended authorization for presidents to deploy military forces against any entity associated with the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against the United States.¹⁵ This law has been invoked several times to authorize military operations in support of their presidential policies. Repeated attempts at repeal are examples of Congress, as part of the GPACED system, wielding significant power and asserting its authority over the executive branch.

America's military often dominates other elements of national power, but diplomacy is also essential to the success of presidential foreign policy. Diplomatic measures carried out by the Department of State, although less expensive than "big stick" military budgets, are also subject to GPACED. Congress uses its powers to influence or even dominate United States foreign policy. In 1955, Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, withdrew offers to support construction of Egypt's Aswan High Dam when faced with pressure from Congress. Backed by cotton industry lobbyists, southern Democratic congressmen were opposing support for the dam even before Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded American recognition of the People's Republic of China, and it was Congressional opposition that convinced Dulles to recommend

¹⁵ *Authorization for Use of Military Force*, Statutes at Large 115, sec. 224 and 225 (2001).
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/23?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%222001+Authorization+for+Use+of+Military+Force%22%7D&s=4&r=18>.

withdrawal of funding.¹⁶ This incident contributed to Egypt joining the Soviet sphere of influence, thus complicating Eisenhower's Middle East foreign policy.

Some congressmen attempt to take matters of foreign policy into their own hands by talking directly to foreign governments without Executive Branch consent.¹⁷ Former secretary of state, Democratic presidential candidate, and senator John Kerry (D-MA) admitted to conducting unsanctioned diplomatic talks with Iran, advising the Iranians to pursue other options while openly criticizing Trump's foreign policy.¹⁸ As a senator during the Reagan administration, Kerry participated in another unsanctioned diplomatic mission when he and Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), both from the opposition party, traveled to Nicaragua to negotiate a deal with the Sandinistas that conflicted with Reagan's foreign policy.¹⁹ In speaking about this trip, Kerry clearly attempted to dictate American foreign policy, and the Reagan administration's response showed the disruption Kerry had caused. Said Kerry, "Senator Harkin and I are going to Nicaragua as Vietnam-era veterans who are alarmed that the Reagan administration is repeating the mistakes we made in Vietnam. Our foreign policy should represent the democratic values that have made our country great, not subvert those values by funding terrorism to overthrow governments of other countries." Secretary of State George Shultz decried these "self-appointed emissaries to the Communist regime" in Managua, complaining that he could

¹⁶ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 675.

¹⁷ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 129.

¹⁸ Lia Eustachewich, "Kerry Admits to Meeting Iranian Officials over Nuclear Deal," New York Post (New York) date of article.

¹⁹ Wikipedia. "John Kerry United States Senate (1985-2013)." [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Kerry#_United_States_Senate_\(1985-2013\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Kerry#_United_States_Senate_(1985-2013))

not "conduct a successful policy when [such people] take trips or write 'Dear Comandante' letters with the aim of negotiating." Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger added that "[i]f the Nicaraguans want to make an offer, they ought to make it through diplomatic channels. We can't be negotiating with our own congressmen and Nicaragua simultaneously."²⁰

Congress can also pass laws designed precisely to thwart presidential foreign policy actions. Some of these laws are aimed at specific policies, and generally only affect the current administration. The 1984 Boland Amendment expressly prohibited any funding of military or para-military activities in Nicaragua, thereby crippling Reagan's efforts to aid the Contra rebels. Faced with a choice of obeying Congressional will or helping the Contras, Reagan chose the latter, leading his administration into the Iran-Contra scandal.²¹ Congress also has the power to create laws that have long-term foreign policy implications for future presidents. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 remains a source of congressional-executive friction. This legislation was passed by Congress during the Nixon administration to prevent future presidents from deploying military forces without consultation. It places limits on what a president may do with military forces by requiring the president to seek congressional approval for the employment of force.

The 1973 law stipulates three circumstances in which the president can use military force: a declaration of war by Congress, statutory approval from Congress, or a

²⁰ Jay Nordlinger, "Back in Sandinista Days..." *National Review*, (New York) December 15, 2012. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2012/12/back-sandinista-days-jay-nordlinger-2>

²¹ Dilys M. Hill, Raymond A. Moore, and Phil Williams, eds, *The Reagan Presidency an Incomplete Revolution?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 109.

national emergency in which U.S. territories or possessions are attacked. Any use of force or deployment of forces equipped for combat into the territory, waters or airspace of a foreign nation falls under the purview of the War Powers Resolution. Section 3 of the law further specifies that presidents must consult with Congress before and after troops are introduced into combat, and that presidents must report any use of force within 48 hours. There is also a time limit: presidents have 60 days after notifying Congress with a 30-day extension possible to gain Congressional agreement. If congressional consent is not given, the president must recall forces and cease hostilities.²²

Hendrickson, Beschloss, and others assert that Congress neither exercises its full authority nor holds presidents accountable to the War Powers Resolution and that presidents regularly violate the law when deploying military forces in support of their foreign policies. Such opinions elevate presidential authority above the constraints of GPACED but, as we have seen, a president cannot deploy and sustain forces without the resources that Congress provides. Congress has also enacted subsequent legislation that prohibits presidents from carrying out desired foreign policy courses of action.

Convincing arguments support the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution in controlling the deployment of America's military forces. One contends that the War Powers Resolution's mere existence alters presidential behavior, thereby meeting the intent of the resolution. This opinion also accounts for perceived congressional inaction. David P. Auerswald, and Peter F. Cowhey argue that the War Powers Resolution does meet the intent of the law. "Congress rarely uses the Act not because of collective action

²² Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*. 1st ed (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), 16.

problems or electoral fears, but rather because presidents tailor their behavior to abide by the Act's provisions, thus avoiding a series of constitutional battles over the use of force that would benefit neither branch of government.²³ By rule of law, Congress holds sway over the executive branch both legally and fiscally. Not only can Congress withhold funding for a president's favored foreign policy but it can also force the president to execute specific foreign policies that he does not support.

Congress can also influence or prevent presidents from conducting covert operations in support of foreign policy goals. Administrations use covert operations and secret military deployments to achieve objectives and set conditions that conventional military deployments and diplomacy cannot, but such operations often create controversy between Congress and the executive branch. Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been accountable to Congress since its inception, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 added reporting requirements to better keep select committees of Congress in the loop. When committee members object to a covert operation, they hold talks with the administration to stop or alter it. When these disagreements cannot be resolved, Congressmen often add pressure by "leaking" classified information to the media either in or out of context. This illegal dissemination of classified information by legislators is usually enough to enforce the congressional majority's will.²⁴

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David P Auerswald and Peter F. Cowhey, "Ballot box Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (September 1997): 506. <http://library.pittstate.edu/2091/stable/2600794>.

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Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 135.

As a body, Congress typically reflects the political leanings of the general population, and presidents must contend with the political makeup of both houses. While it is an advantage for the president's party to hold majorities in both the House and the Senate, presidents rarely enjoy an uninterrupted two-house majority. George H.W. Bush's party held the House but was in the minority in the Senate, a political split that doomed fifty percent of administration-supported legislation to defeat. By his fourth year, that figure dipped to forty percent. Even when presidents enjoy a two-house majority, they often suffer declining Congressional support towards the end of their terms; Barack Obama's legislative success declined during the 111th Congress even though the Democrats controlled both houses. George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama all garnered less support from Congress towards the end of their terms in office.²⁵ Post-World War II presidents who served two terms all saw declines in Congressional support towards the end of their first terms, even though their reelection bids were successful. This demonstrates the negative impact of the election cycle on presidential initiatives that include foreign policy.

America's elected politicians are beholden to their constituents. Although presidential terms are four years, each president must campaign every two years to support his party's congressional election efforts as well. At best, this election cycle distracts the president from foreign policy efforts. At their worst, elections can alter foreign policy for the sake of garnering public support; presidents who trail in the polls sometimes adopt a popular foreign policy even though they disagree with it. Similarly,

²⁵ United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016*, Table 8-1. Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>

Congress sways toward a president's preference if the voters support it, and away from a president's preference if the voters oppose it.²⁶

How the Commander-in-Chief of America's armed forces, and the chief executive responsible for U.S. foreign policy gains those positions is crucial. Elections are as much a part of GPACED as any other factor, as presidents ultimately answer to the voting citizen. That citizen, in turn, is accountable for the person he or she chooses to lead national foreign policy. Presidents simply may not act in any way they see fit without support from the nation's elected representatives. To do so is to risk punishment by Congress.

Elections allow America to either support a president, by voting for the representatives who support presidential policies in the Congressional elections, or reject a president by choosing Congressional representatives who oppose presidential policies. The election cycle also provides resiliency in recovering from mistakes. A new president can rapidly reverse the problems of the previous administration, but the system can also make it hard to develop and manage strategies since current administrations must work within the resource limits provided by previous ones. Most importantly, those responsible for developing and executing foreign policies do not control all of the assets needed to accomplish the strategies. The American political system of elections influences national security development. Because the system is open to the public, the

²⁶ Brandice Canes-Wrone, *Who Leads Whom* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 25.

people's will gives legitimacy to decisions.²⁷ Policy approval's very public nature can also benefit national adversaries who try to use the American political system to thwart actions that work to their disadvantage. The influence of the public on the system ties a president's success or failure to the American domestic situation.

The domestic component to GPACED -- the situation in America and American society -- is the home equivalent of the geopolitical situation discussed earlier. Purposeful man-made events, economic factors, mass calamity due to natural disaster or industrial-scale accidents, and any events or conditions that sway public opinion are also environmental factors. America's prosperity is key. A poor economy means fewer resources available for foreign policy support, and less opportunity for the average citizen; high unemployment can turn the voter against a president even though his foreign policy is a success. The success of a policy can also have more to do with the attitudes and personalities of the political leadership than any formal political process.²⁸

Scandals involving presidents are a common occurrence in many administrations. During the Korean Police Action, a war that was not well supported by the American public, Truman dealt with charges of being soft on communism and sheltering communist sympathizers within his administration.²⁹ President Trump has been dogged by accusations that he colluded with Russia to sway the result of the general election in his favor. These scandals can seriously detract from a president's ability to conduct foreign policy. Allegations of illicit behavior are also political weapons against sitting

²⁷ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 45.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 115.

²⁹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 649.

administrations because presidential administrations can expend considerable time and resources when refuting accusations and containing damage. Scandals contribute to the general public's perception of the president, a figure who must sustain rapport with the public to be effective. The primary means of presidential communication with the general population is through the media.

The role of the media as the chief means of executive branch communication complicates the relationship between the president and the people. The media can be an asset to a president or a liability. In addition to serving as a source of information to the public, it is very much a component of the political landscape with its own agendas, some of which support or oppose foreign policy and national security strategies. Opinion polls whose results are shaped by a largely uninformed public often compound that public ignorance by oversimplifying the issues. The political affiliation of a president can also be an asset or a liability, as leading media professionals are statistically proven to hold liberal ideologies and most often align their organizations with Democratic party agendas.³⁰ Political affiliation can also align with or pit presidents against interest groups. Interest groups have specific agendas and often couple with the media to promote or refute foreign policy actions. Working for powerful organizations, supported by lobbies, interest groups influence key members of Congress and seek to gain the support of the general public in achieving their agendas.

The domestic situation can be the deciding factor in the success or failure of foreign policy. A hurricane, riot, stock market crash, or revelation of hush-money

³⁰ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 139-145.

payments to a porn star can all have the potential to disrupt or altogether thwart presidential foreign policy actions. Each facet of GPACED alone can derail policies, but the limitations and effects of GPACED can be especially difficult to overcome when combined. Some administrations succumb to the effects and have major foreign policy failures. Other administrations, whose president and key advisors are knowledgeable and experienced, can mitigate the impacts of GPACED. How presidents are equipped to deal with the system plays a role in their foreign policy success or failure.

The president's personal foreign policy qualifications, those of his advisors, how he organizes them, and the decisions he makes are all crucial aspects. The system largely decides the first aspect, and not all presidents are elected for their foreign policy expertise. What the president has personally brought to the office in terms of foreign policy and organizational knowledge varies widely. Americans elected George H. W. Bush, who arguably had one of the best foreign policy resumes. The United States also elected Donald Trump, whose background suggests that he was largely ignorant of foreign policy matters and government organization before he took office -- not the first presidential foreign policy rookie by any means. But regardless of individual qualifications, it is highly unlikely that any president can be cognizant of and fully competent in the entirety of the vast, complex system of foreign policy. Presidents compensate for a lack of personal experience and knowledge of foreign policy by selecting key personnel to provide advice and counsel. Selecting the best people to fill these roles, and knowing when to replace them if they are not achieving the desired results are critical decisions.

The second aspect is the selection of advisors, a process influenced by the system as well. The National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments created the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the CIA. This Act intended that the principal advisors for national security reside in the National Security Council. All the statutory members of the National Security Council are civilians.³¹ The president may select those individuals who provide principal advice through the National Security Council, but the statutory members of the National Security Council are confirmed by the Senate, which exposes the president to the influence, or partisanship of Congress. This is where GPACED can influence the selection of key personnel, for some are chosen for their political affiliations versus their suitability for the job. Although not required by law, the National Security Council includes an Assistant for National Security Affairs, commonly referred to as the National Security Advisor, who serves as the president's chief advisor on national security. Since Congress does not control this position, the president is free to choose a National Security Advisor who is like-minded and supportive of the administration's foreign policy philosophies.

The third consideration is how presidents organize their foreign policy teams. The president can empower the National Security Advisor to do this, elevating him nearly to the rank of statutory cabinet member. Some presidents minimize the role of the National Security Council, while others rely heavily on it. Primary National Security Council members each have their own separate power bases. As a body, the NSC can

³¹ John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation* (Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1985), 177.

formulate its own policy options or oppose other courses of action, but it does not have an operational arm to execute any options on its own. Conversely, the State and Defense Departments, and sometimes the CIA, have all the resources to implement foreign policies budgeted by Congress. These power relationship dynamics make for a challenging command and control situation. The effectiveness of the National Security Advisor can be crucial in coordinating the implementation of administration foreign policies.

The national security advisor along with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State form a triad of foreign policy development and execution for the president. The powers and relationships of these three key positions are critical to the president for shaping the security strategy. The Department of State operates with traditional diplomacy that focuses on negotiations and compromise. The State Department normally runs primary diplomatic exchanges. This department is very bureaucratic and somewhat entrenched in its methods and philosophical approaches to foreign policy. Department of State personnel can be obstinate, reticent and difficult for some administrations to control. The Department of Defense tends to lean towards military responses. Presidential responsibilities as commander-in-chief are usually exercised through the Defense Department. It is not unusual for State and Defense to work at cross purposes, which harms foreign policy efforts. The president's National Security Advisor ideally deconflicts and synchronizes foreign policy efforts between State and Defense.³² However, presidents do not always rely on this triad to formulate

³² Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 73-83.

and execute foreign policy. Regardless of who presidents depend on, choosing the “right” people for these critical positions, and how an administration organizes its foreign policy teams are among the most important decisions a president can make before assuming office.


This brings us to the fourth consideration, which is the foreign policy decisions the president makes while in office. Ostensibly, this consideration should carry the most culpability for presidents, as they selected the courses of action. But, as we shall see, GPACED often imposes severe restrictions on a president’s freedom of action. If a president is forced to choose a bad course of action that is neither appropriate nor suitable to the task but politically feasible or demanded, who is responsible for the outcome of that task? Is the execution of this bad foreign policy the fault of the president or is it the fault of GPACED, which forced the president’s hand?

Personal experience, selecting key personnel, organizing to develop, and execute foreign policy, and the foreign policy decisions made during their time in office are within the purview of the president. A president who rates highly in these four areas has an advantage over those less qualified and not as adept at organizing. But GPACED does not discriminate -- it affects each administration.

The concept of GPACED can be used to paint a picture of the significant foreign policy events of every president. This graphic is a visual summary of the key events of each administration, where those events align with GPACED, and how GPACED influenced the foreign policies of the administrations. This depiction is not a scientific, statistical instrument; rather, it is a visual representation of the subjective assessments of GPACED and its influences on American foreign policy.

The constant, or reference line, for this visual is defined by what the president intended to achieve with their administration's foreign policy. This goal occupies the center of the chart in Figure 2 below, forming the baseline. Foreign policy events that generally conform to the administration's desired goals are depicted along this baseline. When GPACED prevents a goal from being achieved, meaning little change occurs, the event or condition is displayed below the baseline. When GPACED compels foreign policy actions that are generally opposite of the president's foreign policy goals, the forcing event or condition is displayed above the baseline. The dominant element(s) of GPACED that prevent or compel foreign policy, as represented by their corresponding letters to the acronym, are indicated next to each event.

The example provided here uses President Trump's current administration to illustrate a graphic depiction of the apparent impact of GPACED on his administration's foreign policy. The understanding, of course, is that Trump's administration is not complete at the time of these writings, and has yet to be properly analyzed and assessed from a historical perspective.



For the purpose of this sample visualization of the Trump administration, we use George Friedman’s assessment of Trump’s foreign policy. Friedman judges Trump’s foreign policy goals as seeking to defuse situations that might require military actions, instead of engaging in an offensive foreign economic policy, while disregarding opinions from abroad in the broadest sense.³³ Note that foreign policies evolve throughout every administration; for the purpose of this example, Trump’s foreign policy goals remain constant. At a glance, this visualization shows the extent to which Trump is either compelled or restrained from accomplishing his stated foreign policy goals. The geopolitical environment and Congress appear to be the dominant factors in Trump’s foreign policy achievements.

³³ George Friedman, “The Trump Doctrine” *GPF Geopolitical Futures*, (Texas) July 11, 2018. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-trump-doctrine>.

The following chapters are an analysis of GPACED's impacts on the key foreign policy actions of presidential administrations from Eisenhower to Carter. Discussions of individual administration foreign policies are not exhaustive; the emphasis is on well-known primary events. Each administration is viewed from the perspective of the elements of GPACED. Following the analysis, the administrations are summarized with a graphic representation that effectively displays the influence of GPACED on the foreign policies of each president.

CHAPTER III

EISENHOWER

Case study analysis begins with Eisenhower's presidency because his administration embraced the intent of the National Security Act of 1947 by developing and implementing procedures that employed the National Security Council structure. While the National Security Council continued to evolve with subsequent administrations, vestiges of Eisenhower's construct are reflected in every one of them and are a consistent part of foreign policy making. Eisenhower was uniquely qualified to serve as president during the time of his administration. Few had his leadership experience on the world stage. He had a firm grasp of America's standing and its relationships in the international community. General Eisenhower commanded armies alongside the world's leaders on the grand theater of the World War Two battlefields. As president, he continued this association with many of these same international leaders. He also faced some of his former allies as international competitors and adversaries, and his personal knowledge and insight into the personalities of these world leaders were a unique asset to his administration's foreign policy efforts. Another exceptional personal aspect of Eisenhower, a feature that further sets him apart from all his presidential peers, is that his motivations for holding the office of the President of the United States appear to be truly altruistic. He did not seek office and was not a career politician. In 1952 he

agreed to represent the Republicans after they aggressively sought him out and pressured him to run as their presidential candidate. President Eisenhower continued to demonstrate this altruism during the Suez Canal incident, which occurred on the eve of the election for his second term. Counseled not to risk alienating Jewish voters by publicly going against Israel, the president stated that he did not care about the election.³⁴ He based his decision on the merits of the situation rather than the influence of the American voter.

Accustomed to grim decisions and working with senior Allied military leaders and heads of state, Eisenhower remarked on his first day in office that he had “[p]lenty of worries and difficult problems. But such has been my portion for a long time...the result is that this just seems (today) like a continuation of all I’ve been doing since July 1941...even before that.” His leadership experience at the military and national level made him more qualified to serve as commander-in-chief than any of his contemporary peers.

Eisenhower’s key foreign policy advisor was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Although illness forced him to resign near the end of Eisenhower’s final term in office, Dulles exerted a major influence on foreign policy. Dulles had a pedigree for his job and previous experience with international politics, his grandfather and uncle having served as secretaries of state for presidents Harrison and Wilson. As a young man, he participated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Dulles’ experience, like-minded views of America’s role in the international community, and close friendship with

³⁴ Evan Thomas, *Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 233.

Eisenhower made him an ideal foreign policy advisor.³⁵ Two other advisors that Eisenhower relied heavily on were Robert Cutler, his special assistant for national security affairs, and CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, the secretary of state's brother. Eisenhower's relationship with Allen Dulles proved to be a much more challenging association. Even though exceptionally qualified, Dulles did not always use the freedom of action allowed by Eisenhower wisely and significant problems resulted. With his extensive military background, the president preferred to keep his military advisors at arm's length, also troublesome for Eisenhower because his three successive secretaries of defense were ineffective.³⁶

The administration was well organized and had an efficient foreign policy planning process. Upon entering office, Eisenhower instituted a military-like staff process of routine national security planning sessions, with Cutler an integral part of the National Security Council. After participating in the NSC meetings for three months, Cutler codified the duties and responsibilities of the existing members, made recommended changes to the basic structure, and added permanent personnel to maintain an apolitical continuity to the staff functions of the council. His role – the special assistant for national security affairs – ensured that the president's views for policy-planning were carried out. He acted as executive officer at council meetings and presided over the planning board.³⁷ Eisenhower attended National Security Council meetings on a

³⁵ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 656-657.

³⁶ Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 397.

³⁷ National Security Council, *Memorandum for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*, by Robert Cutler. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1953), 246. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d50>

weekly basis and, in addition to these weekly formal meetings, frequently met for informal conferences to discuss policy with key trusted advisors. Using these gatherings as a forum for consideration of major foreign policy issues, he insisted his staff members present analyses of the issues to the security council in highly digested forms with options clearly distinguished. Eisenhower relied on his staff to manage the details, preferring to focus on the bigger picture. This allowed him to see each action in context, and how it related to his overall foreign policy.³⁸

That foreign policy was a continuation of the Truman administration's policy of containment -- containing the spread of America's communist enemies rather than seeking their immediate destruction.³⁹ Using his skills for organization and staff work, Eisenhower commissioned a long-term study group to develop his administration's own version of this security strategy. Called Project Solarium, these strategic planners developed three options to defend against the global communist threat. When Eisenhower ordered the study, he clearly had military organization in mind; he instructed that "[t]he preparation should be as for a War College project, and might be done at the War College, utilizing also its top personnel and facilities."⁴⁰ The outcome of Project Solarium was the adoption of a National Security Council document that selected the preferred course of action. NSC-162/2 called for a move away from reliance on large conventional forces and emphasis on the threat of nuclear retaliation instead. Eisenhower

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John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation* (Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1985), 234-235.

³⁹ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: America's Foreign Policy Since 1938*. 8th ed (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1997), 126-129.

⁴⁰ National Security Council, *Memorandum for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs: Project Solarium*, by Robert Cutler. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1953), 324. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d63>.

strongly believed that the United States should avoid getting sucked into wars like the one being fought in Korea when he took office. At the same time, he sought to reduce the enormous amount of spending on military systems for national defense. NSC 162/2 also emphasized asymmetric responses such as covert operations, economic aid, and military assistance to those non-communist countries threatened by communist takeover. To empower an increase in covert operations, Eisenhower successfully gained approval of an additional National Security Council directive: NSC-5412, a directive on covert operations that funneled economic and military aid directly to anti-communist groups without involving American military forces.⁴¹

The Eisenhower administration named this strategy the New Look, but its emphasis on the nuclear threat made it known to the world as Massive Retaliation. When John Foster Dulles announced in a 1954 speech that the United States would rely on its retaliatory capacity to deter aggression however and wherever it chose, the Soviets and Communist Chinese perceived a worst case: nuclear counterstrikes aimed at their economic and political centers even in response to the most limited aggression.⁴² This New Look/Massive Retaliation strategy guided Eisenhower throughout both terms of his administration despite its potential for destabilization.

Considered in light of the U.S. presidency's foreign policy role, Eisenhower must be rated favorably. His personal qualifications were ideal for the times -- he was experienced and understood the systems provided for foreign policy making. Aside from

⁴¹ Ionut Popescue, *Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy: How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 67-72.

⁴² Peter Paret eds, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 740.

the three successive secretaries of defense, he selected knowledgeable, experienced, competent people to serve in key advisory positions and his talent for organization, command, and control enabled him to manage America's foreign policy by adapting the existing structures and procedures to the environment that he faced. Experienced key personnel complemented his administration, allowing him to deal with the complexities of foreign policy. Even so, GPACED imposed itself on President Eisenhower and forced him away from his stated goals on several occasions.

One of the first challenges Eisenhower faced was ending the Korean conflict. He even considered using nuclear weapons and leaking this possibility to the Chinese and Soviets. To his credit, the July 1953 armistice might not have been possible without that threat. In 1962, John F. Kennedy's defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, called on then former President Eisenhower for advice on Kennedy's foreign policy in South East Asia. When questioned on the issue of Chinese military assistance to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, Eisenhower reminded McNamara of the measures he had taken to end the Korean War, especially his warnings to the Chinese that their territory north of the Yalu River would no longer be off limits to American air power, and that he would not be limited in the weapons he used.⁴³ This nuclear threat had proven a powerful diplomatic tool in convincing communist regimes to stop fighting. On the other hand, it did not liberate anyone or reduce military spending in Korea. Instead of honoring

⁴³ Department of Defense, *Memorandum of Conference with Former President (General) Eisenhower*, by Robert McNamara. (Gettysburg: DOD, 1962), 5. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/declass_fy11_1962_05_14.pdf.

campaign promises, he settled for the status quo, extending Truman's version of containment.⁴⁴

Eisenhower's efforts to use asymmetric methods proved successful at first. In Guatemala and Iran, his administration conducted low-cost, CIA-led operations that provided direction and funneled aid, arms, and financial support directly to anti-communist political groups. A June 1954 telegram from John Peurifoy, the American Ambassador to Guatemala, shows how the State Department cooperated with the CIA to set the conditions for the American-instigated coup there. Peurifoy noted that the targeted Guatemalan regime had successfully lowered tensions in the country and was making political gains that strengthened its hold on power. He further stated that if Eisenhower made a negative public statement about the situation and renounced a U.S.-Guatemalan trade deal, the trend could be reversed.⁴⁵ The Guatemalan and Iranian operations placed pro-Western leaders in control and kept two countries out of the communist sphere of influence quickly and quietly in support of Eisenhower's foreign policy.⁴⁶

In Vietnam, however, New Look containment failed and the communists gained control of North Vietnam. America provided only material support for the French, leaving their conventional troops at home while the French struggled against the Viet Minh. However, direct intervention had been considered in late December of 1953;

⁴⁴ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: America's Foreign Policy Since 1938*. 8th ed (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1997), 129.

⁴⁵ United States State Department. *The Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Department of State*. by John Peurifoy. (Guatemala City: FRUS, 1954), 1156. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d461>.

⁴⁶ Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 142.

reinforcing the French with American military power was an option, as was replacing French troops should France quit the fight. Each of these options contained both coalition and unilateral plans for U.S. military operations against the Viet Minh.⁴⁷ Eisenhower also considered supporting a deployment of Republic of Korea (ROK) troops to help the French, and Allen Dulles' CIA thus assessed likely global reactions to such a plan. In the CIA's report, Dulles predicted that South Korean troops would most certainly be viewed as proxies for America and possibly draw similar reactions from the larger communist powers. He also concluded that the French and the British would oppose ROK intervention, particularly because it would show America's lack of confidence in French military capability and thus cause a blow to French national prestige.⁴⁸

No South Korean troops deployed to Vietnam at that time and, even if they had, the decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu would have brought Eisenhower closer to intervening than before. He did use the threat of nuclear arms to prevent Chinese intervention, but the Chinese provided the Vietminh with military equipment and supplies nevertheless -- support that was instrumental in their victory.⁴⁹ The Geneva Accords of 1954 were signed, withdrawing French troops from the region and establishing a cease-fire and partition of Vietnam, ending the First Indochina War. A progress report to

⁴⁷ National Security Council. *Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the NSC Planning Board.* by James S. Lay. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1954), 1183. <https://history.state.gov/historical-documents/frus1952-54v13p1/d657>.

⁴⁸ Allen Dulles, Memo, CIA, "Assessment to Reactions of ROK Participation in the Indochina War." by Allen Dulles. Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 10, NSC 54161. <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2013/undated-uk-indochina.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Alexander L. Hunt and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 236-237.

Eisenhower's National Security Council summarized these agreements as "completing a major forward stride for communism which may lead to the loss of Southeast Asia."⁵⁰

The United States refused to sign the agreement, and Eisenhower reacted to the establishment of a communist-controlled North Vietnam by creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Otherwise, he reasoned, the "Domino Effect" would spread communism throughout the region. Under SEATO, defense depended on Asian ground troops backed up by American airpower and military advisors. It conformed to the New Look strategy by using less direct involvement and empowering anticommunist governments to fight communist takeover while American threats of retaliation kept the Chinese at bay.⁵¹

The passage of the Formosa Resolution in early 1955 again tested the New Look. This resolution authorized Eisenhower to use the full range of military options should the Chinese attempt to seize Formosa and its adjacent islands, and he aimed his signing statement on this resolution squarely at China. "We are ready to support a United Nations effort to end the present hostilities in the area" he declared, "but we also are united in our determination to defend an area vital to the security of the United States and the free world."⁵² The resolution was the result of Communist Chinese attacks on offshore islands claimed by the Nationalist Chinese, Quemoy Island being the main bone

⁵⁰ National Security Council, Progress Report on NSC 5405, *United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia*. (Washington, D.C: July 30, 1954), 1. <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2010/1954-07-30.pdf>.

⁵¹ Ionut Popescue, *Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy: How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 80-81.

⁵² Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Statement by the President Upon Signing the Joint Resolution on the Defense of Formosa*, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-upon-signing-the-joint-resolution-the-defense-formosa>

of contention. Even after a large American show of force involving aircraft carriers and attack aviation positioned on Formosa, China continued to make overt moves to seize Quemoy. Eisenhower resorted to another atomic threat during a March 16, 1955, press conference to deter the Communists Chinese. The threat worked, and Communist China ceased hostilities.⁵³

Meanwhile, Allen Dulles and the CIA acquired the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, providing Eisenhower with a lead over the Soviets in strategic intelligence gathering. This spy asset allowed him to see that America still had a sizable advantage in strategic weapons, despite a widely held public belief that the Soviets were far superior. In 1956, the U-2 gathered information on the Soviets as they sent troops into Hungary to put down a revolution and discovered British, French, and Israeli troop buildups in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the heart of the latter crisis was a souring of Anglo-Egyptian relations after World War Two. Heavy-handed actions by British troops defending the Suez Canal had inflamed Egyptian nationalists. A 1936 treaty had authorized the British presence, but a British embargo on fuel oil to the Egyptians living in the canal zone and the cutoff of fuel supplies in retaliation for Egyptian interference with British trains caused Egypt to abrogate in October 1951. Jefferson Caffery, American ambassador to Egypt, intervened and eased tensions a bit, but when American politicians withdrew United States offers to fund construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal.⁵⁴ Some wondered about American motives. Remarking

⁵³ Alexander L. Hunt and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 280-292.

⁵⁴ United States State Department, *The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State*, by Jeffrey Caffery. (Cairo, Egypt: FRUS, 1951), 408. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d178>

on Democratic charges that the Republicans had pulled funding for the dam in order to weaken the Southern cotton industry's foreign competition, Alabama columnist Ray Tucker saw the move as a transparent effort to buy Southern votes. It had released five million bales of American cotton onto the world market, he claimed.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the British concocted a scheme to regain control of the Suez Canal. While Israel attacked Egypt, Great Britain and France intervened under the guise of keeping this strategic waterway open to world commerce. Nasser responded by blocking the canal with sunken ships, and Eisenhower's administration publicly condemned the Anglo-French attack, using economic sanctions and an oil embargo to force England, France, and Israel to withdraw. Both America and the Soviet Union supported a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the attack on Egypt, but Eisenhower still warned the Soviets to stay out of the conflict and further elaborated on Nikita Khrushchev's threat of intervention in a post-presidency interview. Eisenhower instructed Dulles to tell the Russians that the Americans would counteract anything they did; that even though he did not agree with the French and British, they were still America's allies, and he would defend them.⁵⁶ Both the Soviet Union and the United States began preparations for a general war over the incident. American general preparedness for combat operations started October 29, 1956, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared for a joint force deployment to the Mediterranean.⁵⁷ In the end, the 1956

⁵⁵ Ray Tucker, "National Whirligig," *The Montgomery Advertiser*, August 15, 1956. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/262366603/?terms=aswan%2Bdam>.

⁵⁶ Eisenhower Interview, *Public Relations (PR-3) Interviews-Kennett Love with DDE re Suez and Middle East Situation*, Nov. 25, 1964, Box No. 4, 1964 Signature File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969, Dwight D. Presidential Library.

⁵⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum from the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wentworth) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford): JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting 29 October 1956*. by Richard Wentworth,

Suez Canal Incident destabilized an already volatile Middle East situation and moved Egypt closer to the Soviet sphere of influence.⁵⁸

This destabilization caused Eisenhower to extend Truman's policy of containment to the Middle East and, in what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, his administration successfully orchestrated passage of a Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East. This 1957 law authorized the president to cooperate with any Middle Eastern nation to promote and maintain their national independence. Economic programs and security/military assistance were authorized, as well as the deployment of American forces to protect these nations from communist aggression.⁵⁹

In what many considered to be gunboat diplomacy, Eisenhower used this Middle East executive authority to keep the pro-Western King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan in power. Although this new law gave the president broad authority, he still had to battle Congress for support of his objectives in Jordan. During a telephone call in early 1957, Eisenhower discussed the negative impact on his Jordan policy, one that resulted from cuts in the State Department budget by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Secretary of State Dulles countered that the president was constitutionally responsible for foreign policy, and that the Senate had made it impossible for the president to carry out his foreign policies in Jordan.⁶⁰ When a comparable effort failed in Syria, Syria and Egypt

(Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1956), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d407>.

⁵⁸ Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 216-234.

⁵⁹ Congress, House, *Joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East*. 85th Cong., 7th Sess., H.J. Resolution 117. (March 9, 1957). 1. <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/85/hjres117/text>.

⁶⁰ White House, *Telephone Call to the President at Augusta, Georgia*, by J.M., (Washington D.C.: White House, 1957), 1-2. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/declass_fy16_21.pdf.

responded to America's meddling by forming a pact – the United Arab Republic – with Soviet backing.

Eisenhower did succeed in preserving another Western-leaning government when he sent troops to Lebanon during the summer of 1958. A telegram from the American ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, demonstrates the challenges of coordinating America's diplomatic and military elements of national power. As the American troops arrived, McClintock was trying to get the Lebanese army to maintain security in hopes that a civil war could be prevented, and left-leaning Arab nationalists held at bay. The ambassador's task was complicated because the military had provided very little information about their arrival in the country. Meanwhile Lebanese army commander General Fouad Chehab was shocked to learn from McClintock that marines would soon be in the country. Chehab told the ambassador that he needed time to convince his army to support the Americans. "We are on the brink of catastrophe," he pleaded. "There is a very thin chance we can avoid going over that brink provided your soldiers stay on board their ships." McClintock agreed with the Lebanese commander but was unable to get a message to the invasion force.⁶¹ The Marines came ashore the day before Chehab could speak with his army but, luckily, Lebanon remained aligned with the West. Nevertheless, the Eisenhower Doctrine did not achieve all of its desired results. The goodwill Eisenhower gained when he forced England and France to leave the Suez Canal was

⁶¹ United States State Department, *Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State*, by Robert McClintock. (Beirut, Lebanon: FRUS, 1958).
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d141>.

offset by his gunboat diplomacy, which generated resentment and increased Arab nationalism. The Soviets used this resentment to extend their influence in the region.⁶²

While Eisenhower sought approval for his Middle East doctrine, the Soviets successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and placed a satellite in orbit around earth. Sputnik caused much anxiety in the American public. A White House study noted the consequent blow to American international prestige, citing several instances in which foreign governments might see the clear Soviet advantage in ballistic missile and space technologies as reason enough to act against American interests.⁶³ This anxiety resulted in major pressure on the administration to increase defense and weapons production in order to catch up to a perceived Soviet lead in strategic weapons, and worked against Eisenhower's pursuit of mutual disarmament.⁶⁴

Coupled by the perceived Soviet strategic weapons superiority, Eisenhower's actions in Lebanon caused a response by the Communist Chinese, who resumed attacks on Quemoy, and blockaded the island.⁶⁵ During a planning conference on this crisis, the president determined that an attack on Quemoy was equivalent to an attack on Formosa itself., citing the Formosa Resolution. Eisenhower also decided that any United States military action to defend Formosa must include the use of atomic weapons on mainland

⁶² George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 678-679.

⁶³ Report, *Reaction to Soviet to the Soviet Satellite*, White House Office of the Staff Research Group, October 16, 1957. Box 35, Special Projects: Sputnik, Missiles and Related Matters. <https://www.eisenhower library.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/sputnik/reaction.pdf>.

⁶⁴ Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 252-253.

⁶⁵ United States State Department, *Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles*, by Gerald C. Smith. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1958), 125. <https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1958-60v19/d63>.

China. The president considered Quemoy and other outlying islands to be militarily insignificant but judged their worth in terms of moral rather than military factors.⁶⁶

With United States marines still in Lebanon, the president ordered the military to prepare for conventional and nuclear war against China. American military assistance to Nationalist Chinese helped them cope with the blockade. Dulles also issued a strongly worded statement that indicated the United States might use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend Quemoy if it was invaded. Even though Eisenhower did not invoke the Formosa Resolution, which authorized him to use any force necessary to defend the Nationalist Chinese islands, China's hopes for lack of American resolve ended with the secretary of state's warnings. The Chinese called for talks to settle the dispute, but continued their blockade. Playing on the perceived strategic weapons gap between the United States and the Soviets, they coordinated with Moscow and arranged for the Soviets to send a message to the United States. That message stated that any attack on the Chinese People's Republic was an attack on the Soviet Union. However, American assistance enabled the Nationalists to break the Communist Chinese blockade of Quemoy. Ceasefire agreements followed and the crisis eventually subsided. On the one hand, Eisenhower's foreign policy again contained communist expansion. On the other, his latest threat of nuclear retaliation had drawn a counter-threat from a peer power. No longer would America be able to threaten without an equally great risk to itself.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ National Security Council, *Memorandum of Conference with the President*, by A. J. Goodpastor. (Washington D.C.: NSC, 1958), 1-3. <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2011/1958-08-14.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Alexander L. Hunt and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 363-386.

Elsewhere, Eisenhower's foreign policy efforts struggled. His emphasis on asymmetric methods suffered a setback when a CIA plot to replace Indonesian leader Sukarno failed. The CIA perceived that Sukarno was leaning towards the Soviet and Communist Chinese spheres of influence and orchestrated a coup to remove him. The coup failed when Lawrence Allen Pope, a CIA pilot, was shot down by the Indonesians in May 1958. Jailed and sentenced to death as a mercenary by the Indonesians, Pope was evidence of U.S. involvement in the failed coup, even though the Eisenhower administration maintained that he was a mercenary. The misinformation worked; even after Pope's release in late 1962, American newspapers still referred to him as a soldier for hire. One story dismissed his bombing of Indonesian forces as "the hazard and the romance of flying for hire in the Orient."⁶⁸ Instead of executing Pope, Sukarno used his captivity to leverage military assistance from the very nation that had sought his overthrow.⁶⁹

The fallout from this failed coup created a rift between Eisenhower and CIA Director Allen Dulles. The president began to shut out Dulles, formerly one of his key policy advisors, from planning sessions.⁷⁰ The National Security Council meetings leading up to Pope's capture provide some insight as to why this incident may have led to Eisenhower's ire for the CIA Director. During several discussions of the Indonesian civil war, Allen Dulles had commented on the rebels' need for military aircraft. During one

⁶⁸ Joe McGowan, "Soldier of Fortune Good and Bad," *News-Journal*, October 14, 1962. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/291140987/?terms=all%2Blawrence%2Bpope>.

⁶⁹ United States State Department, *Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Acting Secretary of State*, by J. Graham Parsons. (Washington, D.C: FRUS, 1959). <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d236>.

⁷⁰ Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 304.

NSC meeting, the president questioned the utility of providing airplanes to the rebels, who were operating in thick jungle terrain. Director Dulles argued that airplanes could be used to attack Sukarno's forces on the few roads in the area, but Eisenhower remained unconvinced that a few aircraft would significantly help the situation. The president did feel that if a Communist takeover occurred in Indonesia, the United States would have to intervene militarily, but Pope's capture scuttled his plans. That the CIA pilot was captured flying a plane that Eisenhower thought unnecessary surely contributed to the personal rift with his CIA director.⁷¹

In late 1958, President Eisenhower's policy collided with the Soviets when Khrushchev demanded that the West cede control of West Germany's Berlin access to East Germany. Khrushchev gave the West six months. Advisors urged the president to build up conventional forces in Europe in preparation for the defense of West Berlin, but Eisenhower refused. Secretary of State Dulles did acknowledge that America was ready to negotiate, but added that giving up West Berlin was not an option; a response that hinted at nuclear retaliation for any Soviet aggression. The standoff ended with both sides agreeing and to hold a peace summit, preceded by mutual visits. Khrushchev's subsequent visit to Camp David was hailed by the public as a great success, easing tensions between the Soviets and America, bringing hopeful expectations for the upcoming Paris peace summit.⁷² Eisenhower's nuclear deterrence succeeded again, only

⁷¹ Memo, *Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 27, 1958*, 356th Meeting of NSC February 27, 1958, Box 9, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

⁷² Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 321-325.

this time not as an overt threat but simply because the capability was there. The Soviets did not want to test Eisenhower's resolve.

The Paris Peace Conference was anything but peaceful. Two weeks before the conference began, the Soviets shot down a CIA U-2 spy plane over their territory. Eisenhower's administration initially denied that the aircraft was on a spying mission, but soon accepted responsibility. At the conference, the president agreed to suspend U-2 flights over Soviet territory -- not much of a concession, as he had known for two years that American spy satellites would soon be operational.⁷³ More infuriating to Khrushchev, Eisenhower he refused to apologize for the spy flight. Fallout in other nations from the U-2 incident dogged the president's administration. Pakistan had provided bases for the American spy-plane missions into Russia on the condition that they remain secret, and a Pakistani diplomat was most displeased that the free American press had published maps showing the location of a U-2 base in his country.⁷⁴ The opportunity for nuclear arms reduction and cooperation between the East and West was lost when the Soviets downed pilot Francis Gary Powers' spy plane.

Military friction between America and the USSR increased after the U-2 was downed over Soviet territory. One incident a few months later resulted in the capture of two additional American pilots. The Russians attacked an American RB-47H spy plane operating in international airspace, bringing it down in waters outside of Soviet territory.

⁷³ Memo, *Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the National Security Council*, July 31, 1958, 374th Meeting of the National Security Council July 31, 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

⁷⁴ United States State Department, 388. *Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 2, 1960, 5:45 p.m.: Call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir on the Secretary: The U-2 Incident and Soviet Pressures on Pakistan*, by Parker T. Hart, (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1960), 811-813. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d388>.

Most of the crew were killed, but the Soviets captured two surviving pilots. The fact that the RB-47H was operating in an international area caused Eisenhower to consider direct retaliation to secure the release of the surviving crewmen. The plan called for blocking Soviet air and maritime travel to United States and the deliberate downing of any Soviet military aircraft that flew within thirty miles of any United States territory.⁷⁵

The tense relations between the Soviets and America were not the only issues Eisenhower faced. The geopolitical environment remained an active challenge throughout Eisenhower's presidency and, during his final year in office, he severed relations with Cuba. Castro's successful coup, which ousted the American-backed Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, jeopardized United States' control of Guantanamo Bay and deprived many American businessmen from their holdings in Cuba. Most troublesome was Castro's trade agreement with the Soviet Union. These developments put in motion a CIA plan to overthrow the Marxist leader of the island nation.⁷⁶

The prior administration's influence was also significant. Eisenhower had inherited Containment and with it the Korean police action from Truman, but the Truman administration's NSC-68 (April 1950) yielded far-reaching ramifications, too. It reinforced Containment as the overarching foreign policy by calling for a dramatic increase in military funding; by 1953, Eisenhower's first year in office, defense spending tripled.⁷⁷ Having inherited both hot and cold wars against the spread of communism,

⁷⁵ Memo, *Measures to Obtain the Release of the RB-47 Officers*, November 10, 1960, Box 10, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

⁷⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: America's Foreign Policy Since 1938*. 8th ed (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1997), 168-169.

⁷⁷ Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 127.

Eisenhower also intended to save the American economy by reducing military spending. He was passionate about bringing a change in the international climate that allowed for a universal arms reduction and feared costly war preparedness as much as he feared all-out war itself. In his 1953 “Chance for Peace” speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Eisenhower warned that “[t]his world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.”⁷⁸ Yet two years into his presidency, the international climate compelled him to continue spending the bulk of America’s national income on defense. Eisenhower’s comments to Congress on the fiscal year 1954 budget noted that about seventy-three percent of the budget was to be spent on six major national security programs.⁷⁹ Only after a years long effort did his administration succeed in lowering annual defense spending. By the last year of his second term of office, he had prevailed upon Congress to cut defense spending by nearly twenty percent. When he left office in 1961, just under fifty-one percent of the budget was going towards national security.⁸⁰

Eisenhower mostly benefited from the political support of Congress during his first two years in office, mostly because his party controlled both the House and Senate of the 83rd Congress, if only by a slim margin. After two years in office, the support of his party decreased as the 84th and 85th Congresses both saw Democratic majorities in both houses. It was the 84th Congress, backed by cotton industry lobbyists, that directly

⁷⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Chance for Peace” (Presidential Speeches, UVA Miller Center, April 16, 1953). National Archives, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-16-1953-chance-peace>.

⁷⁹ United States. Bureau of the Budget and United States. Office of Management and Budget. “Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1954,” *Budget of the United States Government* (January 9, 1953), M7. <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/54#19007>.

⁸⁰ Ionut Popescue, *Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy: How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 75.

contributed to the Suez Canal Incident.⁸¹ During his last two years as president, the Democrats overwhelmingly controlled the 86th Congress. But while opposition gains generally meant less support in Congress, the decrease was less than catastrophic. In 1953, Eisenhower policies enjoyed a nearly ninety percent success-rate in Congress; by 1960 his administration was still winning on sixty-five percent of the votes.⁸²

But despite a Republican majority his first two years in office, Eisenhower did have to contend with a serious challenge from Senator John W. Bricker (R-OH), who attempted a Constitutional amendment. Bricker intended to limit the presidential role in foreign affairs by giving Congress the power "to regulate all executive agreements with any foreign power or international organization." Eisenhower's administration spent over a year fighting this amendment, eventually managing to overcome its passage by only one vote in the Senate.⁸³ Congressional pressure continued, though. For the remainder of his presidency, Congress worked against Eisenhower's efforts to reduce the defense budget. In late 1957, the Gaither Report reached the American public. It stated that the Soviets would be able to launch a devastating nuclear attack against America in a few years, and recommended a huge military effort patterned on NSC-68 that called for massive defense spending.⁸⁴ Reports of the gap between Soviet and American intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities credited the Soviets with an advantage,

⁸¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 675.

⁸² United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016*, Table 8-1. Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>

⁸³ John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation* (Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1985), 256-257.

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Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: America's Foreign Policy Since 1938. 8th ed* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1997), 159-161.

causing Congress to agitate for more defense spending. As newspapers across America warned of Soviet dominance, Democratic Senators John S. Clark and Joseph C.

O'Mahoney assailed the president for keeping the truth from the American public.

O'Mahoney further stated that the report might be proof that Eisenhower was not capable of performing his duties.⁸⁵

Adding to Gaither's report was a *New York Herald* article by Joseph Alsop charging Eisenhower with misleading the nation while the Soviets increased the missile gap and gained an unmatched nuclear strike capability. Alsop, a prominent columnist who took credit for coining the term "Domino theory," had a large readership, but also his own troubles. While he was in Moscow to interview Premier Khrushchev, Alsop had fallen prey to a Russian "Honey Trap" set by KGB agents who had photographed him in the midst of a sexual encounter with a young man. The Soviets failed to turn Alsop into a spy, but this encounter compromised his lifestyle, and his homosexuality became the subject of considerable domestic and international intrigue.⁸⁶ Despite the resulting credibility problem, the Democratic majority in Congress used Alsop's "Missile Gap" article to allocate a billion dollars more than the president wanted to spend on missiles and long-range bombers.⁸⁷ The president's message in the Fiscal Year 1959 budget reflects his displeasure at the extra spending, and he concluded it with a call for cooperation.

⁸⁵ The Lincoln Star, "Suppression of Gaither Report is Hit by Clark: Asks Possible Congress Action," December 31, 1957. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/66723872/?terms=Gaither%2BReport%2Bcongress%2Bo'mahoney>.

⁸⁶ The Atlantic, "Joe Alsop and America's Forgotten Code," James Kirchick, February 15, 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/joe-alsop-and-americas-forgotten-code/516564/>

⁸⁷ Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 308.

Our response must rise above personal selfishness, above sectional interests, above political partisanship. The goal of lasting peace with justice, difficult though it may be to achieve, is worth all of our efforts. We must make the necessary sacrifices to attain it. Our own people demand it and the nations of the world look to us for leadership.⁸⁸

When signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1959, Eisenhower was more pointed, stating that, "...in addition to appropriating over \$1 billion more than I consider necessary for our security, [Congress] has placed mandatory minimum strengths on the reserve components of the Army. This is an action which seriously disturbs me and which represents an unprecedented departure from past policy."⁸⁹

Congressional elections influenced Eisenhower's foreign policy as well, for with each subsequent election the Democrats gained majorities in both the House and Senate. This opposition party majority made it harder and harder for Eisenhower to gain support for his foreign policy, even though his presidency remained secure. Meanwhile, Vice President Nixon successfully carried the burden of campaigning for the president, as Eisenhower was sick for prolonged periods during the 1956 reelection.⁹⁰ In the months leading up to the general election, the Suez Canal incident saw a seriously ill Eisenhower fighting through his ailments while managing this crisis. And when his son John counseled the president not to offend Jewish voters by taking actions against Israel, the president responded that he did not care about the election. He also wanted to ensure that

⁸⁸ United States. Bureau of the Budget and United States. Office of Management and Budget. "Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1959," *Budget of the United States Government* (January 13, 1958), M56. <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/54#19012>.

⁸⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act Online* by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233872>

⁹⁰ Dayton Daily News, "Dick Nixon Used to Conflict but Unaccustomed to Losing," July 28, 1960. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/404343211/?terms=president%2Billness%2Beisenhower>.

world leaders clearly understood that the American election was not a factor in his response to the Suez crisis.⁹¹

Lyndon Baines Johnson's presidential aspirations also pressured the Eisenhower administration to catch up to the Soviets in the space race. Seeking the Democratic nomination for the 1960 presidential election, Johnson used the national concern caused by the Soviet satellite Sputnik to publicly agitate for the creation of an federal agency for the development of space capabilities. Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act partly because of Johnson's bid for the presidency.⁹² Establishing NASA created its own set of problems for Eisenhower. The military wanted control, and he spent much effort containing the military's angst when the new space agency became a civilian operation. Some of the friction generated by the new space agency surfaced in a meeting of the National Security Council, where the military repeatedly pressed Eisenhower to change the language in a directive in order to give the military more control over the development of space weaponry.⁹³

The crew of the downed RB-47H also played into the 1960 presidential election because the Soviets prevented Eisenhower from obtaining their freedom while he was still in office. Premier Khrushchev discussed the significance of these captured aviators with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson prior to the elections, implying that it would be problematic for the presidential candidates if the Soviets were to hold a public trial before

⁹¹ Eisenhower Interview, *Public Relations (PR-3) Interviews-Kennett Love with DDE re Suez and Middle East Situation*, Nov. 25, 1964, Box No. 4, 1964 Signature File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969, Dwight D. Presidential Library.

⁹² Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 274.

⁹³ National Security Council, *Memorandum of Discussion at the 376th Meeting of the National Security Council*, by S. Everett Gleason. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1958), 842-844. [https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1958-60v02/d441](https://history.state.gov/historical%20documents/frus1958-60v02/d441).

the election. The Soviet leader also said it would be against the policies of his government to free the airmen before the American presidential election. Ambassador Thompson believed that Khrushchev intended to “gift” the pilots to whomever became the next president either to improve world perception of the Soviets or gain bargaining leverage with the new administration.⁹⁴

Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy blasted Eisenhower’s foreign policy during the election campaign, capitalizing on the perception that Eisenhower had allowed America to fall behind the Soviets in the arms and space race. Kennedy also criticized the president for failing to prevent the rise of Fidel Castro in nearby Cuba. While campaigning in Tampa, Kennedy also accused Vice President Nixon of failure in his role as Eisenhower’s personal emissary to Latin America. Kennedy went on to outline his plan to improve Latin American relations, including relations with Cuba.⁹⁵ Kennedy’s campaign also faulted Eisenhower for the loss of the U-2 spy plane, the failed Soviet Peace Summit, unfavorable developments in a newly independent Congo, and many other foreign policy problems during Eisenhower’s watch. While the world viewed this public debate, the constraints of term limits applied pressure and Eisenhower’s window of effectiveness for foreign policy closed.⁹⁶

The public mood played a major factor in President Eisenhower’s foreign policy, too. Throughout his presidency, he battled the public’s clamor for change – a clamor that

⁹⁴ Telegram, *Llewellyn E Thompson to Christian A. Herter*, September 8, 1960, Herter, Christian September 1960, Box 13, Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

⁹⁵ The Monitor, “Kennedy Turns Campaign on Cuba Trouble,” *The Monitor*, October 18, 1960. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/292660654/?terms=kennedy%2Bcampaign%2Bcuba>.

⁹⁶ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 699.

alternately inhibited and shaped his plans. A persistent charge against his policies, carried out in the court of public opinion, was that the "Missile Gap" was real. Eisenhower knew that the Soviets were not ahead in nuclear delivery capability because of the CIA's U-2 spy plane flights over Soviet territories.⁹⁷ He truly feared nuclear war; during a 1956 White House conference on nuclear fissionable materials planning, Eisenhower was emphatic in his belief that the public was concerned over the effects of nuclear radiation and the other consequences of a nuclear war. The president wanted to limit the production of military nuclear materials and slow or cancel atomic weapons testing.⁹⁸

Despite his concerns and his desire to slow the growth of the military, Eisenhower's administration presided over a dramatic increase in American nuclear weapons capability. The missile gap became a political tool used against Eisenhower, and it originated from worst-case scenario intelligence estimates that assumed the Soviets would do everything they were technologically capable of doing. Error, resource constraints, and Soviet consideration of U.S. countermeasures were not factored in.⁹⁹ Available intelligence had already verified that the worst-case assumption was unrealistic, but this perception resulted in more strategic weapons development and growth. From 1958 to 1961, the U.S. nuclear arsenal increased from six thousand to eighteen thousand nuclear weapons. Worse yet, the build-up only heightened public

⁹⁷ Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 213-217.

⁹⁸ White House, *Summary of Conference at White House*, by William H. Jackson. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1956), 5. <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2011/1956-09-11.pdf>.

⁹⁹ National Security Council, *Memorandum of Discussion at the 430th Meeting of the National Security Council*, by Marion W. Boggs. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1960), 354-359. https://history.state.gov/historical_documents/frus1958-60v03/d82.

anxiety. As both sides developed more atomic weapons, fears of nuclear war became a fact of public life. Organizations supported by celebrities rallied for control of nuclear power. News of Japanese fishermen poisoned by radioactive fallout, and Nevil Shute's book *On the Beach*, which was later made into a movie, caused many to fear that Eisenhower's reliance on nuclear retaliation would bring about the end of the world.¹⁰⁰ Secretary of State Dulles' interview in *Life* Magazine also resulted in a re-branding of Eisenhower's New Look policy. Dulles' comments about the president bluffing with nukes to prevent war with China caused backlash both at home and abroad. As the wisdom of Massive Retaliation was questioned, critics argued for an increase in conventional capability to offset its all or nothing approach. To appease the critics, Eisenhower modified his policy to accommodate more flexible responses.¹⁰¹ His successor would expand on this flexibility.

As Eisenhower's public approval ratings began to slip in his second term, heart and intestinal problems also plagued him. Some ailments caused lengthy hospitalization at crucial times, including a six-week recovery from a heart attack in late 1955 and a 1956 bowel obstruction surgery. Even when not hospitalized, bouts of illness would incapacitate the president for long stretches of time. That he often worked himself to exhaustion only made temporarily debilitating illnesses more likely. Eisenhower coped with these chronic conditions with alcohol and sleeping pills.¹⁰² Adding to the burden of poor health was the loss of Eisenhower's key advisors and prominent positions in his

¹⁰⁰ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 690-700.

¹⁰¹ Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 203.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 354.

administration. John Foster Dulles became ill, resigned, and later passed away. National Security Advisor Robert Cutler also left. The schism between CIA director Allen Dulles grew in the aftermath of the U-2 downing and the failed Indonesia coup and, by that time, the president was on his third secretary of defense. The combination of poor health, changes in key administration members, and declining public opinion caused some to attack his presidency. *Harper's Magazine* called for Eisenhower to resign, referring to his administration as, "A leaky ship with a committee on the bridge and a crippled captain giving orders from sickbay."¹⁰³

This discussion of Eisenhower does not touch on every aspect of his administration's foreign policy. It does, however, address most major policy issues during both his terms in office. Viewed from the perspective of GPACED, these major issues compelled Eisenhower to take certain actions and avoid others.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 279.

The president had to take these actions even when they interfered with his goals.




Figure 3. Visualization of the impact of GPACED on the Eisenhower administration.

The geopolitical situation and Congress mattered most, compelling Eisenhower's administration to take actions not of his own choosing almost two-thirds of the time. That pattern of unwelcome GPACED influence would continue to develop during Kennedy's presidency.

CHAPTER IV

KENNEDY

The analysis of John F. Kennedy's administration begins with a look at his foreign policy role. Unlike his predecessor, JFK had very limited experience in foreign policy, strategic level leadership, or as an executive. An ambitious politician elected to the House of Representatives in 1946, Kennedy served there until elected to the Senate. As a senator from 1953-1960, he became interested in foreign policy and acquired some experience, but only served on domestic committees.¹⁰⁴ Once in the White House, his most trusted advisors were National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and his speechwriter, Theodore Sorenson. His expanded group of senior advisors included Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General Maxwell Taylor.¹⁰⁵

Bundy had been a Harvard dean, an experienced foreign policy expert who had worked on the Marshall Plan with Henry Stimson and Dean Acheson. He was a capable yet arrogant man who confidently managed Kennedy's loose organization. Rusk had served the Truman administration as an assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs

¹⁰⁴ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 703

¹⁰⁵ Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 145.

but despite that experience frequently deferred to Kennedy while serving as secretary of state, sometimes abdicating his own responsibilities. In contrast to Bundy, Rusk was a quiet personality who only intended to serve at the pleasure of the president. McNamara, former president of Ford Motor Company who had helped modernize the iconic automaker, brought a businessman's perspective to the Department of Defense. Attorney General Robert Kennedy occasionally stepped outside of that role, helping to solve problems in other areas when the president ran into roadblocks. Taylor was a career army officer who came out of retirement to join Kennedy's administration after the Bay of Pigs operation had failed. Initially an advisor, he moved on to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1964. Small groups of inexperienced but talented and highly intelligent special advisors rounded out JFK's foreign policy term. Twenty-nine-year-old Latin America specialist Richard N. Goodwin was typical of Kennedy's young staffers. Lacking a background in his assigned area at first, he quickly became an expert and thrived in Kennedy's loosely organized and flexible system.¹⁰⁶

The key people throughout JFK's administration all shared a common trait: they were all chosen for their hardline anti-communist beliefs because Kennedy intended to launch a crusade against communism.¹⁰⁷ Using these advisors, Kennedy organized his foreign policy-making apparatus to suit his leadership style and goals -- goals that Eisenhower's more bureaucratic NSC had not always achieved. He also shared a popular perception that the Department of State was too cautious, too slow, and too large,

¹⁰⁶ Thomas G. Paterson ed. *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (Cary: Oxford University Press USA, 1989), 16-18. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241256>.

¹⁰⁷ Richard J. Walton, *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* (New York.: Viking Press, 1972), 10.

referring to it as a "bowl of jelly." Kennedy preferred to run foreign policy in the White House "by seminar" using that small, intelligent-but-inexperienced staff of his.¹⁰⁸ The president's refusal to employ the more formal NSC processes from the previous administration is evident in his letter to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson delegating the president's NSC chairing duties to the vice president.¹⁰⁹ After the Bay of Pigs incident, JFK moved National Security Advisor Bundy into the White House, where Bundy was to establish the NSC in the basement of the West Wing and set up a situation room that allowed for secure communications. These new spaces in the White House gained Bundy greater access to international affairs; he and his staffers took over many of the State Department's foreign policy duties. This arrangement and Secretary of State Rusk's accommodating personality thus allowed Kennedy to function as his own secretary of state.¹¹⁰

President Kennedy's freewheeling planning and policy development structure left him at the center of decision making, but the system drew criticism as disorderly, chaotic, and prone to leaving key people uninformed and actions incomplete. In addition to usurping the State Department's lead role in foreign affairs, these changes caused a rift in civil-military relations as the services became shut out of high-level planning.¹¹¹ For example, the Kennedy administration failed to remove outdated nuclear-armed Jupiter

¹⁰⁸ Thomas G. Paterson, ed, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (Cary: Oxford University Press USA, 1989), 16. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241256>.

¹⁰⁹ White House, *Letter from President Kennedy to Vice President Johnson*, by John F. Kennedy. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d5>.

¹¹⁰ Peter W. Rodman, *Presidential Command, Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy From Richard Nixon to George W. Bush* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 32.

¹¹¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 703.

missile systems from Turkey even though removal of the missiles had been discussed on several occasions prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In an August 1962 meeting between Kennedy and his key foreign policy advisors, the president discussed contingency planning for Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in Cuba. That meeting included a discussion of European-based American missile sites, specifically, that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were useless, but they would be diplomatically problematic with the Turks. Kennedy directed that they be removed, but they remained in Turkey, becoming a significant factor during the height of the Cuban missile crisis.¹¹² Kennedy was furious to discover that his orders had not been carried out, but the disorganized planning environment was largely to blame, and would be again.¹¹³ Even so, America's youngest elected president's reliance on similarly youthful foreign policy advisors is not surprising.

Kennedy's New Frontier campaign included a promise to block the threat of communism where the previous administration had failed. Evoking campaign rhetoric that criticized Eisenhower's Massive Retaliation policy, Kennedy's "Flexible Response" aimed at present and emerging threats instead of reacting defensively after they had become a problem. This policy permitted America to deal with all types of threats, containing global communism with military and/or economic pressure. His policies called for a buildup of conventional capabilities, a closing of the perceived missile gap with the Soviets, the development of a range of counterinsurgency capabilities, expanded foreign aid programs, civil defense to help Americans deal with the results of a nuclear

¹¹² White House, *Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy*, by John McCone. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962), 954-956. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d385>.

¹¹³ John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation* (Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1985), 173.

war, and diplomacy that leveraged the United Nations. The U.S. Army Special Forces, or "Green Berets," and the Peace Corps resulted from Kennedy's goals and belonged to a foreign policy that was very much an extension of Truman's Containment.¹¹⁴

The youth and inexperience of Kennedy's foreign policy team was a disadvantage made worse by his purging of more experienced key personnel, especially at the State Department, where his young staff alienated many of the old hands with its pompous attitude.¹¹⁵ His reorganization of the national security planning apparatus built under Eisenhower also isolated his policymaking team from the subject matter expertise and judgment of veteran policymakers. The resulting loss of useful insight left Kennedy's foreign policy apparatus unprepared for challenges that the geopolitical environment would present.

Two weeks before Kennedy took office, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had given a speech at Moscow's Institute of Marxism-Leninism that redefined peaceful coexistence by promising to support wars of national liberation. According to California newspaper columnist Stanley Johnson, who covered the speech, the Soviet premier warned that war would come if the capitalist nations resisted communism's victories, and that the fertile fields for communist awakenings in Asia had doomed the forces of imperialism. The world, he said, could not allow those doomed forces to drag millions into the grave.¹¹⁶ One such war of liberation was underway in Laos, where Kennedy had

¹¹⁴ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 103-111.

¹¹⁵ Thomas G. Paterson, ed, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (Cary: Oxford University Press USA, 1989), 18-19. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241256>.

¹¹⁶ Stanley Johnson, "Of National Liberation," *The San Bernardino County Sun*, January 18, 1961. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/51378357/?terms=khrushchev%2Bwars%2Bof%2Bliberation>.

his first opportunity to employ the Flexible Response strategy. In 1958, Eisenhower's administration had used the CIA and foreign aid to maintain a pro-Western government in Laos but, in 1960, Laotian nationalists had threatened this government. One such group was the Pathet Lao, a former World War II communist resistance group. With backing from the Soviets and North Vietnam, they and other nationalists had briefly gained control of the country before loyalist forces pushed them out. The Pathet Lao were again threatening the loyalist government when Kennedy took office. For anti-communists like JFK, Laos was one of the "dominoes" of the region; if it fell to communism, the assumption was that all of Southeast Asia would fall as well. Laos was a major concern that Eisenhower had shared with Kennedy during his transition brief. According to Eisenhower, "[i]f Laos [was] lost to the Free World, in the long run we will lose all of Southeast Asia."¹¹⁷

Kennedy used the CIA, and economic assistance to build up the loyalists while U.S. military advisors trained and equipped a twenty-five-thousand-man army to defend the government. However, these efforts did not prevent the civil war from widening. With backing from North Vietnam the Pathet Lao gained ground, seizing key infrastructure from the government including the last operational airfield. While the loyalists were losing ground, Kennedy had to contend with the fallout from the failed CIA-orchestrated coup in Cuba. The president called for a Laotian ceasefire, while at the same time ordering hundreds of American servicemen in Laos to demonstrate American resolve in the region by openly wearing their uniforms. The communists were on the

¹¹⁷ Department of Defense, *Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy*, by Robert McNamara. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1961), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d11>

verge of victory, and the Government of Laos was militarily incapable of preventing Soviet-equipped rebels from seizing power. National Security Advisor Bundy knew it, and warned the president that the Laotian government force “has no stomach and no real capability...development of their confidence and capabilities is going to require a period of years, if it can be done at all.”¹¹⁸ Kennedy moved more American military advisors to the region and even considered intervening with American combat units to defend the Loyalist government, before opting instead to let diplomacy to play out. The resulting arrangement was less than ideal: it called for a permanent end to the fighting, but made Laos a neutral country ruled by a coalition of all the warring parties. In that coalition the communists had the most representation while the Soviet-equipped Pathet Lao held the strongest military capability and more than two-thirds of the country.¹¹⁹

Kennedy’s flexible response fell short of its goals in Laos. Although he did end the fighting, he did not preserve a pro-Western government or block any domino-like communist expansion. The large communist presence not only remained but, despite the neutrality agreement, maintained its ties with the North Vietnamese and the Soviets. That this Southeast Asian foreign policy problem had been forced on JFK is clear by the tone of a letter to the president from advisor Chester Bowles, who was preparing a speech for Kennedy on the Laotian settlement. In this letter, Bowles provided some policy guidance, pointing out that American foreign policy goals in Southeast Asia were no more sophisticated than Eisenhower's had been. The government, according to Bowles,

¹¹⁸ White House, *Memorandum from the President’s Special Representative for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy*, by McGeorge Bundy. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962), 624-625. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d296>.

¹¹⁹ Richard J. Walton, *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* (New York.: Viking Press, 1972), 12-30.

had simply been reacting to military situations with no clear objective in mind and had therefore ceded the initiative to global communist forces.¹²⁰

Elsewhere, in a bid to improve poor third-world conditions that allowed communism to grow, Kennedy's administration started the Peace Corps program. American teachers, medical professionals, agricultural experts, and engineers traveled to Latin America and Africa to aid in social and economic development. Kennedy also pushed his Alliance for Progress program: a scheme targeting Latin America with monetary grants to help improve economic conditions. But neither the Peace Corps nor the Alliance for Progress made communist takeovers any less likely, despite the presence of nearly five thousand Americans. The people they helped showed little interest in American ideals and, two billion dollars later, the Alliance for Progress also failed to achieve its goals.¹²¹ A Missouri newspaper editorial captured some of the problems that the Alliance for Progress struggled to overcome, and called on Congress to do something about the grotesque situation in which millions of dollars were being demanded for Latin American governments. The author also questioned the wisdom of having a virulent anti-capitalist, anti-American Argentinean economist on America's payroll as part of the Alliance for Progress plan.¹²² Lack of funding, corruption, distrust of American interventionism, and cultural differences prevented the sought-after reforms from taking place.

¹²⁰ White House, *Memorandum for the President: The Need for a Definition of US Objectives in SE Asia*, by Chester Bowles. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1962), 1-4. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JCTPP/008/JCTPP-008-012>.

¹²¹ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 111-112.

¹²² Joseph Majersky, "Why a Anti-American?" *The Daily Capital*, April 3, 1962. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/2864335/?terms=Alliance%2Bfor%2BProgress>.

Meanwhile, Germany was once again becoming an international flashpoint. The Soviets and East Germans were losing manpower and intellectual capacity to the West through a steady flow of refugees from the communist satellite German Democratic Republic. Their escape route was through West Berlin and, during the June 1961 Vienna Summit, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave the Western powers six months to leave. Talks in the following days produced no agreement, and Kennedy ultimately responded to the Berlin ultimatum by taking a similarly aggressive stance. Not only would he order the deployment of more forces to Europe, but he addressed Congress personally, asking for a three billion dollar hike in the defense budget, an increase in the authorized size of the U.S. military, and a reserve call-up.¹²³ Congressional approval of those requests -- and of JFK's resolve -- caused the Soviets to stem the flow of refugees into West Berlin another way. In August 1961, construction began on the Berlin Wall, and the six-month ultimatum passed without further incident.

The greatest challenge Kennedy faced was the Cuban Missile Crisis. In August 1962, U-2 spy flights detected Soviet nuclear missile sites under construction in Cuba, and the president formed a special advisory group from the National Security Council to plan a response. The Executive Committee of the NSC, known as Ex Comm, provided the core planning group, its most frequent members being Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Joint Chiefs Chairman Taylor, National Security Advisor Bundy, Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, speechwriter Sorensen, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. UN

¹²³ Kennedy, John F., "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961" (Radio and television, White House, Washington D.C., July 25, 1961). <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/berlin-crisis-19610725>.

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and former ambassadors to the Soviet Union Charles Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson occasionally joined the Ex Comm. This group provided the president with response options, but notes from Ex Comm meetings describe how difficult it was to obtain intelligence now that Soviet air defenses had improved. Meanwhile, the construction of the missile sites accelerated.¹²⁴

The urgent need for aerial reconnaissance that would not spark combat with the Cubans found Ex Comm planners literally struggling over wet paint. One scheme called for the flights to be conducted by the United Nations so that Cubans would not fire on neutral aircraft. However, only the American aircraft were equipped for certain missions, meaning that UN insignia would have to be painted on one or more U.S. aircraft. The plan was delayed because the paint would not have enough time to dry before the flight, and no one wanted peeling paint to reveal an American star and bar.¹²⁵

Kennedy demanded removal of the missiles anyway, and ordered preparations for an invasion of Cuba, along with a naval blockade that president's administration diplomatically referred to as a "Quarantine" because a blockade is an act of war. The Soviets challenged the quarantine at first, and the two powers came close to war. Meanwhile, some Ex Comm members, led by General LeMay, advised an invasion of Cuba even if the Soviets removed the missiles. A confrontation was averted with assistance from United Nations Secretary General U Thant, who helped reach an agreement that allowed the Soviets to remove the missiles in exchange for American

¹²⁴ Chalmers M. Roberts, "Personal Papers," Subject Files. John F. Kennedy: 1962 and Cuban Missile Crisis. CMRPP-035-006. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.
<https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/CMRPP/035/CMRPP-035-006>

¹²⁵ National Security Council, *Debriefing by U. Alexis Johnson, October 28. Current situation in Cuban missile crisis*, by U. Alexis Johnson. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1962), 2.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10-12mSupp/d444>.

promises not to invade Cuba. In a triumph of backchannel diplomacy, Kennedy's administration also concluded a secret agreement to remove the obsolete nuclear-tipped Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Flexible response worked in this crisis, although Kennedy drew criticism for bringing the world closer to nuclear war than Eisenhower era nuclear brinksmanship ever had.¹²⁶ But the Soviets did remove their nuclear weapons from Cuba.

Kennedy's flexible response was also successful in eliminating a perceived threat in British Guiana. His administration judged that the popularly elected prime minister of British Guiana, Cheddi Jagan, was a leftist moving the country towards communism. British Guiana was scheduled for independence from Great Britain after Jagan's August 1961 election, and American analysts feared that he would turn the country into a communist satellite once free of British rule. A memo from the Special Assistant to the President, Arthur Schlesinger, outlined the basic course the administration should take against Jagan: (1) Use the two years before the country's independence to bring Jagan into the Western sphere of influence while establishing covert operations to counter the communist threats in the country. (2) Remove Jagan if he did not align with the West.¹²⁷

The covert operations soon took precedence over trying to win Jagan's loyalty. Using clandestine CIA-manufactured unrest, Kennedy's administration pressured the British to declare Jagan's leadership as failing, citing the CIA-orchestrated civil disorders as evidence -- social unrest that helped Jagan's political opponents beat him in the next

¹²⁶ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 115-126.

¹²⁷ White House, *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy: British Guiana*, by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1961), 525.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d249>

election.¹²⁸ The asymmetrical subterfuge and political pressure on an ally, which strained Anglo-American relations, successfully installed a Kennedy-approved government in British Guiana.

Vietnam was Kennedy's last major foreign policy challenge. His administration inherited Eisenhower's commitment to protect South Vietnam under SEATO's terms and, like Eisenhower, he supported South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem with economic and military aid and military advisors. Unlike Eisenhower, JFK significantly increased the presence of American military personnel in South Vietnam, and the supply of modern combat equipment and ammunition to Diem's Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Also in keeping with the flexible response strategy, he employed U.S. Special Forces in counterinsurgency operations such as the Strategic Hamlet Program.

Much energy went into The Strategic Hamlet concept. This creation of fortified government-controlled villages as a bulwark against National Liberation Front (NLF) insurgents was based on a successful strategy employed by the British during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960). Key to the success of these villages was the support of the South Vietnamese government (GVN) and effective establishment of the individual hamlets, but the Diem government rushed the process, leaving them inadequately prepared and incapable of repelling communist guerrilla attacks. Diem was also unable to compel his provincial leaders to use all strategic hamlet resources for their

¹²⁸ Richard J. Walton, *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* (New York.: Viking Press, 1972), 212-215.

intended purpose. The result was an inconsistent, ineffectual program that demonstrated Diem's inability to protect his population from the Viet Cong.¹²⁹

A report prepared for General Taylor described Ngo Dinh Diem's government as administratively paralyzed, visibly deteriorating, and crippled by intrigue, nepotism, and corruption. The report concluded that only a drastic change at the top of the government could create conditions for improvement and that Diem's leadership was part of the problem.¹³⁰ Kennedy's administration thus encouraged a coup to replace Diem, which resulted in his murder. The president did have reservations about becoming militarily engaged in Vietnam but, as an ardent believer in the domino theory, was determined to keep South Vietnam and the surrounding region out of communist hands. That determination can best be measured by his commitment of American forces. Eisenhower had one thousand advisors in Vietnam when Kennedy took office, but by the time of Kennedy's assassination, there were seventeen thousand in the country.¹³¹

At the Vienna Summit on June 4, 1961, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Kennedy were discussing the Berlin Crisis, Khrushchev also questioned U.S. commitments in Laos. Kennedy responded that those obligations and commitments had been undertaken before he had assumed office, a statement that attests to the influence of prior administrations on foreign policy.¹³² Eisenhower had left Kennedy with what

¹²⁹ Department of Defense, *Memorandum from the Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bagley) to the Chairman (Taylor)*, by W. H. Bagley, (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962), 728. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d314>.

¹³⁰ Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Countries. Vietnam: Subjects: Taylor Report, 3 November 1961: Tabs E-G. JFKNSF-203-008. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/203/JFKNSF-203-008>.

¹³¹ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 126-131.

¹³² White House, *Memorandum of Conversation*, by Dr. Akalovsky. (Vienna, Austria: FRUS, 1961), 208. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v05/d87>.

Truman had left him and, although Kennedy advertised his Flexible Response policy as a departure from Eisenhower's New Look, it was also a form of Containment. More to the point, it increased military expenditures by thirteen percent despite his efforts to distance America from reliance on nuclear weapons. Although Kennedy inherited a smaller military than he wanted, he nevertheless used force to support foreign policy at a far greater rate than any Cold War president to date.¹³³

The Eisenhower administration had also avoided treaties that included firm military commitments, but Kennedy nevertheless used SEATO to justify a greater involvement in the Republic of Vietnam's fight against the North. This advice came from Military Representative to the President General Maxwell Taylor. Upon his return from a Southeast Asia assessment tour, Taylor reported that intervention under a liberal interpretation of SEATO's terms might be the best way to save South Vietnam.

It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Khrushchev's "wars of liberation" which are really pseudo-wars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous Communist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south.¹³⁴

Eisenhower also left Kennedy with a CIA plan to remove Castro from power in Cuba. Kennedy did authorize the invasion that resulted in the Bay of Pigs debacle, but the counsel of experts who had planned the coup and the sheer bureaucratic momentum

¹³³ Thomas G. Paterson, ed, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (Cary: Oxford University Press USA, 1989), 10. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241256>.

¹³⁴ White House, *Letter from the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President*, by Maxwell Taylor. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961), 478-482. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d210>.

of a plan already set in motion was difficult to resist. The new administration's loose-planning organization and JFK's disdain for the previous president's formal planning process contributed to his giving the go-ahead even though National Security Advisor Bundy had cautioned him that the State Department, Department of Defense, and CIA were at odds about whether a force composed of Cuban dissidents could topple Castro's regime. The Defense Department and the CIA were enthusiastic about the chances for success, while the State Department held that no invasion should take place without careful diplomatic preparations.¹³⁵ Assurances that a coup could not be linked to America or his administration even if it failed also factored in, but the official denials that followed the Bay of Pigs failure only made America look worse when the truth came to light. Kennedy ultimately accepted responsibility.

General Taylor's Bay of Pigs investigation shed light on how this secret mission had progressed from Eisenhower's March 17, 1960 four point authorization for Castro's removal to Kennedy's April 4, 1961 approval of the invasion. Eisenhower had authorized (a) the creation of a political opposition, (b) mass communications to the Cuban people, (c) covert intelligence and action originating inside Cuba, and (d) the building of an adequate paramilitary force with a cadre of leaders outside of Cuba. By December 1960, this paramilitary concept had grown into a strike force even though Colonel Jack L. Hawkins of the CIA could not identify the official policy change authorizing it. Taylor further determined that preparations to train and equip a far more conventional force -- much less paramilitary than originally conceived -- had been well

¹³⁵ White House, *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy*, by McGeorge Bundy. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961), 1. https://history.state.gov/historical_documents/frus1961-63v10/d39.

underway by February 1961.¹³⁶ In the breakdown of routine briefings and staff functions that occurred during the transition period, it is easy to see how Kennedy authorized a plan that he thought was Eisenhower's even though it had morphed into something much different. The resulting failure not only failed to remove Castro, but encouraged him to charge the United States with Yankee imperialism and threaten to spread communism throughout Latin America. In the end, Kennedy owned the outcome of what Eisenhower had set in motion.¹³⁷

Kennedy's party controlled both the House and Senate of the 87th and 88th Congresses, and his brief presidency enjoyed an overall success rate of eighty-six percent in Congressional votes supporting administration policies.¹³⁸ Unfortunately, that support did not always result in foreign policy success; "softer" foreign policy programs like the Food for Peace initiative, Alliance for Progress, and the Peace Corps did not achieve meaningful results and many Americans viewed them as a waste of money. Worst of all, the programs sometimes generated anti-American sentiment anyway. Part of the problem was money -- Congress did not give Kennedy all of the funding he had requested.¹³⁹ Soon after the Peace Corps was established, it became obvious that funding was a problem. In a letter to Secretary of State Rusk, Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver asked Rusk to speak to Senator Fulbright about the amount of money needed for Peace

¹³⁶ Memorandum for the Record, *First Meeting of General Maxwell Taylor's Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations Conducted by CIA*. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961), 320-323. https://history.state.gov/historical_documents/frus/1961-63v10/d169.

¹³⁷ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 109.

¹³⁸ United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016*, Table 8-1. Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>

¹³⁹ Richard J. Walton, *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* (New York.: Viking Press, 1972), 217.

Corps activities, saying it was a tragedy if the activities were smaller than those proposed by the president.¹⁴⁰ Had Congress provided full support, the Peace Corps and other such initiatives might have produced better outcomes.

Congress also interfered with one of Kennedy's efforts to establish closer ties between India and the West. The previous administration had already enticed India with economic aid packages and JFK intended to increase the amount of aid in hopes of neutralizing Soviet influence. That influence had become significant by the 1960s; the Soviets were now providing India's military equipment, which complicated American relations with Pakistan and made Kennedy's push for congressionally funded economic aid much more challenging. In 1962, Congress cut the president's proposed India aid package by twenty-five percent.¹⁴¹ Although Kennedy eventually got the full requested amount authorized, Congress's attempt to cut the funding pushed India even closer to the Soviets.¹⁴²

During the Berlin Crisis, the Soviets increased pressure on Kennedy's administration by announcing their intention to conduct atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. The president responded by allowing the United States Strategic forces to conduct their own nuclear tests, first underground, then above it. Nuclear arms negotiations between the two countries eventually resulted in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963,

¹⁴⁰ Peace Corps, *Letter from the Director of the Peace Corps (Shriver) to Secretary of State Rusk*, by Sergeant Shriver. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1961), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d71>.

¹⁴¹ White House, *Telegram from President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith)*, by John F. Kennedy, (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962), 524. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d267>.

¹⁴² Thomas G. Paterson, ed, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (Cary: Oxford University Press USA, 1989), 213. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241256>.

but the negotiations were complicated by a senate so divided that ratification was uncertain. Ironically, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act of 1961 further impeded Kennedy's ability to negotiate disarmament treaties even though he had advocated for it during the campaign. This law mandated Congressional approval of executive agreements by reaffirming the requirement of a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate in order to discourage reliance on executive treaty agreements before they were finalized. The nature of the secretive, compartmentalized negotiations exacerbated divisions in Congress, making it difficult for the president's representatives to present approved options while negotiating with the Soviets.¹⁴³ A memorandum to prepare Kennedy for a meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to discuss nuclear test ban verification shows how his administration had to negotiate the treaty with Congress as well as the Soviets. The memo describes the resistance of the Senate Republicans, who approached the discussions from a partisan perspective.¹⁴⁴

Kennedy's 1960 presidential race against Nixon had been hotly contested, and he clearly factored elections into many of his executive decisions that followed. Timing was also a problem -- he was campaigning in support of congressional elections when the Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head. Distracted by campaigning, he only became aware of the presence of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in October 1962, even though information on missile site construction had been leaked to the press in

¹⁴³ John P. Lovell, *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation* (Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1985), 269-270.

¹⁴⁴ Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Subjects. Disarmament: Nuclear test ban negotiations, April 1962-August 1963.
<https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/100/JFKPOF-100-014>

August over Kennedy's public denials.¹⁴⁵ The leaked information caused concern among some in the general public, especially as the missiles were nuclear-capable and the August newspaper editorial criticizing the administration for downplaying the missile sites was correspondingly blunt.¹⁴⁶ Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone held a discussion about these Soviet missile sites in Secretary of State Rusk's office on August 21, 1962. The intelligence reports noted the buildup of Soviet equipment on Cuba and, although they could not verify the exact nature of construction, they noted that the placement of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba was possible – “a critical and dynamic situation.” The group discussed possible courses of action, including naval blockades, should they discover nuclear arms in Cuba. Kennedy was not present during this meeting.¹⁴⁷

Reelection concerns also factored into Kennedy's Vietnam policy during 1963, when Congressional support for it and his other foreign policies began to waver. When the media attacked him for supporting Ngo Dinh Diem during the June 1963 Buddhist uprising, the president confided to a friend that only winning the war would confound the press. In the short run, however, the televised image of a priest setting himself on fire did more damage. When discussing the upcoming presidential election, Kennedy remarked that he would not be able to get the American people to reelect him if he gave up

¹⁴⁵ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 115-116.

¹⁴⁶ Henry J. Taylor, “Is Kennedy Trying to Ignore Cuba Problem?” *The Los Angeles Times*, August 31, 1962. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/381447336/?terms=missiles%2Bcuba%2Bkennedy>

¹⁴⁷ State Department, Memorandum for the File: Discussion in Secretary Rusk's Office at 12 O'clock, 21 August 1962. by John McCone. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1962), 948-949. [https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v10/d382](https://history.state.gov/historical%20documents/frus1961-63v10/d382).

Vietnam to the communists.¹⁴⁸ And anti-communist campaign rhetoric was already a proven winner by that point. Kennedy had chastised Eisenhower for allowing a communist satellite at America's doorstep and vowed to remove Castro during his campaign against Nixon -- a hard line stance had helped him win even though the Bay of Pigs operation later turned out to be a fiasco.

Kennedy's campaign rhetoric also hastened his decision to accelerate American strategic nuclear weapons capability. By increasing the number of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) sevenfold and gaining a three-to-one advantage over the Soviets, he kept his 1960 promise to close the "Missile Gap" even though he had proof that the only such gap favored the Americans. Nor were the Soviets engaged in an expansion of their strategic missile program, yet this missile gap controversy was playing out in the national media by 1963. Two years before, Defense Secretary McNamara had said that there was no missile gap, but Kennedy nevertheless directed National Security Advisor Bundy to say, for political purposes, that there was one. Bundy's recommended response split the difference, acknowledging that there was not a gap favoring the Soviets, but left the definition of "gap" vague. Kennedy disapproved of Bundy's draft and ordered a new one that helped "demonstrate that there was a military and intelligence lag in the previous administration that started the missile gap."¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Thomas G. Paterson, ed, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (Cary: Oxford University Press USA, 1989), 10, 244. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241256>.

¹⁴⁹ United States Department of Defense, *Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)*, by Adam Yarmolinsky. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1963), 469. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d129>.

The nuclear arms competition was a domestic issue as well. As America rushed to keep up with the Soviets, worries of nuclear Armageddon, and fears of an out of control military entered popular culture. Some popular movies fueled a sense that the military was determined to use their nuclear arsenal. *Seven Days in May* and *Dr. Strangelove* depicted reckless militaries taking over governments and starting atomic wars. These worries undermined civil-military relations as Kennedy's new administration challenged senior military leadership.¹⁵⁰

The civil rights movement also affected foreign policy by adding anxiety to the domestic atmosphere. Challenging the evils of communism was a struggle for U.S. diplomats who could not reasonably justify legalized racism in the United States. Cuba's Castro often used race issues in America as propaganda against Kennedy and African diplomats on official missions in the United States were refused service in racially segregated areas. One incident that made the news was a Raleigh, North Carolina, hotel restaurant's refusal to serve Liberian Ambassador to the United Nations, Angie Brooks. The hotel manager's complaint -- that it was a political setup because Brooks had a reporter and cameraman with her -- did not make the United States look any better, and Liberia lodged a formal complaint.¹⁵¹ Kennedy merely suggested that visiting Africans should try to avoid segregated areas, but he could not continue to ignore America's racial tensions. As Martin Luther King and Medgar Evers rallied for equal rights in the face of

¹⁵⁰ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 703-704.

¹⁵¹ UPI International, "Groups Fail to Integrate Restaurants," *Kenosha News*, May 1, 1963. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/596740333/?terms=African%2Bdiplomats%2Brefused%2Bservice>.

southern politicians who continued to resist the civil rights movement, they pressured Kennedy to support civil rights legislation.¹⁵²

The friction of impending nuclear Armageddon, and the civil rights movement in American society certainly made extremist acts more likely. Months before Kennedy's assassination, an extremist assassinated Medgar Evers, and others blew up a church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four young girls. These murders were part of the domestic environment and in the most extreme and literal sense, Kennedy's murder prevented him from carrying out his policies. That presidential assassinations are nothing new makes them a very real aspect of this facet of GPACED.

The most significant foreign policy-related occurrences of the Kennedy administration reveal the influences of GPACED.




FIGURE 4. Visualization of the impact of GPACED on the Kennedy administration.

¹⁵² Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wiielded Global Dominance*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 207.

Although the geopolitical situation appears most often as a cause for preventing or driving foreign policies, the prior administration's impact on Kennedy's presidency was dominant. Those policies set in motion during the Eisenhower administration resulted in the most significant challenges. Compelled, delayed, or prevented from accomplishing his own objectives almost twice as often as he accomplished them, Kennedy passed those foreign policy failures and successes on to the Johnson administration.

CHAPTER V

JOHNSON

Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency began shortly after 12:30 PM, Central Standard Time, on November 22, 1963. His was one of the few administrations to start unexpectedly, and he had no specific foreign policy goals -- goals that most presidents form and express during election campaigns. Instead of articulating policies, LBJ concentrated on uniting the country in the wake of Kennedy's murder. America's faith in politics without violence was shaken and even though a pervasive mood of doom and gloom gripped the nation, LBJ succeeded in winning the trust of the public. America's political system, he insisted, would survive this crisis.¹⁵³

Johnson had been a politician most of his adult life. His New Deal platform had gotten him elected to Congress in 1937, if only by a slim margin. After a failed bid for a Senate seat, he joined the naval reserves for a brief tour as a lieutenant commander in World War Two. A competent naval officer and advocate of shipbuilding during his time with the Navy, Johnson remained a politician at heart -- the combat award he "earned" while a passenger on a bomber in the Pacific indicates that his tour of duty was little

¹⁵³ Robert Dallek, *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President* Cary (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005), 145-147. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.library.pittstate.edu/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/reader.action?docID=316372&query=lyndon%2Bb%2Bjohnson#>.

more than a political stunt. He returned to the House of Representatives and in 1948 won a Senate seat. By 1955, he had become the youngest senate majority leader in history, and one of the country's most formidable political figures. His reputations for crudeness and cloak room arm twisting were much deserved.¹⁵⁴

The politically ambitious Johnson had competed unsuccessfully against Kennedy in 1960 for the Democratic Party's presidential candidate nomination, and when he assumed his duties as vice president, JFK denied him an office in the White House. Filling a general supervisory role at NASA and several other agencies, Johnson chaired National Security Council meetings even though McGeorge Bundy, who did have an office in the White House, managed most of the foreign policy. Johnson thus became the nation's ambassador of goodwill, traveling to thirty-three countries on "show the flag" missions and, when at home, drew assignments like entertaining the West German Chancellor during the Bay of Pigs crisis. Despite this deliberate sidelining, Johnson gained relevant foreign policy experience during an assessment tour of Southeast Asia, its most crucial stop being in the Republic of Vietnam.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, his forte was domestic politics and unlike Kennedy, who was a strong leader, Johnson preferred to make decisions by building consensus. These consensus decisions often led to belated courses of action involving a great deal of compromise and incremental decision making, the results of which often fell short of stated goals.

Johnson began his presidency with Kennedy's foreign policy team and maintained the in-house National Security Council structure installed by McGeorge Bundy, who

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 111-114

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 121-131

continued to control information flow into and out of the White House. Much like Kennedy, LBJ relied on a small core group of advisors, in this case the "Awesome Foursome" that included Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy. He held weekly working lunches to discuss policy with his team, and these lunches developed into the administration's chief foreign policy planning sessions. Unlike Kennedy, he relied heavily on Secretary of State Rusk for guidance, a relationship that eventually pushed Bundy out of the group. Bundy knew what was at stake and complained in a memo to Johnson that Rusk, and not the president, was in direct communication with the Soviet government.¹⁵⁶ The memo did not have its desired effect, and Walt Rostow became the president's National Security Advisor. Previously head of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, Rostow was experienced in America's current foreign policy challenges and had often participated in Kennedy's small group foreign policy planning sessions.¹⁵⁷

Johnson's preference for small-group strategy planning sessions perpetuated the problems of Kennedy's foreign policy planning apparatus. The compartmented nature of the meetings made it difficult for accurate information to flow to the agencies that carried out the policies. The president and his team also micromanaged the military effort in Vietnam, going so far as to make some tactical level decisions. One 1967 memo from National Security Advisor Rostow to Johnson even recommended targets for Operation Rolling Thunder.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asked me to put to you their agreed recommendations about which targets submitted by the JCS in Rolling Thunder

¹⁵⁶ White House, *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson: Agenda for Tuesday Lunch*, by McGeorge Bundy. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1965), 1. <https://libguides.msubillings.edu/c.php?g=242157&p=1610550>.

¹⁵⁷ George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 1-12.

53 should be accepted at the present time, and which should be deferred until after Tet and until after we see what, if anything, develops in the various flowered negotiating tracks.

They would accept nine military support targets (marked in red in the table attached to the enclosed map: barracks, ammo and supply depots. This table also indicates with a (d) the JCS targets which they recommend for deferral.¹⁵⁸

During the siege of Khe San, LBJ followed the battle's progress on a scale model in his situation room, at one point telephoning the base commander for an update. Feeling deeply responsible for the troops in harm's way and equally responsible for the outcome of the war in Vietnam, he also sought to prevent the conflict from widening into a fight with China or the Soviets. But Johnson's interest in strategy and broader military organizational affairs stopped there; Secretary of Defense McNamara ran the military and the war effort with the president's blessing. McNamara was a superb manager, but had no experience in military leadership, and a dysfunctional relationship between the president's staff and senior military officers soon resulted.¹⁵⁹ In one terse telephone conversation between Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Earle Gilmore Wheeler, Wheeler even *instructed* McNamara to let him overrule the service chiefs' recommendations for a Vietnam bombing program. Similarly, when McNamara overrode his generals' decisions about the use of air power, Wheeler demanded justification.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ White House, *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson: Rolling Thunder 53*, by Walter Rostow. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1967), 59. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d25>.

¹⁵⁹ George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 14-38.

¹⁶⁰ Telephone conversation # 8856, sound recording, LBJ and ROBERT MCNAMARA, 9/14/1965, 11:01AM, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, <https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/tel-08856>.

Johnson's efforts to correct obvious communication problems in his administration resulted in his 1966 National Security Action Memorandum no. 341, which created the Senior Interdepartmental Group and Interdepartmental Regional Group. Better coordination between his foreign policy planners and the agencies who carried out the plans -- chiefly the Departments of Defense, State, and the CIA -- was the objective.¹⁶¹ Unfortunately, these new groups only duplicated efforts, adding to the confusion and disunity, while friction between civilians and the military continued to widen the gap of miscommunication. The tension in Johnson's administration echoed the prevailing public fear of an out-of-control military bent on starting a nuclear war. The president believed it was important for the civilian leadership to keep military leaders in check, but his foreign policy planning apparatus only magnified his own penchants for micromanagement and indecision.¹⁶²

Johnson's foreign policy, like Eisenhower's and Kennedy's, was a variation of the containment strategy handed down from Truman. Using Kennedy's foreign policies as a starting point, Johnson acknowledged that the United States must remain strong -- global communism was still the main threat -- but also called for America to be temperate and just. Seeking to capitalize on Kennedy's limited détente, he told a State Department audience that diplomats needed to show patience and understanding for other systems as well as our own.¹⁶³ Also like his predecessor's foreign policy infrastructure, Johnson's

¹⁶¹ Memorandum # 341, The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas, 3/2/1966, "NSAM 341 The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas [2 of 2]," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 7, LBJ Presidential Library <https://www.discoverljb.org/item/nsf-nsam341>.

¹⁶² George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 38-39.

¹⁶³ Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 123.

organization consolidated planning and decisions at the executive level while isolating the primary decision-makers from the resources of the rest of the government. Most of his key foreign policy team members had provided counsel to Kennedy and, rather than improving on the process or correcting noted deficiencies, Johnson and his advisors carried forward the negative aspects of Kennedy's foreign policy-making apparatus and made them worse. But while Johnson wished to emphasize the diplomatic element of national power, America's military involvement in Vietnam consumed his efforts, and LBJ's ineptitude as a commander in chief only compounded the problem. Historian George C. Herring's rating of him as the least effective war president in American history is a fair assessment. However, GPACED exerted a significant impact on LBJ's performance as commander-in-chief.

Not that all of Johnson's efforts failed; in 1964, his emphasis on diplomacy proved a success when Fidel Castro used Guantanamo Naval Base as leverage to protest the detention of Cuban fishing boats. When Castro shut off the water to the American installation, Johnson's administration ordered the Navy create its own water supply so that a more serious confrontation could be avoided. The idea had originated in a telephone conversation with Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT), when Mansfield suggested that Guantanamo should establish its own water supply and pull out of the existing water agreement with Cuba for breach of contract. Not only was this a diplomatically sound option, but it would save the fourteen-thousand-dollar monthly fee that the U.S. paid to Castro's government.¹⁶⁴ Later that year, when Panamanians rioted in the U.S.-controlled

¹⁶⁴ White House, *Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield*, by Mike Mansfield and Lyndon Baines Johnson. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1964), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d231>.

Panama Canal Zone, LBJ took a similarly non-violent route and got a successful outcome. Dozens of people, including four American soldiers, had died and Panama suspended diplomatic relations with the United States pending a revision of all treaties with America. Rather than intervene militarily, Johnson responded by withholding economic aid and threatening to build a new canal elsewhere. Subsequent talks produced normalized relations and a draft agreement by 1967, and peace had been preserved. But even diplomatic solutions came with costs; in order to avoid the use of force, the U.S. government made concessions that would affect subsequent administrations.

Nor was diplomacy always possible, as a crisis in the Dominican Republic proved. When the Dominican Republic's president, Donald Reid Cabral, found himself losing a civil war, the assistance he requested from the United States was military. Within a week, over twenty-three thousand American troops were in his country preventing an overthrow by insurgents that Johnson, on the advice of United States Information Agency Director Carl T. Rowan, characterized as a communist threat. According to Rowan, it would be “well-nigh impossible” to justify the presence of so many American troops solely on the grounds that they were protecting Americans and other foreigners. Once the communist takeover claim had proved just as dubious, Rowan then provided suggestions to mitigate the anticipated charges of gunboat diplomacy and consequent demonstrations or attacks against American embassies in Latin America.¹⁶⁵ The price of keeping a regime friendly to American business ventures in power was a

¹⁶⁵ White House, *Memorandum from the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson*, by Carl T. Rowan. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1965), 124. <https://libguides.msu.edu/c.php?g=242157&p=1610550>.

further damaging of U.S.-Latin American relations. What little goodwill gained by the under-performing Alliance for Peace program fell victim to gunboat diplomacy.¹⁶⁶

More carefully considered U.S. military commitments were not always safe, either. Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, France had been a charter member and key part of America's containment policy. That came to an end in 1966 when President Charles de Gaulle orchestrated his country's withdrawal and demanded that NATO remove its troops and headquarters from French territory. In 1964, the French government had granted diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China -- the same year that China had become a nuclear power -- and the departure from NATO was but another indication that de Gaulle intended to steer an independent course. However, by denying NATO the use of French ports, he was also making it more difficult for Johnson to maintain American troops in Europe, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk soon found himself seeking French permission for American and other NATO militaries to be in France during emergencies.¹⁶⁷

France's withdrawal from NATO also complicated Johnson's efforts to provide weaker European countries with military and economic assistance. In a planning memo on the NATO French withdrawal, Rusk warned LBJ that Congress would not provide enough resources to maintain an integrated European deterrent if France pursued separate agreements with the remaining NATO members.¹⁶⁸ In 1967, NATO lost more of its

¹⁶⁶ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 733-736.

¹⁶⁷ White House, *Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations*, by Dean Rusk. (Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1966), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d191>.

¹⁶⁸ Memo for the President, Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8, LBJ Presidential Library. <https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/nsf-nsam-b8-f02>

military strength when Great Britain recalled its forces from the European mainland and West Germany failed to build up its forces to previously agreed upon strengths. Both of these developments weakened NATO significantly, and with it, America's containment policy.¹⁶⁹ A flagging European economy and heightened European nationalism led by France's abandonment of NATO compounded the problem.

Meanwhile in the Middle East, Egyptian and Israeli attitudes toward one another had not changed since the Suez Crisis of 1956 and, in June 1967, Johnson's efforts to solve rising tensions there were frustrated by what became known as the Six Day War. After a series of Arab-Israeli skirmishes, Egypt's Nasser closed off the Strait of Tiran, cutting off the Israeli port of Eilat's Red Sea access. Israel responded by attacking Egypt, and efforts by LBJ's administration and the United Nations failed to halt the fighting. The Israeli victory drew threats of military intervention from the Soviets; threats that Johnson countered by ordering the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet to the region. The threat of superpowers entering the conflict brought most of the fighting to a halt, while a United Nations Security Council Resolution ostensibly settled territorial disputes. In practice, however, the UN resolution only broadened the claims of the antagonists, further polarizing the Middle East. All the while, America's open support of Israel with modern weapons complicated its self-proclaimed role as an objective peace broker.

A CIA memo on the eve of the Six-Day War summed up the challenges America was facing in the Middle East; an entire generation of Arabs had been raised to believe that modern Israel would never have existed without American and British assistance.

¹⁶⁹George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 742-744.

Rising Arab nationalism sought the destruction of Israel, yet the Arabs knew that America would always come to Israel's aid. Many Arabs called for boycotts and terror activities against all Western diplomatic and economic presence in the Middle East. The Israelis also resented American regional presence because they believed America was holding them back; that they knew how to defeat the Arabs if only America would step aside. There were hardened attitudes towards America on both sides of the Middle East conflict.¹⁷⁰ After the Six-Day War, much of that assessment played out. Some countries turned towards the West while others, like Iraq, sought help from the Soviets. Iran dangled the possibility of joining the Soviets if America did not increase aid. Israeli promises not to develop nuclear weapons rang hollow. As America's standing in the Middle East suffered, its ability to contain the Soviets suffered as well.¹⁷¹

Elsewhere, the Johnson administration did manage to negotiate two treaties successfully, both of which dealt with nuclear weapons. In 1967 America joined other nations, including the Soviet Union, in signing the Outer Space Treaty, a ban of nuclear weapons in space. The next agreement was the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which the nuclear-capable signatories, including the Soviets, agreed not to provide nuclear weapons technologies to non-nuclear capable nations. Those signatory nations who did not already possess nuclear weapons agreed not to seek the capability. Not surprisingly, the countries this treaty targeted (China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa) did not sign. Johnson had scheduled a third arms control summit, but the 1968

¹⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, *Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency: The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis*, (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1967), 271-272. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d143>.

¹⁷¹ Robert Dallek, *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President* Cary (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005), 282-286. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.library.pittstate.edu/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/reader.action?docID=316372&query=lyndon%2B%2Bjohnson#>.

Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia derailed it. Meanwhile, North Koreans seized the American spy ship *USS Pueblo*, causing a significant distraction.

The president had to personally brief leaders of Congress on numerous occasions about the circumstances of the ship's capture, its mission, why it was not protected, and what America was going to do to recover the captured crew members. He consulted national command authorities from former administrations for advice, including Eisenhower, who suggested a full range of options including the use of atomic weapons against bridges spanning the Yalu River so that commerce with China would be cut.¹⁷² North Korea kept the ship, its spy gear, and its classified documents -- an intelligence treasure for communist enemies -- and the crew came home only after nearly a year of negotiations.¹⁷³ Johnson's own state department sometimes proved less reliable than the former Republican president. Early in his presidency, the administration had been working with a military junta to overthrow Brazil's president, Joao Goulart, whom Kennedy had viewed as an unreliable leftist. A CIA operation launched during the Kennedy administration to remove Goulart from power had seriously destabilized the country, allowing the coup to succeed, and the State Department officially recognized the military leaders of the coup without the Johnson's consent.¹⁷⁴ Although angry that he was not informed, Johnson did not reverse the State Department's actions but provided the Brazilian coup leaders with military assistance and a show of force. On April 1, 1964, the coup succeeded.

¹⁷² Telephone Conversation with General Eisenhower, Folder, "January 31, 1968 - 8:40 a.m. Pueblo 13 - Breakfast with Congressional Leaders & Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2, , LBJ Presidential Library. <https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/pp-johnsontom-mtgnotes-b02-f17>

¹⁷³ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 751-756.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 733.

Having inherited a big military and a weakened diplomatic capability from the Kennedy administration, Johnson also inherited the previous administration's secretary of defense. With little knowledge of military doctrine, Robert McNamara relied instead on the business management approach that had worked so well for him at Ford. That approach manifested itself in the adoption of the Planning Programming Budgeting System, a budget forecasting and control concept started under Kennedy. This was a system for identifying military requirements and budgeting for what McNamara thought necessary rather than what the armed services requested. Sometimes this quest for efficiency worked, even though fights over government waste often played out in the national press. One Associated Press story accused the Navy of wasting hundreds of thousands of dollars on uniforms, and William Newman of the General Accounting Office confirmed that the Navy was spending 2.5 cents per "non-functioning buttonholes in double-breasted coats."¹⁷⁵

Unfortunately, McNamara's purportedly efficient budgeting system produced unintended consequences as well as intended ones. It increased inter-service rivalry and competition as the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments vied for more tightly controlled resources. Military leaders openly resented McNamara's micromanagement, and McNamara countered by replacing all of the joint chiefs of staff with more deferential officers, citing a need for civilian supremacy over the military. Having transformed the U.S. war command system to one of crisis management by yes men, McNamara now operated with a chain of command that ran from the president through

¹⁷⁵ "GAO Alerts McNamara to Useless Buttonholes," *The Ogden Standard-Examiner*, May 21, 1964. [https://www.newspapers.com/image/600396631/?terms=mcnamara %2Bservice%2Bchiefs](https://www.newspapers.com/image/600396631/?terms=mcnamara%2Bservice%2Bchiefs).

himself directly to the commanders in the field, bypassing the uniformed service chiefs, who should have been advising the president on how best to use his military capabilities. To maintain at least some influence, the JCS Chairman, General Wheeler, adopted a “Foot in the door” policy with President Johnson. His tactic was to push for what he wanted but to accept what he could get.¹⁷⁶

Despite his preference for diplomacy, Johnson's chief tool for containing the communist threat was the large military built by Kennedy; a military whose strategic command and control system was degraded by McNamara's leadership style. It was this powerful yet dysfunctional tool that LBJ would use to address another inheritance from the previous administration and one that would consume his presidency: Vietnam. Johnson did not want to fight a war there, but Eisenhower's SEATO commitment, Kennedy's increase in military advisors, and an underlying belief in containment made any other course unlikely. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, further escalation became inevitable, although Johnson cited the Senate's overwhelming intention to honor its SEATO obligations as reason enough for America's involvement.¹⁷⁷ But deploying major combat units still bothered him. Campaigning for reelection in 1964, he told prospective voters that he was "not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."¹⁷⁸ This reflected the Kennedy administration's original intent, as outlined in

¹⁷⁶ George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 29-44.

¹⁷⁷ Lyndon Baines Johnson, “Speech on Vietnam” (Speech, San Antonio, Texas, September 29, 1967). <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-29-1967-speech-vietnam>.

¹⁷⁸ Robert Dallek, *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President* (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005), 209. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.library.pittstate.edu/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/reader.action?docID=316372&query=lyndon%2Bb%2Bjohnson#>.

National Security Action Memorandum 273, written for Kennedy but authorized by Johnson in November 1963, shortly after JFK's funeral. It had set defeat of the Viet Cong as the condition for the withdrawal of all U.S. advisors by 1965, and was optimistic that victory could be won.¹⁷⁹ The problem Johnson faced was that the non-military solutions he preferred could not happen without security provided by the military. The threat of Chinese and/or Soviet intervention also weighed heavily on him and, beginning in March 1965, he committed U.S. ground forces. The commitment was open-ended, reaching a maximum of 549,500 in 1968, because McNamara never understood what it would take to win -- the condition for leaving. Meanwhile, his dysfunctional command structure poured resources into South Vietnam in an uncoordinated and wasteful way. The U.S. armed services essentially fought individual wars within their respective areas of responsibility. The Army sought to destroy large enemy formations, concentrating their efforts on major combat actions. Marine units focused their efforts on counterinsurgency actions, and the Air Force focused on deep interdiction. Because McNamara did not know what it would take to win, America's war strategy flowed up from the tactical unit level in Vietnam rather than down from Washington.

Secretary of State Rusk fought his own separate war, too: a pacification program aimed at developing governance and infrastructure to support the South Vietnamese population. His Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, controlled the program, a hodgepodge of agencies so complicated that the sheer number of programs exceeded Bunker's capacity for management. Pacification included security; most of

¹⁷⁹ White House, *National Security Action Memorandum No. 273*, by McGeorge Bundy (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1963), 638-640. [https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1961-63v04/d331](https://history.state.gov/historical%20documents/frus1961-63v04/d331).

these programs could not run without military protection against the enemy, but lack of coordination and inefficient command/control issues made it difficult for Bunker to get support from American conventional forces. Resorting to ineffective paramilitary units instead, Rusk also coordinated with other non-military agencies to develop security programs.¹⁸⁰ One such program, the CIA-run PHOENIX, became infamous for its counterinsurgency methods; its Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) earned a reputation as nothing more than assassination teams out to destroy Viet Cong political infrastructure.¹⁸¹

Because Rusk did not synchronize his diplomatic efforts with McNamara's military efforts, the resulting compartmentalization and secrecy often brought conflict between the two. In one instance, bombings near a negotiation site in Hanoi derailed a diplomatic operation codenamed MARIGOLD, which had been a promising peace effort.¹⁸² Commenting on the dysfunctional nature of the war's command and control, Chester Cooper, a senior NSC staffer, stated that the peace effort was "unnecessarily diffused, duplicative, and less efficient and effective than it should have been."¹⁸³

Johnson's Vietnam ordeal and his presidency ended with the Tet Offensive. He had tried to contain communism in Vietnam with negotiations, government programs,

¹⁸⁰ George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 44-70.

¹⁸¹ Andrew R. Finlayson, "A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-70," Central Intelligence Agency, June 12, 2007. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/a-retrospective-on-counterinsurgency-operations.html>.

¹⁸² United States Department of State, *Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson: Necessary Actions in Connection with the Marigold Project*, by Dean Rusk. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1967), 12-13. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d4>.

¹⁸³ George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 90-114.

and economic support, yet repeatedly resorted to force. Meanwhile, the seventeen thousand American advisors in country when he succeeded Kennedy had grown to well over five hundred thousand combat troops, and twenty-five percent of U.S. foreign aid was being spent there.¹⁸⁴ The realities of GPACED compelled LBJ to fight in Vietnam; when he took office, U.S. military advisors were already involved in combat, and abandoning containment was politically unrealistic. However, the inheritance of unbalanced elements of national power, weakened diplomatic capabilities, and a flawed foreign policy planning and execution system, is equally obvious. The lack of American public support and the actions of both the North and South Vietnamese also complicated American troop when the conditions envisioned in NASN-273 were not established. Having dictated American involvement in Vietnam, GPACED frustrated LBJ's efforts at containment once there.

Equally to the point, both happened despite a two-house Democratic majorities. Eighty-two percent of Congressional votes supported his administration's actions but the few exceptions proved significant.¹⁸⁵ When France pulled out of NATO, Johnson struggled to maintain economic assistance to Western Europe and keep American troops in Europe against the wishes of a vocal Congressional minority. Accommodating the Israeli lobby before, during and after the Six-Day War was not easy, either.¹⁸⁶ Congress put the most pressure on Johnson towards the end of his administration, when grass roots opposition to the war in Vietnam was putting pressure on Congress, including fellow

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 21.

¹⁸⁵ United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016*, Table 8-1. Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>.

¹⁸⁶ George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 743-748.

Democrats. By Johnson's final year in office, congressional support of presidential policies had dropped from 84% (1964) to 77% (1968) in the House and from 73% (1964) to 64% (1968) in the Senate.¹⁸⁷

Under such conditions, gaining support for administration foreign policy became a struggle. When Congress cut his administration's requested budget for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 by a third, he expressed his frustration in a signing statement, warning that "the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 reduces the margin of hope to the danger point."¹⁸⁸ Weakened support also hampered the approval of LBJ's 1969 budget proposal, as his costly foreign policies, especially the war in Vietnam, clashed with domestic program requirements. Only after withdrawing from the 1968 presidential race was he able to get the budget through Congress, and only then with a six billion dollar cut in domestic programs.¹⁸⁹

The 1968 presidential election also played into North- and South Vietnamese government strategizing, both stopped serious negotiations. Johnson warned Senator Tom McIntyre (D-NH) on December 28, 1967 that "Hanoi will not negotiate until they see the outcome of the election of November 1968 here."¹⁹⁰ The American election influenced the Vietnamese in a more direct way as well. The Republican nominee, former vice president Richard Nixon, had interfered in negotiations with the South

¹⁸⁷ United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016*, Table 8-2. Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>.

¹⁸⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/238303>.

¹⁸⁹ Robert Dallek, *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President* Cary (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005), 326-335. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.library.pittstate.edu/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/reader.action?docID=316372&query=lyndon%2B%2Bjohnson#>.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 321.

Vietnamese government while Johnson was trying to broker a peace between North and South Vietnam. Johnson determined that Nixon's intermediary, the committed anti-communist Anna Chennault, had convinced South Vietnam to withdraw. Shortly before Nixon took office the national media exposed his meddling when one of Nixon's campaign advisors leaked the story.¹⁹¹ The Nixon camp had received messages from the South Vietnamese government several days before the election, indicating a possible delay in participation until after the election.¹⁹²

No matter who the Democrats nominated in 1968, the Johnson administration needed a success, or at least palpable progress, in Vietnam. For he needed more money, and to obtain the money he needed to raise taxes and cut domestic programs; unpopular actions during an election year. When the 1968 Tet Offensive reduced American public support for LBJ's Vietnam policies to ten percent and he withdrew his candidacy, he nevertheless continued to defend his Vietnam policies as free of election concerns. One such defense was a discussion with Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), who purportedly accused the president of playing politics with peace negotiations before the election.¹⁹³ In fact, Johnson had told his advisors to ignore the political calendar when negotiating with Hanoi but despite his direction every political decision about Vietnam was also about the election.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ William A. Bundy, *Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in The Nixon Presidency*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 44.

¹⁹² Tom Ottend, "Was Saigon's Peace Talk Delay Due to Republican Promises?" *The Boston Globe*, January 6, 1969. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/434597058/?terms=saigon's%2Bpeace%2Btalk%2Bdelayed%2Bbottenad>.

¹⁹³ White House, *Lyndon B. Johnson's Daily Diary: October 16, 1968*, (Washington, D.C.: White House, 1968), 5. http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/lbj_tools/daily_diary/pdf/1968/19681016.pdf


¹⁹⁴ Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 162-163.

The domestic situation towards the end of Johnson's presidency was especially challenging. Anti-war sentiment was widespread and very public. Not only was draft-dodging common but, in a horrific act of protest to stop the Vietnam War, a young Quaker burned himself to death outside the Pentagon. The Pentagon was the site of another anti-war scene when, in October of 1967, fifty thousand protestors marched there to demand an end to America's military involvement in Vietnam.¹⁹⁵ Civil rights issues exploded into violence as well, with rioting in cities across America, with the Detroit riots of 1967 being the country's worst since the Detroit riots of 1943.¹⁹⁶ The civil rights movement also affected foreign policy, with activists promoting racially motivated African policies and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy fighting to maintain control.¹⁹⁷ Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were both assassinated in 1968, and a flagging economy caused Johnson to call for higher taxes. The same sectors of the American public also saw the Tet Offensive as a U.S. defeat, even though it was a military victory. Images of the fighting on television contrasted sharply with the progress reported by the White House. As America's support for the Vietnam War took a critical blow, so did LBJ's efforts to stay the course. His withdrawal from the presidential race had been the only way out.

¹⁹⁵ George C. Herring, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 741.

¹⁹⁶ Robert Dallek, *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President* (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005), 281. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.library.pittstate.edu/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/reader.action?docID=316372&query=lyndon%2Bb%2Bjohnson#>.

¹⁹⁷ National Security Council, *Memorandum from Robert W. Komer and Ulrich Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)*, Robert W. Komer and Ulrich Haynes. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1965), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d194>.



Johnson's poor foreign planning organization deserves some credit for his administration's foreign policy failures but, as discussed above, GPACED dictated much of its direction, with the prior administration exerting the most influence. His main effort and the foreign policy actions for which he is most remembered, America's war in Vietnam, was a war he did not choose but one that he was compelled to fight.

CHAPTER VI

NIXON AND FORD

Richard M. Nixon had a brief career in the United States Navy, serving in the Pacific during World War Two as a transportation officer. In 1946, he employed red-baiting tactics to defeat incumbent Jerry Voorhis in the race for Southern California's 12th Congressional District and won a Senate seat in 1950 using the same tactics against Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas, who famously referred to him as "Tricky Dick." His strong political base in California and anti-communist stance got him noticed, and two years later, at age 39, he became Eisenhower's vice president. During the next eight years, Nixon gained foreign policy experience by assuming various presidential duties whenever Eisenhower was ill. These duties included a July 1959 meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, where the two engaged in the "Kitchen Debate." The previous spring, Nixon displayed poise and calm during an attack on his motorcade while on a good will tour in Venezuela. More important was his chairmanship of several National Security Council meetings while Eisenhower was recovering from illness.¹⁹⁸

Gerald Ford's early background is similar in some respects. He served in the Navy in World War II, seeing action in the Pacific while assigned to the light aircraft

¹⁹⁸ "The Life," President Nixon, Richard Nixon: Presidential Library and Museum. <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/president-nixon>.

carrier *USS Monterey*. After the war, he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1948, becoming House Minority Leader in 1965. In 1973, he came to Nixon's aid, agreeing to serve as vice president after Spiro T. Agnew's resignation.¹⁹⁹

Both Nixon and Ford were experienced politicians, although Nixon's foreign policy duties had given him far more first-hand knowledge and practical experience. While in Moscow during 1959, he met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev to discuss the ongoing Berlin Crisis and, in addition, outlined the official U.S. position on the status of Vietnam. Khrushchev used Eisenhower's policies on Vietnam as an analogy for his own position on the Berlin Crisis.²⁰⁰ Ford lacked Nixon's foreign policy experience, and was selected for the vice presidency because of his reputation for cooperation and willingness to accommodate opposition.

Assisted by few key advisors in the development and execution of his foreign policy, Nixon relied mainly on one person, Henry Kissinger, who served as his National Security Advisor. A World War II-era German refugee, Kissinger served in the U.S. Army during World War II as a military intelligence specialist. After the war, he earned his Ph.D. in political science at Harvard and remained on faculty there while serving simultaneously as a consultant to the National Security Council's operations Coordinating Board and Council on Foreign Relations during Eisenhower's presidency. Working with Nelson Rockefeller on national security policy, Kissinger later consulted with the

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John Robert Greene, "Gerald Ford: Foreign Affairs," Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. <https://millercenter.org/president/ford/foreign-affairs>

²⁰⁰ United States State Department, *Memorandum of Conversation*. (Ogorevo, Russia: FRUS, 1959), 1058-1069. <https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1958-60v08/d481>.

Kennedy and Johnson administrations on various Cold War foreign policy issues including nuclear weapons non-proliferation.²⁰¹

Ford also had few key foreign policy advisors, starting with Nixon's team but making changes after his first year in office. He retained Kissinger initially as his national security advisor and later as secretary of state, appointing Brent Scowcroft to replace Kissinger as his National Security Advisor. Donald Rumsfeld was named secretary of defense, and George H.W. Bush, CIA director.²⁰² Retired Lieutenant General Scowcroft was a career Air Force officer who had gained foreign policy experience from the military perspective as a senior advisor in the State Department, Department of Defense, and White House.²⁰³ Rumsfeld was a former United States naval aviator, a four-term Congressman, and a previous member of Nixon's administration, where he had directed the Office of Economic Opportunity and served as Nixon's ambassador to NATO. Having helped with Ford's transition as White House Chief of Staff, Rumsfeld succeeded James R. Schlesinger as secretary of defense.²⁰⁴ A former torpedo bomber pilot, Bush was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the Texas 7th Congressional district in 1966, and ran unsuccessfully for the Republican

²⁰¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 762-764.

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John Robert Greene, "Gerald Ford: Foreign Affairs," Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. <https://millercenter.org/president/ford/foreign-affairs>

²⁰³ Wikipedia. "Brent Scowcroft." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brent_Scowcroft#Career

²⁰⁴ "Donald H. Rumsfeld: Former Secretary of Defense," US Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/Our-Story/Biographies/Biography/Article/602800/>.

presidential nomination two years later. After losing a Senate race in 1970, Nixon appointed him an ambassador, first to the United Nations and later, to China.²⁰⁵

Despite those personnel changes, Ford inherited Nixon's organization, one that limited foreign policymaking to a very secure inner circle, with Kissinger in charge of all NSC policy making. In fact, Nixon chose William Rogers to serve as secretary of state because Rogers had very little experience with diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger often performed the primary high-level state department functions with secret back-channel negotiations. For example, the president met with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin early on and told him to deal directly with Kissinger on all matters of consequence.²⁰⁶

Thus isolated from foreign policy planning and decisions, the Departments of Defense and State took on low priority projects, some of which were never seriously considered, while Kissinger and Nixon secretly sought détente and an end to the war in Vietnam on the president's terms.²⁰⁷ While Kennedy had begun the trend toward an increasingly smaller foreign policymaking organization, Nixon continued it, making planning more compartmentalized as well. Ford inherited the secrecy and compartmentalization but tried to include more of his cabinet in the planning and decision-making process. A struggle with Kissinger resulted and, not wanting to trust

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John Robert Greene, *The Presidency of George Bush*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 10-20.

²⁰⁶ William A. Bundy, *Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in The Nixon Presidency*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 58.

²⁰⁷ Fredrik Logevall, and Andrew Preston eds, *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*, (Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2008), 5.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=415592>.

both the NSC and State to one person, Ford added Scowcroft, Rumsfeld, and Bush in what became known as the “Halloween Day Massacre.”²⁰⁸

Nixon publicly announced his foreign policy in the summer of 1969. If it worked, the Nixon Doctrine would see America extend its political, economic, and diplomatic support to any country that was threatened by communism while avoiding heavy military involvement. Threatened nations would be responsible for providing their own defensive manpower -- America would no longer play world policeman. Nixon preferred diplomatic engagement with peer powers and emphasized detente with the Soviets and Chinese, but like the foreign policies of every administration since Truman's, this was a form of containment. Refining Nixon's emphasis on diplomacy with the communists, Kissinger insisted on the "linkage" of incentives and disincentives to American foreign policy goals. Not only might granting or withholding economic aid achieve the same result but this carrot and stick diplomacy also assumed that each diplomatic action was linked to all others.²⁰⁹ Meanwhile, Nixon expected supported nations to share the burdens and responsibilities of local self-defense so that there would be no more Vietnams.²¹⁰ Believing as he did in détente, engagement with the Soviets, and improved relations with the People's Republic of China, Ford shared Nixon's view. He, too, was committed to providing what support he could to the government of the Republic of Vietnam.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 817-828.

²⁰⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 717.

²¹⁰ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 181-182.

²¹¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 815-820.

Amidst all of these similarities, Nixon's isolation of the critical planning and decision making within the White House was the crucial difference, and despite Ford's efforts to the contrary, after-effects lingered. The danger posed by such a closed system was not always apparent but, despite Nixon's practical experience in foreign policy, much of Kissinger's was academic. Because Ford's retreat to a more open process was never complete, both administrations experienced significant pressures from GPACED.

Nixon's détente scored a win for his presidency and surprised the world when he announced an official state visit to the People's Republic of China in 1971. This was not a total surprise; his earlier easing of restrictions and discontinuation of patrols in the Taiwan Strait upon taking office hinted at those intentions, as did a May 1969 telegram from the State Department to the American-UN mission. Early efforts to set the diplomatic conditions for formal recognition also include Undersecretary of State Elliott L. Richardson's low-level discussions with other nations about PRC membership in the UN and Kissinger's secret arrangement of an official state visit during a Chinese tour by American table tennis players.²¹² The president had the State Department announce support for China's membership in the United Nations, eventually allowing the expulsion of former U.S. ally Taiwan from the same body. Nixon's promotion of détente was in line with his stated foreign policy and Kissinger's linkage theory. At the expense of Taiwanese and Japanese relations, better ties with China improved the chances that the Chinese would lessen their support for North Vietnam, thus making it possible for Nixon to bring U.S. troops home. The president discussed these reasons for dialog with the

²¹² United States State Department, *Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations*, by Elliot Richardson. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1969), 486. <https://history.state.gov/historical documents/ frus1969-76v05/d276>.

Chinese during an Oval Office meeting of January 26, 1972, citing the potential for reducing further confrontation in Vietnam.²¹³ Nixon's Chinese success was a signature achievement that would help his reelection campaign.

Meanwhile, mutually assured destruction remained the primary argument against using nuclear weapons, and an incident involving the construction of a base in Cuba that could house nuclear-armed Soviet subs reminded Nixon that a nuclear war could erupt easily. Once in office, he sought to reduce the competition over strategic nuclear capability, and Kissinger began negotiations with the Soviets for a nuclear arms reduction treaty. Unfortunately, his backchannel diplomacy and the president's chief arms control negotiators often worked at cross purposes, a problem highlighted in a July 20, 1970 White House conversation between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Kissinger about arms control. Kissinger told Dobrynin that lead American arms control negotiator Gerald Smith was not authorized to discuss certain technical aspects of arms control that would be included in the treaty, thus disrupting an important effort at disarmament.²¹⁴ Despite the confusion caused by Nixon's compartmentalized foreign policy team, his administration successfully negotiated agreements to limit the production of anti-ballistic missile systems and offensive nuclear weapons. These Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, (SALT I) were another success for Nixon's foreign policy. And Nixon's Moscow

²¹³ OVAL 656-10; January 26, 1972; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
<https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/tapeexcerpts/china-656-10a.pdf>.

²¹⁴ White House, *Memorandum of Conversation*, by Henry Kissinger. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1969), 1. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v32/d96>.

Summit was the first time a sitting American president had visited Moscow since the Russians formed the Soviet Union.²¹⁵

Except for Cuba, Nixon and Kissinger preferred to expend little effort on the Western Hemisphere, the latter once acknowledging to a Chilean diplomat that he knew nothing about Latin America and did not care. But this did not prevent the U.S. backing of a coup against Chile's Salvador Allende, an avowed Marxist and lawfully elected president of Chile. A 1970 National Security Council memo to Kissinger recommended subsidizing election campaigns of anti-Allende politicians and supporting any incumbents who also opposed him even before the CIA had commenced covert operations.²¹⁶ The brutal dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet followed, bringing unintended consequences for the CIA in its wake, including congressional restraints on its overseas operations.²¹⁷

Later in 1973, at the height of the Watergate crisis, the Yom Kippur War broke out. The Arabs nearly succeeded in defeating Israel with a well-coordinated effort that included both military and regional economic cooperation. While the Israelis struggled to resupply weapons and equipment depleted in the early stages of the fighting, the Egyptians hoped that a Saudi oil embargo would prevent the Americans from resupplying Israel while the Soviets replenished the Arab forces. This embargo threat caused such

²¹⁵ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 773-775.

²¹⁶ National Security Council, *Memorandum from Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger): Chilean Election*, by Viron P. Vaky. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1970), 106-107. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d39>.

²¹⁷ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 786-788.

great apprehension among the major oil corporations that their leadership wrote President Nixon of their concerns:

The terms demanded by OPEC at Vienna are of such a magnitude that their impact could produce a serious disruption in the balance of payments position of the Western world.

We are convinced of the seriousness of the intentions of the Saudis and Kuwaitis and that any actions of the U.S. Government at this time in terms of increased military aid to Israel will have a critical and adverse effect on our relations with the moderate Arab producing countries.

Much more than our commercial interests in the area is now at hazard. The whole position of the United States in the Middle East is on the way to being seriously impaired, with Japanese, European, and perhaps Russian interests largely supplanting United States presence in the area, to the detriment of both our economy and our security.²¹⁸

With Nixon sidelined by the scandal, Kissinger took over foreign policy and managed the crisis for America. Defying the oil embargo and resupplying the Israelis, he allowed them to gain the initiative and go on the offensive. Kissinger was also instrumental in establishing an international observer group to monitor the warring parties and negotiate a ceasefire once the Israelis had won. He succeeded in preserving Israel but raised the stakes considerably by bringing all American forces to high alert when the Soviets threatened to intervene, yielding long-range negative consequences: First, the Israelis developed a distrust of the United States when it prevented them from completing the destruction of Arab forces. Second, although the United States had prevented the Israelis from following through, the American public came to fear weaponized Arab oil policies.

²¹⁸ White House, *Memorandum by the Chairmen of Exxon Corporation (Jamieson), Mobil Oil Corporation (Warner), Texaco, Inc. (Granville), and Standard Oil Company of California (Miller)*, by J. K. Jamieson, Maurice F. Granville, Rawleigh Warner, Jr. and Otto N. Miller. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1973), 580. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36/d212>.

Third, and a rift developed between the United States and its NATO allies because the United States did not consult them about its heightened military force readiness.²¹⁹

Ford began his presidency with one of the same challenges Johnson had faced: reassuring the country that America's system of governance would survive a current presidential crisis. The president and Kissinger also wanted to maintain the positive gains from Nixon's détente with the Soviets and improve on SALT I, and Ford's meeting with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev soon resulted in a SALT II draft agreement that placed limits on the numbers of nuclear arms for the next ten years. These new arms discussions were a limited success, as each side agreed to the framework of the treaty without ratifying it.²²⁰ During the rest of Ford's presidency, arguments against the draft framework of SALT II from both sides of the aisle became political tools to be used against him in the 1974 mid-term election. In an October 7, 1974, National Security Council meeting, Ford chastised the State and Defense Departments for allowing leaks of SALT II negotiations to the press. Not only did media publication of this information damage the administration, but it was harming the talks as well. President Ford gave his staff forty-eight hours to stop the leaks.²²¹

Ford continued his détente with Brezhnev during the Helsinki Conference of July and August 1975, where thirty-five nations met to promote stability and international cooperation. At stake was the ratification of several agreements, and Ford's closing

²¹⁹ William A. Bundy, *Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in The Nixon Presidency*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 430-444.

²²⁰ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 204-205.

²²¹ Minutes: National Security Council Meeting, October 7, 1974, folder: NSC Meeting October 7, 1974, box 1, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974-77, Gerald R. Ford Library. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0312/1552376.pdf>.

speech noted that the United States hoped to advance human rights and the free flow of ideas, information, and people.²²² The Soviets, on the other hand, hoped to solidify their position in Eastern Europe and, although both superpowers signed the agreements, Ford's Soviet diplomacy did not achieve any advancements. The rapport he gained from earlier meetings was lost, as his personal exchanges with Brezhnev were antagonistic.

America's participation in the agreements was viewed, both at home and abroad, as abandoning Eastern Europe by recognizing the Soviet conquests of World War II as within their legal boundaries. Ford's hopes to advance SALT negotiations did not pan out either. The Helsinki Conference was a setback for détente.²²³

Johnson left Nixon with what Kennedy had left him. Nixon spent a great deal of time during his administration working to achieve his goals in Vietnam. He directed studies on Vietnam soon after entering office and pursued a policy of Vietnamization based on these studies. Vietnamization, as expressed by Kissinger's National Security Study Memorandum of April 1969 required that the Republic of Vietnam be made to shoulder the load of combat and that American forces conduct a phased withdrawal.²²⁴ For the next several years, Nixon and Kissinger embarked on a series of negotiations with the governments of North and South Vietnam to implement Vietnamization. While steadily withdrawing American forces, Nixon pressured the North with intensified American firepower, mainly from the air. He also extended significant American

²²² Gerald Ford, "Remarks in Helsinki" (Speech, Helsinki, Finland, August 1, 1975). <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-1-1975-remarks-helsinki>.

²²³ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 826-827.

²²⁴ National Security Council. *National Study Memorandum 36. Vietnamizing the War*. by Henry Kissinger. (Washington D.C.: NSC April, 1969), 1-2. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssm-nixon/nssm_036.pdf.

military operations to the border countries of Laos and Cambodia, countries that the North had previously used as staging areas and supply routes without fear of U.S. interdiction. While American forces fought the North, Nixon pressured the South Vietnamese leadership to agree to peace terms. His conditions were that any South Vietnamese government left in place must be able to stand on its own for at least five years.²²⁵

Nixon and Kissinger both believed that all communist movements shared a common goal and centralized direction. With this belief, the president's Chinese and Soviet diplomacy encouraged both to leverage the North Vietnamese leadership into agreeing to Nixon's terms, but reaching American goals in Vietnam via Kissinger's linkage proved costly. Amid negotiations, the North frequently attempted to gain ground on the South with increased military operations, and each time the North attacked, Nixon responded with force. Nixon's détente with China and the Soviets gave him some freedom of action to authorize a massive bombing operation against the North during the 1972 Easter Offensive. By January 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had gotten both sides to sign the Paris Peace Agreement, the massive bombing of North Vietnam being a key factor. Unfortunately, adherence to the treaty was unverifiable and unenforceable, and peace, temporary. Both the North and the South assumed the war would continue anyway, and actively prepared for the resumption of the fight.²²⁶

Nixon achieved his short-term goals in Vietnam, but only delayed the communist takeover and therefore failed to contain the spread of communism. Compelled to deal

²²⁵ William A. Bundy, *Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in The Nixon Presidency*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 62-80.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 360-367.

with Vietnam on account of the previous administration's policies, he effected more of a compromise than a success. Significant pressures from GPACED, as noted in the next section, limited Nixon's choices in Vietnam.

Ford dealt with the aftermath of America's failed containment strategy in Southeast Asia when North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam in 1975. Soon after the hectic evacuation of Saigon, the president acted against the Cambodians who seized an American merchant ship, the *S.S. Mayaguez*. He ordered bombing attacks against mainland Cambodia and assaulted a Cambodian island, believing the ship's crew was being held there. These unplanned frantic responses caused President Ford much consternation. Angrily chastising his staff, he repeatedly demanded to know why his orders to prevent boats from leaving the Cambodian island had not been carried out.²²⁷ In fact, poor intelligence and the hurried nature of the operation was the cause of the island raid's dozens of pointless casualties. The Cambodians were releasing the merchantmen around the time that U.S. Marines were attacking the island. Although flawed, Ford's decisive response did win him short-lived, but fleeting public approval.²²⁸

Meanwhile, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress during Nixon's entire presidency. His record of sixty-seven percent in presidential victories for Congressional votes on measures supported by his administration reflects the majority opposition.²²⁹ Much of the pressure Nixon faced from Congress was over Vietnam

²²⁷ Memo, Smyser to Kissinger, May 29, 1975, folder: "NSC Meeting, 5/13/1975 (evening)", box 1, National Security Council Meetings File, 1974-77, Gerald R. Ford Library. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0312/1552388.pdf>

²²⁸ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 825.

²²⁹ United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016, Table 8-1*. Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>

policies. Not only was the War Powers Resolution of 1973 a blow to his freedom of action, but Watergate had already crippled his presidency when that act went into effect. Prior to the War Powers Act, Congress had moved to restrict Nixon's military activities in Southeast Asia multiple times. From 1970 to 1973, Congress proposed or enacted twenty-four measures specifically aimed at restricting Nixon's actions in Vietnam. Nine of those measures placed significant restraints on the president's policies in Vietnam, prohibiting him from conducting operations in some countries while placing limitations on his force strength in others. The Cooper-Church Amendment of 1970 barred U.S. forces from Cambodia and the Mansfield Amendment of 1971 went so far as to mandate the complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.²³⁰ Nixon's response to the latter was especially pointed, emphasizing that "section 601 of this act--the so-called Mansfield Amendment--does not represent the policies of this Administration. It is because section 601 of this bill will not in fact alter this policy that I have signed it into law. I would add, regretfully, that legislative actions such as this hinder rather than assist in the search for a negotiated settlement."²³¹ These restrictions had a direct impact on the effectiveness of Nixon's exit strategy from Vietnam. The Defense Appropriations Act of 1974 -- the final one of Nixon's presidency -- barred any U.S. combat activities in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia by restricting the amount of military aid to South Vietnam.

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Congressional Research Service, *CRS Report for Congress: Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches*, by Amy Belasco, and Lynn J. Cunningham, and Hannah Fischer, and Larry A. Niksch. (Washington D.C.: Congress, 2007), 6-27.

²³¹ Richard Nixon, *Statement on Signing the Military Appropriations Authorization Bill*. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/241246>.

Ford's ability to provide support to South Vietnam, as promised under the Paris Peace Agreement, fell short because of this budget.

Ford struggled against a Democratic-controlled Congress throughout his administration. The Democrats maintained control of Congress during his presidency, winning only fifty seven percent of the votes he supported.²³² Not only had Nixon done better, but Ford's lack of recourse resulted in fifty-six vetoes. Congressional opposition was constant; the first significant clash came when a congress pressured by the Greek lobby seeking assistance in Cyprus terminated military aid to Turkey. Ford managed to delay the military aid embargo for a year, but eventual capitulation was inevitable. When the end came, he warned Congress that national security would suffer as a result of its interference:

The restrictions imposed in this bill on our military assistance to Turkey create serious problems. Without substantial benefit to any other country, these restrictions threaten our relations with a country which is a close ally, which is the eastern anchor of an alliance vital to the security of the United States, and which plays a fundamental role in the strategic interests of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean area. It is for these reasons--the national security interests of the United States--that we have been providing military assistance to Turkey. ...Congressional leadership must bear the full responsibility for that failure.²³³

Congress proceeded with the embargo, and when the sanctions went into effect, NATO ally Turkey shut down nearly every American military and intelligence collection base on its soil. This dealt another blow to containment as Ford lost valuable pieces of America's defense against the Soviet Union. Congress also cut funding for South Vietnam and

²³² United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016*, Table 8-1. Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>

²³³ Gerald R. Ford, *Statement on Signing the Continuing Appropriations Resolution*. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256205>.

Cambodia in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, prompting a rebuke from Ford that equated inadequate funding with likely mission failure and objectives left unachieved.²³⁴ As the Republic of Vietnam's economy collapsed and American support dwindled, the North Vietnamese sensed an opportunity and quickly overran South Vietnam. The only request Congress granted for South Vietnam was to support Ford's evacuation of the country.²³⁵

In 1974, Congress also sank a trade initiative sought by Ford and Kissinger. After agreeing to a draft treaty, the Soviets were angered when Congress stipulated that they must recognize human rights before they would allow Ford to join in the commercial trade treaty. Ford signed the law with Congress' stipulations but noted that the complexity of its wording would make it difficult to implement and objectionable to other countries.²³⁶ As Ford had feared, Congress' efforts to pressure the Soviets backfired; not only did they reject the treaty but increased their restrictions on Jewish emigration as well – the very human rights abuses that Congress had hoped to prevent.²³⁷

Congress also prohibited Ford from continuing the policy of containment in Africa, where he had been providing military assistance to the newly independent Angolan government in its fight against Soviet-backed Leftists. Supported by thousands of Cuban troops, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was

²³⁴ Gerald R. Ford, *Statement on Signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974*. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256300>.

²³⁵ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 816-821.

²³⁶ White House, *Presidential Remarks on Signing of the Trade Act of 1974: Friday, January 3, 1975*, Gerald Ford. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1975), 7. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0122/1252185.pdf>.

²³⁷ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 204-205.

gaining ground on Angolan government forces, when Congress cut off funding for military assistance. “It is time these people put up or shut up,” retorted Ford. “Congress has lost its guts -- they have cut and run, and we need them on the record. No one who voted no can tell me to get tough with the Soviet Union. There is a lot of talk but no guts.”²³⁸ Ford was unsuccessful in gaining the funds to support Angola, and without support, the country quickly fell to MPLA forces. Angola joined the Soviet’s sphere of influence shortly afterward.²³⁹

Desire for a second term in office motivated Nixon’s efforts towards détente, and his early achievements with China and the Soviets contributed much to his successful reelection run. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was certain that North Vietnamese foreign policy actions towards America had hinged on the Nixon campaign, and that the North Vietnamese expected Nixon to woo voters with a softer Vietnam policy.²⁴⁰ Indeed, Vietnam was a significant issue in Nixon’s reelection campaign. In October 1972, he emphasized to Kissinger that he did not want to withdraw from South Vietnam if its government were to collapse before the American presidential election.²⁴¹ Domestic measures, including the Selective Service Reform Bill, which calmed conscription anxieties, also helped secure his reelection, but in the end, Nixon’s cutthroat political methods damaged his foreign policy most of all.

²³⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, January 27, 1976, folder: “National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977”, box 17, Memoranda of Conversations, Ford Administration, Gerald R. Ford Library. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553349.pdf>

²³⁹ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 209.

²⁴⁰ White House, *Memorandum of Conversation*, by Henry Kissinger. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1972), 67-68. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v15/d25>.

²⁴¹ “Richard Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger on 6 October 1972,” Conversation 793-006 (*PRDE* Excerpt A), *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition* [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006749>.

The Watergate scandal was ultimately the biggest obstacle in preventing Nixon from achieving his foreign policy goals. A scandal of his own making driven in part by motivations to succeed in the upcoming reelection, it frustrated the president's attempts at control. Nixon not only resigned but handed his successor a crippled administration and Ford -- essentially a lame duck for his entire term -- was unable to achieve any significant foreign policy goals.

Nixon's South East Asia foreign policy generated widespread anger among the public when he informed America about his 1970 Cambodian operations. The president's announcement caused hundreds of mass protests at universities nationwide, including the May 4, 1970 incident at Kent State University that had left four students dead and another nine wounded. When over 100,000 demonstrators converged on the White House five days later, Nixon attempted to appease the public by limiting the scope of the Cambodian operations. He promised that American troops would move no further than twenty miles into Cambodian territory and leave the country by June 30th.²⁴²

Responding to the unrest, Congress formed an ad hoc committee to hear student views of America's policy towards South East Asia and sixty-three university students from dozens of colleges testified in Congress over a two-day period. The initial student testimonies captured the divisive nature of the Vietnam war's impact on American society. Greg Rambo of Kent State voiced support for Nixon's policies including combat operations in Cambodia, adding that Senate actions to limit funding of the Cambodian operations were an insult to the integrity of the president of the United States. The

²⁴² Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 185-186.

second witness was Steve Kramer, a student at Whittier College, California -- Nixon's alma mater. Kramer described the shocked reactions of students when they learned about Nixon's secret invasion of Cambodia and decried the military-industrial complex that had taken over America. The only way to avoid a civil war in America, he said, was to remove the power from the corporate-military elite and give it to the people. The Whittier College student went on to extol the virtues of communism and criticize American international aggression.²⁴³ Not all of the student views were as extreme, but the ad hoc committee hearings increased the public pressure on Nixon's Vietnam policies and brought about additional Congressional scrutiny on the president's war efforts.

The domestic situation in 1972 factored into strategic decision making. National Security Council Staffer Winston Lord stated that the U.S. domestic scene was an argument against a resumption of bombing. Although it would bring temporary support from conservatives, the left would be critical, and American opinion against the president would intensify if the aerial attacks did not result in timely war gains on the ground or in diplomatic breakthroughs.²⁴⁴ Domestic reactions to events elsewhere also mattered. When the president sent a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal to support Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, his lack of neutrality and Kissinger's backchannel negotiations with the Chinese resulted in a near confrontation with the Soviets, whose navy was already supporting India. The *New York Times* also published secret internal

²⁴³ Congress, House, Ad Hoc Committee of Members of the House of Representatives, *Student Views Toward United States Policy in Southeast Asia*, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., May 21-22, 1970, 1-12. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-91hhrg46487/pdf/CHRG-91hhrg46487.pdf>.

²⁴⁴ National Security Council, *Memorandum from Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger): Haiphong & Hanoi*, by Winston Lord. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1972), 347-348. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus/1969-76v08/d106>.

documentation of the decisions to support Pakistan; documentation laced with some of Nixon's mean-spirited personal attacks on Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi. With the leak of these "Pentagon Papers," the White House became increasingly fearful of further disclosures even though the leaked classified reports also reflected poorly on Kennedy and Johnson as well as Nixon. Columnist Gary Wills of *The Record* typified media criticism of the president when he accused Nixon of using the American public as a tool for pressuring his enemies.²⁴⁵ Within a week of the release of the Pentagon Papers, the president's staff created a special unit nicknamed the "Plumbers" to stop the leaks. Nixon's attempts to identify and stop the disclosure of these damning reports drew him closer to the scandal that allowed the GPACED system to remove him from office.²⁴⁶

The Watergate scandal killed Nixon's foreign policy, and amid the growing domestic and international perception of the president's abuse of power, his efforts for détente became ineffective. Kissinger carried the load and tried to maintain détente while Nixon retreated from the public, but when Nixon stepped down and Ford took over, the new administration was unable to revive détente effectively. Not only did the office of the president lose credibility because of Watergate but Ford's pardon of Nixon cost it even more.²⁴⁷

Nixon was initially effective in attaining the foreign policy goals the system compelled him to undertake, but his actions also resulted in Watergate and GPACED punished his administration accordingly. The system prevented both he and Ford from

²⁴⁵ Gary Wills, "The Pentagon Papers: Nixon see the People as Claque," *The Record*, May 23, 1972. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/492232164/?terms=pentagon%2Bpapers%2Bnixon>.

²⁴⁶ William A. Bundy, *Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in The Nixon Presidency*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 260-285.

²⁴⁷ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 204-205.

achieving their goals at a higher rate than the previous administrations.




Figure 6. Impact of GPACED on the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Congress exerted the most influence. The system of GPACED dominated foreign policy for the duration of Ford's presidency and did not release its grip until the next administration took power.

CHAPTER VII

CARTER

Jimmy Carter graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and became a nuclear submarine engineer officer, but resigned his commission after his father's death to run the family business. As Carter's business flourished, he became active in local politics and in 1962 won a seat as a Georgia state senator. He became Governor of Georgia on his second attempt, and from there secured the Democratic Party nomination, winning a narrow victory in the 1976 election. As president, Carter was a religious man with strong convictions who genuinely cared for people and wanted a government that would work for the public good. Acting on this central leadership theme, he tried to represent the public interest by choosing morally correct goals rather than politically expedient ones. He also believed that he was serving the global community as well as America, and that an inherently "stupid and venal" government could not succeed. Only intelligence and honesty would solve problems. Unfortunately, his sense of political timing for major initiatives was flawed.²⁴⁸

Domestic issues accounted for the bulk of President Carter's experience; he came to the presidency with no practical knowledge in foreign policy. What he brought to the

²⁴⁸ Erwin C. Hargrove, *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 5-23.

office was a strong work ethic and executive experience gained as Georgia's governor. He also brought a keen, detail-oriented mind and a tendency to work out problems by himself; a habit he had developed in previous offices. Working with this hands-on mindset, President Carter tried to learn everything about an issue so that he could fix it from a position of knowledge. He spent thirty hours a week reading background information on matters brought to him for consideration, which often made him more knowledgeable about proposed legislation than congressional committee leaders. But if Congressmen did not have the slightest idea what was in their bills, Carter's own expertise stemmed from a work ethic that ultimately overtaxed him.²⁴⁹ This penchant for doing too many things at once with little prioritization prevented him from seeing individual problems in a broader geopolitical context.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski were Carter's principal foreign policy team members. Experience as the deputy secretary of defense under President Johnson and participation in the Paris Peace Talks in 1968 and 1969 had convinced Vance that America was unable to solve every problem. Instead of military intervention, he believed in peace through negotiations and economic ties. Brzezinski, on the other hand, distrusted the Soviets and had no faith in détente – attitudes one might expect of a Polish immigrant with practical experience as a foreign policy advisor under Kennedy and Johnson.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ John Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency a re-evaluation* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), 39.

²⁵⁰ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 216-217

Reacting against Nixon's centralized foreign policy apparatus, Carter established a decentralized one in which cabinet members took his direction and then implemented policy at the department level. He also expected cabinet members to be friends and equals rather than competitors in argument mode during coordination meetings. A more open administration whose policymaking included the entire cabinet, he reasoned, would avoid the sort of duplicity that had plagued previous administrations. Accordingly, Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-2 reorganized his administration's National Security Council structure by consolidating a few subgroups that existed under Nixon's NSC and placing them in a Policy Review Committee. Notably, Carter also took the chairmanship of this consolidated group from Brzezinski and gave Vance more control over national security council sessions.²⁵¹

Ironically, Carter's inclusiveness revived a process that he had hoped to discard. Like Johnson, Carter held weekly breakfast meetings; only the key players --Vance, Brzezinski, Vice President Mondale, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown -- had changed. Carter led the discussions, and foreign policy decisions were made at these working breakfasts.²⁵² The decisions required staffing for effective implementation, but Carter's hands-on, central coordinator method of leadership left room for miscommunication and omissions.

Carter began his administration without a chief of staff. He attempted to handle all communication himself but eventually realized he needed assistance to manage the

²⁵¹ White House, *Presidential Directive / NSC-2*, by Jimmy Carter. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1977), 1-4. <https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd02.pdf>.

²⁵² Erwin C. Hargrove, *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 18-26.

volume of work passing through his office. Hamilton Jordan was the solution. As chief of staff, he conducted a study of staff functions and noted that it was difficult to track, let alone control the information flow of foreign policy actions coming to the president's office. Jordan also noted that Brzezinski and a few others were bypassing the staff and bringing foreign policy memos directly to Carter.²⁵³ While Jordan brought some organizational control to the White House, the president's deep simultaneous involvement in many issues at once created problems for his foreign policy implementation.

President Carter wanted to correct the wrongs of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, and bring back honest government that met the needs of the common public. Fittingly, he had campaigned for president using a fair, open, decent, and competent government platform, all themes countering the Vietnam and Watergate eras. The president and his secretary of state held Wilsonian views -- they sought to cooperate in the spirit of peace with America's competitors while pushing for human rights causes, and helping developing nations.²⁵⁴ Carter presenting his purportedly more democratic and humane foreign policy at the University of Notre Dame's Spring 1977 commencement, reaffirming America's commitment to human rights and vowing to reinforce America's bonds with other democracies. President Carter also called for engagement with the Soviets to halt nuclear and conventional arms proliferation and

²⁵³ Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Cabinet-Congress, 1977; Container 33, 3-4. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital-library/cos/142099/33/cos_142099_33_04-Administration_Review_Goals_&_Priorities_First_Draft_of_December_1977_Memo_Constituents_Plan_Memo_1978_Charts.pdf.

²⁵⁴ Erwin C. Hargrove, *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 6-15.

bring about peace in the Middle East.²⁵⁵ Presidential Directive /NSC-18, *US National Strategy*, emphasized the non-military elements of power, especially diplomacy and economics. The spirit of NSC-18 shifted competition with the Soviets to political engagement, with diplomacy being the main effort.²⁵⁶

Secretary of State Vance worked early to set the conditions for Carter's Middle East Peace initiatives and, although the president's immediate goal of reviving the Geneva Conference was not attainable, he did convince the leaders of Israel and Egypt to meet at Camp David. The meetings between Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Israel's Menachim Begin produced no agreement, but Carter's follow-up diplomacy produced an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty several months later. While the agreement fell short of Carter's goals, it did produce calmer relations between Egypt and Israel.²⁵⁷

Diplomacy with China early in his administration also brought limited success. At the expense of Taiwan's peace of mind – China agreed not to seek unification by force – America normalized diplomatic relations with Communist China. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in April 1979, Carter responded by authorizing the sale of equipment and sharing of intelligence with the Chinese, but pressuring the Kremlin in this way meant that Carter had to backtrack on his human rights principles. Congress resisted, and passed a Taiwan Relations Act containing provisions for American arms sales to Taiwan should the People's Republic of China attack. The act specified that

²⁵⁵ Jimmy Carter, "University of Notre Dame Commencement" (Speech, Notre Dame, IN, May 22, 1977). <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may-22-1977-university-notre-dame-commencement>.

²⁵⁶ White House, *Presidential Directive /NSC-18: National Security Strategy*, Jimmy Carter. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1977), 1-5. <https://jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd18.pdf>.

²⁵⁷ Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 210-211.

“...the United States shall make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.”²⁵⁸ These defense provisions caused strained relations with the newly recognized Communist Chinese.

Another initial success for the Carter Administration was the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) with the Soviet Union, but it also encountered a human rights stumbling block. Repeated American attempts to link human rights to the treaty complicated the negotiations, but the Soviets eventually relented. An extension of Mutually Assured Destruction, SALT II aimed at maintaining strategic nuclear weapons parity between the two superpowers. Once Carter and Brezhnev had signed the agreement in Vienna, it encountered strong opposition led by Senate Armed Services Committee member Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona). He would vote against ratification, he told Carter, because verification of Soviet compliance would be impossible.²⁵⁹ Congressional resistance and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prevented SALT II’s ratification.

The SALT II agreement was but one of several major foreign policy initiatives during 1977-1979, when efforts to secure a Middle East peace agreement and ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty were also in progress. Such ambitious foreign policy goals compounded the effects of changes in the geopolitical environment. Carter’s personal overextension did not go unnoticed either, with White House Chief of Staff Jordan

²⁵⁸ *Taiwan Relations Act*, Statutes at Large 93, sec. 22, 48 (1979).
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479>.

²⁵⁹ Senate Armed Services Committee, *Dear Mr. President*, Barry Goldwater. (Washington D.C: Senate Armed Services Committee, 1979), Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 6/1/79; Container 119, 20. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/119/SSO_148878_119_11.pdf.

critiquing his multitasking, arbitrary deadlines, and out-of-context decision making.

Carter acknowledged his problem in a hand-written reply and characterized his situation as frantic.²⁶⁰ This frantic situation caused him to overlook a developing problem in Iran.

The problem was Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's increasingly despotic rule and the disagreement among key foreign policy advisors over how to deal with it. This division and Carter's inattention contributed to the loss of American influence in the region. The April 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan compounded the problem, making Carter's goals of engagement and reduction of military competition with the Soviets unattainable. Once again, the Cold War heated up, this time with anti-Soviet embargoes and a notoriously unpopular U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics. This debut of the Carter Doctrine, a declaration that threats in the Persian Gulf constituted an assault on U.S. vital interests, in turn caused Carter to stop Congress's military budget slashing and develop Enhanced Radiation Weapons.²⁶¹ In his 1980 Presidential Directive 59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy" (PD-59), Carter announced to the Soviets that any nuclear attack on America would be met with enough force to render any gains meaningless. Not only did PD-59 explicitly extend American nuclear targeting to Soviet industrial, political, and urban centers, but civilian population centers as well; a strategy nearly identical to that ordered by Eisenhower in 1958.²⁶² Like Carter, he had concluded

²⁶⁰ White House, *Early Month's Performance*, Hamilton Jordan. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1977), 2-3. Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Early Months' Performance, HJ Memos to Pres., 1977, Container 34a. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_34a_17-Early_Months_Performance_HJ_Memos.pdf.

²⁶¹ Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 214.

²⁶² White House, *Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy*, Jimmy Carter. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1980), 2-4. <https://jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd59.pdf>.

that only a retaliatory strike against both military and urban-industrial targets would destroy Soviet nuclear offensive capability.²⁶³ As with previous administrations, the geopolitical situation forced Carter to engage the Soviets in Cold War rhetoric and emphasize military power over diplomacy.

World events also led to a reversal of human rights policy in Central America. National Security Advisor Brzezinski's January 1979 memo to Carter expressed the administration's stance on Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, whose widely reported human rights violations had caused the withdrawal of American support. The Nicaraguan leader did not align with communist ideologies, which was important for America interests in the Western Hemisphere, but his harsh methods violated American desires to support international human rights. Carter's intentions to remove military and economic aid from Somoza's regime are clear in a memo prepared for him by Brzezinski.²⁶⁴

Without American support, Somoza fell, but Cuban-backed Sandinistas soon gained control of Nicaragua, frustrating American plans. In a reversal of his Somoza policy, Carter offered the Sandinistas aid incentives even though the Sandinistas had committed human rights violations of their own. Reports of summary executions made the newspapers; one report claiming that thousands of members of the Somoza regime

²⁶³ Memo, *Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council*, November 20, 1958, 387th Meeting of the National Security Council November 20, 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

²⁶⁴ White House, *Memorandum for the President: Your Lunch with Rep. John Murphy*, Zbigniew Brzezinski, (Washington D.C.: White House, 1979), 1-4. Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 1/19/79; Container 103.
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/103/SSO_148878_103_12.pdf.

and their families had been shot.²⁶⁵ In a Congressional working breakfast session, Carter urged support for a huge supplemental aid package to Nicaragua, laying out several incentives for the Sandinistas and stressing the prevention of a Nicaragua-Soviet-Cuba alliance.²⁶⁶

The geopolitical situations in the Middle East and Central America forced Carter to amend his foreign policies, as did the threat of Soviet involvement in those areas. Challenges from Congress only compounded these problems, as Jimmy Carter did not have a harmonious relationship with Capitol Hill. Through the course of his administration, he had lost in four Congressional votes -- a poorer record than either Kennedy or Johnson, and only slightly better than Nixon -- despite Democratic control of the House for his entire presidency and control of the Senate except for his last year in office.²⁶⁷ Early in his term, those poor relations with Congress became apparent when loss of a vote on a domestic issue caused heated debate and criticism from Congress. The president's staff responded to several specific criticisms by claiming that the current poor executive-congressional relations were an ongoing problem that had begun in the prior to his administration and had only grown worse since Carter took office.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ "Sandinista Executions Alleged," *News-Press*, August 2, 1979.
<https://www.newspapers.com/image/220345732/?terms=sandinistas%2Bexecutions%2Balleghed>.

²⁶⁶ White House, *Congressional Leadership Breakfast*, Frank Moore, (Washington D.C.: White House, 1979), 38. Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 12/11/79; Container 142. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/142/SSO_148878_142_02.pdf.

²⁶⁷ United States Congress, March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016*, Table 8-1. Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>

²⁶⁸ Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Congress/President, Container 34a, 2. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_34a_10-Congress_president.pdf.

Senator James B. Allen (D-Alabama) typified the congressional resistance. Opposing Jimmy Carter's Panama Canal policy, Allen noted that Carter had reneged on a campaign promise when he signed the Panama Canal Treaty, for in a 1976 debate with Gerald Ford, he had taken a hardline stance towards maintaining American control of the canal.²⁶⁹ The president's move to push forward a treaty early in his term, although unexpected by some and contested by many, did nest well with his national security strategy. However, congressional efforts to alter the spirit of the agreement dogged Carter's team, with Senator Allen urging an indefinite presence of American military to defend and maintain neutrality of the canal.²⁷⁰ The president's administration spent a great deal of energy battling Allen and others, finally securing ratification by a slim margin.

Congress and Carter were often at odds over the budget, too. Although the president was able to achieve an initial cut in the defense budget that halted the B-1 Bomber, National Security Advisor Brzezinski was concerned about his long-range budget planning. In a March 1978 memo to the president, Brzezinski pointedly noted the budget's foreign policy implications and that economics alone should not guide it. America's friends and enemies, he argued, took cues from the Department of Defense funding and arms control efforts.²⁷¹ Brzezinski's warning soon became a reality when

²⁶⁹ Donald M. Rothberg, "Carter Given Slight Edge in Debate II," *The Times Herald*, October 7, 1976. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/210340000/?terms=carter%2Bpanama%2Bcanal>.

²⁷⁰ United States State Department, *Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter*, by Cyrus Vance. (Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1978), 358. Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 2/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote: "Cy." <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v29/d149>.

²⁷¹ White House, *Memorandum: Jim McIntyre's Memo of March 1 Concerning Plans for 1980 Budget*, Zibgniew Brzezinski. (Washington D.C.: White House, 1978), 2. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/68/SSO_148878_068_11.pdf.

the Soviets interpreted Carter's budget actions as an American retreat and stepped up their military activities.

The near-constant resistance from Congress played a significant role in Jimmy Carter's dim prospects for reelection. As America's national politics played out in the international media, other governments noted his weakened congressional and public support. This magnified the 1980 election's effect on Carter's foreign policy, his "lame duck" status being a relevant factor in the Iranian Hostage crisis. One memo from CIA Director Stansfield Turner warned that the time for accomplishing any agreement with the Iranians before Ronald Reagan's inauguration was running out and that the Iranians had to believe that they would get a better deal from Carter for that agreement to happen.²⁷² Despite Turner's efforts, Iran rebuffed Carter, and hostage recovery efforts hit a dead end until the new administration came to power.

Carter also spent money on foreign humanitarian assistance for the first three years of his presidency despite the voting public's disapproval. Only when his bid for reelection neared did he begin to regard domestic political consequences seriously, proposing a significant reduction in foreign humanitarian aid. But that change, of course, did not help America's best interests abroad, and it came too late to satisfy a political base more interested in domestic programs.²⁷³

Hamilton Jordan's White House staff study, conducted late in Carter's first year in office, shows the effect of those domestic concerns on the president's foreign policies. In

²⁷² Central Intelligence Agency, *Memorandum for the President: US Iranian Negotiations*, by Stansfield Turner. (Washington: CIA, 1980), 2. <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/23914367>.

²⁷³ Brandice Canes-Wrone, *Who Leads Whom* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 136.


his findings and recommendations, Jordan urged Carter to change the way his administration developed and implemented foreign policy. Especially concerned that newspapers and political opponents were capitalizing on leaked national security policy plans, he favored active preemption of leaks rather than reacting to them after the fact.²⁷⁴ Throughout his administration, Carter struggled to keep his foreign policy formulation free of domestic politics, yet his efforts to make them more transparent made that struggle more difficult. While the president's public image affected U.S. foreign relations, so did domestic energy programs.

President Carter's national address on the energy crisis backfired on him. His perceptions of a declining national mood and consequent call for civil cooperation in making America better became famously known as the "Malaise Speech." American lack of respect and confidence in its institutions had, in his estimation, caused a gap between society and government. While his conclusions were debatable, that plea for Americans to have faith in each other and the administration clearly overshadowed his efforts to gain support for his energy programs. Public support declined as a result, and many of Carter's former supporters concluded that he was a weak and ineffective president. Newspaper columnist Anthony Lewis aptly expressed the national attitude towards the president by writing that Carter's character had not translated itself into the sort of leadership that makes Washington work.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ White House, Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Administration Review, Goals & Priorities-First Draft of December 1977 Memo; Container 33 77-78.

https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/33/cos_142099_33_02-Administration_Review_Goals_&Priorities_First_Draft_of_December_1977_Memo.pdf.

²⁷⁵ Anthony Lewis, "Being a Decent Person does not make a Leader," *The Times-Tribune*, August 18, 1979. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/531271487/?terms=Malaise%2BSpeech>.



Jimmy Carter's few foreign policy successes occurred early in his administration, with GPACED preventing the accomplishment of his favorite goals. Instead, it compelled him to carry out those foreign policies he had most wanted to avoid. The previous administration did not affect Jimmy Carter's foreign policy, but the GPACED's other elements exerted significant pressures, nevertheless. Figure 7 illustrates the Carter administration's struggle against the system and eventual reversal of his chosen foreign policy goals. Although GPACED forced him to pursue those reversed objectives for new reasons, GPACED was still the deciding factor in dictating the course of his foreign policy.


CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Each of the presidents discussed in the preceding chapters came into office with clear foreign policy goals but, although each administration met some of those goals with relative ease, unforeseen challenges were the norm. Often compelled to undertake strategies not of their choosing, and sometimes prevented from accomplishing their chosen foreign policies altogether, those presidents faced complex patterns of influence that were impossible to control even when their effects were obvious. That such a murky process as GPACED produced such clear results might seem counterintuitive were it not a shared tendency of six consecutive administrations. All of the presidents in this study tended to achieve crucial foreign policy goals early in their terms, while later efforts in line with previously stated objectives encountered more resistance.

A second tendency is that GPACED compels administrations to act more often than it compels them to sit still. All but Nixon and Ford took actions not of their choosing, but even compromise involves more action than inaction. Those two exceptions encountered more delays and obstructions than pushes from Congress, a possible result of Nixon's impeachable criminal activities and subsequent resignation.

Figure 8 displays foreign policies forced on administrations along with accompanying trends. The numbers in each block represent the instances when the system altered foreign policies, either by compulsion or prevention.




A third tendency is that some elements of GPACED usually carry more influence than others. In the preceding historical case studies, the most influential element is the geopolitical environment, an unpredictable element that causes administrations to react rather than act. In terms of influence and leverage on presidential administrations, Congress runs a close second.

Figure 9 illustrates the number of instances that each element of GPACED exerted a significant influence on foreign policies. In all but one case study, the geopolitical environment is the most cited element, although Congress affected the Nixon and Ford administrations as much, Watergate being the likely factor in this increased

Congressional activity. The most influential element after Congress is the prior administration, but there is an exception here as well. The Carter Administration did not encounter significant prior administration influence on foreign policy, probably because Congress had exerted such an extreme impact on Ford's presidency, effectively preventing him from accomplishing anything of significance in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate.

Examining these historical examples through the lenses of GPACED demonstrates the effects of the system on presidential freedom of action where foreign policy development and execution is concerned.



More than the president, the GPACED system establishes what can be done, what must be done, and the direction an administration will go by defining the environment, the problem set, and choices available. And because the executive selects foreign policy

actions within the confines of GPACED, he must frequently choose between the lesser of two evils. Presidents are remembered for these choices, which history often judges to be poor, yet the systemic constraints that lead to these choices seldom draw as much attention. An appreciation of GPACED allows us to see these presidential decisions in a different light. Neither absolving individual presidents nor removing ownership of key foreign policy actions from them, it nevertheless enables a broader understanding of presidential foreign policy decision making. In the end, it shows us how often those decisions were forced by the system rather than chosen by an individual acting solely on his own volition.

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- Nixon, Richard. *OVAL 656-10; January 26, 1972*; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtual-library/tape-excerpts/china-656-10a.pdf>. Nixon discusses reasons for opening relations with the Chinese. In this Oval Office meeting, he tells Haig and others that China is on its way to becoming a peer nuclear power. Its best to open relations now so the two nations do not get into military fights over policies in the Asia and Pacific regions.

———. *Statement on Signing the Military Appropriations Authorization Bill*. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/241246>. This is the signing statement by Nixon on the 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Act. Nixon is critical of Congressional attempts to legislate foreign policy. He states that his signing of this act does not change the policies of the administration.

Nixon, Richard and Henry A. Kissinger. *Richard Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger on 6 October 1972*. Conversation 793-006 (PRDE Excerpt A), *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition* [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006749>. This recorded conversation between Kissinger and Nixon discusses their efforts to secure a peace deal between South and North Vietnam. Nixon's reelection is part of this discussion. Nixon repeats that his reelection is very important, and the peace deal will help his reelection.

Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Subjects. Disarmament: Nuclear test ban negotiations, April 1962-August 1963. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/100/JFKPOF-100-014> This memo for the President prepared him for a meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to discuss the administration's proposed Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The memo describes the partisanship of some of the senators.

———. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Countries. Vietnam: Subjects: Taylor Report, 3 November 1961: Tabs E-G. JFKNSF-203-008. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/203/JFKNSF-203-008>. This is a series of memorandums on South Vietnam prepared for General Taylor. The memos provide a political and military assessment of the situation. The conclusion of the assessment is that the current South Vietnamese leader is incapable of improving the situation and is a major factor for the poor conditions.

Peace Corps. *Letter from the Director of the Peace Corps (Shriver) to Secretary of State Rusk*. Sergeant Shriver. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1961. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d71>. In this letter to Secretary of State Rusk, Peace Corps Director Shriver asks Rusk to speak to Senator Fulbright about the amount of money the Peace Corps needs. Shriver tells Rusk it would be a tragedy if the program did not receive enough money to carry out JFK's vision.

Roberts, Chalmers M. "Personal Papers." Subject Files. John F. Kennedy: 1962 and Cuban Missile Crisis. CMRPP-035-006. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/CMRPP/035/CMRPP-035-006>. These memos are a first-hand account of discussions of the Ex Comm during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The group speaks of how to conduct a naval blockade but not in such a manner as to be an act of war. The term "quarantine" is used to announce the blockade. Planners also discussed how difficult it was to obtain aerial footage of the sites because of improved anti-air defenses.

Senate Armed Services Committee. *Dear Mr. President*. Barry Goldwater. Washington D.C: Senate Armed Services Committee, 1979. Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 6/1/79; Container 119. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/119/SSO_148878_119_11.pdf. This letter from Senator Goldwater to President Carter expresses his intent to challenge the passage of SALT II through Congress. Goldwater says he supports disarmament but not this treaty. His argument is that the SALT II treaty is unverifiable and will only give the Soviets an advantage.

Taiwan Relations Act. Statutes at Large 93 (1979). <https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479>. This act normalizes relations with Communist China and diplomatically severs relations with Taiwan. The act, however, contains provisions that, in effect, maintain normal relations with Taiwan. This act also contains provisions that require American weapons and defense materials be provided to Taiwan in sufficient quantities to allow them to protect against attack from China.

Telegram. *Llewellyn E Thompson to Christian A. Herter*. September 8, 1960. Herter, Christian September 1960, Box 13, Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This telegram from Ambassador Thompson to Sec of State Herter relates the conversation the Ambassador had with Soviet Premiere Khrushchev. The Soviet leader discussed the status of two captured pilots of an American RB-47 spy plane the Russian shot down over international waters. The timing of the release was impacted by the American election. The Soviets declined to give the captive to Eisenhower because they wanted to use them for political capital with the new president.

United States, Bureau of the Budget and United States. Office of Management and Budget. "Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1954," *Budget of the United States Government*. January 9, 1953. <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/54#19007>. This is the formal budget for America for fiscal year 1954.

———. Office of Management and Budget. "Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1959," *Budget of the United States Government*. January 13, 1958. <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/54#19012>. This is the formal budget for America for fiscal year 1959.

United States Congress. House. Ad Hoc Committee of Members of the House of Representatives. *Student Views Toward United States Policy in Southeast Asia*. 91st Cong., 2nd sess., May 21-22, 1970. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-91hhrg46487/pdf/CHRG-91hhrg46487.pdf>. This special hearing was conducted after a wave of student riots across the U.S. Students from dozens of universities were allowed several minutes each to give their views of Nixon's conduct of the Vietnam war. The primary topic was Nixon's Cambodian incursion.

———. House. *Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020*, 116th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 2968, *Congressional Record*. 116-103. (May 23, 2019). <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2968?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Department+of+Defense+Appropriations+Act%22%5D%7D&r=2&s=4>. This unsigned legislation is the proposed United States Defense budget for fiscal year 2020. It contains specific provisions aimed at thwarting President Trump's foreign policies. Specifically, there are provisions preventing support of any Yemen military operations and prohibiting sales of weapon systems to Turkey.

———. House. *Joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East*. 85th Cong., 7th Sess., H.J. Resolution 117. (March 9, 1957). <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/85/hjres117/text>. This law gave Eisenhower broad powers in the Middle East to oppose communism. The authorities allowed him to negotiate, provide foreign assistance, or use American military force if needed to maintain any government threatened by armed communist aggressors.

United States Department of Defense. *Memorandum from the Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bagley) to the Chairman (Taylor)*. by W. H. Bagley. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d314>. This memorandum to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes the situation in Vietnam in late 1962. The report is on the effectiveness of the Strategic Hamlet program. The program is failing on account of poor execution by the Diem government.

———. *Memorandum from the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wentworth) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford): JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting 29 October 1956*. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1956. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d407>. This memo called for the assembly of a joint force, consisting of air, ground, naval, and amphibious units to prepare for combat actions in the Mediterranean area near the Suez Canal.

- . *Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy*. by Robert McNamara. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1961.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d11>. This is a memorandum from Sec of Defense McNamara to JFK. McNamara is responding to an inquiry from the president about what Eisenhower told them during one of their turnover meetings. McNamara recalls President Eisenhower saying that all of South East Asia would fall to communism if Laos fell.

- . *Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)*. by Adam Yarmolinsky. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1963.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d129>. This memo is a recommendation from the Department of Defense to JFK's National Security Advisor as to how to respond to accusations that the Kennedy administration lied about a gap between Soviet and U.S. strategic weapons.

- . *Memorandum of Conference with Former President (General) Eisenhower*. by Robert McNamara. Gettysburg, PA: DOD, 1962.
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/declass_fy11_1962_05_14.pdf. This memo was prepared to report on a conference McNamara had with former President Eisenhower. The topic was South East Asia. McNamara issued his recent trip report from a visit to the region to Eisenhower and sought the president's opinion on the best course to take on foreign policy.

- . *Telephone conversation # 8856*. Sound recording. "LBJ and ROBERT MCNAMARA, 9/14/1965, 11:01AM." Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library,
<https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/tel-08856>. This telephone call was about a bombing program the service chiefs wanted to conduct in Vietnam. General Wheeler and McNamara are overriding the program. Wheeler tells McNamara to let him take the lead, and that written justifications need to be prepared to use in case the service chiefs bring this issue up later.

- United States State Department. *Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles*. by Gerald C. Smith. Washington, D.C: FRUS, 1958.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d63> This memorandum of conversation is a dialog between Sec of State Dulles and a policy planning assistant relates the discussion of US options in dealing with China's attacks against Quemoy Island. Atomic weapons use and possible Chinese repercussions are discussed.

- . *Memorandum for the File: Discussion in Secretary Rusk's Office at 12 O'clock, 21 August 1962.* by John McCone. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1962. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d382>. This memo summarized discussions between CIA Director McCone, Sec of State Rusk, NSA Bundy, and a few others on Soviet construction on Cuba in August. The intel reports discussed included the possibility of nuclear IMBMs on Cuba and how the US would react to this development.

- . *Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson: Necessary Actions in Connection with the Marigold Project.* by Dean Rusk. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1967. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d4>. Sec of State Rusk discusses the negotiations with Hanoi using the Poles and Canadians as intermediaries. He also brings up the US bombings near the site of the negotiations and says there is a need to better coordinate the military activities to prevent them from interfering with the talks.

- . *Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations.* by Elliot Richardson. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1969. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d276>. This telegram discusses the Soviet attitudes towards allowing China to join the UN. It directs members of the American Mission to the UN to help set diplomatic conditions for communist China's UN membership. Low-level personal discussions are to be undertaken to set these conditions.

- . 388. *Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 2, 1960, 5:45 p.m.: Call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir on the Secretary: The U-2 Incident and Soviet Pressures on Pakistan.* by Parker T. Hart, Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1960. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d388>. This is a transcript of a telephone call from Pakistani foreign minister to the U.S. Department of State. The foreign minister complains that the Russians are pressuring them for allowing American U-2 spy planes to fly out of bases in Pakistan. The Russians are also trying to entice them to break ties with the U.S. by offering economic incentives.

- . *Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Acting Secretary of State.* by J. Graham Parsons. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1959. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d236>. This memo to President Eisenhower discusses progress towards U.S. goals in Indonesia and the current threat of communism. It also discusses foreign military assistance and how the assistance should not be tied to downed aviator Allen Pope. The memo also assesses that the Indonesians suspect Pope worked for the American government but will not bring that information to the public during his trial.

- . *Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter*, by Cyrus Vance. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1978. Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 2/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote: “Cy.” <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v29/d149>. This memo from Vance to Carter discusses the upcoming vote to ratify the Panama Canal Treaty. Vance tells of an effort to amend the treaty with the provision that a president can maintain U.S. troops at the Panama Canal if there is a need to defend or compel neutrality. Vance reports that Senator Byrd can table this amendment.
- . *Memorandum of Conversation*. Ogorevo, Russia: FRUS, 1959. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v08/d481>. This is a transcript of a discussion between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Vice President Nixon. Nixon met with the Premier while on a trip to Moscow to open a US exhibit at the Moscow Fair.
- . *The Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Department of State*. by John Peurifoy. Guatemala City, Guatemala: FRUS, 1954. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d461>. This telegram from Ambassador Peurifoy describes improving conditions in Guatemala. The ambassador recommends courses of action that American government could take to raise tensions to help destabilize the country.
- . *Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State*. by Robert McClintock. Beirut, Lebanon: FRUS, 1958. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/d141>. This telegram from Ambassador McClintock describes his meeting with the Lebanese army commander. McClintock’s efforts to gain the commander’s trust are hampered by the ambassador’s lack of information on the U.S. military operation in Beirut.
- . *The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State*. by Jeffrey Caffery. Cairo, Egypt: FRUS, 1951. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d178>. This is a telegram Caffery sent advising the State Department on negative actions taken by British military authorities in the Suez Canal Zone. The British cut off fuel supplies to Suez in retaliation for locals interference with the British train system that supported canal operations.
- White House. *Congressional Leadership Breakfast*. by Frank Moore. Washington D.C.: White House, 1979. Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 12/11/79; Container 142. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/142/SSO_148878_142_02.pdf. This information package was assembled for a working breakfast Carter held with members of Congress. The packet included schedules and topics of discussion. Specific talking points for Carter were prepared for each topic. One topic is Nicaraguan aid funding requests.

- . *Lyndon B. Johnson's Daily Diary: October 16, 1968*, (Washington, D.C.: White House, 1968), 5. http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/lbj_tools/daily_diary/pdf/1968/19681016.pdf. This is the daily log of presidential activities. The log has several entries of various visitors to President Johnson. One visit was from Senator Dirksen whom the president was upset with, because Dirksen gave a speech claiming Johnson was trying to gain a peace deal instead of winning the war to sway votes for the election.

- . *Early Month's Performance*, Hamilton Jordon. Washington D.C.: White House, 1977. Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Early Months' Performance, HJ Memos to Pres., 1977, Container 34a. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital-library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_34a_17-Early_Months_Performance_HJ_Memos.pdf. This memo to President Carter from his COS Hamilton Jordon, discusses Jordon's observations during his early months as COS. Jordon praises the president but admonishes him to do a better job scheduling his political requirements to prevent arbitrary decision making. He also wants the president to consider the impact his decisions has on other projects.

- . *Letter from President Kennedy to Vice President Johnson*. by John F. Kennedy. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961. <https://history.state.gov/historical-documents/frus1961-63v25/d5>. This letter from JFK to vice president LBJ directs Johnson to chair the NSC meetings for him. The president tells Johnson to prepare himself by obtaining relevant foreign policy information to attend the NSC meetings.

- . *Letter from the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the President*. by Maxwell Taylor. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961. <https://history.state.gov/historical-documents/frus1961-63v01/d210>. This is a trip report from General Maxwell Taylor's assessment tour of South East Asia for the president. Maxwell sees the need for military assistance in most countries and probable intervention in Vietnam to prevent communist forces from overtaking the country.

- . *Memorandum by the Chairmen of Exxon Corporation (Jamieson), Mobil Oil Corporation (Warner), Texaco, Inc. (Granville), and Standard Oil Company of California (Miller)*. by J. K. Jamieson, Maurice F. Granville, Rawleigh Warner, Jr. and Otto N. Miller. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1973. <https://history.state.gov/historical-documents/frus1969-76v36/d212>. This letter from the chairmen of several major oil corporations was sent to President Nixon after the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil embargo threat of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The chairmen explain the dire circumstances of the oil embargo to the balance of world energy production. They also believe that America's position in the Middle East will be usurped by the Soviets if the embargo is challenged. They ask the president to not support the Israelis during the war.

- . *Memorandum for the President: The Need for a Definition of US Objectives in SE Asia*. by Chester Bowles. Washington D.C.: White House, 1962. <https://www.jfk library.org/asset-viewer/archives/JCTPP/008/JCTPP-008-012>. This memorandum for the JFK admonishes him to develop a clear policy for American involvement in South East Asia. Bowles informs the president that US actions in the region have been undertaken with no clear national objectives. Bowles' opinion is that America's actions are reactionary and at the will of global forces.

- . *Memorandum for the President: Measures to Obtain the Release of the RB-47 Officers*, November 10, 1960, Box 10, NSC Series, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This memo from the Sec of State and Sec of Defense is a recommendation for action against the Soviets to obtain the release of two captured US spy plane pilots. The plan calls for two phases of action. Phase II was the denial of Soviet ships and aircraft from operating in US territory. Phase III was the harassment of Russian ships in international waters and the deliberate downing of a Soviet military airplane in international waters.

- . *Memorandum from the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson*. by Carl T. Rowan. Washington D.C.: White House, 1965. <https://libguides.msubillings.edu/c.php?g=242157&p=1610550>. Johnson's director of information advises him that it will be difficult to justify America's large intervention in the Dominican Republic. Suggestions were made to mitigate the possibility of demonstrations at American missions throughout Latin America.

- . *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson: Agenda for Tuesday Lunch*. by McGeorge Bundy. Washington D.C.: White House, 1965. <https://libguides.msubillings.edu/c.php?g=242157&p=1610550>. This memo from Bundy to Johnson lays out the agenda for the upcoming Tuesday's lunch. Bundy chides Johnson to establish direct communication with the Soviets.

- . *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy: British Guiana*. by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Washington, D.C.: FRUS, 1961. 525. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d249>. Memo from Art Schlesinger to Kennedy outlining a course of action for British Guiana. He recommends working with Jagan while at the same time running covert operations to block communism.

- . *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy*. by McGeorge Bundy. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historical_documents/frus1961-63v10/d39. Bundy tells of disagreement between DOD and the CIA with DOS. DOS recommends caution and careful diplomatic preparation before invading Cuba with U.S. backed dissidents. DOD and CIA are enthusiastic about the chances of success for the invasion. Bundy agrees with DOS and recommends JFK consider DOS concerns.

- . *Memorandum from the President's Special Representative for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy*. by McGeorge Bundy. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historical_documents/frus1961-63v24/d296. This memo describes the background leading up to the current situation in Laos. Bundy describes the Laotian government's force's inability to hold against an overwhelming communist force, backed up by NVA regulars and Soviet equipment.

- . *Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson: Rolling Thunder 53*, by Walter Rostow. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1967. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d25>. This memo from the NSA to Johnson goes over a list of targets the JCS is asking for permission to bomb during the Vietnam War in 1967. The memo refers to maps that the president uses to reference each target.

- . *Memorandum for the President: Your Lunch with Rep. John Murphy*. by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Washington D.C.: White House, 1979. Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 1/19/79; Container 103. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/103/SSO_148878_103_12.pdf. This memorandum from Carter's NSA provides talking points for the president to use with Senator Murphy. Murphy is pro-Somoza regime. Carter is against Somoza, but needs Murphy's support for congressional legislation.

- . *Memorandum for the Record: First Meeting of General Maxwell Taylor's Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations Conducted by CIA*. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historical_documents/frus1961-63v10/d169. This document is a transcript of General Maxwell Taylor's first meeting into the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.

- . *Memorandum: Jim McIntyre's Memo of March 1 Concerning Plans for 1980 Budget*, by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Washington D.C.: White House, 1978. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/68/SSO_148878_068_11.pdf. This memo from NSA Brzezinski to President Carter is in reference to budget planning for FY 1980. The OMB is isolating the early planning to departments with an economic focus. Brzezinski wants the president to force the OMB to ensure that the NSC and Defense Department are included in the budget planning early in the process.

- . *Memorandum of Conversation*, January 27, 1976, folder: "National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977", box 17, Memoranda of Conversations, Ford Administration, Gerald R. Ford Library. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553349.pdf> White. This is a transcript of a discussion Ford has with his UN Ambassador and National Security Advisor. Ford is upset over Congress' refusal to provide funds to support Angola against Cuban-back rebel forces. Ford complains that Congress is weak and should have to publicly vote to display their soft stances on the Soviets.

- . *Memorandum of Conversation*, by Henry Kissinger. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1969. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v32/d96>. Kissinger and Dobrynin discuss arms control talks. They speak of combining most aspects under a single agreement and other technical aspects of arms control. Kissinger remarks that US lead arms control negotiator Smith is not allowed to make decisions on certain aspects of the agreement.

- . *Memorandum of Conversation*, by Henry Kissinger. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1972. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v15/d25>. Record of conversation between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The two discuss several topics including Middle East issues, nuclear agreements, and Vietnam and the impact of the American presidential elections on negotiating with Vietnam.

- . *Memorandum of Conversation*. by Dr. Akalovsky. Vienna, Austria: FRUS, 1961. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v05/d87>. This is an account of the conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev at the Vienna Conference to discuss the 1961 Berlin Crisis. The topics of discussions are far ranging, covering South East Asia, nuclear disarmament, Berlin, divided Germany, and a host of other issues.

- . *Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy*. by John McCone. Washington D.C., FRUS, 1962. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d385>. This memo describes a meeting between JFK and his principle foreign policy advisors. The discussion centered on planning for the possibility that the Soviets would demand removal of U.S. installations in Cuban territory. The removal of obsolete Jupiter missile systems stationed in Turkey was also discussed during this meeting.

- . Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Congress/President, Container 34a. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_34a_10-Congress_president.pdf. COS memo addressing why a bill failed in Congress. The memo discusses the origins of congressional friction with the executive branch. It states that some of the issues are related to Carter's administration.

- . Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Cabinet-Congress, 1977; Container 33, 3-4. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/33/cos_142099_33_04-Administration_Review_Goals_&_Priorities_First_Draft_of_December_1977_Memo_Constituents_Plan_Memo_1978_Charts.pdf. This is a compilation of assessments of congressional support studies and notes about Carter's staff in 1977. It breaks down members by various demographics. The assessment includes notes for each congress member.

- . Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Administration Review, Goals & Priorities-First Draft of December 1977 Memo; Container 33. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/33/cos_142099_33_02-Administration_Review_Goals_&_Priorities_First_Draft_of_December_1977_Memo.pdf. This document is a staff study conducted by Jordon Hamilton before he took over as Carter's COS. Hamilton uses diagrams and examples to illustrate the current White House staff processes. Included in this study are critiques of the current processes and recommendations for improvements.

- . *National Security Action Memorandum No, 273.* by McGeorge Bundy. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1963. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d331>. This presidential directive on Vietnam outlined the general policy of American activities in the conflict. The goal was to set conditions that enabled the government of South Vietnam to maintain its own security and defend against the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. Once these conditions were set, American military forces were to be withdrawn from the conflict.

- . *Presidential Directive / NSC-2: The National Security Council System.* Jimmy Carter. Washington D.C.: White House, 1977. <https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd02.pdf>. This document describes the reorganization of President Carter's national security council system. It establishes council membership, subcommittees, and ad hoc groups. It changes the role of the NSA, affording more power to the DOS.

- . *Presidential Directive / NSC-18: U.S. National Strategy*. Jimmy Carter. Washington D.C.: White House, 1977.
<https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd18.pdf>. This document describes the President Carter's national security strategy. It outlines the goals, responsibilities, and regional focus for America's foreign policy.

- . *Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy*, Jimmy Carter. Washington D.C.: White House, 1980.
<https://jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd59.pdf>. This policy authorized by Carter directed the study and planning for winning a nuclear war with the Soviets. The directive emphasized winning the fight versus simply surviving a nuclear attack. Notable was the explicit direction to target Soviet civilian activities that supported military capability.

- . *Presidential Remarks on Signing of the Trade Act of 1974: Friday, January 3, 1975*. by Gerald Ford. Washington D.C.: White House, 1975.
<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0122/1252185.pdf>. Ford comments on his signing of the 1974 Trade Act into law. He writes that the law will be difficult to implement. The law will also not be received well by other countries.

- . *Reaction to Soviet to the Soviet Satellite*. White House Office of the Staff Research Group. October 16, 1957. Box 35, Special Projects: Sputnik, Missiles and Related Matters. <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/sputnik/reaction.pdf>. This special report assesses the impact of the Soviets successful orbit of the Sputnik satellite. It describes America as being weakened, with the country's prestige suffering a severe blow. It also reports that several nations have made statements regarding potentially aligning with the Soviets due to their perceived superiority in missile and space technology.

- . *Summary of Conference at White House*. by William H. Jackson. Washington D.C.: White House. <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2011/1956-09-11.pdf>. This is a summary of a meeting chaired by President Eisenhower. The topic was how much strategic weapons-grade nuclear fissible material should be produced and maintained. Discussions also included civilian applications for atomic power.

- . *Telephone Call to the President at Augusta, Georgia*. J.M. Washington D.C.: White House, 1958. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/declass_fy16_21.pdf. This memorandum of record relates telephone calls between Eisenhower and a member of the White House staff. The topic is American efforts to maintain the King of Jordan's hold over his country. Concerns of King Hussain are discussed, including requests from the King to help him improve his security situation. The president comments on how funding cuts by Congress are damaging efforts to fulfill foreign policy objectives in Jordan.

- . *Telephone Conversation with General Eisenhower*. Folder, "January 31, 1968 - 8:40 a.m. Pueblo 13 - Breakfast with Congressional Leaders & Advisors." Papers of Tom Johnson. Box 2. LBJ Presidential Library. <https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/pp-johnsontom-mtgnotes-b02-f17>. This memo is a transcript of a telephone conversation between General Eisenhower and General Goodpastor. The topic was the seizure of the Pueblo spy ship by the North Koreans. Goodpastor asks Eisenhower's advice on how to deal with the situation. Eisenhower offers a range of options ranging from naval blockade to use of atomic weapons.

- . *Telegram from President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith)*. by John F. Kennedy. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1962. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d267>. This telegram from JFK to the American ambassador to India instructs the ambassador to work with the Indians for cooperation in the Kashmir issue. JFK tells that his public statement should not be misconstrued as lacking support for India. The president also says there is little time for him to secure funding for India because of pressure from Congress.

- . *Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield*. by Mike Mansfield and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1964. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d231>. Telephone conversation between Johnson and Mansfield discussing Cuba's shutting off Guantanamo's water supply in protest of Cuban fishermen detained by Florida fishing authorities. The president agreed that establishing their own water supply would be the best response to Castro.

- . *Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations*. by Dean Rusk. Washington D.C.: FRUS, 1964. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d191>. Rusk sent a telegram to NATO contesting France's demand to have all NATO troops and equipment withdrawn from France by April. Rusk also wanted clarification on NATO forces' abilities to use French territory in times of emergency.

Speeches

- Carter, Jimmy. "University of Notre Dame Commencement." Speech, Notre Dame, IN, May 22, 1977. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may-22-1977-university-notre-dame-commencement>. Carter discusses his foreign policy during commencement for Notre Dame University. He says America's foreign policy will be based on human rights and supported by the people of the United States. He calls for five specific goals within his policy, ranging from nuclear disarmament to peace in the Middle East.

- Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Chance for Peace." Speech, aired, April 16, 1953.
<https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-16-1953-chance-peace>. President Eisenhower pleads for the world to stop producing arms. He likens arms manufacturing and preparations for war as stealing from the people.
- Gerald Ford, "Remarks in Helsinki." Speech, Helsinki, Finland, August 1, 1975.
<https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-1-1975-remarks-helsinki>. This is Ford's remarks at the conclusion of the Helsinki Conference. He thanks Finland, and speaks for the need of all to practice détente. He also reiterates America's goals at the conference.
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines. "Speech on Vietnam." Speech, San Antonio, Texas, September 29, 1967. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-29-1967-speech-vietnam>. Johnson's speech justifies his reasoning for keeping America in the Vietnam war. He refers to the SEATO obligations of America and Congress's support of this treaty. He also speaks on the implications of allowing the communists to take over South East Asia. The president indicates that he is willing to halt bombing of North Vietnam if they will seriously negotiate terms of peace.
- Kennedy, John F. "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961" Radio and television, White House, Washington D.C., July 25, 1961. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/berlin-crisis-19610725>. JFK addresses the American public after returning from talks with Soviet Union Premier Khrushchev on the Berlin Crisis of 1961. The president informed the people that America would remain firm in West Berlin and protect its citizens. He discussed the Soviet arms buildup and announced that he was calling for a massive increase in the size of American military forces.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Alterman, Eric. *When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences*. United States: Penguin Publishing Group, 2004. Alterman argues that presidents routinely mislead the American public to justify military actions. He holds that this tactic has become routine and is pervasive throughout every administration. Furthermore, the author contends that the commonplace nature of presidential deliberate misconception is encouraged because the public does not hold presidents accountable for their actions.

Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *Rise to Globalism: America's Foreign Policy Since 1938*. 8th ed. New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1997. The authors conduct an analysis of American foreign policy spanning administrations from Roosevelt to Clinton. Ambrose describes the influence of American economic policies, racism, and fear of communism on United States foreign policies.

Anderson, Terry H. *Bush's Wars*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Anderson's stated purpose for this book is to capture the history of George W. Bush's approach to terrorism, Afghanistan, and Iraq in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The author's thesis is that Bush and his administration intentionally misled the public to justify an unwarranted invasion of Iraq. He also contends that Bush ranks as the worst American president in history.

Auerswald, David P., and Peter F. Cowhey. "Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (September 1997): 506, accessed September 20, 2018, <http://library.pittstate.edu:2091/stable/2600794>. The authors argue that the War Powers Act has fulfilled its intent. They say critics' claims that Congress has neglected its duty and presidents ignore the law are untrue since the act changes presidential behavior sufficiently to the effect of curbing executive use of military force. Presidents consider the requirements of the law and take them into account before they deploy forces to combat. The result is a very political solution that suits our democracy.

Bauman, Robert F., and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington. *My Clan Against the World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994*. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004. The authors argue that the dominant collective memory of the Somalia operation was a reminder to avoid the "Vietnam Syndrome." Their thesis is that this operation is a unique experience, containing valuable lessons for the military professional, and should be compared to the broader military experience, and not viewed as simply an extension of the Vietnam experience.

- Beschloss, Michael. *Presidents of War*. New York: Crown, 2018. The author cites a series of American foreign policy events to support his contention that presidents have exceeded their authorities as commanders-in-chiefs. He describes the evolution of presidential use of military force, and the dangers modern weapons pose in the hands of a president if Congress neglects its Constitutional duties.
- Bundy, William A. *Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in The Nixon Presidency*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998. The author argues that Nixon's penchant for secrecy, frequent use of deception, desire for control, and willingness to break the rules undermines his efforts and causes his presidency to fail. Bundy further states that Nixon's deception jeopardized some of his foreign policy initiatives and caused Congress to enact laws limiting not only president Nixon but impacting future presidents as well. This even-handed accounting of Nixon's presidency does a good job of avoiding the bias that many works on Nixon display.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice *Who Leads Whom*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006. Canes-Wrone argues that presidents rarely pursue policy goals based on mass public approval when they know the goals are not in the best long-term interests of the American public. However, public opinion does influence policy. Under a specific set of circumstances, presidents may cater to mass opinion and support a policy that is not in the best interest of the United States public.
- Dallek, Robert. *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983. Dallek argues that social domestic concerns are a key factor in shaping American foreign policy. He covers America's international relations from late in the nineteenth century through the twentieth century.
- . *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President*. Cary: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005. Accessed September 24, 2019. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.library.pittstate.edu/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/reader.action?docID=316372&query=lyndon%2Bb%2Bjohnson#>. This biography is a thorough telling of the personal and presidential aspects of President Johnson. The author illustrates the negative sides of Johnson's personality as well as his admirable qualities. The book also reflects on the positive domestic political accomplishments, but still underscores them with Johnson's failures in Vietnam.

Dumbrell, John. *The Carter Presidency a re-evaluation*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995. Dumbrell argues that Carter was committed to human rights. He argues that this commitment was reflected in the president's domestic and foreign policy initiatives. The author further suggests that perception of Carter's lack of success is due more to the actions of his key policy advisors, Washington bureaucracy, and world circumstances than to his own incompetence. Dumbrell states up front that this book is written from the perspective of those who contest the negative condemnation of the Carter presidency. His writings are an attempt to present a more favorable perception of Carter's term in office.

George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. The authors contend that foreign policy developers have a lack of understanding of major activities used to execute foreign relations. Deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management and detente all are critical activities that policy makers must have a firm grasp of the use of these tools in practice. This book is an effort to provide examples, through case studies, of the potential outcomes of these activities.

Girard, Philippe R., *Clinton In Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. The author reasons that the United States intervened in Haiti, restoring Aristide to power, due to President Clinton's domestic and international political weakness. Dr. Girard contends that Clinton's military intervention in Haiti was a failure when measured by the operation's stated purposes of restoring democracy and growing Haiti's economy. He also argues that despite the failure of the military operation, Clinton's presidency still benefitted from the outcome.

Greene, John Robert. *The Presidency of George Bush*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. Greene argues that the Bush presidency was successful on the foreign policy front. He cites the ouster of Noriega, the Gulf War, and Soviet-US relations as Bush's key foreign policy accomplishments. The author contends that Bush was less effective with his administration's domestic policy. However, he does credit Bush with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Clean Air Amendments.

Hargrove, Erwin C. *Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988. The author argues that Carter used homework and centralized collegiality to lead and develop national policy. He also contends that Carter was not an unsuccessful president lost in the details. Hargrove judges Carter as a successful leader who simply had unreasonable circumstances to deal with. These circumstances, not Carter's performance, led to the perception of a failed presidency.

Hendrickson, Ryan C. *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*. 1st ed. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002. Hendrickson contends that Congress has neglected its authority to approve the use of the Nation's military for combat operations. Congress, not the president, has the power to decide as a body when to use military force. He further argues that a clear pattern of congressional deference to presidential authority is due to political partisanship among members of Congress.

Herring, George C. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Herring's work is part of The Oxford History of the United States series of books. The author provides commentary and analysis of key foreign policy events, and prominent figures, that shaped those events throughout U.S. history. The period covered spans from the birth of the nation to 2007.

———. *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Herring's work is part of a series of books written specifically to address presidential management of policy-making and implementation processes. The author argues that Johnson fails in Vietnam because he and his administration follow a flawed strategy of Limited War Theory. Herring also contends that LBJ's personality and leadership style are major contributing factors in his failures at leading the war effort.

Hill, Dilys M., Moore, Raymond A., Williams, Phil, eds: *The Reagan Presidency an Incomplete Revolution?* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. The authors argue that Reagan had superior communication skills and used them to successfully promote his administration's goals. They contend President Reagan had an overall successful presidency, despite the scandals of his second term. Although successful, the authors conclude that Reagan's achievements mainly benefited his presidency only, causing challenges for future administrations.

Hunt, Michael H. *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007. Hunt argues that essential elements in the U.S. rise to power are wealth, national confidence, and strong state. He describes the nineteenth-century foundations that lead to American hegemony. Throughout this work, Hunt seeks to debunk myths that have led to a misunderstanding of America's history and eventual global influence.

Jones, Howard. *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009. The author uses historical case studies from post WWII to the recent War on Terror to examine leaders' understanding of history. This study attempts to gauge if leaders are cognizant of history that is relevant to their administrations. It also seeks to establish if leaders use their understanding of history to formulate their foreign policies.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Touchstone, 1994. Kissinger discusses the art of diplomacy using historical examples. He relies heavily on his personal experiences as Nixon's national security advisor and his accomplishments as secretary of state for both Nixon and Ford. He describes a uniquely American way of conducting modern diplomacy.

Logevall, Fredrik, and Preston, Andrew, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*. Cary: Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2008. Accessed September 28, 2019. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.library.pittstate.edu/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=415592>. The authors state that Nixon, Kissinger and Ford reoriented US foreign policy. They took America away from interventionism but did not retreat to isolationism. Instead, they adopted a policy of active engagement.

Lovell, John P. *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation*. Macmillan Publishing Company: New York, 1985. The author contends that American foreign policy makers lack the knowledge and insight to ask the right strategic questions. The conclusions they do reach are inappropriate for the situations they face and often lead to a paradigm that carries over to future policy makers. This paradigm perpetuates a cycle of foreign policy decisions based on answers to the wrong questions, which, in turn, lessens the chances for successful outcomes.

Murdock, Clark A. *Improving the Practice of National Security Strategy: A New Approach for The Post-Cold War World*. Washington: The CSIS Press, 2004. Murdock maintains that United States has had no systematic approach to formulating national security strategy since the end of the Cold War. He contends that America does not have a consistent security strategy because of the lack of an actual threat like that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Murdock describes American foreign policy as being born of a messy, inside-the-beltway process. Our current democracy, he says, is inherently anti-strategic.

Nathan, James A. "Curbing the Distress of War: An Outline for a War Powers Resolution That Works." *Polity* 23, no. 4 (Summer 1991): 606, accessed September 19, 2018, www.jstor.org/stable/3235065. Nathan argues that the War Powers Act is insufficiently written, allowing presidents to circumvent the intent of the law, thus thwarting Congressional oversight and authorities of presidential use of military force. He recommends that the act be re-written to remove ambiguity. Nathan also suggests new reporting requirements be developed to force presidents to communicate on congressional terms.

- Paret, Peter eds. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. The author's thesis is that strategy is developed within the context of, and dependent on, the realities of the situation faced by strategists. The geography, society, economics, politics and other factors ultimately determine the decisions made by world leaders. This study spans 500 years of history, using case studies from each era to defend the thesis.
- Paterson, Thomas G. ed. *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*. Cary: Oxford University Press USA, 1989.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pittsburgstate-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241256>.
 (September 22, 2019). This book analyzes the foreign policies of Kennedy. The authors look at Kennedy's foreign policy team, its assumptions, and goals. It also discusses how the president's personality and lifestyle, as well as the world geopolitical environment, impacted the successes and failures of his foreign policies.
- Popescu, Ionut. *Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy: How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2017. The author argues that a long-term, coherent, grand strategy is no longer viable. He says presidential knowledge is always inadequate and that foreign policies are accomplished with improvisation, incrementalism, and adaptation. He calls this approach "emergent strategy."
- Rodman, Peter W. *Presidential Command, Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. The author presents two main arguments in this book. Rodman argues that the key to a successful foreign policy is the consistent personal engagement of the president; the failed foreign policy efforts he recounts all have a common theme of a president who is not personally engaged in the execution of the policy. Rodman's second central contention is that the ability of a president to influence those that control the resources and means is also key to successful foreign policy.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989. Sarkesian contends that United States government leaders have poor understanding of national security interests. Politicians, and key appointed officials tend to see security problems in a superficial way. These leaders only focus on foreign policy issues when they become a crisis, or when issues emerge as central topics of public discourse. His purpose for writing this book is to correct problems that evolve from superficial decisions made by those who neglect to understand national security interests. By explaining the nature of the national security environment, Sarkesian hopes to enhance the knowledge of leaders, and key members of the national security system. This, he feels will allow them to better identify America's national interests, and apply the right resources to attain those interests.

Sestanovich, Stephen. *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*. New York: Vintage Books, 2014. The author discusses American foreign policy from an apolitical standpoint. He contends that in the main, American foreign policy has been successful since World War II, and the criticism levied on presidents is not wholly warranted.

Thomas, Evan. *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012. This book is about Dwight D. Eisenhower's leadership during the most difficult challenges of his two-term presidency. Thomas argues that Eisenhower used ambiguity, bluff, and confusion to achieve his central national security goal of preventing the US from entering a nuclear war. He further contends that Eisenhower's skill at games enabled him to succeed in bluffing his way through conflict. Key to support of his main argument is a recurrent reference to Eisenhower's fondness for games, card playing skills, and use of card analogies while dealing with critical decisions.

Walton, Richard J. *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy*. New York.: Viking Press, 1972. Walton's thesis is that Kennedy's foreign policy approach was militant, anticommunist, and counterrevolutionary. Kennedy, according to Walton, was not the liberal icon that popular consensus remembers him as. Kennedy was a war hawk who increased military spending, who furthered Cold War rhetoric, whose foreign policy was dominated by military options, and who marginalized diplomatic courses of action.

Government Documents

Allen, Brian. *Lesson Plan for Lesson C204: National Planning Systems*. CGSOC, Ft. Leavenworth: CGSC, 2019. This is a lesson plan designed to teach American mid-level military officers how the United States national command authority determines the security strategies; how those strategies are conveyed to military leadership; and how the military develops capabilities, systems, and forces to support those strategies.

United States Department of Defense. "Donald H. Rumsfeld: Former Secretary of Defense." Accessed September 29, 2019. <https://www.defense.gov/Our-Story/Biographies/Biography/Article/602800/>. This Department of Defense website lists the biographies of the current and former secretaries of defense. Rumsfeld's personal and professional life are summarized on this website.

Newspaper Articles

- AP. "GAO Alerts McNamara to Useless Buttonholes." *The Ogden Standard-Examiner*, May 21, 1964. Accessed October 5, 2019.
<https://www.newspapers.com/image/600396631/?terms=mcnamara%2Bservice%2Bchiefs>. This newspaper article summarizes a letter from the GAO to McNamara reporting on how the US Navy wastes money on decorative buttonholes for double breasted uniform coats.
- Dayton Daily News, "Dick Nixon Used to Conflict but Unaccustomed to Losing," July 28, 1960. Accessed October 1, 2019.
<https://www.newspapers.com/image/404343211/?terms=president%2Billness%2Beisenhower>. This is an opinion story on Richard Nixon's run for office against JFK. The story describes Nixon's experience and the public's perception of him. It also relates how Nixon did most of the campaigning for Eisenhower in 1956 while the president was sidelined on account of a prolonged illness.
- Eustachewich, Lia. "House Orders Pentagon to Reveal if It Turned Ticks into Biological Weapons", *New York Post*, (New York) July 17, 2019. Accessed August 21, 2019. <https://nypost.com/2019/07/17/house-orders-pentagon-to-reveal-if-it-turned-ticks-into-biological-weapons/>. Newspaper report of Congress ordering a probe into DOD biological weapons development. The House of Representatives is calling for an investigation into allegations that the Department of Defense tried to turn ticks and other bugs into biological weapons.
- . "Kerry Admits to Meeting Iranian Officials over Nuclear Deal", *New York Post* (New York) date of article. Accessed 7 September 2019 <https://nypost.com/2018/09/12/kerry-admits-to-meeting-iranian-officials-over-nuclear-deal/>. This is a newspaper report of former Senator John Kerry conducting talks with Iran involving salvaging an international nuclear deal and war in Syria.
- Johnson, Stanley. "Of National Liberation." *The San Bernardino County Sun*, January 18, 1961. Accessed October 4, 2019.
<https://www.newspapers.com/image/51378357/?terms=khushchev%2Bwars%2Bof%2Bliberation>. This article presents the highlights of Khrushchev's Wars of Liberation speech. The Soviet Premier states his intentions to support socialism and communist countries. The implication is that the Soviets will militarily intervene to protect countries threatened by capitalist, western powers.

Kirchick, James. "Joe Alsop and America's Forgotten Code." *The Atlantic*, February 15, 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/joe-alsop-and-americas-forgotten-code/516564/>. This article uses Joe Alsop's career and known homosexuality as an example of how the American government has tolerated, and shield gay people for years. Alsop was set up and blackmailed by the Russians who filmed Alsop having sex with a man while in Moscow. Alsop refused to cooperate with the KGB and turned to the American government for help.

The Lincoln Star. "Suppression of Gaither Report is Hit by Clark: Asks Possible Congress Action," *The Lincoln Star*, December 31, 1957. Accessed October 1, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/66723872/?terms=Gaither%2BReport%2Bcongress%2Bo'mahoney>. This news article (no author listed) covers Democratic complaints of suppression of the Gaither Report. Democratic senators call for full release of report and charge the president with incompetence.

Lewis, Anthony. "Being a Decent Person Does Not Make a Leader." *The Times-Tribune*, August 18, 1979. Accessed October 11, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/531271487/?terms=Malaise%2BSpeech>. This editorial newspaper article criticizes Carter's national energy address for blaming his lack of success in enacting policies on a poor national mood. The author says peoples' attitudes are not to blame for the current crisis; government policies are. He also says that Carter is a decent man but a poor leader.

Majersky, Joseph. "Why an Anti-American?" *The Daily Capital*, April 3, 1962. Accessed October 4, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/2864335/?terms=Alliance%2Bfor%2BProgress>. This editorial newspaper article questions the wisdom of having a former UN politician, who was well known for his anti-American stance, be employed by the Alliance for Progress Program.

McGowan, Joe, "Soldier of Fortune Good and Bad," *News-Journal*, October 14, 1962. Accessed October 1, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/291140987/?terms=allan%2Blawrence%2Bpope>. This article is an interview of CIA pilot Allen Pope shortly after his release from Indonesian authorities. The author describes Pope as a soldier for hire, making no mention that he was working for the CIA.

Nordlinger, Jay "Back in Sandinista Days..." *National Review*, (New York) December 15, 2012. Accessed 7 September 2019. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2012/12/back-sandinista-days-jay-nordlinger-2> The article is critical of John Kerry's effort to project himself as centrist for Latin American policies. The author relates the history of Kerry's leftist activism as a senator. He describes how Kerry's efforts to establish policy backfired when those he supported turned to the Soviets.

Ottend, Tom. "Was Saigon's Peace Talk Delay Due to Republican Promises?" *The Boston Globe*, January 6, 1969. Accessed October 5, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/434597058/?terms=saigon's%2Bpeace%2Btalk%2Bdelayed%2Bottenad>. This article discusses Nixon's contact with the South Vietnamese government the week before the November 1968 election. The author argues that Nixon's communication caused the RVN government to delay entering peace negotiations until after the outcome of the election.

Rothberg, Donald M. "Carter Given Slight Edge in Debate II." *The Times Herald*, October 7, 1976. Accessed October 10, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/210340000/?terms=carter%2Bpanama%2Bcanal>. This newspaper article covers the debate between Carter and Ford in October 1976. The author judges that Carter preformed marginally better than Ford did during the contest. A somewhat controversial issue arose when both candidates indicated that neither would allow Panama to fully control the Panama Canal.

"Sandinista Executions Alleged." *News-Press*, August 2, 1979. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/220345732/?terms=sandinistas%2Bexecutions%2Balleged>. This newspaper article reports on the alleged summary executions of thousands of former Somoza government and military members. The sources claim that the Sandinista's are killing the family members too. US Senator John Murphy held a press conference to validate the claims from several Nicaraguans who say they have knowledge of the killings.

Taylor, Henry J. "Is Kennedy Trying to Ignore Cuba Problem?" *The Los Angeles Times*. August 31, 1962. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/381447336/?terms=missiles%2Bcuba%2Bkennedy>. This editorial is critical of a military buildup on Cuba. It charges JFK's administration is ignoring Soviet reinforcement of military capabilities in Cuba. The article points out that Soviet rockets could reach most of the continental United States.

Tucker, Ray. "National Whirligig," *The Montgomery Advertiser*, August 15, 1956. Accessed October 1, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/262366603/?terms=aswan%2Bdam>. This editorial comments of American withdraw of funding for the Egypt's Aswan Dam. The author believes it was the right call to pull funding because Egypt was courting the Soviets. The author also believes that domestic politics played a role in rescinding the funding.

The Monitor, "Kennedy Turns Campaign on Cuba Trouble," *The Monitor*, October 18, 1960. Accessed October 1, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/292660654/?terms=kennedy%2Bcampaign%2Bcuba>. This newspaper article (no author listed) reports on JFK's campaign speeches in Tampa, Florida. JFK attacks Eisenhower's foreign policy. He also criticizes Nixon's credentials and charges Nixon with being responsible for the loss of Cuba.

Wills, Gary. "The Pentagon Papers: Nixon see the People as Claque." *The Record*, May 23, 1972. Accessed October 7, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/492232164/?terms=pentagon%2Bpapers%2Bnixon>. The article discusses Nixon's notes used to deliver a speech on his decision to mine Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam. Wills says Nixon shows contempt for the American public and uses them to further his foreign policy.

UPI International. "Groups Fail to Integrate Restaurants." *Kenosha News*, May 1, 1963. Accessed October 5, 2019. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/596740333/?terms=African%2Bdiplomats%2Brefused%2Bservice>. This article reports on efforts for racial integration in the United States. The focus is on restaurants not serving people of African descent. One story within the article relates the refusal of service to a Liberian diplomat.

Online Content

Best, Jr. Richard A. "U.S. Intelligence and India's Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned." *Every CRSReport.com* 98, no. 672 (August 1998): 2, accessed September 5, 2019, <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-672.html>. This article discusses the American intelligence failure to detect that India was preparing to detonate a nuclear weapon. The author discusses the background of the incident, and the indications missed by the intel community. Suggestions for improving national intelligence practices are included too.

Congressional Research Service. *CRS Report for Congress: Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches*, Amy Belasco, and Lynn J. Cunningham, and Hannah Fischer, and Larry A. Niksch. Washington D.C.: Congress, 2007. Accessed September 29, 2019. <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33803.html>. This report is a detailed listing of congressional efforts to prevent presidents from conducting foreign policies in South East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. The report includes every measure brought before Congress. The listing tells the provisions of each measure and who authored the bills. It also lists which measures were ratified.

Encyclopedia Britannica. "Geopolitics." Last modified August 9, 2019. Accessed 3 September 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/geopolitics>. This provides a definition of geopolitics as an analysis of the geographic influences on international power relationships.

Finlayson, Andrew R. "A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-70." Central Intelligence Agency, June 12, 2007. Accessed October 5, 2019. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/vol5 1no2/a-retrospective-on-counterinsurgency-operations.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/vol5%20no2/a-retrospective-on-counterinsurgency-operations.html). COL Finlayson explains the CIA's Phoenix Program in the Vietnam War. Finlayson relates his experiences as a member of a Provincial Reconnaissance Unit. He says the program is misunderstood, but their job was to attack and destroy the political infrastructure of the Viet Cong.

Friedman, George "The Trump Doctrine" *GPF Geopolitical Futures*, (Texas) July 11, 2018. Accessed September 11, 2019. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-trump-doctrine>. The author analyzes President Trump's foreign policies. Friedman states that Trump uses an aggressive economic policy as a form of warfare to achieve his goals. Trump's intentions are to avoid military engagements, and use extreme economic measures, while disregarding world opinion.

Goujon, Reva "US Adversaries and Allies: Start the Countdown to 2020" *Stratfor Worldview*, June 22, 2019. Accessed 4 September 2019 <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-adversaries-and-allies-start-countdown-2020-presidential-election-iran-china-russia-north-korea-eu-japan-mexico-israel-poland>. The author argues that Trump's foreign policy is too aggressive to achieve his goals. His main targets are China and Iran; other targets, such as Mexico are included to a lesser degree. Goujon believes that if Trump fails to achieve his goals in his first term in office then he, or the next president will have significant issues dealing with these countries later.

Greene, John Robert. "Gerald Ford: Foreign Affairs." Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. Accessed September 28, 2019. <https://millercenter.org/president/ford/foreign-affairs>. This article focuses on President Ford's role in the maintaining Nixon's foreign policies after the former president resigned. It describes Ford as struggling to achieve his goals. The credit Ford does receive is in reforming the CIA, by convincing Congress to adopt greater oversight of the organization.

Richard Nixon: Presidential Library and Museum. "The Life." President Nixon. Accessed September 28, 2019. <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/president-nixon>. This website briefly describes Nixon's personal life and his political career. The description is a summary of Nixon's pre-presidential years, his terms in office, and his post-presidency life. This summary covers both good and infamous aspects of Nixon's career.

Wikipedia. "Brent Scowcroft." Last modified September 18, 2019. Accessed 27 September 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brent_Scowcroft#Career. This website contains biographical information about Brent Scowcroft's personal life, military career and political life.

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———. "Twenty-second Amendment to the United States Constitution." Last modified September 1, 2019. Accessed 1 September 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-second_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution. This website explains the Twenty-second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ratified in 1951, the amendment prohibits presidents from serving more than two terms in office.

United States Congress. March 2019, *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016, Table 8-1*. Brookings Institute, accessed 7 September 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>. Table 8-1 is a compilation of statistical studies of overall Congressional voting history. The table details how much success each administration had with respect to achieving passing votes for measures and laws supported by the president.

———. *Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1952-2016, Table 8-2*. Brookings Institute, accessed 7 September 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>. Table 8-2 is a compilation of statistical studies of Congressional voting history by party affiliation. The table details how much success each administration had with respect to achieving passing votes for measures and laws supported by the president.