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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF
CORDILL HULL

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Division in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science

By

Francis McCorkill

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ABSTRACT

A reevaluation of the "Good Neighbor" policy has been necessary in the last year due to the current uneasiness in the countries of Latin America over the possibility of the entrance of Communism into the Western Hemisphere. A part of this reevaluation has been a renewed interest in the development of the "Good Neighbor" policy. This thesis discusses the formulation by Secretary of State Cordell Hull of the "Good Neighbor" policy in United States-Latin American relations between 1933-1937.

After providing the background of United States' relations with Latin America, before 1933 and the background of Cordell Hull, the thesis discusses first the conference held in Montevideo. This Conference presented an opportunity for Mr. Hull to meet personally the Latin American countries and to enunciate the new American policy of non-intervention and friendship. The discussion of the new non-intervention policy includes both the abrogation of treaties which gave the United States the right to intervene and the instances where there was a possibility of the United States intervening. The economic policies of Mr. Hull were centered around the Trade Agreement Act, better known as the reciprocal trade program. The conference at Buenos Aires in 1936 is the first illustration of the success of the "Good Neighbor" policy as it was the beginning of inter-American solidarity.

The policies of Secretary Hull during this first term lay only the foundation for the better years to come, but without them, what would the future have held? The personality of Mr. Hull is evident in each step of the program as his long experience in Congress proves to be a definite asset.

The major sources used in the thesis were Samuel Guy Inman's Problems in Pan-Americanism; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull; Harold B. Hinton, Cordell Hull: A Biography; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal; The New York Times; The Foreign Relations Papers of the United States; and the official reports of the delegation to the Montevideo and Buenos Aires Conferences.

CHAPTER I

With the turbulent situation in the Caribbean today and the threat of Communism entering the Western Hemisphere, the relations of the United States and Latin America loom larger than ever. This thesis traces the development of the Latin American policy as initiated under Cordell Hull in the years, 1933-1937. The Montevideo Conference, the first personal contact of Mr. Hull with the group as a whole, provided the framework of both the non-intervention policy and the reciprocal trade program. The Buenos Aires Conference was the result of three years of friendly relations and is the beginning of inter-America solidarity. The major sources used in the thesis were Samuel Guy Inman's Problems in Pan-Americanism, Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Harold B. Hinton, Cordell Hull: A Biography, Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, The New York Times, The Foreign Relations Papers of the United States, and the official reports of the delegation to the Montevideo and Buenos Aires Conference.

Latin America

One of the major accomplishments of the United States' diplomacy under the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the work of Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, in our relations with our neighbors to the South, Latin America.

Since the discovery of the New World the two American continents have been tied together in many ways; however, it was not until 1789 when our Constitution was established that inter-American relations became important. As the United States had won her independence, so had the Latin American countries under the leadership of such men as Simon Bolívar. Spain, through her own lack of democracy, had not given her colonists the background for self-government, as had England, which still influences their governments today.

By 1820, most of South America had established independent governments for the people, however unstable they might be. With Russia looking at the North American west coast, and Europe looking at the new very weak republics to the south, President James Monroe found it necessary on December 2, 1823, to set forth in his State of the Union Address the principles which have become known as the Monroe Doctrine.

This new policy proved a point at the time; the United States was ready to help her sister nations to the south maintain the common ideals of freedom for which all had fought. Latin America warmly received the Monroe Doctrine. Brazil suggested an alliance between the United States and Brazil which other Hispanic countries could join.¹ Colombia, Argentina, and Chile all voiced their approval to the Doctrine which

¹Samuel Guy Inman, Problems in Pan Americanism, 154. (Hereafter cited as Inman, Problems.)

gave them European prestige. Colombian Vice-President Santander, on April 6, 1824, sent a note to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, which exemplified the feelings of South America by stating: "My government has received with greatest pleasure the message, worthy of its author, which expresses the sentiment of the country over which he presides."²

The Monroe Doctrine then started its record of being used as an excuse for anything, even expansion. The United States was not taking care of Mexico as a sister when she took what is now California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.

Little was done to better the relationship until 1881, when James G. Blaine, Secretary of State, issued an invitation in the name of the President, to all American countries to convene in Washington "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing wars between the nations of America."³ However, the Pacific War with Chile against Peru and Bolivia, prevented the meeting until 1888. It convened in October 1889, with all eighteen nations present, but the Mexican and Chilean delegates were unhappy about their presence. Much was discussed, but the only concrete result was the establishment of the International Bureau of American Republics, the predecessor of the Pan American Union.

²Ibid., 155.

³Ibid., 196.

In 1896, the government declared war on Spain when the U.S.S. Maine was sunk. By the war, the United States annexed Puerto Rico and declared Cuba a protectorate. The Platt Amendment came as a result in May, 1903. It states in Article III:

The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty...⁴

The Platt Amendment was used when troops were sent to Cuba in 1906, remaining until 1909, then again in 1917 when they stayed until 1922. When the troops were withdrawn in 1909 Guantanamo was retained as a naval base.

When the United States entered the war for Cuban independence, it was also the entrance of the United States into the internal affairs of our southern neighbors. The Platt Amendment to the Treaty of 1903 had given the right to intervene in Cuba, but the United States "encouraging" the revolt of Panama against Colombia when Colombia would not grant the United States canal rights. The United States immediately recognized Panama and signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty which gave the United States a ten mile zone.⁵

⁴Henry Steele Commager, editor, Documents of American History, 209. (Hereafter cited as Commager, Documents.)

⁵John Holladay Latane, A History of American Foreign Policy, 536.

In 1905 the United States under Theodore Roosevelt established financial supervision of the Dominican Republic. After a period of revolution in Nicaragua in 1910, the United States sent marines to help restore order upon the request of President Adolfo Diaz.⁶ In 1916 after years of financial difficulty and an interim revolution, marines were landed in Haiti and a treaty was signed giving the United States control over Haitian finances and customs as well as American officers for the Haitian Garde.⁷

When President William Howard Taft announced his "Dollar Diplomacy," he felt that the number of revolutions would decrease if economic conditions were better. He therefore encouraged banking and trading with the Hispanic countries.⁸

All these programs, including Wilson's interventionist program, were issued in good faith but were not accepted by Latin America which thought the United States was imperialistic. By 1923, one hundred years after Monroe's speech, there were United States' troops stationed in Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic. The marines had just been removed from Cuba. The United States was also supervising the finances of Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.

⁶Ibid., 552.

⁷Ibid., 557.

⁸Commager, Documents, 256-257.

Perhaps the most unfortunate incident for the United States was the Tampico Affair. The police of Vera Cruz, Mexico, arrested several sailors. The American admiral demanded their release, and a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag as an apology. Mexico did not apologize, so Wilson, with the Senate's consent, sent marines into Vera Cruz. The A.B.C. powers had to come to the rescue of the United States.⁹

By the 1920's the situation was bad. Marines were stationed in several countries and a Mexican government, which never really gained control, had been recognized. Both Harding and Coolidge made overtures toward the Latin American states unsuccessfully. The marines were withdrawn during the Hoover administration, but the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana in 1928 showed the American people actually how little the people of the southern republics thought of the United States and how contemptuous they were of its methods.¹⁰

The tactics of the United States had to be altered if her leadership of the western hemisphere was to be maintained. Cordell Hull took the cue from Roosevelt's "in the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation

⁹Ibid., 271-272.

¹⁰Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean, 149.

to the policy of the good neighbor" and carried it forward in Latin America, our closest neighbors.

Even before the inauguration of the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, planning for the Seventh International Conference of American States was in progress. It was convened on December 3, 1933, but the formulation of the agenda to be discussed at the conference presented the major problems. In the official invitation to the United States Government, the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Mañe, expressed his country's desire that the conference discuss the economic situation created by the depression and methods of insuring peace in the New World.¹¹ J. Butler Wright, the United States minister to Uruguay, conveyed to the State Department the hopes of the Uruguayan Government that the United States would send their Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to the Conference. The Uruguayan Government believed that if Hull were to personally attend, other foreign ministers would follow the example, and the conference would gain much in prestige and effectiveness.¹²

¹¹Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State, August 7, 1933, (a translation), Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 9-10.

¹²Minister in Uruguay to Secretary of State, August 28, 1933, Ibid., 11.

The conference originally scheduled to have met in December of 1932 had been postponed upon the request of Brazil because of disagreement on the agenda. Again the talk of postponement arose in October, 1933, as the Argentine press voiced the idea that the conference should be delayed since little of concrete value could be accomplished with such vague and general subjects on the agenda. Brazil shared similar feelings but refrained from officially initiating another postponement.¹³

While some of the countries were considering the advisability of not holding the conference, President Roosevelt appointed the official delegation from the United States. It consisted of Cordell Hull, Secretary of State and chairman of the delegation, J. Reuben Clark, a Republican, former Undersecretary of State, and former ambassador to Mexico, J. Butler Wright, a career diplomat and ambassador to Argentina, Spruille Braden, an ardent New Deal businessman with much business experience in Latin America, and Dr. Sophonisba Breckenridge, professor of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, and the first woman ever to be appointed by the United States as an official delegate to a major foreign conference.¹⁴

¹³Ambassador in Brazil to Secretary of State, October 12, 1933, Ibid., 29.

¹⁴Harold B. Hinton, Cordell Hull, A Biography, 244. (Hereafter cited as Hinton, Hull.)

The experience of these delegates and the personal drive for success of the conference by Mr. Hull were impressive and extremely important. Secretary Hull expressed the importance of the conference in the "Instructions to the Delegates" by saying:

The importance of this Conference has been considerably augmented by the events and experiences associated with the Economic and Monetary Conference which met in London during the summer this year.

Never before have the need and benefit of neighborly cooperation in every form of human activity been so evident as they are today. Friendship among nations calls for constructive efforts to muster the forces of humanity in order than an atmosphere of close understanding and cooperation may be cultivated. You will endeavor to be guided by the policy enunciated by President Roosevelt in his inaugural address: 'The policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors'. You will keep in mind the conviction that the well-being of one nation depends in large measure upon the well-being of its neighbors.¹⁵

Hull in Tennessee

To understand these words properly, it is important to appreciate the background of Cordell Hull and his political life. Cordell Hull was born on October 2, 1871, and reared in the backcountry of Tennessee, the third of five sons of William and Elizabeth Riley Hull. Hull described the country

¹⁵Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 43-44.

in which he was reared as deeply patriotic and Jacksonian. In discussing this area during the Civil War, one finds the natives had the choice of which side they wanted to serve, but only the old, the women and the children could stay at home.¹⁶ It was with this heritage that Cordell Hull inherited his political party.

As the financial situation of William Hull improved, the sons profited through their education. Cordell attended Montvale Institute in Celina, Tennessee, where he met Professor Joe S. McMillin, whose brother was a member of the House of Representatives, a member of the Ways and Means Committee, and in favor of the income tax, all of which were to greatly influence the life of Cordell Hull.¹⁷

In the school year 1886-1887, Cordell and his brother attended normal school in Bowling Green, Kentucky. The next fall he read law for several months in the office of John H. McMillin, another brother of the professor, where he met many active Democratic leaders, as they congregated around the law office. After an intervening period on the farm and logging for his father, in the summer of 1888, Cordell Hull made his first political speech in the campaign between Grover Cleveland

¹⁶ Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 7.
(Hereafter cited as Hull, Memoirs.)

¹⁷ Ibid., 15.

and Benjamin Harrison. The major issue was the tariff, especially controversy over Cleveland's tariff message of 1887.¹⁸

The tariff issue and the income tax, which had already entered Mr. Hull's life by the age of seventeen, were to be two of the major interests of his Congressional career and greatly influence his actions as Secretary of State. After giving three or four speeches in Mr. Cleveland's behalf, Cordell Hull enrolled at National Normal University in Lebanon, Ohio. He returned again the next fall only to be a victim of the influenza epidemic of 1889 and was forced to withdraw from school.

Returning to Tennessee, Cordell Hull continued to read law. He really began his political career when a friend from Judge McMillin's law office nominated him for Clay County Democratic Chairman. In the summer of 1890, he served as a delegate to the state nominating convention in Nashville. In January of 1891, Hull entered Cumberland Law School where he graduated the following June. The same summer he passed the bar examination, less than twenty years of age.¹⁹

The following summer, Hull announced his candidacy for the state Legislature. Although not yet twenty-one and not gaining much support from party leaders, Hull won the

¹⁸ Ibid., 21.

¹⁹ Ibid., 27.

nomination and the election, and was re-elected two years later. Hull himself says nothing of importance happened during these four years except his first trip to Washington in the summer of 1893 when he met President Cleveland through the efforts of Congressman McMillin.²⁰ Refusing a third term, Hull returned to private law practice until the Spanish-American War. He became a captain of the Fourth Regiment of the Tennessee Volunteers. By the time they arrived in Cuba, the war was over, but they remained in Santa Clara for five months. Mr. Hull in his position in the Army legal department aided in the restoration of local government.²¹

After the war, Mr. Hull returned to his law practice only to have it interrupted again. In 1903, Mr. Hull was appointed Fifth Circuit Judge upon the resignation of W. T. Smith, and was elected to the position the following year. This was the place where he acquired the nickname, "Judge" by which he was known afterwards.²²

Hull in Congress

In 1906, he was elected to the House of Representatives for the first of eleven times. The career of Congressman Hull

²⁰Ibid., 30.

²¹Ibid., 34.

²²Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, 183.

is one to be studied with interest. From the first, he made vigorous attacks on high tariffs. When the Payne-Aldrich Bill was passed in 1909, raising tariffs, Hull was unsatisfied. The same group in Congress that had supported the tariff law were opposed to the income tax, which Hull favored. The income tax law that Congressman McMillin had written had been declared unconstitutional. Cordell Hull knew one of two things had to be done: (1) write a bill that the Supreme Court would accept, or (2) a constitutional amendment. Aldrich and Payne thinking an income tax amendment would never be ratified worked for the constitutional amendment, only to be greatly surprised four years later.²³ When the amendment was ratified in 1913, Cordell Hull was appointed to the committee to draft a suitable law. It went before the House with few changes from his final draft.²⁴

With the Democratic victory in 1910, Hull was appointed to the powerful Ways and Means Committee. This committee passed through Congress a number of tariff reductions, only to have President Taft veto them. The veto aroused such public opinion in favor of the tariff reduction that with the election of Woodrow Wilson and other factors, it was possible for Congress to pass the Underwood Tariff in 1913.

²³Hull, Memoirs, 70-71.

²⁴Ibid., 65.

By 1916, the philosophy of lower tariffs, which was to greatly influence Hull's terms as Secretary of State, had been solidified in his thinking. Representative Hull had opposed high tariffs before 1916 on the basis of internal effects--the building of monopolies, subsidies to private business, et cetera. With the appearance of World War I, he maintained his dislike for high tariffs but for different reasons. In an address to the House of Representatives on July 8, 1916, he said in part:

Apart from essential injustice to the people this system has become a positive menace to the peace of all trade countries. It is naturally utilized for purpose of rank discrimination, practical boycotting, undue preferences, and other irritating practices....It was a matter of common knowledge that the operation of many unfair, injurious and troublemaking trade practices and the strenuous trade conquests pursued under these systems chiefly contributed to the outbreak of the present European War.²⁵

Mr. Hull felt that this speech, which also contained recommendations for an international trade congress, was the forerunner of Woodrow Wilson's "Point Three".

When the United States entered the war, Hull, as a member of the Ways and Means Committee of the House, exercised considerable power in the program of financing the war. The maximum tax on income and excess profits was his major program.²⁶ It was during this work with the various departments of the

²⁵ Ibid., 81-82.

²⁶ Ibid., 97.

military that he became acquainted with the assistant Secretary of Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.²⁷

A Wilson supporter from 1912, Hull argued vigorously for the Senate ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. With the election of 1920, Hull, like many other Democrats, was defeated in the Harding landslide. This was his only defeat in running for office sixteen times.

Democratic National Chairman

Even with the loss of his Congressional seat, Hull remained in Washington, this time as the chairman of the Democratic National Committee. In this capacity he found the Party's treasury in debt and the Party's morale at low ebb. Through organization of Victory Clubs, he raised the Party morale and assessed each member five dollars. When he resigned the chairmanship in 1924, a debt of \$300,000 had been paid and a surplus of \$30,000 was in the party treasury.²⁸ Perhaps one of the most valuable experiences Mr. Hull had from this four year period was the contact with Mr. Wilson and their discussions on world peace and the League of Nations. It was during these years that Hull renewed his acquaintance with Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 1920 Democratic nominee for vice-president.

²⁷ Ibid., 94.

²⁸ Ibid., 116.

The Discouraged Democrat

In the 1922 election Hull was returned to the House of Representatives. This was to be one of the most disappointing periods of Mr. Hull's life, for as a member of the minority and with the majority having directly opposite views on tariffs, he met many defeats. The isolationist feeling was also strong. With the defeat of Alfred E. Smith for president, the lack of attention given to his predictions, and the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, Hull arrived at the place where he questioned the value of his remaining in politics. The death of Senator Typson from Tennessee almost seemed to make the decision for him. After a warm campaign against the Crump machine, Hull won first the nomination, then in November of 1930 the general election as United States Senator from Tennessee. From his campaign came his philosophy which was to be fulfilled in 1932.

The Democratic Party will be recreant to its high mission unless it unifies itself behind a definite constructive liberal program, and proceeds during 1930-32 to educate, organize, and bring about civil revolution and political reformation as did Jefferson in 1800, Jackson in 1828, and Wilson in 1912.²⁹

Campaign for Roosevelt

With this in mind, he fought Al Smith on the tariff issue. The open break came in the Democratic National Committee when

²⁹Ibid., 138.

Hull challenged the Smith-Raskob organization's right to formulate the platform in 1932 for the entire Democratic Party. Franklin D. Roosevelt sent James A. Farley, Chairman of the New York State Democratic Committee and the two New York national committee members to support Hull.³⁰ The fight continued into the nominating convention in Chicago where the Committee on Resolutions accepted Hull's economic and tariff planks.³¹ The final phase of victory came with Roosevelt winning the nomination for the presidency over Al Smith.

The qualifications of Cordell Hull for the appointment as Secretary of State are fairly evident. His long career in the legislative branch of the government, his long service to the Democratic Party, and his aid to Roosevelt in securing the nomination made him a candidate for a cabinet position.

President-elect Roosevelt announced the appointment of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State on February 21, 1933, after consultation between the two men. Hull at this time expressed his feelings that the Secretary of State should be more than just a correspondent, but the men had known each other long enough to be familiar with the other's opinions on foreign relations. Cordell Hull was a confirmed internationalist that

³⁰ Ibid., 143.

³¹ Ibid., 152.

saw trade barriers as one of the greatest sources of war. To secure permanent peace, a nation must take positive action as peace was not a gift, but the result of planning. It is only natural that one of his first journeys was to be to an economic conference, and one of his greatest triumphs was the new trade policy of the United States.

London, England, December 1919

Just after his return from the Paris Peace Conference, Mr. Wilson's health was so poor that he was unable to travel. He was, however, able to send a personal representative to the Economic Conference in London in December, 1919. The conference was held at the Hotel Cecil and was attended by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. The conference was held for the purpose of discussing the economic situation of the world and the need for international cooperation. The conference was a success and resulted in the signing of the Declaration of Economic Principles, which was a statement of the principles of international economic cooperation. The conference was a landmark event in the history of international economic relations.

CHAPTER II

THE MONTEVIDEO CONFERENCE

The Seventh International Conference of American States gave Latin American countries a new insight to the United States. The personal diplomacy portrayed by Cordell Hull was to form the basis of the Good Neighbor Policy in the future years. Major sources used in this chapter are Hull's Memoirs, Hinton's Hull, Bemis' Latin American Policy, Foreign Relations Papers and The Report of the United States Delegates to the Seventh International Conference of American States.

London Economic Conference

Just having taken office on March fourth, Hull was named chairman of the United States' delegation to the Economic and Monetary Conference which convened in London on June 12, 1933. The American and European delegations could not come to an agreement on stabilization of currency or on a sound economic policy. Just as the conference was beginning to lag, Raymond Moley, Assistant Secretary of State, arrived in London with the newspaper headlines implying he was a personal representative of the President. The Secretary of State felt it was an insult to have a subordinate being presented as having more

information than he.³² Moley negotiated an agreement to stabilize currency but when he submitted it to the President by cable, the entire situation changed. The President cabled his reply, often referred to as the "bombshell message", in which he violently rejected Moley's proposal.³³ The Conference soon adjourned, but Cordell Hull had met a personal defeat in the failure of the conference and considerable embarrassment due to Moley. The Conference had done little to help the world economic situation, but it had made the success of the forthcoming Pan-American conference much more important as far as Hull was concerned.

Personal Diplomacy of Cordell Hull

It was during his trip on the S.S. American Legion that the Secretary of State began to use the "groundfloor" politics that had carried him to the State Department. While aboard the ship, he conversed with other delegations as to their feelings on the forthcoming conference, but gained only responses of distrust of the United States. Hull realized then that positive actions on the part of the United States were needed.

³² Hull states in his Memoirs, 260, "During the few days that followed, ministers and other top officials of governments flocked after Moley as if he were the Pied Piper." Schlesinger Jr. in Coming of the New Deal, 217, says, "Moley saw no Prime Minister except McDonald."

³³ Hull, Memoirs, 262.

Secretary Hull arrived in Montevideo five days before the opening of the conference to an exciting but not promising atmosphere. Nine other foreign ministers were listed as chairmen of their delegations. Cordell Hull could not see why it might be beneath his dignity to call on them.³⁴

Following this pattern, Secretary Hull consulted with Dr. Mello Franco, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on December ninth. Using the traditional friendly relationship between Brazil and the United States as a basis for conversation, Hull confided in Dr. Franco. He revealed new instructions from Washington concerning economic proposals in regard to tariff, custom barriers, and other commercial factors. Dr. Franco gave the Secretary the impression that he would approve such a proposal and appreciated the Secretary seeking his advice.³⁵ After discussions with other foreign ministers, on December twelfth, Mr. Hull again conversed with Dr. Franco. This time Mr. Hull found it necessary to remind the Brazilian that he had been the first to know the intentions of the United States, as Dr. Franco felt he had been neglected.³⁶

³⁴Hinton, Hull, 245.

³⁵Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 179.

³⁶Ibid., 183.

Hull-Lamas Friendship

The Argentine chairman, Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas, posed the largest threat to Hull's positive actions. Lamas had authored a peace pact for the Americas very similar to the Briand-Kellogg Pact, but the United States had not signed it. Even more crucial was that Argentina saw herself as the only possible leader and spokesman for Latin America. Hull knew to accomplish his purpose and at the same time avoid complete destruction of the Conference, he must have Lamas's support. With this in mind, he proceeded to win Lamas's friendship.

Mr. Hull had prepared two resolutions he felt should be passed by the Conference--one on economic recovery and one on promotion of world peace.³⁷ After talking in generalities to Señor Lamas for some time, Mr. Hull offered Lamas the opportunity to present one of the resolutions, as Hull felt him the best man for the job.

Even with this new-born friendship, Senor Lamas and Mr. Hull had their disagreements. In the editing and translating into Spanish of the United States economic proposal, Lamas omitted two paragraphs highly valued by Mr. Hull. This problem was solved by a re-translation into the Spanish.³⁸

³⁷Hull, Memoirs, 328.

³⁸Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 181.

Opening of the Conference

The effect of Hull on Gabriel Terra, the President of Uruguay, is thought to be significant by many. His welcoming address to the Conference expressed many ideas parallel to those of Hull, by saying in part:

I feel confident that the distinguished statesmen and leaders who have set aside completely their own arduous tasks and have come from afar to attend this conference with the wish and the hope of improving the condition of their peoples, that form an integral part of a 'discouraged and disillusioned world', according to the fitting expression of the Hon. Cordell Hull in his statement of Rio de Janeiro, shall not leave Montevideo without taking effective work for the complete pacification of America and for the solution of the great economic problems of the moment, searching for the exact causes of the present human distress and finding a concrete formula for an immediate alleviation and their complete elimination in the near future.

These causes are truly complex, but we all know the most important of all and should not attempt to conceal it, because it would be cowardice and folly: it is the policy of isolations through custom barriers that we have followed, bringing disastrous consequences to the commercial relations of America and the world.³⁹

President Terra, who had been a professor of economics, continued by agreeing with the view of President Roosevelt in Looking Forward that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff had greatly decreased international trade and reminding the delegates that the Financial Conferences of Washington (1915) and Buenos Aires (1916),

³⁹ Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh International Conference of American States, 102. (Hereafter cited as Montevideo Report.)

to which he was a delegate, had unanimously accepted reciprocal custom facilities.⁴⁰

The Conference passed several non-political technical conventions pertaining to (1) nationality, (2) nationality of women, (3) extradition, with an optional clause, (4) political asylum, (5) revision of history textbooks, and (6) an additional protocol to the Washington treaty (1929).⁴¹ The two most important and controversial subjects presented to the Conference were those previously mentioned--economic policies and intervention. It is with these two phases that Cordell Hull was to shape the diplomacy of the United States relations with Latin America in the next four years.

Convention on Rights and Duties of States

The non-intervention question was a carry-over from the Havana Conference of 1928, when Charles Evans Hughes, chairman of the United States delegation, had refused to allow it to come before the Conference but had it referred to a committee for further study. With the report of the committee, the Conference accepted the Convention on Rights and Duties of States which included the definition of a state, equality of states, recog-

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, 273. (Hereafter cited as Bemis, Latin American Policy.)

dition by other states, jurisdiction of the state, settlement of disputes by "recognized pacific methods", but the major discussion arose over Article 8: "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."⁴²

Attacks came from Cuban and Haitian delegates but not as vivid as at previous Conferences. At this time Cordell Hull rose before the committee to remind the delegates of the change in the United States Government on March 4 and say "I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration."⁴³

A week later the convention was presented in the general session. Before the voting started, Mr. Hull found himself in an uncomfortable position as did Saavedra Lamas as criticism of the United States was expressed in strong terms. Hull and Lamas had faithfully carried out their agreement to cooperate but Argentina had long led the attack on the United States' behavior. Lamas, while not revealing the United States' position, said only enough to satisfy his fellow-delegates.⁴⁴

⁴²Montevideo Report, 165-172.

⁴³Ibid., 19.

⁴⁴Hull, Memoirs, 335.

While the other countries voted "yes" with enthusiasm, the United States accepted the treaty with reservations which only meant as much as "the laws of the nations as generally recognized".⁴⁵

Ratification of Peace Instruments

Even with the acceptance of the Convention on Duties and Rights of States which banned intervention, all of the American states had not signed the different peace pacts. In the presentation of Mr. Hull's proposal by Dr. Lamas the American States were asked to sign the remaining treaties. These treaties included the Treaty to Avoid Conflicts (Gondra Treaty) of 1923, Convention of Inter-American Conciliation (Washington) 1929, Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration (Washington) 1929, Anti-War Treaty on Non-Agression and Conciliation (Lamas Treaty) 1933, and Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Briand-Kellogg) 1928. According to the resolution after adherence by the countries, each is to seek ratification through their respective constitutional order.

Economic Proposals

The problems surrounding the economic situation were different yet. The United States delegation found it necessary to consider the workings of the New Deal before they could make

⁴⁵ Bemis, Latin American Policy, 274.

commitments. The instructions to the delegations were altered after the conference convened. The original instructions were vague on the grounds of division of constitutional powers between Federal and State Governments. However, during the conference, in answer to a telegram from Mr. Hull, the President, through the State Department, stated that he was wholly sympathetic with long-term programs which would coordinate with National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.⁴⁶ With the approval of Washington, Hull proceeded with his economic proposals. With the support of Lamas and other leaders, Hull presented his resolution on December twelfth. The resolution called on the governments of the American Republics to reduce tariff barriers through bilateral reciprocity treaties, containing mutual concessions with the objective being the promotion of world commerce. The bilateral agreements were to contain the unconditional most favored-nation clause.⁴⁷

While President Roosevelt supported Hull's resolution in a Washington press conference, the delegations at Montevideo began to ask questions as to its effect on existing trade agreements. Lamas came to the rescue of the proposal by underlining the

⁴⁶The Acting Secretary to State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Hull), December 8, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 168.

⁴⁷Montevideo Report, 196.

United States delegation's statements that it amounted to only a declaration, without any obligations upon the signatory nations.⁴⁸

Chaco Dispute

Not to be overlooked as unimportant was the situation created in the Conference by the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. A commission from the League of Nations had accomplished little. Hull, as a representative of a non-League nation, was anxious for a Pan-American solution to a Pan-American problem. Through the efforts of Cordell Hull and Dr. Terra, President of Uruguay, a temporary armistice was accomplished on Christmas Eve.⁴⁹ On December 26, the Conference adjourned.

Results of Conference

With great consistency, the reports of the Conference credited Secretary Hull with its success. His simplicity, honesty, and personality led to the growth of trust in the United States and the death of suspicion by the Latin American

⁴⁸Bemis, Latin American Policy, 302.

⁴⁹Hinton, Hull, 249. Mr. Hinton includes this footnote in his book: "Secretary Hull was unaccountably missing for several hours one day shortly before Christmas. Ulric Bell, the delegation's press officer, encountered him as he came into the Parque Hotel, late in the evening, and asked where he had been. He replied: 'Oh, I have just been talking to a few fellows.' It turned out that the 'few fellows' had been the other foreign ministers and President Terra and that Hull himself had drafted the joint telegram which brought the Chaco armistice."

countries.⁵⁰ President Roosevelt paid his compliments to his Secretary of State before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation on December 28, 1933, by saying:

A better state of feeling among the neighbor nations of North and Central and South America exists today than at any time within a generations. For participation in bringing about of that result we can feel proud that so much credit belongs to the Secretary of State of the United States, Cordell Hull.⁵¹

The Secretary of State then went to work to carry out the promises made at Montevideo, pertaining to correction of intervention policies and economic policies.

⁵⁰ Hubert Herring, "The Pan-American Dream Reborn", Christian Century, LI (January 24, 1934), 119-121.

⁵¹ Hull, Memoirs, 340.

CHAPTER III

THE POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION

The tradition of intervention in internal affairs of Latin American countries presented the major threat to the "Good Neighbor Policy." This chapter, in discussing intervention, divides itself into two phases--the abrogation of treaties giving the United States the right to intervene, and the instances where the question of possible intervention arose. Major sources for the chapter are Foreign Relations, New York Times, Hull's Memoirs, and Bemis' Latin American Policy.

Cuban Revolution

When Cordell assumed the position of Secretary of State, he was immediately confronted with many problems. In his own words:

Our inheritance of ill will was grim. It was probated under the name of Intervention: intervention in Panama to separate Panama from Colombia and build the Panama Canal; intervention in Mexico; intervention in Cuba; intervention in Haiti; intervention in Nicaragua.⁵²

he expressed the history of United States relations with Latin America. Among the problems he immediately faced was the impending revolution in Cuba where Gerando Machado y Morales, who had been president of Cuba since 1925, was beginning to be

⁵²Hull, Memoirs, 308.

plagued by bombings, wire cuttings, and other disrupting movements.⁵³ After Sumner Welles was appointed Ambassador to Cuba by President Roosevelt in April, 1933, Secretary Hull sent explicit instructions to him on May 1, 1933. These instructions were, while expressing United States-Cuban friendship, to convey the feelings of the United States that nothing constructive could be done as long as terrorism existed, that friendly mediation by the United States Government between President Machado and members of opposition parties could insure political peace for Cuba and that the United States was interested in a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba which could aid in Cuban economic stabilization. Ambassador Welles was also reminded that he was dealing with an independent, sovereign nation, and that the United States had no intentions of intervening.⁵⁴

Welles negotiated with the different political factions but to no avail. On August 11 and 12, revolts became so wide spread that President Machado resigned and Dr. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes became President. A new cabinet was named, representing every political group. A proclamation was issued calling for elections the following February and a return to the Constitution as it was before the amendments procured under Machado.

⁵³The Ambassador in Cuba (Guggenheim) to the Secretary of State, February 28, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 273-274.

⁵⁴The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), May 1, 1933, Ibid., 284-286.

At the same time Welles was conferring with Cuban officials, the Cuban Ambassador to the United States conferred with Mr. Hull. Secretary Hull stated again that the United States was only interested in a Cuban solution to a Cuban problem.⁵⁵

Then on September 4, the situation changed when the enlisted men of the Cuban army revolted under the leadership of Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. By this time the United States had sent the U.S.S. Richmond, U.S.S. Mississippi, and the U.S.S. Bainbridge to join the U.S.S. McFarland in Cuban waters to be ready, if necessary, to evacuate the United States citizens and embassy officials.⁵⁶

The de facto government consisted of at first, a five man, and then a four man, junta. The question of intervention immediately arose again. When Welles was informed of a regrouping of forces to reinstate the Cespedes Government, he included the following proposal in his report to the Department:

If the legitimate and recognized Government of Cuba [Cespedes] can make an effective demonstration of its intentions to reestablish itself, it would most decidedly appear to me to be in the best interest of the United States Government to

⁵⁵ New York Times, August 11, 1933.

⁵⁶ Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), September 5, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 385-387.

afford them immediate support. Any solution of this character is more advantageous to our interests and to our policy than full intervention and the possible necessity of an American Military Government. What I propose would be a strictly limited intervention of the following nature:

The Céspedes Government should be permitted to function freely in exactly the same manner as it did until the time of its overthrow, having full control of every branch of Government.... Such a policy on our part would presumably entail the landing of a considerable force at Habana and lesser forces in certain of the more important ports of the Republic.⁵⁷

The President and Secretary Hull replied quickly that the United States would not forfeit neutrality to support "one faction out of many, as attempting to set up a government which would be regarded by the whole world and especially throughout Latin America, as a creation and creature of the American Government."⁵⁸

As uneasy as the Latin American countries were about the Cuban situation, they were favorable to United States non-intervention. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs was confident that Cuba would overcome her difficulties and was pleased with the non-intervention of the United States.⁵⁹

⁵⁷The Ambassador in Cuba to the Secretary of State, (Welles) September 7, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 397.

⁵⁸The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), September 7, 1933, Ibid., 402.

⁵⁹The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Department of State (a translation), Ibid., 409.

Dr. Puig Casauranc, Foreign Minister of Mexico, also expressed that feelings against United States intervention were "deep seated and unanimous."⁶⁰ Dr. Puig was not alone in his feelings on this subject. The United States Ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, reported that the other Latin American representatives in Mexico were also concerned about the possibility of United States intervention.⁶¹

On September 10, 1933, Dr. Grau San Martín, a former professor at the University of Havana, was designated provisional president by the three remaining members of the junta. The United States did not recognize the government, waiting to see if it could establish and maintain order. On September 12, Secretary Hull issued an official statement including the following:

"The chief concern of the Government of the United States is and has been that Cuba solve her own political problems in accordance with the desires of the Cuban people themselves. It would seem unnecessary to repeat that the Government of the United States has no interest in behalf of or prejudice against any political group or independent organization which is today active in the political life of Cuba....."⁶²

Then again on September 15, 1933 Hull restated the determination to avoid intervention in Cuba. He said that the ships

⁶⁰The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to Secretary of State, September 9, 1933, Ibid., 413.

⁶¹Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat, 324.

⁶²New York Times, September 12, 1933.

in Cuban waters were there only to protect American officials, but that the State Department was disturbed about sporadic revolts on the island, especially those to the south and east of Havana.⁶³ On the other hand neither did the United States intervene to help or hinder the new government. Conflicts between factions continued until time for the Montevideo Conference.

By the time Hull returned to Washington from Montevideo the San Martin Government had disappeared and Colonel Carlos Mendieta had become president through the formulation of a new coalition government. Even though Mendieta was president, the self-promoted Colonel Bastista was the strong arm man of Cuba with wide powers. The United States, after consulting Latin American representatives, extended recognition to the government on January 22, 1934.⁶⁴

On May 29, 1934, the United States and Cuba signed a new treaty outmoding the treaty of 1903. Where the United States had had a legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of Cuba and approval of all Cuban treaties and loans, the United States returned Cuban sovereignty and independence to the Cubans. The United States only maintained the lease on the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The period of United States intervention and as a protectorate over Cuba had ended.⁶⁵

⁶³New York Times, September 15, 1933.

⁶⁴Bemis, Latin American Policy, 281.

⁶⁵Ibid., 283.

New Haitian Treaty

The Cuban situation was just one phase of the problem faced by the State Department. The United States had treaties with Haiti (1916) due to expire in 1936, Panama (1903), and the Dominican Republic which gave them the right to intervene in one fashion or another. By August 7, 1933, the negotiations were completed and a new treaty with Haiti was signed. It provided for all American officers then serving with the Garde d'Haiti to be replaced by October 1, 1934 and control given to Haitian officers; withdrawal of the Marine Brigade was to begin in October, 1934, and end within thirty days; removal of all Americans in the Haitian House of Customs to be replaced by Haitians; and the right to retire bonds before maturity; and any controversy arising between the two Governments shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Treaty of January 7, 1909 between the two countries.⁶⁶

At the signing of the treaty, Secretary Hull's official statement gave credit for the new treaty to the efficient government in Haiti under President Stenio Vincent.⁶⁷ On

⁶⁶ Agreement between the United States of America and Haiti for the Haitianization of the Garde and Withdrawal of Military Forces from Haiti and Financial Arrangement, signed August 7, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 755-761.

⁶⁷ New York Times, August 9, 1933.

August 16, 1934, the last marine was removed, two months ahead of the original schedule.

New Panama Treaty

A treaty similar to the Cuban and Haitian treaties was concluded with Panama in March, 1936. However, this treaty was not ratified until 1939, due to pressure placed on the Senate.⁶⁸

Absolute Non-Intervention

Two times the cry for intervention arose, only to be refuted by Hull. The first of these was the situation in Mexico created by government seeking to lessen the power of the Catholic Church. The Catholics in the United States had watched Mexico since 1917 when the new Mexican constitution had narrowly defined religious functions. However, in July, 1934, when Ambassador Daniels spoke before the American Seminar, the American Catholics began to demand his recall.⁶⁹ The Catholic publications in the United States wrote editorials, certain Catholic leaders, especially the Knights of Columbus, wrote letters to and called on President Roosevelt demanding Daniels' recall. By fall the furor was greater

⁶⁸Hull, Memoirs, 345.

⁶⁹E. David Cronon, "American Catholics and Mexican Anticlericalism, 1933-1936", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLV (September, 1958), 208.

with one newly elected Congressman, John P. Higgins, calling for either intervention or withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of Mexico.⁷⁰ Secretary Hull warned Higgins he would only provoke Mexican resentment and President Roosevelt told him he was misjudging the facts.

When Senator William E. Borah introduced a resolution in January, 1935, calling for an investigation of the situation in Mexico, Hull used his personal influence and that of the administration to defeat the resolution.⁷¹ After the failure to get the resolution out of committee, the furor began to die but it was still in sight until after the 1936 election.⁷²

The importance of this instance is the fact that it was the first long attack on the Good Neighbor Policy. Through the cooperation of Roosevelt, Hull, and Daniels, the propaganda never achieved its aims. Even more important was the example of the United States' not intervening, which made many friends in Mexico and Latin America.

⁷⁰Ibid., 215.

⁷¹Ibid., 217.

⁷²The role played by Mr. Hull in this dispute is questionable. It is not mentioned in his Memoirs or the biography of his life by Mr. Hinton, however, the author of the cited article refers to letters to and from Hull which are in State Department files, Daniels Papers, Roosevelt Papers and Borah Papers. His statements in the New York Times were only of the very official type and did not seem to indicate his personal feelings.

The second test of the non-intervention policy was the internal disorders resulting from revolution in Nicaragua in the summer of 1936. When rumors began to appear that president Juan B. Sacasa had asked the United States to intervene, Mr. Hull received notes from Peru and Chile. He quickly reaffirmed the United States policy of not interfering or intervening in the affairs of other nations. He also reminded the people that the United States had signed the Convention for the Duties and Rights of States which abolished intervention.⁷³ For his actions, he received praise in Latin American papers. One such editorial was quoted in the New York Times: "After calling former President Juan B. Sacasa of Nicaragua 'the incarnation of mediocrity' an editorial in Panama America today praises Secretary Hull's policy of non-intervention."⁷⁴

Evaluation of the Policy

Just what amount Hull, Roosevelt, and Assistant Secretary of State Wells each contributed to this program is hard to judge. Secretary Hull as the spokesman for the Administration in foreign affairs carried much of the burden during the years. The far more lasting accomplishment is the change in United States relations with Latin America, from one of the neighborhood "bully" to one of a "good neighbor." This change belongs primarily to no one but Mr. Hull.

⁷³ New York Times, June 5, 1936

⁷⁴ New York Times, June 28, 1936.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC POLICY

The economic policy and philosophy of Cordell Hull represents a major portion of his life's interest and his accomplishments as Secretary of State. Long an opponent of high tariffs, as Secretary of State he saw a life's dream fulfilled. The New York Times, Hull's Memoirs, Foreign Relation Papers, and Bemis' Latin American Policy form the major sources for this chapter.

Philosophy of Tariffs

For nearly twenty-five years before becoming Secretary of State, Cordell Hull had pleaded for low tariffs in the traditional Democratic fashion. However, as we have already seen, his reasons for this belief changed with World War I, from these of domestic reasons to those of international reasons. Cordell Hull thought in 1916 the war was caused by the strifes over international trade. He saw the same situation arising with the increase in tariffs throughout the world in the 1920's and 1930's. Not long after assuming his cabinet post, Cordell Hull in speaking before the American Society of International Law, said:

In short, healthy international relations depend no less upon a properly regulated exchange of goods and commodities than upon courteously phrased diplomatic exchanges. Let me add, too, that international commerce is the life blood of civilization.⁷⁵

⁷⁵New York Times, April 30, 1933.

Cordell Hull, as a student of tariffs and a Congressman, had watched the countries of Latin America raise their tariffs. Between 1929 and 1932, Argentina raised all tariff rates by ten percent, which in many cases caused a rise of one-third over previous duty rates. Brazilian and Chilean raises were even higher.⁷⁶ He believed that the rise in tariff barriers were a source of conflict between countries, especially among these of Latin America. From the beginning of his career as Secretary of State, Cordell Hull worked for reciprocal trade agreements as a road to economic recovery and peace.

Early Negotiations

Even though the Argentine Ambassador, Felipe A. Espil, inquired as early as March 16, 1933, as to the possibilities of a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Argentina,⁷⁷ it was not until July 12, 1933, that the State Department was authorized to open preliminary negotiations for such an agreement.⁷⁸ At the same time similar instructions were forwarded to Brazil and Colombia. Negotiations

⁷⁶D. M. Phelps, "Industrial Expansion in Temperate South America," American Economic Review, XXV (June, 1935), 277.

⁷⁷Memorandum of the Secretary of State, March 16, 1933, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933, IV, 642.

⁷⁸The Acting Secretary of State to Charge in Argentina (White), July 12, 1933, Ibid., 647.

were held with each of the three countries, but only with Colombia was a treaty signed.⁷⁹

One of the problems plaguing discussions of trade agreements was the low percentage of trade treaties accepted by the United States Senate. Hull knew that the only practical way to implement a full program of reciprocal trade agreements was by obtaining authorization from Congress to make such agreements through use of the Executive Agreement.

With this in view, President Roosevelt formed the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy on November 11, 1933, with representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, chairman of the Tariff Commission, and heads of the A.A.A. and N.R.A., with the State Department acting as chairman.⁸⁰ This committee, under the chairmanship of Francis B. Sayre, the son-in-law of Woodrow Wilson, worked until they had drafted a suitable law.

Trade Agreement Act

On March 2, 1934, the Trade Agreement bill was sent to Congress. It authorized the President for a three year period, through use of the executive agreement, to enter into trade agreements, with the authority to raise or lower the tariff

⁷⁹Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 249. A footnote states: "This agreement never went into force. It was replaced by a new agreement signed September 13, 1935; Department of State, Executive agreements Series No. 89."

⁸⁰Hull, Memoirs, 353.

rates, as they are given in the Smoot-Hawley Act, by fifty percent.⁸¹ When the bill came before Congress, the voting closely followed the party lines, as the Senate voted 57 to 33 and the House voted 274 to 111 for the proposal. The main objection voiced was the idea of giving the President too much authority and the influence that Cordell Hull would exert for his free trade philosophy. On June 12, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the Trade Agreement Act, making it law. So close was this project to Cordell Hull's heart that he wrote of his emotions as the President signed the bill: "Each stroke of the pen seemed to write a message of gladness on my heart. My fight of many long years for the reciprocal trade policy and the lowering of trade barriers was won. To say I was delighted is a bald statement."⁸²

This was the program for which Cordell Hull had hoped when in Montevideo he presented his resolution for a program of reciprocal lowering of high tariffs based upon the principle of the unconditional most-favored-nation, through bilateral and multilateral agreements.⁸³ Immediately the delegations began to inquire as to the status of existing trade agreements

⁸¹Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 254.

⁸²Hull, Memoirs, 357.

⁸³Bemis, Latin American Policy, 301.

under such a proposal. Dr. Saavedra Lamas explained to the delegates that the proposal was only a declaration, without any obligations. Alfonso Lopez, chairman of the Colombian delegation, stated that this was a new and welcome move on the part of the United States to lower her tariffs.⁸⁴ The resolution passed unanimously and laid a foundation for negotiations after the Trade Agreements Act was passed by the United States Congress. The New World had accepted what the Old World at the London Economic Conference had refused.⁸⁵

Reciprocal Trade Treaties

The first agreement, signed on August 24, 1934, with Cuba, was not a typical agreement in that it did not include the most-favored-nation clause. The treaty of 1902 with Cuba was continued in effect as it had given preferential tariffs to the imports of products from the other country.⁸⁶

In the period of time between the Cuban trade treaty and the Brazilian treaty, Hull was frequently called upon to defend his policy. In one such instance he called present [1934] trade policies "blind, dumb, nationalistic measures which are

⁸⁴Ibid., 302.

⁸⁵New York Times, December 28, 1933.

⁸⁶Hull, Memoirs, 368.

getting us nowhere."⁸⁷ On February 2, 1935, a trade agreement was signed with Brazil. After the ceremonies of the treaty signing, Mr. Hull's official statement included such statements break in the log-jam of international trade created by restrictions..." and "Having once started on the road away from the medieval mercantilism which was strangling the commerce of a new world, progress should now be more rapid and the movement gain momentum."⁸⁸

By the end of 1935, the United States had agreements with Haiti, Colombia, and Honduras as well as Cuba, Brazil, Canada and three European countries. Before the end of the first term of Roosevelt's administration, trade agreements had been made with Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador of the Latin American countries. Of the American states, only Panama, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic did not express an interest in the trade agreement program.⁸⁹

Disagreement over Treaties

Even with these accomplishments in hand, the road had not been an easy one. One of the major changes presented by the

⁸⁷ New York Times, February 1, 1935.

⁸⁸ New York Times, February 2, 1935.

⁸⁹ Bemis, Latin American Policy, 306.

Trade Agreement Act was the unconditional most-favored-nation clause. On this issue Cordell Hull disagreed with George N. Peek, who after being eased out of the A.A.A. had been appointed special assistant on trade policy in December of 1933. When Roosevelt appointed him Foreign Trade Advisor in March, 1934, Hull was extremely disappointed. Peek and Hull disagreed on operational procedure, whether the agreements should be nation-by-nation, or to all non-discriminating nations. Peek favored the former, while Hull preferred the latter. After the Act was passed, Peek tried to use it as a "horse-swapping" method with other countries. The real crisis came with the effect of the proposed trade agreement with Germany being negotiated by Peek upon the agreements under consideration, especially with Brazil. In the agreement with Germany, the United States was to sell Germany 800,000 bales of cotton through the new Export-Import Bank, one-fourth to be paid in United States dollars and three-fourths to be paid in German currency, giving Germany special preferential treatment. Brazil objected on the basis that if the United States made such an agreement, they as a cotton exporter could only do the same. Hull appealed to the President, who finally withdrew his support of the agreement, thus preventing the similar proposals Peek had in mind.⁹⁰ The acceptance of Peek's resignation in November, 1935, by the President meant a

⁹⁰Hull, Memoirs, 374.

victory for the interpretation Hull had given the Trade Agreement Act, but also established the policy of internationalism in foreign trade by the New Deal.⁹¹

Evaluation of Program

The reciprocal trade program was only started during this period under study but by 1936 evaluations were beginning to come forth. Mr. Hull expressed the idea that "Our trade agreement program is thus a standing offer to all the nations of the world to deal with each of them in commercial matters on a basis of equal treatment."⁹² Editorials throughout the period varied but generally supported Hull. One such column said, "Mr. Hull believes that to restore 'fair, friendly and normal trade relations would be not only an economic help, but a great moral and diplomatic gain.'"⁹³

One of the most interesting statements came from Sumner Welles, whose disagreements with Hull caused him to resign after

⁹¹Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, 258-259.

⁹²Address of Cordell Hull before the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, April 30, 1936, as quoted in Ruhl J. Barlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy, 515.

⁹³New York Times, May 1, 1936.

serving under Hull in the State Department for ten years,

The greatest positive achievement of the first Roosevelt Administration in the realm of international co-operation lay in the trade agreement policy for which Secretary of State Hull is wholly responsible, and which he has furthered with a single-minded and indefatigable devotion.... It lowered commercial barriers at the very moment when all nations seemed most bent upon increasing them. It greatly assisted in establishing the good neighbor policy in the Western Hemisphere.⁹⁴

By 1935 the United States had trade agreements with fourteen countries and by 1945 with twenty-nine countries.⁹⁵

⁹⁴Sumner Welles, Time for Decision, 55. This book on American foreign policy only makes this one reference to Cordell Hull by name. Mr. Welles gives all the credit to the President and himself and when he does refer to Mr. Hull it is as the "Secretary of State".

⁹⁵Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 259.

CHAPTER V

THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE

The conference held in Buenos Aires in 1936 as discussed in this chapter represented another phase of the extension of the Good Neighbor Policy of Hull. Although not conclusive within itself, it represented a basis for continued cooperation and further negotiation, both political and economic. The major sources for this chapter include Hull's Memoirs, Hinton's Hull, Bemis, Latin American Policy of United States, and Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.

With the coming of peace between Paraguay and Bolivia in the Chaco area, President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull advocated machinery to establish (1) neutrality in instances of intra-hemispheric war and (2) to consolidate against the possibility of attack from outside the hemisphere. The European and Asian situation was becoming more threatening and the next Pan American conference was not until 1938. In the words of Secretary Hull, "The newborn friendship among the American Republics required solidifying. A common attitude toward the dangers rising in Europe and the Orient was essential. The existing peace agreements in the Western Hemisphere had to be strengthened."⁹⁶

⁹⁶Hull, Memoirs, 493.

With this outline in mind, on January 30, 1936, President Roosevelt wrote President Agustín P. Justo of Argentina and the chief executives of the other American republics suggesting that a conference be held in Buenos Aires sometime during the year to discuss neutrality and prevention of inter-hemispheric wars.

The idea was received with welcome response, and planning of the agenda began. On August 20, 1936, the official invitation was extended by the Argentine Government to all the American states to meet in Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936. The United States delegation, appointed by President Roosevelt upon Secretary Hull's suggestion, consisted of Secretary Hull as chairman, Sumner Wells, Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Latin American Affairs, Alexander A. Weddell, United States Ambassador to Argentina, Adolf A. Berle, Chamberlin of New York City, Alexander F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Charles G. Fenwick, professor of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College, Michael Francis Doyle, lawyer from Philadelphia, and Mrs. Elise F. Musser, State Senator from Utah.⁹⁷

On November 7, Mr. Hull again boarded the U.S.S. American Legion to journey to a Latin American conference. He followed his established practice of holding informal meetings of his delegation en route to the conference. The delegation stopped

⁹⁷Ibid., 494-495.

at Rio de Janeiro on November 19, where Secretary Hull was met by the cabinet and honored by a banquet. The delegation stopped in Montevideo on November 24, where Hull was welcomed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay before arriving in Buenos Aires on November 25.

Attitude of Lamas

The atmosphere was different from Montevideo in 1933. All twenty-one republics were represented with the delegations including eleven foreign ministers and two ex-presidents.⁹⁸ The Lamas had just returned from Geneva where he had presided over the League of Nations; on the day before the Conference he had received the Nobel Peace Prize; and he had presided over the neutral commission which had brought final peace in the Chaco. At the height of his fame he could not accept the leadership of the Conference resting with a delegation other than his own. Even though Secretary Hull nominated him for the permanent President of the Conference, Dr. Lamas was ever protective of any statement that would infringe upon the League.

⁹⁸ Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 6. (Hereafter cited as Buenos Aires Report.)

⁹⁹ Ibid., 10.

The President's Visit

On November 30, President Roosevelt arrived in Buenos Aires for the opening session of the Conference. This was the second time that a President of the United States had attended an inter-American conference.⁹⁹ The President was welcomed by President Justo of Argentina as he disembarked from the U.S.S. Indianapolis and by thousands as he rode through the streets of the city. The Argentine people took the President to heart as "the man who could beat the bankers."¹⁰⁰

In the President's address to the Conference he pointed out that the New World could help the Old World avert the impending war by preventing wars among ourselves; prevention of conditions which cause war; and expressing faith in the Western World. He concluded by saying:

The faith of the Americas, therefore, lies in the spirit. The system, the sisterhood, of the Americas, is impregnable so long as her nations maintain that spirit.

In that faith and spirit we will have peace over the Western World. In that faith and spirit we will all watch and guard our hemisphere. In that faith and spirit may we also, with God's help, offer hope to our brethren overseas.¹⁰¹

The Conference Begins

With this United States background, on December 5, Secretary Hull gave his speech that contained the "Eight Pillars of

¹⁰⁰ Hinton, Hull, 312.

¹⁰¹ Buenos Aires Report, 81.

Peace" which are summarized as follows. This was the outline of the United States program upon which Mr. Hull embarked.

(1) Peoples must be educated for peace. Each nation must make itself safe for peace.

(2) Frequent conferences between representatives of nations, and intercourse between their peoples, are essential.

(3) The consummation of the five well-known peace agreements will provide adequate peace machinery.

(4) In the event of war in this hemisphere, there should be a common policy of neutrality.

(5) The nations should adopt commercial policies to bring each that prosperity upon which enduring peace is founded.

(6) Practical international cooperation is essential to restore many indispensable relationships between nations and prevent the demoralization with which national character and conduct are threatened.

(7) International law should be reestablished, revitalized, and strengthened. Armies and navies are no permanent substitute for its great principles.

(8) Faithful observance of undertakings between nations is the foundation of international order, and rests upon moral law, the highest of all law.¹⁰²

¹⁰² Ibid., 11.

Accomplishments of Conference

Two treaties, eight conventions, an additional protocol relative to non-intervention and sixty-two resolutions, recommendations and declarations were signed by the Conference. Special notice must be given to six of these.¹⁰³

Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace. This convention called for consultation in the event of menace to American republics from outside, menace to peace between American states and menace of an international war. Peace was to be maintained by means of arbitration or judicial settlement.¹⁰⁴

This document did not describe methods of consultation or collaboration, but when it became necessary to place it in effect in December, 1941, it functioned.¹⁰⁵

Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation. The Central American delegations offered a convention for the solidarity of the Americas as a result of an Uruguayan statement when Brazil entered World War I in 1917 "understanding that the grievance against the rights of one country would be considered as a grievance by all and provoke them

¹⁰³Ibid., 15.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 120

¹⁰⁵Bemis, Latin American Policy, 289.

to uniform and common reaction."¹⁰⁶ Uruguay then repealed all neutrality laws against American states in the war. Article two of the proposed convention stated:

All of the American nations will consider as an attack upon themselves individually an attack which may be made by any nation upon the rights of another, and such a situation shall give rise to an agreement or consultation between the foreign offices with the object of determining what position is to be taken or, it may be, the rules of concerted neutrality.¹⁰⁷

The convention was reduced to only a declaration reaffirming the non-recognition (1) of territory acquired by violence or force; (2) intervention in internal or external affairs of another state, and; (3) forcible collection of debts. However, it did establish a basis for action of later conferences.¹⁰⁸

Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention. The non-intervention clause of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States had merely stated that no state has the right to intervene. The United States had accepted this with reservations. The additional protocol very nicely removes the United States reservation "under laws as generally recognized" by stating in Article 1. "The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties." The protocol provides for any problems

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 290.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 290.

¹⁰⁸Buenos Aires Report, 228

arising being settled by arbitration or judicial judgement.¹⁰⁹

Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies. The Treaty for the Prevention of Controversies established a permanent bilateral commission, composed of representatives of each country. The commission could be called into session by any signatory state with the hearing alternating between the capitals of the states in controversy. The commission is to study the situation, propose a solution, and promote a closer friendship between the nations.¹¹⁰

The commission to be established was similar to the successful existing body between the United States and Canada.¹¹¹

Inter-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation. This treaty called for each signatory country to name two individuals, considering their legal knowledge and high character, to be placed on a list with the Pan American Union. From this list any countries in controversy could (1) select one man as mediation, or (2) each select a man, and these men in turn select a third who is agreeable to both nations. At the end of the allowed time, no less than three months or more than six, if no peaceful settlement has been reached, the question shall go to the machinery on conciliation as provided for in the various American agreements.¹¹²

Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American States. This

¹¹¹ Ibid., 20.

¹¹² Ibid., 154-155.

treaty restates and reaffirms the provisions of the five existing peace treaties and further acceptance of them.¹¹³

Results of Conference

The Conference had not accomplished what Hull and Roosevelt had hoped, but it formed a firm foundation for future meetings. Hull had not liked the actions of the Argentine delegation and Dr. Lamas in particular.¹¹⁴

The entire conference, the results, and the effects, were results of the philosophy of the President and the Secretary of State that peace is something to be achieved, not granted just as was friendship. The Argentine government did not ratify any of the treaties even though they were signed in Buenos Aires because Lamas could not lead while the United States Senate ratified all the agreements without debate.¹¹⁵ The United States had not achieved its entire program, but it had not been entirely destroyed.

The acceptance of the beginning of continental solidarity was present as was friendship among the countries. The dislike and distrust of the "Colossus of the North" was missing. The slow, smooth actions of Cordell Hull were beginning to flower in Latin America.

¹¹³Ibid., 23.

¹¹⁴Hull, Memoirs, 501.

¹¹⁵Bemis, Latin American Policy, 291.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This last chapter contains the conclusions the author has reached about the man, Cordell Hull, and his policies after the research for this paper. There are no particular sources other than those mentioned in the thesis; however, Mr. Hull's Memoirs and Hinton's Hull contain so much of the man's personality that through these two sources one becomes well acquainted with the man.

Study of Personal Diplomacy

The Latin American policy of Cordell Hull during the first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt was in some ways a continuation of policies begun under Herbert Hoover, but it was different, too.

President Hoover and his Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, had begun the non-intervention policy of the United States by starting negotiations for the new treaty with Haiti which the Haitian legislature refused, and withdrawing the United States marines stationed in Nicaragua. After the beginning of the New Deal, Hull successfully negotiated a treaty with Haiti. The personal diplomacy of Cordell Hull at Montevideo as a follow-up to the new Haitian treaty started a new era in United States--Latin American relations. This is an

era of the United States accepting the neighbors to the south as equals, not as "poor relations". This new attitude was shown by Mr. Hull's answer to the various foreign ministers at Montevideo. To their statement, as he called on them in their hotels, "I was just intending to call upon you at your hotel," he answered, "It was as much my duty to call upon you as your duty to call upon me, and my people feel that way toward you and your people."¹¹⁶

This is but one example of the carry-over of the techniques learned by Cordell Hull in his long career as a politician. Through these years he had learned to treat all men as equals for each had one vote. He knew that if a man were to feel inferior, his support was lost. In the same years, Cordell Hull learned the value of giving your own ideas to someone else to gain his support, but above all the value of compromise. As a career politician he had learned when to persist, when to wait, and when to withdraw. It was this background that had become so natural to Hull, that made it possible for him to work successfully with foreign diplomats.

Dr. Saavedra Lamas stands as an example of this technique. He had arrived in Montevideo not positive the Argentine delegation would stay, then Mr. Hull called. When Mr. Hull offered Lamas the opportunity to present the peace proposal, Lamas

¹¹⁶Hull, Memoirs, 326.

accepted and the two men led the conference, thus strengthening the weak Argentine-American relations. Mr. Hull then nominated Lamas for the Nobel Peace prize, which was awarded just as the Buenos Aires conference was convening, but at Buenos Aires it was different. The United States plans had been sent to each nation before the conference for their study so Hull could not "give" Lamas a resolution. Hull, who never admits to a mistake in his Memoirs, however, leaves the impression there that this could have been one. If the plans had not been sent early, he might have been able to woo Lamas and retain friendly relations between the two countries. As it was, the two men left the Conference unhappy with each other, and this was the beginning of a period of troubled relations between the United States and Argentina.

Fate Plays a Part

The interest of Cordell Hull in establishing Latin America as a focus for the "good neighbor" policy, did not enter the office of Secretary of State with him, but came as a result of circumstances, mainly the London Economic Conference. At this conference, the first of many that he was to attend, he was rebuked on his philosophy of world trade tariffs. The Europeans were more interested in war debts and currency stabilization. Then Raymond Moley appeared on the scene to violate the very

essence of protocol by superseding his superior. By the actions of Moley and lack of consideration given to the Secretary of State by Moley and Prime Minister McDonald of Great Britain, Hull was not only personally embarrassed but felt completely humiliated. To the man who had won fifteen out of sixteen elections, this was a personal defeat of deep emotions. His next attempt had to be successful for his personal satisfaction. The next conference just happened to be Montevideo.

With the success he found in Montevideo and the tributes given him for the success of the Conference by everyone from his President to the press, he could not mar this record. Latin America had become his special area of success and he maintained it. Through a continuation of the "Good Neighbor" policy and his personal diplomacy, when Pearl Harbor was bombed in December, 1941, his work was repaid. By the end of January, 1942, all the Latin American states, except Argentina, had broken relations with the Axis through the machinery established at the conferences of 1936, 1938, and 1940.

It was again Latin America that had first accepted his economic policies, particularly reciprocal trade agreements. The period under consideration, 1933-1937, only discusses the infant stages of the program. By 1945, reciprocal trade agreements had been concluded with twenty-nine countries and has continued to grow.

Hull as Secretary

Cordell Hull had entered the Department of State with a different background than most of his 20th century predecessors who had been mainly New Yorkers of good families, legal training at Harvard or Yale, and few elective offices. Hull, who some thought at his appointment would only be a figure head, was not to be underestimated. His long years in Congress not only gave him many good friends there, but a very astute ability to evaluate the body. He had his differences with the group, but eventually he got his way. The Trade Agreement Act had little opposition except strictly partisan. The Neutrality Act of 1935 was a reaction to one Senator Nye, but Hull waited and in 1938, the law was what the administration had wanted.

As the Secretary of State he had the advantages of modern communications, the cable and the telephone. Whenever he needed an on-the-spot report, he telephoned, but he used the cable and air mail a majority of the time. In this manner he was a traditional Secretary; however, he was the beginning of the traveling Secretaries of State. It was on his travels that the personal diplomacy appears.

One thing that must be remembered, however, is that during the years 1933-1937, Cordell Hull was the Secretary of State,

but after this period Roosevelt became more and more his own Secretary of State and Hull becomes more and more only an administrator, especially in the handling of the European and Asian problems. Latin American was still more or less left to Hull. This makes for a strange dichotomy in the relationship between the two men, but even then Hull remained as Secretary of State until his health forced his resignation in November, 1944, just short of twelve years.

This gives for one of the most varied evaluations of a Secretary of State, as through this division there can be only two different reports. The first division of Hull's tenure as Secretary of State illustrates a man with many high principle views going into a world of men with short-visioned practical views, or so it appeared at the time. Yet time has approved of Hull's belief in lower tariffs, as illustrated by the continued reciprocal trade agreements, and of his belief in an international peace organization, for which he was given the title "Father of the United Nations", as it celebrates its fifteenth anniversary.

Cordell Hull was one of the few during the isolationist period between the two wars that could see the United States as a part of the world neighborhood, not a unit that could exist within itself. For his world peace movement and promotion of cooperation of nations, he was granted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945. The more one studies this American, the more certain

facts appear and reappear. Here was a politician, an idealist, a persistent worker for programs in which he believed, a man who was not afraid to remove subordinates who did not follow his leadership, and a man that grew with his office. Yet neither can one study Cordell Hull without a growing respect and admiration for the man who was Secretary of State for the longest period in the history of the office. Today with conditions unsettled as they are in the Caribbean, the efforts of Hull to make the Monroe Doctrine a hemispheric project rather than a national doctrine becomes more important. Final proof of his lasting effect on American foreign policy comes with the 1960 Democratic Party platform. The opening phrase of their plank on world trade and tariffs was prefaced by the phrase, "In the tradition of Cordell Hull".¹¹⁷

In the tradition of Cordell Hull, the United States has continued the reciprocal trade program which was the life-long dream of the man. In the tradition of Cordell Hull, the United States has tried to remain neutral in the Cuban revolution which brought Castro to power. In the tradition of Cordell Hull, the United States has tried to be a "good neighbor" to our neighbors to the south.

¹¹⁷New York Times, July 13, 1960.

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