Civil Wars in the Capital: Civil Affairs in the Defenses of Washington, 1861-1863

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CIVIL WARS IN THE CAPITAL: CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, 1861-1863

A Thesis Submitted To The Graduate School In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Degree Of Master Of Arts

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This thesis analyzes the relationships between civilians and soldiers in the Defenses of Washington during the Civil War. Marked by a combination of conflict and adaptation, the visible tension between soldiers and civilians threatened Union loyalty around Washington. Differing identities and priorities caused these conflicts. Steeped in a Northern education that cast the South as an enemy, many of these young soldiers thought slavery and associations with Maryland marked Washington’s rural outskirts as enemy territory. This dynamic, along with material needs, led soldiers to frequently take private property without compensation, known as foraging. Furthermore, soldiers adopted new identities and social groups that encouraged behavior not normally accepted in peacetime. Therefore, drunkenness, violence, and theft became an easy and tempting way for soldiers to “fight” the war around the Washington and vent frustration and boredom. Civilians attempted to find redress with junior and senior officers, but found the former dismissive and latter too overwhelmed to effectively compensate for lost property. Blaming alcohol, both military and civilian authorities restricted alcohol’s sale and traffic, itself an intrusion on local business and customs. In the end, few real solutions were found for these problems, but soldiers and civilians nonetheless adapted to each other, building informal communities in the process.
(Civil War Trust)
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INTRODUCTION

A few hours away from the hallowed ground of the Civil War’s most legendary struggles lay the earthen ruins known as the Defenses of Washington. From 1861 to 1865, these once formidable structures protected the Union capital from Confederate attacks, but now they remain a hidden aspect of the history of the Civil War and Washington, D.C. Grand equestrian statues of Union generals memorialize the war’s meaning and identity to downtown Washington, but the Defenses of Washington left a lasting impression on the city’s suburban outskirts. In addition to providing security, the forts also witnessed an unending stream of men and material. Regiments of fresh and eager recruits first tasted war’s privations in the forts’ shadows, and local civilians bore the heavy burden of hosting the Union army in their own backyards. The sacrifice of both soldiers and civilians around Washington helped ensure Union victory and in the process brought profound changes to the District of Columbia.

Despite the forts’ centrality to the history of the war and of the nation’s capital, Washingtonians know little about them. Washington tourists already swamped with options ignore the forts when they know about them at all. Some of them can be visited today; most of the forts gave way to post-war development, but some exist today in various states of preservation. In some cases, small stretches of earthen parapet are all

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that remains, but some fort structures are entirely preserved in thick woodlands. Generations of Washington children played in these fort remains, especially in the “caves,” which were the forts’ original magazines and bombproofs!\(^2\) Others are completely gone, but their former sites house public parks.

Despite their disappearance, their importance to history calls for attention. The forts in the District of Columbia are neglected subsidiaries of Rock Creek National Park and National Capitol Parks East. Faded and outdated signage, where markers exist at all, testify to the forts’ second-hand status within the National Park Service budget. Without success, citizens have long looked to the forts’ remains as an opportunity to educate the public and provide green spaces. The Great Depression laid waste to elaborate plans to resurrect the fort system as part of a “Fort Circle Park” around the city, and preservationists have lamented the lost opportunity.\(^3\) In 2014, District of Columbia Congressional delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton introduced House Resolution 4003, the “Civil War Defenses of Washington National Historical Park Act,” to the 113\(^{th}\) Congress.\(^4\) Boldly calling for a single National Park encompassing sites in Maryland, Washington, and Virginia to “study ways in which the Civil War history of both North and South can be assembled, arrayed, and conveyed for the benefit of the public, and for

\(^2\) Bruce Fagan, conversation, April 1, 2017.


other purposes,” Norton’s bill lacked Congressional support and faded away in committee.  

Municipally managed sites in Virginia such as Forts Ward and Ethan Allen have fared a little better, but like their counterparts in Washington, preservation and interpretation efforts are uncoordinated and awkward. Interpretive signs are sometimes blocks away from actual fort sites and city governments remain reticent about committing resources to heritage tourism.  

The Civil War Trust, an organization committed to preserving Civil War battle sites, placed the Defenses of Washington on its 2006 list of most endangered places. Civil War Trust President Jim Lightizer summarized the challenges faced by the Defenses of Washington: “what remains of the forts is dying because of neglect and lack of coordination for maintenance and interpretation.”

This thesis answers the call for an interpretive framework suitable to the history of the Defenses of Washington. Specifically, previously unused documents provide evidence to interpret and analyze civil affairs. Defined by Merriam-Webster as the “affairs and operations of the civil population of a territory that are supervised and directed by friendly occupying power,” this framework provides historical meaning in two main ways.  

First, studying civilian and military interactions gives meaning and identity to the areas affected by the Defenses of Washington: the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. Particularly for Washington, D.C., an area pushing for statehood

5 Ibid.

6 Cooling and Owen, *Mr. Lincoln’s Forts*, xii.-xiii.

7 Ibid., xiii.

and Congressional representation, the Defenses of Washington’s transformation of the District of Columbia makes the Civil War a defining event.

Secondly, this interpretive framework provides insights into the complex terrain of civil affairs. Projecting the course of future military operations, American strategists admit that that military operations require civilian interaction: “war is no longer – if it ever was – a spectator sport.”9 In the words of retired Marine Colonel Curtis Lee and David Kilcullen, “as we rethink our approach…and confront the new global pattern of irregular conflict, there’s a real imperative to develop new ideas and approaches for civil engagement.”10 Studying the past gives real promise for preparing service personnel for these unique challenges. The United States military cleverly uses preserved Civil War battlefields for “staff rides,” battlefield tours catered to servicemen and women to teach leadership and military science.11 If staff rides justify preserving Civil War sites across the country, then the Defenses of Washington should be preserved and curated.

Frederick Little argues that Civil Affairs curricula across divisions is not consistent or coordinated, leading to a “convoluted understanding of what a CA Soldier brings to the fight.” This thesis argues the Defenses of Washington can contribute to this dilemma.

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10 Ibid, 36.

Staff rides on these sites can help modern soldiers grapple with the enormously difficult task of maintaining peace overseas while winning “hearts and minds.”

Historians have recently penetrated the Civil War’s civil-military connections. Carl William Piper’s 2011 dissertation examines the importance of civil-military policies in keeping Kentucky and Missouri loyal to the Union cause. Categorizing border state operations as “highly complex where loyalties are not always clear,” this thesis concurs in Piper’s view that the “complexities of the Border State conflict can be used as the basis for an examination of other intra-state conflicts with similar characteristics.” Within the past five years, Judkin Browning and Claudia Floyd, and others have examined the Union occupation of eastern North Carolina and Maryland, respectively. LeeAnn Whites and Alecia P. Long also collected a series of essays documenting the effects of military occupation on women. These and other studies reveal a pattern: that occupied civilians, even in staunchly pro-Southern areas, shifted their loyalties according to their circumstances. The sudden appearance of large bodies of soldiers naturally caused

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inconveniences, and civilians’ predilections combined with the degree of inconvenience to determine responses. A similar process occurred around Washington.

Concerning the Defenses of Washington, Benjamin Franklin Cooling III, flanked by Walter H. Owen and David Miller, make up the subject’s specialists. Cooling’s 1975 book, *Symbol, Sword, and Shield*, remains the flagship work. Positing the forts within the war’s military narrative, Cooling uses the metaphor of a “sword” and “shield” to describe the interplay between the Union’s offensive and defensive operations.\(^\text{15}\) Far from being a static part of the Civil War, the Defenses of Washington were a central component of Union strategy. Cooling’s Cold War sensibilities inform his thesis: he describes the forts as the Civil War’s “deterrent.”\(^\text{16}\) Although Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early threatened Fort Stevens in July 1864, Robert E. Lee and others avoided confronting Washington’s formidable defenses.\(^\text{17}\) Around the same time, David Miller’s 1976 *The Defenses of Washington During the Civil War*, provided the first guide to finding and understanding the fort’s remains.\(^\text{18}\) By the time Cooling and Walton H. Owen expanded upon Miller’s design in *Mr. Lincoln’s Forts* (1988), published into a new edition in 2010, more forts had been lost to inevitable local development.\(^\text{19}\) A focus on the fort’s technical and strategic elements unites all of these narratives. Although


\(^{16}\) Ibid, 7-9.

\(^{17}\) Cooling, *Symbol*, 173-211.

\(^{18}\) David V. Miller, *The Defenses of Washington During the Civil War* (Buffalo, NY: Mr. Copy, 1976), 11.

\(^{19}\) Cooling and Owen, *Mr. Lincoln’s Forts*, xi-xiii.
Cooling and Owen briefly mention anecdotal interactions between civilians and soldiers, this thesis will analyze and interpret this aspect.

Tensions and conflict marked civil affairs around Washington. Writing about Alexandria and Fairfax counties, which both witnessed fort construction and continuous military activity, Noel Harrison describes a “civilians’ war.” The war decimated Northern Virginia, as “soldiers terrorized residents, devastated their property, and drove many from their homes.” Furthermore, civilians “exploited one another’s war-related misfortunes…and otherwise helped obscure the distinction between civilians and soldiers.” These areas, particularly more secessionist Fairfax County, represented a demarcation between Unionist Washington and Confederate Virginia. Opposing pickets clashed regularly and partisans, such as John Singleton Mosby and J.E.B. Stuart, operated with civilian help.

While not discounting Virginia’s place in the Defenses of Washington, this thesis focuses on the District of Columbia, particularly Washington’s rural outskirts. Not only was the Civil War a watershed moment for this rarely studied region, but fort remains here represent the greatest interpretive opportunity. Although less pronounced than in Virginia, tension also reigned between District residents and garrisoned soldiers. From the war’s earliest days, Washingtonians felt the ill effects of hosting many thousands of


untrained soldiers. But in Washington’s rural outskirts especially foraging for food and supplies, authorized or unauthorized, most aggravated civilians.  

Alcohol and other abuses, sometimes violent and often in connection to foraging, represented another major sticking point. Collectively, these tensions even threatened Union loyalty and support for the war.

Conflicting identities and priorities between civilians, soldiers, and senior commanders, determined these tensions. Soldiers and civilians differed on multiple dimensions. Perceived gaps in regional identity and their suspicion of nearby Maryland powerfully affected soldiers’ impressions of the city’s rural outskirts known as Washington County. Besides Judith Beck Helm (1981), scholars have scantily studied this peculiar North-South borderland, but examination of surrounding counties suggest rural Washingtonians adhered mostly to pro-slavery Unionism. Although most Union volunteers felt similarly about the war’s aims, they nonetheless assumed Washington’s disloyalty vis its social connections to Maryland. The appearance of slavery, and a secessionist minority, convinced soldiers otherwise ignorant about the region that Washington’s forts stood in the hostile South. As Susan-Mary Grant points out, young volunteers’ Northern education informed attitudes about a diametrically opposed North and South. In this environment, assumptions about regional identity justified adverse

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actions against even loyal civilians. Even if the regions had more in common than
different, as Pessen clarifies, civil affairs in the Defenses of Washington demonstrate how
perceptions formed reality.26

This Civil War example resonates with American military operations today.
Strategic and tactical success, past and present “depend on the Army’s ability to
anticipate and shape how people and their identity groups perceive military missions in
relation to their interests, and what they do about it” in the words of Jeffrey Lipson.27
Military strategists today recognize the role identity and understanding local dynamics
play in operational environments, something Civil War soldiers did not in the absence of
organized Civil Affairs programs. As retired Marines Carell, Karwacki, and O’Donnell
assert, “successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly
understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted.”28 Without
that understanding, Civil War soldiers around Washington endangered themselves, those
around them, and their mission.

The identity and priorities of the mostly volunteer Union army also affected their
decisions and attitudes. Bell Irvin Wiley’s landmark work, The Life of Billy Yank, has
long served as the guidebook for understanding Union soldiers’ lives, and Reid

26 Edward Pessen, “How Different from Each Other Were the Antebellum North and

27 Jeffrey P. Lipson, “Civil Reconnaissance and the Role of Civil Affairs,” Marine Corps
Gazette 100, no. 1 (Jan 2016): 76.

28 Joseph Carelli, USMCR, Christopher Karwacki, USMCR, and Alan O’Donnell,
USMCR, “Releasing the Potential of Marine Corps Civil Affairs,” Marine Corps Gazette 100, no.
9 (Sept 2016): 58.
Mitchell’s later work also studies soldiers’ psychic worlds.29 Both make clear that although quite diverse, soldiers on both sides had to confront similar pressures in the army, such as the pressure to drink and how to cope with hunger and lack of supplies. More recent scholarship by Andrew Bledsoe details the relationship soldiers had with military discipline, an important component to civil affairs in the Defenses of Washington. Civil War junior officers illustrates the especially difficult position of company level officers, lieutenants and captains. Union volunteers expected the same freedoms and rights they enjoyed in peacetime, an attitude at odds with the demands of military discipline. Although military authorities attempted to regulate civil affairs, soldiers’ democratic priorities preluded obedience.30 Caught between the expectations of enlisted men and the demands of senior officers, company officers around Washington abetted and even participated in behavior subversive to smooth civil affairs.

Soldiers’ transformation from citizens to soldiers also affected civil affairs. As they donned the blue uniform of the Union Army and faced new, seemingly tyrannical rules, soldiers noticed a change within them. In Mitchell’s words, “as they became isolated from their old patterns of life, men had to make themselves new identities from the very military life that threatened to degrade them.”31 On their own and unshackled from contemporary mores, volunteers acted out new roles and identities, sometimes at civilians’ expense. Foraging and drinking therefore became socializing forces within


31 Mitchell, *Civil War Soldiers*, 56.
soldier groups as well as expressions of a new identity. Mostly young men ages eighteen to twenty-five, Union volunteers found temptations, especially alcohol, around Washington that complemented their transformation.\textsuperscript{32} Alcohol’s effect on soldiers, particularly their actions towards citizens, concerned civilian and military authorities. Alcohol regulations intended to ensure safety nonetheless caused other civil-military conflicts, as it affected local businesses and civilian freedoms. These expressions also became ways to channel soldiers’ frustration at being stuck around Washington while others fought gloriously at the front. Bored, and wishing to contribute, soldiers around Washington looked to civilians as a source of ‘anti-heroic’ entertainment, or modes of behavior that embraced a new, or sometimes pre-existing, status as tough men.\textsuperscript{33}

Particularly when they suspected disloyalty, unauthorized foraging and other repressive acts became a way to contribute to the Union cause without fighting the Confederate Army directly.

Still, alcohol represented a common ground between soldiers and civilians; the latter eagerly helped soldiers acquire illegal alcohol. This is only one way that soldiers and civilians negotiated their identities and adapted to one another despite civil-military tension. Civilians also sold food and materials to soldiers as a respite from unsatisfactory rations and soldiers and civilians improvised new communities to cope with the anxieties of occupation. African-Americans fleeing slavery formed alliances with soldiers for protection and economic opportunity and soldiers even admitted to commiserating with

\textsuperscript{32} Wiley,\textit{ Billy Yank}, 299.

suspected and even known secessionists.34 In the words of James A. Davis, “survival required a reckoning with the social environment…emotional stability required that one’s potentially conflicting belief systems were balanced in some way.”35 Although civil-military tension threatened the Union cause around Washington, adaptation also helped keep the peace.

Nonetheless, civil-military adaptation underscored the dangerously uncertain environment. Although pro-Union, enemy elements still lurked and worked against efforts to maintain peace. Rumors flew of local conspiracies to harm soldiers and some civilians were known to be outspoken secessionists. Some soldiers even died under mysterious circumstances, with poisoned whiskey often blamed. Untrained in dealing with these circumstances, soldiers’ repression of the local population felt necessary to their survival. Sometimes foraging and other property theft came out of necessity, as logistical problems prevented soldiers from receiving rations or other supplies. In this context, stressed civil affairs was also the result of Union unpreparedness and the fog of war.

Separated into three parts, this thesis examines these relationships through Spring 1863. Mostly constructed during late 1861 and early 1862, the fort system underwent constant upkeep, expansion, and modification. The forts were at their most full during 1862 and early 1863. Once President Abraham Lincoln put Ulysses S. Grant in command of the Union army in mid-1863, Grant began removing regiments from the


35 Davis, Music on the Rapidan, 13.
Defenses of Washington and placed them at the front, thereafter changing the civil-military dynamic in Washington. Therefore, the fort’s construction and subsequent garrisons are fruitful periods to investigate civil affairs. The fall and winter of 1862 and 1863 also deserve special attention because scholars widely consider it as one of the lowest points in Union morale and discipline. Records from the Defenses of Washington command attest to a direct link between this nadir and a worsening of civil-military relations around Washington.

Sources include a variety of primary and secondary works. Contemporary newspapers like the *Evening Star* give insight on civilian reactions to the war and provide much material for Chapter one, which covers the war’s first summer in Washington City before the construction of the Defenses of Washington. The experience of Summer 1861 in the city set a tone for future civil affairs, as civilian and military authorities alike realized the need to regulate troop behavior. Chapter two discusses the construction of the Defenses of Washington in 1861 and 1862 and the emergence of civil-military tension in Washington County. Military records, as well as many official regiment histories describe soldiers’ reactions to this region and the effects on civilians. Regiment histories deserve special mention. Written sometimes many years after the war by one or more regiment members, their contents are vulnerable to the pitfalls of memory. Nonetheless, they were often drawn from letters and diaries from regiment members written during the war. Their memory of civilians around the Defenses of Washington emphasizes soldiers’ attitudes both during and after the war. Chapter three looks at the fall and winter of 1862 and 1863 as a particularly difficult time for soldiers, civilians, and senior commanders alike. A new separate command structure for the Defenses of
Washington also created new, hitherto unseen documents, that shed light on civil affairs as well as official responses and policies during that difficult period.
CHAPTER I

SETTING A TONE: APRIL-JULY, 1861

The first months of the war set the tone for civil-military relations in the Defenses of Washington. The intensity of the war’s beginning combined with stories of secessionist activity – which was sometimes violent – in the Chesapeake region made volunteer soldiers suspicious of their new hosts in Washington. The area’s political geography, however, was more complicated, and volunteer soldiers’ actions concerned the area’s loyal citizens. Exacerbating these tensions, the young volunteers who answered Abraham Lincoln’s call in 1861 found themselves in a city known for its plethora of vice. They inevitably drank alcohol in the city’s many drinking establishments, causing incidences that further widened the civil-military gap. By the end of Summer 1861, both civilian and military authorities understood that to ensure victory, managing volunteer behavior could not be overlooked. To control their massive volunteer army, they focused on regulating an easy target: alcohol. Controlling volunteers’ alcohol consumption and its ill effects, as well as relations between soldiers and their hosts occupied military and civilian leaders in the Defenses of Washington throughout the war. Alcohol proved difficult to subdue, and smooth civil-military relations that satisfied the needs of both sides would be even more elusive.
The story of the civil-military relations within the Defenses of Washington began with the firing on Fort Sumter in mid-April 1861. The potential for a Southern takeover of the city was very real at that time, with the most populous state in the Confederacy just across the Potomac River. Washington lacked a sufficient garrison and defenses. Indeed, barely four hundred reliable troops stayed in the city, and the lone fortification, Fort Washington, was a crumbling 1824 relic and unlikely to provide any strategic benefits.\(^1\) Improving the defenses of the nation’s capital was an immediate strategic priority.

Accordingly, the War Department created the Department of Washington on April 27\(^{th}\) to meet the threat. The War Department placed Colonel Joseph Mansfield, an engineer in the peacetime army and veteran of the Mexican-American War, in command.\(^2\) Breveted to brigadier general, he found himself responsible for improvising the defense of Washington and maintaining order in the city. President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers, and loyal citizens throughout the North responded enthusiastically; the arrival of 11,000 volunteer infantry by the end of April ensured that the Federal government could breathe more easily.\(^3\) Local newspapers announced the arrival of volunteer regiments, noting their uniforms, patriotic fervor, and the discipline of their members. No regiment gathered more attention than the 11\(^{th}\) New York


\(^3\) Cooling, *Symbol, Sword, and Shield*, 38, 40.
Volunteer Infantry, ornately uniformed in the French Zouave style. Their commander, Colonel Elmer Ellsworth, formerly of the New York City Fire Department, had been famous before the war. The twenty-four-year-old military enthusiast had organized a drill whose nationwide tour brought him nationwide acclaim. Now his “Fire Zouaves” presented an image of martial prowess strength when the Union needed one.

Union leaders struggled to provide adequate supplies so many soldiers. Arriving regiments reported their need for updated weapons, blankets, wagons, tents, and other military essentials. As the War Department struggled to keep up with the demand, Mansfield focused on the security of the city and the Federal Government there. This meant identifying any enemies within Washington and eradicating them. Conspiracies, real and imagined, abounded during the war’s opening weeks when loyalties of Washington and Maryland’s were far from certain. Pro-Union sentiment was powerful in the city, but anxiously neutral, and by no means pro-Lincoln. Vocal and active secessionists operated around the region, but the city’s laborers, servants, and entrepreneurs wanted security and peace. Few Washingtonians wanted rebellion and civil war.

By the first weeks of May, Washingtonians felt secure, but not without an intensely anxious April experience. Bellicose secessionist elements in Baltimore had obstructed the movement of Union regiments to Washington. In two separate incidences

4 Thomas Houck to Joseph Houck, May 7th, 30th, 1861, Ms2003-014, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Library, Blacksburg, Virginia; Register of Communications Received, May-Aug. 1861; Department of Washington, 1861 General Records, entry 5366; Part 1, Records of the U.S. Army Command, Record Group 393; National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Library will hereafter be called Virginia Tech Library.

5 Winkle, Lincoln’s Citadel, 82-3.
on April 18th and 19th, secessionist mobs attacked the 1st Pennsylvania and 6th Massachusetts as they changed trains in Baltimore. Soldiers and civilians exchanged fire, and days of chaos ensued. The regiments eventually got through Baltimore, but troops now carried serious doubts about Maryland’s loyalty to the cause. War Department officials were no more confident: the quickest route to Washington from the North went through the railyards of Baltimore, and Washington’s links to the rest of the Union would be severed if could not be kept secure. Maryland’s governor and pro-Union state legislature tried to prevent further rioting while Union logisticians rerouted troops via ship down Chesapeake Bay. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott could report with a sigh of relief that Maryland was “ready to return to her duty towards the Union.” Still, the Baltimore Riots cast a shadow long past the Maryland Crisis of mid to late April; Maryland’s association with secessionist resistance proved difficult to dispel.

While Unionism triumphed in Maryland, Lincoln’s April 15th call for volunteers spurred Virginia’s state legislature into calling a secession convention. Virginia’s eventual secession, which surprised few, soon overshadowed the mostly pro-Union opinion in nearby Alexandria and Fairfax Counties, which had actually sent Unionist delegates to the convention in Richmond. But despite pro-Union sentiment, voter intimidation assured higher pro-secession turnout in both counties’ April referendums.

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7 OR, vol. 2, chap. 9, 620.

8 Winkle, *Lincoln’s Citadel*, 143.

Ignorant of these nuances, Union Soldiers reading newspapers on their way to the city came to view the area’s citizens with suspicion and distrust. Bound for an area not clearly Northern or Southern, troops associated it with the latter, making conflict between soldiers and civilians even more likely. Though initial incidents seem innocent in retrospect, local papers reported problems emerging between arriving soldiers and their new hosts. “Making up for lost time,” en route from New York, men of the Fire Zouaves “amused themselves in playing various pranks,” and imposed upon cigar stores, restaurants, and other businesses, telling offended parties “to charge it to Uncle Sam, ‘Jeff Davis,’ or some imaginary captain.” Soldiers entered homes unsolicited, demanding meals and other comforts, usually with “some injury to the house,” and the owners told to “call on the Colonel for damages.”

Colonel Ellsworth discovered that close order drill alone was only one small part of command. Soon his Zouaves attracted a negative reception from both the public and even other soldiers; while bivouacked in the Capitol, Thomas Houck of the 96th Pennsylvania wrote his brother “they are the worst fellows that ever were seen around here.” Ellsworth attempted to explain this misbehavior to the public, telling the papers that “we could not avoid taking some men unknown to a majority of the regiment” in the haste of the war emergency. Furthermore, he provided a means to report such actions to him personally at 10:00 every morning “to free ourselves, by the summary process, of all such characters, the moment we can identify [them].” A few days after this report, the

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10 “Pranks of the New York Zouaves,” *Washington Evening Star*, May 4, 1861. The *Evening Star* will hereafter be known as *ES*.

11 Thomas Houck to Joseph Houck, May 7th 1861, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.

Zouaves were sworn into Federal service, with the Star assuring that “the prevalent idea that they are a vicious body of men, is entirely incorrect.”

The Star’s assurances missed an important point. While not, overall, “a vicious body of men,” Union volunteers found temptations in the city that led to disorderly behavior. The city of Washington never enjoyed a wholesome reputation to begin with, and its many saloons, brothels, and gambling dens proved numerous and abhorrent to American Victorian sensibilities. The blocks around Pennsylvania avenue between the White House and the Capitol were especially notorious. Bawdy houses, bars, and gambling dens covered the area now known as the Federal Triangle but then called “Murder Bay.”

To curb future misbehavior, Washington mayor James Berrett required that all establishments selling liquor close at 9:30 every night, the time soldiers were required be in camp for the night. The burden for enforcing Berret’s regulation fell on the undermanned nighttime police force of Washington, which proved woefully inadequate. A further resolution passed by the City Council forcing closure at 8:00 at night also did little.

Meanwhile, disputes between the volunteers and local authorities escalated. On May 8th, a policeman shot John H. Howard of the Metropolitan Rifles while attempting to arrest him and others for disorderly conduct. News spread quickly and an “intensely excited crowd . . . principally of soldiers, instantly gathered around the spot . . . and the

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16 “City Council,” ES, May 7, 1861.
greatest excitement was manifested, and hundreds were for instantly lynching the four policemen.” The shooting confirmed soldiers’ suspicion of local police, as “the charge of general hostility on their part to the military was generally made.” Other soldiers accused the policemen of being secessionists. Mansfield himself arrived on the scene, fired his pistol in the air, and dispersed the crowd.17

By the end of May, the local population had grown tired of the military’s presence – tired enough to threaten the Union cause in the crucial border region around the Potomac River. As an editorial in the Star pointed out, those who sought to make the war “one of confiscation and extermination in the border States” gave secessionists “all the capital” they needed to convince those on the fence that Republican tyranny had caused the war.18 While the writer looked particularly to overzealous Northern journalists, it was no less true for soldiers’ behavior. Like Ellsworth, the Star tried to assuage readers that the early mishaps were merely the “irregularities of the occasional ‘black sheep’ to be found in all large military bodies.” The Star was strongly pro-Union, but served throughout the summer as a watchdog for the morality and behavior of the Union Army, and their wide readership stirred and chagrined at what they saw. Other papers, such as the Richmond Examiner, saw these incidences as evidence of Union debauchery and excess.19 Both papers had a point; the expectation of a short war, an unfamiliarity with military discipline, and the youthful enthusiasm of Union volunteers made the environment ripe for conflict. The single largest age group of the Union army in 1861 were

17 “Fatal Affair,” ES, May 9, 1861; “Georgetown Correspondent,” June 25, 1861.
19 “A Veracious Correspondent,” ES, May 9, 1861.
eighteen-year-olds.\textsuperscript{20} Regimental discipline became entirely unpredictable as men grew bored and bold as weeks turned into months in Washington.

The American antebellum norms which influenced volunteer regiment organization also determined these outcomes. Unlike their Regular Army counterparts, Civil War volunteer soldiers saw themselves as citizens first and foremost. They were not professionals, and did not experience a clear transformation of identity as Regular Army soldiers then and today do. The volunteer regiments’ reliance on socially prominent commanders meant that Civil War regiment hierarchies reflected peacetime social structures. Influential men petitioned their state governments for the rights to raise a regiment, and if received, then organized ten companies into a regiment. Once companies reached their full strength one hundred men, they elected their company officers, who in turn elected their regimental officers like chaplains and other staff positions. Governors technically had the final say, but they most often bowed to the wishes of the community.\textsuperscript{21} Though democratic, this system produced inexperienced officers and enlisted men who expected the same freedoms they enjoyed in peacetime. Peacetime leaders unused to enforcing military discipline over their subordinates found themselves having to maintain that control while simultaneously reporting to senior commanders. Civil War officers were, therefore, in a bind: they could jeopardize their


position by placating the men of their regiment, or risk insubordination of enlisted. Most chose the former route.\textsuperscript{22}

Expecting a short war and entirely unused to practicing military discipline, many volunteers of all ranks operated as they wished. Most soldiers avoided negative attention, but the local papers reported more and more incidents of misbehavior through June and July. The city’s three main papers, the \textit{Evening Star}, \textit{National Republican}, and \textit{Intelligencer}, all wrote pro-Union columns, with the \textit{Star’s} brand of pro-slavery Unionism being most representative of local opinion. But not even the latter two could entirely ignore the local news.\textsuperscript{23} Over time, negative interactions between soldiers and civilians caused concern over the efficiency of the army and by extension, the entire war effort. Although the war’s execution remained the primary focus of the military, the growing rift between occupiers and occupied attracted growing attention, and ultimately, led to reform efforts from military authorities and government alike. Poor firearm safety, property confiscations, arbitrary arrests, and needless fighting between soldiers were commonplace. Seeking to explain and limit such behavior, the local government and the press blamed alcohol as the root cause.

The combination of alcohol and firearms especially raised civilian concern. The dearth of appropriate space for firearms practice posed a problem, but the addition of alcohol and volunteer inexperience unnerved Washingtonians. On June 13\textsuperscript{th}, “a drunken soldier” insulted a lady on the corner of 8\textsuperscript{th} and D streets, afterwards drawing a pistol and

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\textsuperscript{22} Andrew S. Bledsoe, \textit{Citizen-Officers: The Union and Confederate Volunteer Junior Corps in the American Civil War} (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), xiii.
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\textsuperscript{23} Leech, \textit{Reveille}, 75.
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threatened to shoot her. When nearby soldiers and policemen arrested him, he tried to shoot them. The Star asked, “Why do the officers permit their soldiers to wear side arms when off duty?”\textsuperscript{24} Another “drunken private” of a Massachusetts regiment took to dry firing his musket at passing pedestrians, afterwards smashing it on the street in a drunken frenzy. “We hardly know which is most blameworthy” the paper said, “the officer who allows the private to roam the streets off duty, armed,” or the private himself.\textsuperscript{25} William John Miller, a local attorney, wrote directly to Brigadier General Mansfield about the problem on June 27\textsuperscript{th}, reporting that reckless firing frightened women and that a ball came very near to hitting him while walking down the street. He harbored “no doubt” the soldier who fired was drunk. Miller urged Mansfield to issue an order prohibiting privates from carrying “arms or dangerous weapons” while off duty, noting that “the laws . . . of this District are sufficient to protect them from any harm.”\textsuperscript{26}

Soldiers believed that Washington was a den of secessionist conspiracy, so such an order might have only angered soldiers.\textsuperscript{27} The register of department communications did not record Miller’s letter, and if he received a response, it has not survived. Believing secessionism operated all around them, soldiers took the suspension of \textit{habeas corpus} in Maryland to mean it had trickled into Washington, leading to arbitrary arrests for any kernel of suspicious activity. Soldiers sometimes misconstrued pacifism for

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{24}] “Drawing Weapons,” \textit{ES}, June 14, 1861.
\item[\textsuperscript{25}] “Deserving Severe Punishment,” \textit{ES}, June 20, 1861.
\item[\textsuperscript{26}] William John Miller to Brigadier General Joseph Mansfield, June 27, 1861; Part 1, entry 5364, M.35; Letters Received. Apr.-Aug. 1861; Headquarters Department of Washington, Apr.-Aug. 1861; Records of the Department of United States Continental Army Command; National Archives Building, Washington DC.
\end{itemize}
secessionism. Additionally, Washington society always carried what Carl Abbott calls “the imprint of the South,” and for all practical purposes, its climate and the nearby social and economic milieu gave it a Southern element. Even if the actual differences between the two sections were negligible, the differences Northern soldiers perceived colored their views of Washington and its inhabitants. Such apprehension further aggravated civil-military relations.

Soldiers’ suspicions were both real and imaginary: secession had made itself known in and around the capital. Civilians and soldiers alike reported seeing signal lights in the vicinity of Columbian College and from the Smithsonian Castle. Men and women wore pendants displaying the palmetto of South Carolina and spoke “treasonous utterances” in public. Others attempted to pose as inspectors and attempted to gain entry into Union camps, only to be exposed when asked for papers by attentive officers. Another man, John F. Waring, appeared at the camp of the 21st New York on Kalorama Hill, “discoursing on the South and Southern men,” and blaming the war on Abraham Lincoln and John Brown. He offered whiskey to the soldiers and tempted soldiers to desert. It did not work; the New Yorkers arrested Waring, who quickly took the oath of


32 “The Case of Fletcher,” *National Republican*, June 1, 1861. The *National Republican* will hereafter be called *NR*.

33 “Another Spy,” ES, June 26, 1861.
allegiance in exchange for release. Other stories of men being arrested for attempting to smuggle gunpowder into the city or alleging plots to poison the water supply did little to allay soldiers’ anxieties.

With this evidence, it should not be surprising, then, that soldiers took matters into their own hands, and many of the resulting actions during the war’s first summer drove a wedge between the army and civilians. Responding to the reports of signal lights coming from Columbian College, men of the 21st Pennsylvania Volunteers attempted to arrest a deaf-mute man attending that school because he carried papers whose origin and purpose he could not explain. After soldiers roughed him up, nearby citizens tried to intervene, only to be told that they carried orders to arrest all suspicious characters. The soldiers released him, but the incident and similar examples of arbitrary mistreatment drew much local criticism.

Previous conflicts simmering between the police and soldiers also boiled to the surface. The trial of local policeman charged with the shooting of John Howard in May by local policemen got coverage for many weeks, and rumors of a feud between soldiers and the Washington police circulated among Union camps. One police officer, J. Williamson, arrested a black man named Tom Bush for disorderly conduct. As the two men passed the 1st Massachusetts’ camp, Bush shouted that Williamson was a secessionist. Angry soldiers poured out of camp, surrounded him, and demanded a fight. Reporting on the incident, even the aggressively patriotic Star commented that “Mr.

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34 “Examination at the Jail,” ES, June 27, 1861.

35 “Arrests of Secessionists,” NR, June 17, 1861.

Williamson is as loyal and thoroughgoing a Union man as there is in this city or in the country... In times like these it is on the highest moment that there should be no clashing between the civil and the military authorities.”

The association between the region, slavery, and secession manifested in other, more politically dangerous ways. Slaves from the District, Maryland, and Virginia saw the war as a signal that freedom was in reach even though emancipation was not yet a war aim. Still, the Star attempted to ease local concerns over emancipation by reporting that the government had no intention of freeing slaves, and that not a single slave had been lost to crusading Northern troops. Some soldiers, however, had no intention of enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 that was still the law of the land. So the Star had not gotten it entirely right: some regiments harbored runaways and made no attempt to turn them over to civil authorities. Two slaves from Fairfax County, Virginia, found jobs as cooks for the 2nd Michigan. The National Republican’s more anti-slavery tone reported slaves found work as servants in the abolitionist 14th New York State Militia, claiming with satisfaction that the war “will embarrass the institution of slavery.”

This controversy exposed the limits of border state Unionism. No doubt responding to constituent pressure, Maryland Congressman Charles Calvert wrote impassioned letters to Mansfield urging enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law. Calvert, a Union Whig, pointed to the employment of runaway slaves in Union camps as a

37 “Interference With An Officer,” ES, June 19, 1861.
38 “A Fugitive,” ES, June 17, 1861.
39 “Contraband,” ES, June 24, 1861.
40 “Fugitive Slaves In Camp,” NR, June 12, 1861.
“monstrous abuse,” and cited personal conversations with Mansfield, the Secretary of War, and the President which denounced the approbation of fugitive slave labor. He called for the immediate arrest of all fugitives in Union camps and further suggested an order prohibiting the confiscation of any property in the name of suspected secessionism without overwhelming evidence and properly published charges and warrants. Alluding to the recent Maryland Crisis, Calvert made clear that not doing so put the Union hold in the state in severe jeopardy. Reports of Union depredations and confiscation were “being very successfully used by our enemies to prejudice the Union cause and it is asserted that it is a part of the designs of the government.” Although Mansfield did publish orders prohibiting the harboring of runaways, Calvert complained that they lacked mechanisms of enforcement.

Calvert claims of “very successful” propaganda against the Union were exaggerated, but volunteers’ unilateral actions towards civilians alarmed senior military commanders. The Union advance across the Potomac on May 24th gave soldiers their first taste of Confederate territory, and they gave Virginians’ loyalty no benefit of the doubt. Major General Irvin McDowell complained to the Headquarters of the Army about soldiers ransacking private property. This was a result, at least in part, of the Army’s poor logistical support; troops occupied houses, took food from farms, and cut down wood for fuel because they saw no other options. Nevertheless, a desire for vengeance against Virginia caused similar incidents. The locally based Georgetown Volunteers

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were notorious in their harsh treatment of Virginians, considering them all secessionists and confiscating property accordingly.\footnote{OR, vol. 2, chap. 9, 654-5.}

McDowell was at a loss. “I am aware we are not, theoretically speaking, at war with the State of Virginia, and we are not, here, in an enemy’s country . . . It is a question of policy, which, being so near at hand, I beg to submit to the General-In-Chief.”\footnote{OR, vol. 2, chap. 9, 653-5.} Here he spoke of a tension central to the subject of the Civil War around Washington and of civil-military relations during the war generally. The United States government never recognized the legitimacy of the Confederate States. Therefore, from the Union perspective, the war’s purpose was the suppression of rebellion where it existed, not conquest of what officially still U.S. territory. But again, volunteer soldiers, were not as likely as policy makers to see such complexities. Young men all over the country grew up with a view of a diametrically opposed American North and South.\footnote{Susan-Mary Grant, North Over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2000), 75; John Hope Franklin, A Southern Odyssey: Travelers in the Antebellum North (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 2.} For them, the war’s borders superseded its ideas. Meanwhile, the reality around Washington and in the northern counties of Virginia was more complex and unpredictable. Indeed, self-interest and survival determined civilian loyalties, and the presence of very large numbers of soldiers in the vicinity destabilized local society. This left soldiers and civilians caught in the sticky web of Civil War, and military authorities tried to extricate them from it with policies designed to regulate and normalize civil-military relations. That process proved incredibly difficult. While McDowell established strict procedures for confiscation
whereby civilians could be reimbursed for their property, officers and men often ignored these cumbersome procedures. Further General Orders demanding decorum towards all civilians had similarly little effect.\textsuperscript{45}

In consequence of these more politically damaging incidences, civilian observers heavily criticized alcohol consumption by soldiers as well as those willing to sell it to them. Social reformers considered it a sin; the U.S. government and Washington newspapers worried more about its dangers for soldiers, civilians, and the Army’s effectiveness. Soldiers fought almost daily, and these altercations sometimes turned deadly. A fight between two men of the 14\textsuperscript{th} New York and 1\textsuperscript{st} New Jersey State Militias, “all very much in liquor” at a house of bad reputation, led to the murder of the New Jersey militiaman.\textsuperscript{46} Others led to collateral damage of property. Men of two Zouave regiments who refused to pay for their drinks at Holbrook’s restaurant on Pennsylvania Avenue threw tables and chairs through the windows and destroyed food. Those soldiers soon devolved into fighting each other with bottles and stones. The same day, other Fire Zouaves, “all of whom were drunk,” assaulted a soldier from Maine on 4\textsuperscript{th} Street.\textsuperscript{47} Because fights occurred near brothels and bars which stood near areas of business and politics, they endangered soldiers and civilians alike.\textsuperscript{48} As noted earlier, city authorities instituted some safeguards such as early bar closures, but these did little in the end.

\textsuperscript{45} OR, vol. 2, chap. 9, 659, 664.

\textsuperscript{46} “Military Rowdyism,” ES, July 13, 1861.

\textsuperscript{47} “Another Big Row By Soldiers,” ES, June 28, 1861.

\textsuperscript{48} “A Brawl” and “Fight,” ES, June 26, 1861.
While government apprehended danger, other citizens saw opportunity in the arrival of the regiments. Alcohol selling establishments advertised and welcomed the soldiers’ business in the area around Pennsylvania Avenue. Ernest Loeffler’s Washington City Garden advertised to “pleasure seekers,” civilian and soldier alike, that “it is needless to praise its Lager Beer – just give him a call and judge for yourselves.”

For soldiers so far away from home and comfort, easy access to alcohol was a way they dealt with the boredom and homesickness that accompanied the long encampment in the Washington summer heat. Even before the big battles and campaigns had begun, soldiers became tense. Alcohol kept anxiety at bay and encouraged social bonds between the men, essential to unit cohesion. A battalion of District volunteers, writing to the paper, reported the men passed the time and that “a little lager does much to keep our spirits up.”

Most soldiers who spent time drinking while in Washington likely enjoyed themselves without incident. Still, apprehensive bar-keepers attempted to regulate their own sale, refusing to sell to soldiers they deemed too drunk or disorderly. Soldiers sometimes interpreted refusal of service as disloyalty. On June 5th, the owner of the European Hotel on the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and 11th Streets refused to serve liquor to a New Jersey soldier, “the proprietor thinking [he] had enough.” The soldier then drew a knife on the owner, Mr. Emrich, who fled to find police. The conflict between New Jersey volunteers and Emrich did not end there, for on June 27th around

49 “Notice To Pleasure Seekers,” ES, June 14, 1861.


51 “Row,” ES, June 5, 1861.
thirty members of the 1st New Jersey State Militia approached the European Hotel “in a drunken frenzy.” They shattered windows and fired their pistols into the hotel. Emrich and a nearby policeman tried to disperse the crowd – Emrich threw bricks – but to little effect. In addition to the $500 in property damage, someone took the forty dollars in the hotel’s cash register. Emrich and his European Hotel carried a good reputation in the city, so the press heaped negativity on the New Jersey troops, noting that “Mr. E[sic] did all in his power to avoid a collision with these men.” Earlier feuds between New Jersey and German soldiers perhaps motivated the attack on the German Emrich, as the papers noted that “ill feeling” existed between them for several weeks.\(^{52}\) Even the typically more sanguine *National Republican* commented that “something should be done towards further protecting our city from the vicious men that will unavoidably find their way into these regiments.”\(^{53}\) Mansfield ordered an immediate investigation, which produced a few arrests. Non-guilty members of the 1st New Jersey State Militia were “extremely mortified by the conduct of their comrades.”\(^{54}\)

The civilian response to the incident at the European Hotel was the culmination of civilian discontent with the volunteers. Through July, soldiers’ misbehavior attracted more and more negative press as regiments crowded into the city and its environs. Initially, the press appealed to regimental honor, noting that lack of discipline is noticeable even in regiments composed of the “most reliable and best drilled men.”\(^{55}\)


\(^{53}\) “Outrageous Conduct,” *NR*, June 27, 1861.

\(^{54}\) “Picking Up The Disorderly,” *ES*, June 28, 1861.

\(^{55}\) “Georgetown Correspondent,” *ES*, June 25, 1861.
During fights and other breaches of decorum, nearby soldiers often intervened, being “greatly mortified at seeing their uniforms disgraced.”\textsuperscript{56} When a soldier shot a small dog that annoyed him, the paper reported soldiers nearby allegedly “thanked God he didn’t belong to their regiment.”\textsuperscript{57} Regiments tried suppressing these more disruptive elements, but because officers often went out on the town as much as their men, enforcement was inconsistent.

In fact, the breakdown in order that summer demanded more than appeals to honor. Mansfield delegated power to the city police in local infractions, but this caused divisions between the volunteers and the local police. Besides, the city’s twenty-five man day police force was far too small to maintain control, so the end of June saw the first public calls for a large military police. Mansfield improvised a small provost guard of around fifty men in May, but it was no more able to police the many thousands who camped in and around Washington than local law enforcement. Especially after the incident at the European Hotel, restaurant owners grew more apprehensive and careful in their service to soldiers. The press noted restauranteurs’ diligence led to a relatively safe Fourth of July, “all things considered…few casualties have been reported, and of these none were said to be serious.”\textsuperscript{58} Through the early days of July, correspondents and citizens noted the positive impact of the military police. Sometimes, only their rapid intervention prevented further injury and damage, according to the press.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56}“Fight,” \textit{ES}, June 26, 1861.
\textsuperscript{57}“Brave Soldiers,” \textit{ES}, July 20, 1861.
\textsuperscript{58}“Good Order Yesterday,” \textit{ES}, July 5, 1861.
When the soldiers finally left to confront Confederate forces at Bull Run, the city breathed a sigh of relief, believing that the war might be over soon. But the First Battle of Bull Run was a chaotic affair marked by confusion and inexperience on both sides. Such lack of order confirmed earlier civilian impressions. The press laid blame on various commanders, but the Star endorsed the idea that the defeat “was mainly due to the lack of discipline of our army,” an assessment that dominated the newly formed United States Sanitary Commission’s first resolution. A July 26th editorial summed up the city’s general opinion when it called for the cessation of quartering troops in the city limits of Washington and Georgetown, the establishment of a 1,000 man Provost Marshal’s guard with police duties in the Union camps, and an evaluation of all officers:

> Too many of the regiment field and staff officers, as well as company officers, seem to do duty much more assiduously in the hotels, on Pennsylvania avenue and every where else conceivable, but just where they should viz: where their men are quartered…Were the regiments all camped out of the city limits, and rule established that neither regimental officer or man should leave his camp except on absolute duty, and were the provost marshal of sufficient rank to enforce that rule upon every regiment officer, we would soon have not only no drunken soldiers or loafing officers sailing around our streets, but the initiation of such regiment discipline as will guarantee the cause against the recurrence on the field of such a panic as marked the action of Sunday last [Bull Run]… until they learn that their place is to be constantly with their men, the latter will never become reliable troops under fire.

Clearly, Washington’s numerous temptations and distractions had to be dealt with.

The Star, the Sanitary Commission, and influential citizens, therefore, pushed temperance on the army in the name of military discipline and efficiency. They strongly endorsed the newly incoming commander, Major General George McClellan, not only

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61 “A Reform Necessary,” ES, July 26, 1861.
because of his recent victories in western Virginia, but also for his emphasis on temperance and military discipline.\textsuperscript{62} Citizens petitioned to Congress to “suppress the nuisance known as grog shops within the District,” and Congress listened.\textsuperscript{63} Republican New York Senator Ira Harris introduced legislation prohibiting the sale of “spirituous liquors and intoxicating drinks” in the District of Columbia “in certain cases.” “Certain cases” referred to military personnel, and its violation was a misdemeanor punishable by thirty days in jail and a fine of $25. After the resolution’s immediate passage in the Senate on July 29\textsuperscript{th}, the House passed it the next day. The City Council likewise forbade the issuance of any more tavern licenses. Congress’ passage of the prohibition law days before the more famous Confiscation and Revenue Acts suggests the bill’s strategic significance and universal popularity in consequence of the spring and summer experiences.\textsuperscript{64}

The temperance movement made its way into rural and urban communities all around the country by the Civil War, so Union soldiers were familiar with it. By the early 1850s, reformers grew impatient with the slow progress of voluntary temperance and favored more stringent and controversial measures. Maine passed the country’s first statewide alcohol ban in 1851. Nearly every northern state passed or attempted to pass similar “Maine laws,” but lackluster enforcement or state judiciaries struck them all from


\textsuperscript{63} “Thirty-Seventh Congress-First Session,” \textit{NR}, July 29, 1861.

\textsuperscript{64} “XXXVIIth Congress-Extra Session,” \textit{ES}, July 30 and 31, 1861; “City Council,” \textit{ES}, July 30, 1861. Hereafter, the bill will be called the Certain Case Law.
the books by 1860. The necessity of an effective army resurrected alcohol reform at a time when the progress of temperance appeared to be going the opposite direction. At least one Congressman even attempted to use the legislation to expand the anti-alcohol agenda past the war emergency. Republican John Covode of Pennsylvania moved to add members of Congress and government workers to the prohibition, but failed with laughter and jests from the chamber and even the gallery. Elihu Washburne, the Radical Republican leader and the bill’s House sponsor, countered that General McClellan’s recent declaration on the army’s deplorable discipline “obviated the need for the bill.” In the end, the Certain Case Law was a victory for the anti-alcohol movement, but a limited one. The pushback against alcohol betrayed already existing temperance pressure in a Washington that had always disdained on the city’s tainted reputation. Poor performance on the battlefield made alcohol a more vulnerable enemy than before, and civilian leaders waged war against it with the same fervor that infused the war against secession. One letter to the editor blamed the “money grabbing…grog shops” who sold “the most poisonous and passion-inflaming fluids,” and not soldiers, for the defeat at Bull Run.

The drunkenness and disorder of Summer 1861 flowed from other factors as well. The inexperience of the volunteer officers and enlisted men notwithstanding, soldiers, particularly mid-nineteenth century soldiers, drank regardless of their experience. The


initial press opinion of the inevitability of a few bad apples slipping through the cracks of enlistment was essentially true. Even soldiers from regiments celebrated for their performance in the war admitted afterwards that “a proportion of worthless material” made it into regiments. Especially in April, the need to quickly reinforce Washington led to legendary laxity in enlistment standards. Washington’s well-established sin business naturally latched on to the opportunity presented by tens of thousands of young soldiers and represented one way civilians adapted to the war’s pressures.

The regular army’s inexperience in regulating such large bodies of men was another important factor. Of the 767 West Point graduates who stayed with the Union in 1861, few commanded volunteer regiments. Peacetime Regular Army lieutenants and captains who otherwise could have been breveted to command positions usually remained in the regular regiments, leaving the discipline, training, and command of volunteers to volunteer officers, many of whom had no military background. As weeks turned into months and the army only moved across the Potomac River, inactivity warped early enthusiasm into restlessness. Some senior commanders, and many volunteer officers, were too preoccupied with the war and career promotion to monitor the behavior of volunteers. Compounding uneven discipline was an overwhelmed Commissary Department unprepared to meet the demands of so many soldiers. Regiments arrived unsupplied and unhoused – a “cheerless reception” that “had a dispiriting effect.” Enlisted men and officers needing to meet their own needs looked wherever they could.


70 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 169.

71 Cudworth, First Massachusetts, 26.
When men stole large quantities of food from city markets, malice was perhaps less to blame than hunger.\textsuperscript{72}

In the end, alcohol made an easier target for would-be reformers, but the soldiers’ perception of the Chesapeake region was the biggest detriment to Washington’s civil-military relations in 1861. Reports about dangerous riots in Baltimore, Virginia’s secession, and Washington’s secessionist and proslavery elements made volunteers nervous and kept them that way. Tragic news compounded the tension. After forcibly removing a secession flag from a hotel in Alexandria, the proprietor shot and killed the man who tore down the flag: Col. Elmer Ellsworth, the darling of local Unionist society. Ellsworth’s death, one of the first officers killed in the entire war, sent shockwaves across the city and the Union. One member of the 7\textsuperscript{th} New York compared Ellsworth’s death to “the baptismal blood poured by Massachusetts on the pavements of guilty Baltimore.”\textsuperscript{73} Although opinion in northern Virginia was decidedly moderate on secession and the war, like Maryland and Washington, it carried the stain of disloyalty therever after.

Just as Union volunteers did not always match the citizen-soldier ideal, Washington residents disappointed Union soldiers. Compared to the ecstatic patriotism exhibited in New York, Philadelphia, and other northern locations, Washington appeared indifferent, even unpatriotic, giving soldiers even less apparent reason to trust the civilians around them. Massachusetts soldiers felt that “no Union man is safe” in Washington.\textsuperscript{74} Even Ellsworth and his Zouaves of the 11\textsuperscript{th} New York arrived in the city

\textsuperscript{72}“Market Depredation,” \textit{ES}, May 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1861.


\textsuperscript{74}Cudworth, \textit{First Massachusetts}, 27.
to no ceremonies or official greeting, a complete reversal of their experience in the North. Though not indifferent to the Union cause, Washington residents still felt the inconvenience and danger of the volunteer army’s presence. As a result, war weariness visited Washington before anywhere else. Understanding broke down between them; soldiers had a war to win at all costs while civilians wanted the war won with as little inconvenience to them as possible.

So it was that the experience of the first months of the war set a tone for civil-military affairs in and around Washington throughout the war. Alcohol would continue to pose problems – especially where the military authorities were concerned – but not always in the ways it did in the Summer 1861. So, too, would foraging and theft continue to cloud civilian impressions of soldiers, while displays of loyalty – both real and imagined, worked against locals. It was against this backdrop that soldiers continued to pour in and out of the District of Columbia for the next four years, leaving their mark on its politics, geography, and residents.
CHAPTER II:

DIGGING IN: CIVILIANS, SOLDIERS, AND CREATING THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, 1861-1862

The First Battle of Bull Run did not live up to its expectation as the heavyweight finale of the rebellion, so Union leaders prepared for a long war. They understood that future operations against the Confederates in Virginia required permanent defenses in Washington. To this end, in July 1861, Congress appropriated funds for the completion of a ring of fortifications to protect Washington, known thereafter as the Defenses of Washington. Comprising earth and timber fortifications, the system allowed for an effective defense at a minimum cost of manpower. Even so, the flow of men and material was constant, and many volunteers’ first taste of military life outside their hometowns was in the shadow of Washington’s forts. As those men experienced the new sensations of army life, they encountered and encountered the residents of the rural District of Columbia and Virginia. When the focus of military action shifted from Washington City to its rural outskirts, soldiers and civilians both confronted the confusing and dangerous realities of occupation.

1 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Symbol, Sword, and Shield: Defending Washington during the Civil War (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1975), 66.
The Defenses of Washington had humble origins. When Union troops first crossed the Potomac River into Virginia during May 1861, Brigadier General Joseph Mansfield ordered the construction of earthen redoubts at Arlington to protect the main entrance to Washington: the Aqueduct and Long Bridges. The fortifications were built on low ground and with a few hastily gathered guns. The soldiers, engineers, and civilians who built those redoubts must have breathed a sigh of relief when Confederate forces never threatened Washington after Bull Run.² These first six fortifications, known as Forts Corcoran, Haggerty, Bennet, Runyon, Jackson, and Ellsworth, were inadequate, but they formed the foundation upon which Union engineers and soldiers built a much more formidable system of fortifications.³

In August 1861, McClellan appointed Major John Gross Barnard of the Corps of Engineers to oversee fort design and construction. Barnard and his staff called for a ring of earthen fortifications on strategic points in Northern Virginia and the rural areas directly north and east of Washington City. Construction began immediately. Forts DeKalb, Woodbury, Cass, Tillinghast, Craig, Albany, Blenker, Richardson, Scott, Worth, Ward, and Lyon defended the critical high ground near Alexandria and Arlington, Virginia, as well as the small Chain Bridge that led into the District of Columbia from the west. Forts Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Slocum, Totten, Lincoln, Saratoga, Bunker Hill, Gaines, DeRussy, Slemmer, and Thayer stood to guard Washington from the north.

² Cooling, *Symbol*, 62.
To the east stood Forts Stanton, Mahan, Meigs, Dupont, Davis, Baker, Wagner, Snyder, Carroll, Ricketts, and Greble on the hills across the Anacostia River.\(^4\)

Barnard’s successful pleadings with Congress allowed him to expand and evolve the system throughout the war. Additional forts and modifications, rifle trenches, and other defensive structures made the Defenses of Washington a formidable obstacle to any attacking force. To facilitate movement of troops and supplies, thirty-three miles of military roads, most of which are still in use today, linked the forts to each other and to supply depots in Washington City. In an official report after the war, Barnard boasted that the Defenses of Washington consisted of 68 enclosed forts and 93 batteries featuring 1,521 gun emplacements, and over 35,000 yards of rifle trenches.\(^5\) Indeed, according to authors Benjamin Franklin Cooling and Walton H. Owen, Civil War Washington was easily the most heavily fortified city in North America, “if not the world.”\(^6\)

Strategic position, as well as the availability of space and material determined each fort’s size. They ranged from the relatively small Fort Slemmer (93 yard perimeter), to the huge Fort Runyon (1,484 yard perimeter). Barnard and his staff used D.H. Mahan’s 1836 work, *A Treatise on Field Fortifications*, as their design inspiration.

Laborers began by framing each fort in timber and then filling that frame with earth. Parapets twelve to eighteen feet deep stood between the forts’ interior and a mote surrounding each fort. Beyond the mote lay abatis, pointed sticks facing outward

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\(^4\) Ibid, 69-70.


\(^6\) Cooling and Owen, *Mr. Lincoln’s Forts*, 1.
intended to foil attackers. This design’s inexpensive and relatively quick construction fit the Union need, but each fort required constant upkeep to remain effective.\(^7\)

Soldiers found this fatigue duty annoying and “distasteful.”\(^8\) Some regiments worked eight or more hours a day, including Sundays.\(^9\) Long hours of construction duty disrupted the work of drilling in infantry tactics, and it seemed beneath their dignity, sometimes causing patriotic zeal to diminish. Winter duty in the Defenses of Washington made men “depressed” and led to a “spirit of impatience on account of the semi-military character of our service.” Laziness did not cause the frustration as much as a desire to do ‘soldier’s’ work: “our work is digging, we could have done that at home” as one New Yorker said.\(^10\) Even officers “complained grievously of being kept so long…digging and building”. Desiring the thrill of facing combat, they much preferred leaving the work to “idle hands in Washington.” Impatient to face their enemy, volunteers found forts’ “advantages…not immediately apparent.”\(^11\)

Bored of service around Washington, Union regiments nonetheless stamped their own identity on their new homes by naming forts after their home states and

\(^7\) Cooling, *Symbol*, 67. D.H. Mahan is also known as the father of naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan.


commanders, and some D.C. parks and neighborhoods still reflect those origins. The 2nd Rhode Island Volunteers used their labor on Fort Slocum to pay homage to their fallen commanding officer, Colonel John Slocum, who died at Bull Run. Parks on the locations of forts Reno, Lincoln, Dupont, Ethan Allen, Battery Rodgers, and others remain green spaces used by Washingtonians today. The well preserved remains of Fort Totten, named after the Chief Engineer of the Army, lie behind a copse of trees across the street from the Fort Totten Metro station in northeast D.C. Barnard later renamed some forts after officers martyred in the wars’ epic struggles; Forts Pennsylvania and Massachusetts later became Forts Reno and Stevens, both named after the young fallen generals, Jesse Reno and Issac Stevens. Aside from local nomenclature, the Defenses of Washington had far reaching consequences for the postwar development of their immediate environment. By the end of 1862, the Defenses of Washington and their garrisons covered Washington City’s rural northern flank, then known as Washington County. A politically separate and undeveloped polity from the city, migration to fort sites and the facilitation of transportation lent by new military roads helped the county’s post-war integration into the city. The poet Walt Whitman noted that “the roads connecting Washington and the numerous forts…made one useful result, at any rate, out of the war”.14

12 Woodbury, Second Rhode Island, 25.

13 B.25; Vol. 2; January-March, 1863; Registers of Letters Received, Sept. 1862-Mar. 1869, 19 vols (Nos. 1-19 DW), Entry 5381, Part I; U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393; National Archives Building, Washington, D.C.

The Defenses of Washington dramatically changed communities in Washington. The forts required huge tracts of land to operate effectively, usually with little to no consideration for reimbursement to civilians who lost property or had their houses destroyed to make room for fortifications. John Gross Barnard, the head engineer for the Defenses of Washington, even estimated in 1864 that at least 1,000 people would ask the government for compensation after the war. He later wrote the army took land “with little or no reference to the rights of the owners…in one case a church and in several instances dwellings and other buildings were demolished, that the sites might be occupied by forts.” One writer of the 10th Massachusetts was surprised when civilians around him “evidently depended on us for spiritual consolation” as Fort Steven’s construction left them “without any place to hold services.”\(^{15}\)

At the time, “no compensation for such damages of occupations was made or promised, nor was it even practicable to make an estimate.” Soldiers generally did not sympathize with property losses in part because their disdain for the local population. Worcester Burrows wrote his sister about building a fort “in the middle of a beautiful farm owned by a pretended Union man, but known as a secesh of a pretty rank kind.”\(^{16}\) Union leaders attempted to compensate for losses after the war, but efforts were inconsistent. While loyalty factored into postwar decisions to pay for lost property, few citizens received fair compensation. Some settlements seemed more calculated to insult than repay; Michael Caton, the owner of the Fort Dupont site, reclaimed his land with only one dollar in compensation for lost timber and crops. Some faced almost total ruin


\(^{16}\) S. Worcester Burrows to his sister, Sept 11, 1861, Ms2008-007, Virginia Tech Library.
and left town to seek better fortunes elsewhere, as the Dyers did after Fort Reno and its garrison overtook their land.  

In addition to land, forts required massive amounts of lumber, and Washington County’s rich woodlands fell quickly. Fort DeRussy, a relatively small fort with a one hundred and ninety-yard perimeter, consumed all timber within a fifty-six-acre radius to build the fort, two barracks, two mess halls, five officer quarters, two stables, a guard, and other structures. Although the government tried to buy lumber from locals, Washington County’s forests proved too convenient and abundant for the army to resist. The local landscape changed forever as soldiers cleared a swath of forest fifteen miles long and a mile and a half wide for construction and to clear firing lanes for the forts’ guns. Melville P. Nickerson of the 2nd Maine wrote his sister that his regiment made “an awful slaughter in the oak woods in a day.” He estimated the army cut a four mile radius from his post at Fort Corcoran. The ecological impact of the Defenses of Washington reminded soldiers of the war’s larger significance as an arbiter of American industrial change. Barnard reported in December 1861 that “it is impossible, at present, to indicate the exact extent of forests cut down.” One New York soldier compared the disappearance of the District’s forests like “snow [which] gradually dissolves from the


19 Melville P. Nickerson to his sister, Sept 24, 1861, Ms2013-029, Virginia Tech Library.
hillsides in springtime.” Some soldiers lamented the “spoiling of nature’s fairest handiwork,” but understood the “sad necessity” of the war’s impact.20

The loss of timber affected civilians emotionally and economically. Thomas Blagden, a D.C. lumber dealer who also owned a fertilizer and flour mill near Rock Creek, owned three hundred and seventy-five acres of pristine timber worth $150,000 in 1860. He and others, such as the wealthy and well-established Shoemaker family, used extant business apparatus and government connections to sell lumber to the army and protect their forests.21 Others, however, suffered losses of the valuable resource that affected not only their property value, but their ability to cook, keep warm, and maintain farmsteads. Civilians who owned enough forest “for hundreds of years” wondered if they had enough for the next winter.22 George Mason, a wealthy heir to signer of the Declaration of Independence, mourned the loss of “his magnificent oaks” when “axemen of the pioneer corps” cut them down to clear firing lanes for Forts Lyon and Ellsworth.23 The loss of these forests also led to erosion, further damaging the region’s agricultural potential. Northern Virginia suffered worst of all; even by Spring 1862, only the “recently-hewn stumps suggest the past existence” of forests and even grass was hard to find.24


21 Bushong, Rock Creek Park, 33.


23 Curtis, Sixteenth New York, 62.

24 Harrison, “Atop an Anvil,” 133.
Soldiers’ assumptions about regional identity informed their responses to the area. As they left their home states, soldiers experienced the journey south by rail as a discernible transition from a patriotic North to a hostile South. The Baltimore Riots and Colonel Elmer Ellsworth’s murder in Alexandria only further heightened soldiers’ suspicions about the area’s latent secessionism.\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, the rail transfer in Baltimore had become universally regarded as the transition from North and South. While awaiting that transfer in July 1861, the men of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps received their first ammunition with orders “that they should load their guns and be prepared to engage the enemy at any moment.”\textsuperscript{26} Interestingly, although the commander of the 9\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery gave strict orders against loading the soldiers’ guns, “there were few unloaded pieces,” as the city “rous[ed] memories of the assault on the Massachusetts 6\textsuperscript{th} on April 19\textsuperscript{th}.”\textsuperscript{27}

Baltimore remained calm after April 1861, but soldiers still experienced a noticeable change in scenery and attitudes. Men of the 117\textsuperscript{th} New York Volunteers had “more than one insult hurled at them.” Upstate New York native, J. Harrison Mills, wrote about “the changed demeanor of the fair sex. Thus far they had been charming, fascinating, anxious only to encourage. Here…but that their eyes lacked the basilisk power of wreaking the hatred they expressed, their glances would have been quite


killing.” Indeed, some admitted surprise when “no opposition was made to the march of the regiment across the city to the Washington depot, as had been anticipated.”

These experiences, soldiers’ first outside the peace of their hometown encampments, only affirmed Maryland’s latent treachery. Even officers felt a change in Baltimore; Union Col. Régis de Trobriand remarked that “there the scene changed. We entered an enemy’s country.”

Northern volunteers also experienced a transition from North to South in other ways. Unaccustomed to tropical diseases such as malaria, many soldiers became sick. Referring to the contemporary theory of miasmas, or foul air, as the source of disease, soldiers from the 9th New York Heavy Artillery referred to Washington County as “the very theatre of miasma.” Soldiers also encountered Southern pests such “Egypt’s curse of flies,” the mosquito.

One group of Rhode Islanders gathered specimens of “Wood ticks,” “gray-backs,” mosquitos, and other bugs in their tent and opened a “Smithsonian Museum,” a jest towards this unwelcome change of fauna. Still others discovered their new quarters “had previously been selected” for “an immense entomological convention, with delegates from every part of the world of bugs.” Crickets drew the ire of one

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28 Mowris, One Hundred and Seventeenth New York, 34-35; J. Harrison Mills, Chronicles of the Twenty-first Regiment New York State Volunteers (Buffalo, NY: Gies, 1887), 74.

29 Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 72.

30 Régis de Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, trans. George K. Dauchy (Boston, MA: Ticknor, 1889), 75.


captain, who wrote that they reminded him of “the female orators at an anti-slavery meeting, by making a noise entirely disproportionate to their size.”

Furthermore, the District’s infamous summer heat reminded the Northern volunteers of their entry into a foreign land. J. Harrison Mills described the nights near Washington as “intolerably warm” and soldiers near Fort Baker nicknamed it “The Bakery” and compared themselves to loaves of bread baking in the sun. Nelson Hutchinson of the 7th Massachusetts Volunteers remembered after the war that duty near Forts Stevens and Slocum “was hard digging, and the weather extremely hot. Many of the boys were suffering from climatic changes….it was more discomfort [sic] to stand the heat and mosquitos than the work of guard duty.” To Northern volunteers, the noticeable increase in temperature and entomological population affirmed Washington’s Southern geographic status.

The region’s ambiguous civic status also caused confusion. Although Congress held sovereignty in Washington County vis it’s position inside the District of Columbia, prior to the Civil War, the United States government left the District’s rural territory to its own devices. Council decisions in Washington City did not apply there. Instead, Presidential appointment levy courts administered laws from nearby Maryland, where the social and economic milieu more reflected that of Washington County. Officials seeking

33 Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 86, 250-1.

34 Mills, Twenty-first New York, 99; Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 98.


36 Donald Campbell to his mother, June 6th, 1861, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.
guidance to Washington County law likewise looked to guides printed for Maryland magistrates.  

Soldiers even mistakenly thought the area was part of Maryland. When Captain William Hale’s Rhode Islanders arrived in Tenleytown amidst a rainstorm, he wrote home that the weather “poured down their fierce vials of wrath upon us, the invaders of ‘Maryland, my Maryland,’” unaware that he was, in fact, in the District of Columbia. A later communication demonstrated a better, yet still uncertain, awareness of his location: “I must confess that in the whole course of my travels, the name of this ancient borough had never before greeted my ears. And in fact I find that even the residents here are uncertain as to the precise locality. The postmaster says it is in ‘the District.’ The oldest inhabitants say it is in Maryland, and the younger inhabitants don’t care a copper where it is.” Captain Hale’s portrayal of him and his comrades as ‘invaders’ of Maryland demonstrates their assumption of Maryland’s status as enemy territory. The Frenchman, Régis de Trobriand, described Tenleytown as being “on the border of the District of Columbia.” Perhaps true in a cultural sense, Tenleytown had been inside the District since its founding in the late 1700s. Regardless, rural Washington’s status as a border territory between North and South led soldiers to believe themselves in the South.

As a result, soldiers thought little of the communities around the forts. The younger generations of the Union army, especially, grew up learning about a


38 Spicer, *Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island*, 134, 140.

39 De Trobriand, *Four Years*, 108.
diametrically opposed North and South. Seeing the forts’ environs as Southern, therefore, caused them to look askance at their new neighbors. Henry Cole of the 2nd Rhode Island wrote his sister that the houses around Fort Slocum “all look just like pictures you have seen of the southern farmers house…the buildings are a century behind the times.” According to Cole, even “Old Dr Fairfax, who owns a number of farms lives in a house, no larger, and not so good as ours.” Volunteers from Brown University described their camp near Fort Pennsylavnia as being on a hill “on which the village of Tennallytown[sic] clings with feeble grasp.” Others reported “as to the personnel of the town, little requires to be said. A few barns, and hungry looking houses straggle along a lean and hungry looking street…at the entrance of our camp, stands the village church, never, from appearances, a very notable structure…. ” Soldiers who bartered with locals reported buying pies from “not very clean-looking women.”

Loyalties, however, mattered most to soldiers’ impressions of the South. The loyalties of the “personnel” of Washington County, though difficult to pin down, reflected their homeland’s ambiguous geopolitical status. Examining socio-economic developments in the region over time give the best clues. For centuries, the Potomac region participated in the Chesapeake tobacco economy, but soil strain led to lower yields

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42 Ibid.

43 Shaw, _First Maine Heavy Artillery_, 92; Spicer, _Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island_, 136, 140.
and plummeting land values by the 1820s and ‘30s. By 1830, many of Washington County’s original families sold their lands and slaves to forestall bankruptcy. Many families sought new lives elsewhere, leading to sharp population decline.\textsuperscript{44} By 1845, however, new immigrants from Germany and the American North purchased this depreciated land as the introduction of Peruvian guano to the region revitalized the soil. Improved roads and rails connecting Washington with the rest of Maryland further encouraged immigration and economic development. These changes renewed Washington County’s overall economy, making the 1850s a decade of unprecedented prosperity.\textsuperscript{45} By 1850, population finally exceeded 1820 levels, and in 1860, 5,225 people lived in Washington County, a 35 per cent increase from a decade before.\textsuperscript{46}

Few voting records and newspapers for Washington County remain, but those from nearby counties in Virginia and Maryland provide clues to local opinion on the war. Typical of other border states, most area voters chose the Constitutional Union candidate, John Bell, in the 1860 presidential election.\textsuperscript{47} Abraham Lincoln received little support, but pro-Union candidates surpassed secession candidates, even in Northern Virginia.

\textsuperscript{44} Helm, \textit{Tenleytown, D.C.}, 72-74.


\textsuperscript{47} Charles V. Mauro, \textit{The Civil War in Fairfax County: Civilians and Soldiers} (Charleston, SC: History Press, 2006), 19; Harrison, “Atop an Anvil”: 137.
Montgomery County, Maryland, citizens voted along similar lines. Lincoln received only 2 per cent of votes, and Bell took the county and the state.\(^{48}\)

Political allegiances reflected the region’s experience with slavery. In 1820, the apex of slave agriculture in Washington County, 1,049 slaves, or approximately 38 per cent of the total population, lived in Washington County.\(^{49}\) In 1860, the number of slaves in Washington County remained about the same but only constituted 20 per cent of the population. Two-hundred percent more slaves lived in the much smaller space of Washington City, making slavery a noticeably lesser part of the Washington County landscape at the start of the war than in previous decades.\(^{50}\) Therefore, area voters cared little for emancipation and radical Republicanism, but they shunned secession. Still, secession still found homes in the hearts of some. Tenleytown historian, Judith Helm, noted in 1981 that “slavery was generally taken for granted in Tennallytown in the middle of the 19\(^{th}\) century, and many residents had secessionist leanings.”\(^{51}\)

Although large-scale plantation agriculture found no home in Washington, some residents had many slaves for their farms and orchards. Thomas Marshall owned thirty-four at his estate, “Dunblane,” and his mother-in-law, Arianna Lyles, owned eighteen more. These larger estates represented the upper echelon of local slave-based agriculture. Most owned few to no slaves. Jacob Hoyle, an illiterate Marylander who had purchased


\(^{50}\) Winkle, *Lincoln’s Citadel*, 17.

\(^{51}\) Helm, *Tenleytown, D.C.*, 104, 97. “Tennallytown” was the popular spelling during the Civil War.
land in the 1840s in what is now the Rock Creek Park Golf Course, represented the majority in Washington County. He, along with his wife and four children, lived with one fifteen-year-old female slave and a thirty-six-year-old freeman in 1850. By 1860, his $2,000 estate showed that he owned no slaves. The sudden appearance of Union fortifications and thousands of uniformed Northern soldiers must have unnerved these individuals and other slave-owners in the area.

These nuances did not concern soldiers, who were ignorant of the area’s local history in any case. When they saw slavery, they assumed secessionist sympathies. De Trobriand’s regiment, the 55th New York, “almost believed themselves in an enemy country, because they found themselves in a country with slavery.” The historian of the 117th New York, J.A. Mowris, remembered in 1866 that while working on Forts Ripley, Franklin, and Alexander, “citizens in that section were mild unionists” and that “there were several families in the neighborhood by the name of Shoemaker; they were on friendly terms with the Yankees, and they did consent to board some of the officers, ‘just to accommodate.’ They could have no other motive, for they charged only three times the usual price.” The Shoemakers made homesteads throughout northwest D.C. since before the American Revolution and represented one of the oldest and well known area families. The wealthiest, forty-three-year-old Pierce Shoemaker, owned over nine-hundred acres of woodland around Rock Creek near the present location of Smithsonian National Zoo. In addition to his ownership of twenty slaves, his “aristocratic bearing”

52 Bushong, Rock Creek Park, 34; Helm, Tenleytown, D.C., 97.
53 De Trobriand, Four Years, 130-131.
54 Mowris, One Hundred and Seventeenth New York, 47.
and “striking resemblance to Robert E. Lee” probably contributed to Mowris’s lukewarm opinion to Shoemakers. Shoemaker’s cousin was Joshua Pierce, a noted botanist who frequently hosted the likes of fellow slave owners Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun.

Soldiers held such associations in contempt. Members of the 10th Massachusetts Volunteers reported that the regiment’s acceptance of runaway slaves “caused considerable ill-feeling among some of the people living near the camp, some of them open sympathizers with secession, and many of them having friends in the rebel army.”

De Trobriand’s troops and other nearby regiments also aided slaves escaping their masters. When describing the area, J.A. Mowris said “it had formerly supported some of the slave holding gentry, most of whom, however, fled on approach of the Union army.” The official history of the 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery noted after war that “guerillas, bushwhackers, and such…hover[ed] about” the Defenses of Washington, and several of which were picked up and turned over to the authorities.” The men of the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery reported they “very naturally” saw the rebels everywhere and “heard stories of pies with pulverized glass in them being sold to men…in fact, most of us thought that we were in the midst of rebeldom, and that everybody, male or female, who did not wear a uniform, was a rebel, and that nothing would have made him happier

55 Bushong, Rock Creek Park, 28-29.
56 Ibid, 30.
57 Newell, 10th Massachusetts, 69.
58 De Trobriand, Four Years, 130.
59 Mowris, One Hundred Seventeenth New York, 41.
than to have killed us.”\(^{60}\) The history of the 9\(^{th}\) Rhode Island Volunteers reported similar sentiments. Despite only being encamped a few days, they “knew” that “shooting pickets was a favorite amusement with the prowling secesh in the vicinity.” In the early months of 1862, the 4\(^{th}\) New York Heavy Artillery found secessionist conspirators near Fort Greble in southeast D.C. who they “immediately seized and executed.”\(^{61}\) The regiment surgeon, Dr. Berky, had reported signal lights at a nearby household where a search party found the “conspirators” hiding in a cherry tree. It is unclear what proof the New Yorkers had of conspiracy or the purpose of the lights Berkey saw.

Even if some soldiers imagined danger in their first weeks as soldiers in an unfamiliar land, real danger did exist around the Defenses of Washington. Although mostly Unionist and Northern in sympathies, some Washington residents enlisted in the Confederate cause. Just as it did in other border states, the war ripped Washington families apart.\(^{62}\) One resident “faithfully attached to the Union” nonetheless had a son who “enlisted in the rebel army.”\(^{63}\) Despite de Trobriand’s attempts to guard this man and his family from the worst aspects of occupation, theft and destruction of crops left the


\(^{63}\) De Trobriand, *Four Years*, 131.
family in ruin. True-hearted Southern sympathizers would have justified soldiers’ suspicions, but local slavery and resistance to emancipation proved problematic enough.

The resulting paranoia had a basis in fact. Rumors of poisoned water had been around since the first days of the war, but at least one man with “very strong anti-Union sentiments” attempted to poison a spring near the 4th New York Heavy Artillery’s garrison at the forts in southeast D.C.. The man said “he meant to poison the -------[sic] Yankees!” Interestingly, the men did not formally arrest this “poor wretch,” but rather shaved his head, covered him with molasses and flour, and chased him back into Washington City. In June 1862, a “desperate looking fellow” near Tenleytown shot a picket of the 69th New York, who upon his arrest, “made his boast that he had shot six Union soldiers before.” His fate is unclear, but the regiment history hoped “he meet the retribution he so justly deserves.” The discovery of a small rifled howitzer in a barn near “a peaceful and unpretending wooden mansion” belonging to known secessionists only increased mutual apprehension. Soldiers suspected some residents of using treachery and subterfuge to harm them. Captain Jardin, Battery C, 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, died of a mysterious illness one day after dining with a civilian near Fort Thayer. The regiment assumed “drugged liquor, as well as poisoned food” caused Jardin’s death. Thomas Houck reported a similar incident to his brother: one man died

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64 Ibid, 132. Protecting the families, de Trobriand only refers to the family as “Mr. and Mrs. L------.” He could be referring to the family of Mr. A.H. Loveborough, a principal landowner near Fort Gaines.

65 Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 38-41; Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 146, 180.

after drinking whiskey that the dealer “had put some arsenic in.” Although unclear why Houck or Jardin’s comrades assumed poison caused these deaths, their suspicions are equally telling. Houck wrote angrily of giving “a bitter pill” to whoever sold the whiskey.

Theft of private property, often passed off by the army as foraging, was the strongest irritant to civil-military relations. Official Union policy prohibited theft from loyal civilians, but authorities struggled to determine loyalty, much less catch and punish violators. Civilian land, crops, livestock, timber, and alcohol became vulnerable to foraging, adding further economic burdens to a civilian population already suffering the inconveniences of military construction. “Foraging,” wrote Captain William Hale of Rhode Island, “is procuring necessary subsistence by buying when you can’t steal it, or stealing when you can’t buy it – or stealing, *per se*, whether you can buy it or not. The last is the favorite mode in this section.” Hale’s sardonic tone typified most soldiers’ account of their time in the Defenses of Washington, and most regiment histories looked back with pride at their ability to have their way with local produce. Hale also mentioned how “our cook is great at foraging,” no doubt a welcome skill during mess time. Corporal B.F. Pabodie, stationed at Battery Vermont, told how “Job Armstrong…was also a great milk forager, he had a wonderful faculty in deluding the cows of the neighborhood into the belief that he was one of their own calves.”

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67 Thomas Houck to Joseph Houck, June 26, 1861, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.


70 Ibid, 256.
home colorfully that his bayonet “had been stained with Southern blood, but it wasn’t a man I killed, only just a pig” belonging to a Tenleytown farmer.  

When the 10th Massachusetts Volunteers relieved a regiment of Zouaves, the farmers in the area “did not seem to regret [their] departure….one lady who lived close by said she frequently had dinner all prepared for her family, when a party of Zoozoos would march in, coolly sit down to the table, eat up the dinner” and leave.

Even regiments whose histories took pride on their decorum or performance in drills boasted of their foraging abilities. Thomas West Smith of “Scott’s 900,” a privately raised New cavalry regiment that later became the 11th New York Cavalry, recalled that “peaches, melons, apples, fruits of the farm and garden could be had for the taking.”

While marching to their new post at Fort Mansfield, the 9th New York Heavy Artillery stopped near a potato field and dug out the “popular and necessary vegetable with bayonets, and if any man in the regiment failed to have ‘spuds’ for supper, it is his own fault.” Alfred Roe, the regiment’s historian, labored to paint the regiment as upright and moral, so his casual tone demonstrates foraging’s universally accepted part of the soldier experience in the Defenses of Washington. The 9th and 10th Rhode Island Volunteers, stationed at various times throughout the Defenses of Washington, admitted

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71 Ibid, 111.

72 Newell, 10th Massachusetts, 53. “Zoozoos” refer to Zouaves.


74 Roe, Ninth New York Heavy Artillery, 39.
“we lived on the fat of the land... by energetic foraging in the neighborhood we obtained milk, butter, eggs, chickens, corn-bread, sugar, and coffee.”

Such confiscation took a heavy toll on local citizens. De Trobriand, who pitied civilians, reflected after the war that duty in the forts near Tenleytown was “rosy, although around us man had been pricked by the thorns... soldiers, with little discipline, committed depredations difficult to prevent, especially in the orchards and vegetable gardens.” Stationed near Fort Lyon, Joshua W. Culver wrote to his friend that “few of you cant begin to think how desolate it looks... thare is not enough found on 2 thousand acres to fence in a hay stack... it looks harde to see property destroyed.” John G. Barnard wrote adamantly to the Army Chief of Engineers, Joseph G. Totten, in December 1861, “I feel it my duty... to urge that Congress should take immediate measures to assess the land and other damages arising from these works and from the occupation of troops. In most cases the owners are ill able to bear temporarily the losses to which they have been subjected.”

Major General George McClellan, already burdened with organizing the Army of the Potomac and planning an offensive towards Richmond, proclaimed that soldiers “detected in depredating upon the property of citizens shall be arrested and brought to trial” and even threatened the death penalty. Other commanders at the division level attempted similar orders to make receipts so that the army could repay for land, timber, or

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75 Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 219.
76 De Trobriand, Four Years, 130.
77 Joshua W. Culver to Lewis, April 27, 1862, Ms82-004, Virginia Tech Library.
79 Ibid, 56.
food, but enforcement was extremely haphazard. Moreover, because military necessity prompted confiscation of land and timber by unit commanders, private soldiers felt entitled to forage by virtue of their mission requirements. And if their suspicions towards Washington County residents provided moral justification for wanton confiscation, Congress’s passage of the Confiscation Act in July 1862 only compounded the problem by allowing the army to confiscate freely and lawfully from disloyal person. Prescribed loyalty oaths provided the foundation for determining whether a citizen was loyal or disloyal, but soldiers did not usually have the time or patience for additional verification, and loyalty was a complicated concept.

The prevention of unauthorized foraging was especially burdensome for company and regimental officers. While generals issued orders, more junior officers in daily contact with the troops faced noncompliance and insubordination at close quarters. When a detachment of the 16th New York Volunteers came back from patrol with stolen property instead of captured Confederate pickets, their brigade commander “issued a very severe order against pillaging.” The regiment protested the order and after a series of arrests the controversy died down even though soldiers’ habits changed little. Still other commanders successfully enforced discipline. After hearing the complaints of a local farmer, “who claimed to be a loyal man,” that men of the 127th New York Volunteers took his sheep, Col. Gurney ordered those found with mutton to pay full price.80 When an Irish couple appeared at the headquarters of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery about missing pigs, the men initially feigned ignorance although “there was an aroma like of

80 Curtis, Sixteenth New York, 72; Franklin McGrath, The history of the 127th New York Volunteers, “Monitors,” in the war for the preservation of the union” (n.p.: 1898), 36.
the odor of fresh pork.” The regiment commander reprimanded the men and forced them to recompense the farmers, even the other officers who “had a piece of that pork.”

Still, other officers at the regiment and especially company levels not only looked the other way, but practically abetted unlawful foraging. The 4th New York Heavy’s commanding officer, Col. T.D. Doubleday, enforced official Union policy, but at least one company commander did not. A farmer named Ganz who lived near Fort Marcy approached Captain Morrison, and reported men stationed there stole poultry, potatoes, and beef. Upon hearing the “pitiful account,” Morrison responded “my soldiers steal chicken? No sire! . . . I am a good Catholic myself, but I am so unfortunate as to be in command of a lot of damned Methodists, and they won’t steal anything.” With many of these incidents occurring outside the view of superior officers, enlisted men and their immediate superiors could act with impunity.

Even with knowledge of superior officers, accusations of disloyalty became easy justifications for confiscation. Lieutenant Colonel Shaw of the 10th Rhode Island Volunteers “seized a building” at Tenleytown, “in spite of protests and threats, and prepared a hasty cup of coffee for the command.” Considering the numerous accounts of foraging from the 10th Rhode Island and its sister regiment, the 9th Rhode Island, many field grade officers clearly accommodated a culture of occupation and even repression around the Defenses of Washington. Other regiments fondly recalled officers who allowed their men to forage, and even refused punishment for those caught. A farmer near Fort Barnard asked Colonel Robert Tyler of the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery to

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81 Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 81.

82 Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 55.
punish men he caught stealing his peaches. When the men told Colonel Tyler they belonged to another regiment, Tyler told the man that he could not punish them, despite knowing the men in question to be part of his regiment.83 Volunteer officers had to adapt leadership styles to succeed in wartime, and many appeased enlisted men to maintain their position.84

Unable to find satisfaction or compensation, area residents wrote to the local press. “A Subscriber” wrote to the Evening Star repeatedly called the regiments camped in Washington County “a lawless mob” that “go in companies of five, ten, and twenty, often with side-arms; they take what they please and destroy what they do not want.” Clearly frustrated with officers, “who are very civil,” but unwilling to discipline their men, the writer asked, “must we attempt to defend our lives and property with force of arms?” These words signaled the danger around Washington; caught between flippant – or confused – soldiers’ desires and their own livelihoods’, even loyal citizens faced the possibility of appearing unpatriotic. For the “many persons…dependent entirely on the produce of their gardens and rounds for the support of their families,” resorting to force of arms risked violent conflict in the Defenses of Washington between soldiers and civilians, just a few miles from the Federal seat of government.85

A few days later, “A Farmer and a Sufferer” seconded this assessment, and attempted a diagnosis of “the outrageous depredations committed upon the crops of the

83 Bennet, First Connecticut Heavy Artillery, 18; Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 135.

84 Andrew Bledsoe, Citizen-Officers: The Union and Confederate Volunteer Junior Officer Corps in the American Civil War (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), xiii.

farmers in the vicinity of Washington.” Just as Washington City residents did in Summer 1861, rural Washingtonians admonished “regiment officers [to] look to the morals and manners of their men” and punish men for foraging. “If the Colonels, Lieut. Colonels, etc., will do their duty in a proper manner, those living near the encampments will have no occasion to complain of depredations upon their gardens, fields, or fruits, nor of insolence from the men.” 86 Although General McClellan issued an order in August 1861 against the stealing of private property that met with adulation in the Washington newspapers, farmers noticed the lack of its enforcement in the Defenses of Washington. Frustrated that the orders seemed “to be applied or intended for the city,” civilians living “where the soldiers are camped” felt backed into a corner. As one civilian wrote in desperation and anger, “what are they to do? . . . and they are to be called on to pay taxes to support this robbery and theft upon themselves. Where will be their means to pay?” The Evening Star attempted to defuse this letter to the editor by referencing the government’s policy that they “will pay when the legal proof of the injury, and that it was done by Government troops, may be made.” But as the regiment histories attest, even eyewitness accounts did not yield reparation. Without twenty-first century cell phone cameras, civilians could do little to petition the government with tangible proof in the moment. As one New Yorker wrote, civilians complained about foraging, “and endeavored to identify the culprits, but failed utterly.” 87

Despite witnessing or experiencing the hardships of occupation, some civilians adapted to their situation, preserving their own livelihood and creating cross cultural

86 “Another Sufferer,” ES, Oct 12, 1861.
interaction with Northern volunteers in the process. Alfred S. Roe of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery wrote about a private who dined with a citizen in his home, “who quite won his heart through refusing to take pay for his hospitality” and even noted that “many firm friendships were established this way.” Lieutenant DeWolf of the 10th Rhode Island recorded the regiment offering assistance to the Tenleytown community upon hearing that Zouaves “tore up the pulpit and destroyed the Sabbath School Library.” The regiment forwarded the story to women back in Rhode Island, who sent new books and materials to the beleaguered community.

Even when loyalties appeared to conflict, people found common ground. The 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery noted the “considerable society” which existed around northeast D.C. between soldiers and residents, “although it was known that many of them were Confederate sympathizers.” “Two very attractive ladies” near Fort Lincoln represented how southern sympathizers negotiated their identities to accommodate their new neighbors. Despite many officers courting them, “their efforts were ‘flanked’ by two privates.” One private, Richard Eggert, played guitar for the ladies at their frequent evening parties. When two Lieutenants, Iredell and Higgins, attempted to court the ladies by dismissing Eggert, the ladies harshly rebuffed the would be suitors that “Mr. Eggert is our most important guest on all occasions.” This interaction and the relationship between the Pennsylvania private and the two socialites represent not only how soldiers and civilians adapted socially, but also how Confederate sympathizers could defy their occupation; the ladies’ refusal of officers’ advances in favor of a private’s company

88 Roe, Ninth New York Heavy Artillery, 57; Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 276.

89 Ward, Second Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, 26-27.
represented a defiance of Northern occupation.\textsuperscript{90} If not a show of defiance, the women’s bond with Eggert also provided a defense from unwanted advances.

Samuel and Harriet Burrows were also civilians making the most of the circumstances. In their third year living in northwest D.C., the war forced the Burrowses to concede fifty acres of land for the construction of Fort Bayard’s barracks and parade grounds. Able to absorb this loss through Mrs. Burrows’s family wealth, the family willingly provided hospitality and supplies to the Union Army. Seventy-five members of the 9\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery wrote a testimonial for “the many kindnesses and hospitalities” they received during their five-month sojourn at Fort Bayard. Lieutenant Winthrop DeWolf, noteworthy for his more sympathetic attitudes towards civilians, wrote home that “some of us have been out to a neighboring farmhouse, to get a good square meal for twenty-five cents,” no doubt a welcome reminder of fresh meals from peacetime. Harriet Burrow’s father, a well-respected Georgetown Freemason, even organized a lodge for Northern Freemasons stationed in the Tenleytown area. The Burrows’ recent arrival to Washington from Pennsylvania predisposed them towards compliance. they regularly sold milk, vegetables, and even cattle to regiment quartermasters, thus deflecting the humiliating and disturbing effects of foraging.\textsuperscript{91}

The 1\textsuperscript{st} Maine Heavy Artillery forged a peculiar and telling, relationship with the family of Edmund Brooke, a chief clerk in the paymaster general’s office, while stationed at the fortifications defending the Washington Reservoir. Described as “Southern


\textsuperscript{91} Helm, Tenleytown, D.C., 133-143; Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 158.
gentleman of rare refinement and culture, grown amidst Southern institutions,” Brooke nonetheless made their stay “agreeable after he became acquainted with us” by helping them barter with his neighbors. He also had “two most interesting daughters, Maria and Anna, who had, at first, little use or respect for Northern Yankees.” The regiment history devotes an entire chapter to Maria Brooke, who “had been reared in Southern society, and believed in slavery as a divine institution.” Her initial heckling of the regiment stemmed from previous experiences with Dutch troops who “committed some depredations” and stole produce and poultry from the family farm.92 After spending some time with the regiment, however, her hostility gave way to better relations with the regiment. Although she no doubt remained sympathetic to the Confederate cause, her close ties to the men caused her to be adopted as the “ Daughter of the Regiment.” The bonds between the regiment and Maria Brooke became so strong that she regularly corresponded with some veterans as late as 1903, when she married a local Washingtonian.93 The 1st Maine Heavy Artillery’s relationship with the Brookes represent a best case for civil-military conflict and negotiation in the Defenses of Washington. The regiment continuously framed her and her family as being distinctly Southern and their interactions as a curious interfacing of North and South. By describing their relationship with a typical “Southern belle” as overwhelmingly positive, the regiment legitimized their own occupation of this “Southern” territory in contrast to their less scrupulous peers.

Soldiers especially recorded their interactions – both positive and negative – with nearby African-Americans, the group which had most to gain from the Union Army’s

92 Shaw, First Maine Heavy Artillery, 97, 103-4. “Dutch” usually meant German during the Civil War.

93 Ibid, 97, 106.
presence in Washington County. Even in Baltimore, Adjutant Howland of the 16th New York Infantry wrote home that the only smiles came from “darkies standing in doorways.” Already home to a substantial African-American community, Washington County witnessed a large migration of African-Americans escaping slavery. Known historically as “contraband” – a reference to the legal justification used to emancipate slaves – African-Americans found security and economic opportunity in the shadow of the Defenses of Washington. Union soldiers found allies and informants. If white citizens in the vicinity seemed dubious in their loyalties, soldiers universally assumed they could rely on African-American loyalty. One New Jersey soldier wrote from Fort Worth that “these niggers tell our scouts every thing that transpires with the rebels.” While at Fort Greble in southeast D.C., one “negro came into camp and reported that the secessionists were in his neighborhood making trouble.”

Reports like these were not always accurate, but they indicate strong alliances formed between African-Americans and the fort garrisons; alliances that often offended the racial sensibilities of local whites. Like other rural areas, such as nearby Maryland, the war’s effect on race relations caused some around Washington County towards a less tolerant, more white supremacist than might have otherwise been the case. Even when Northern volunteers did not believe in racial equality either, the presence of this ideology

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95 Franklin Lukens to his parents, Dec 9, 1861, Ms2013-029, Virginia Tech Library.

96 Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 34.

around Washington became another indicator of Southernism to soldiers. The 10th Massachusetts, whose members mostly endorsed emancipation, experienced the white backlash against race mixing first hand. When members of the Nolan family, who lived directly across the District border in Maryland, tried to reclaim a runaway living in their camp, the regiment allowed the slave to respond to her former master. She said that the Nolans celebrated the Baltimore Riots and that Mr. Nolan “hoped they would kill every damn Yankee,” an accusation they did not deny. Not only did the Nolans fail to reclaim their former property, but men of the regiment afterward went to the Nolan house to forcibly administered the loyalty oath in an episode they dubbed “the Maryland Raid.” They succeeded in breaking the Nolans’ will, and took chickens and crops as spoils. 98

This “Maryland Raid” was one of many such intersections between race, loyalty, and property in the Defenses of Washington.

Aside from security, the Defenses of Washington provided African-Americans and Northerners alike with social and cultural opportunities. Northern soldiers found contrabands friendly and some even “[had] come to the conclusion that they are ‘the best society of the place.’” Winthrop DeWolf wrote of “glorious July evenings” spent playing music and dancing with field hands “in a regular Virginia hoedown” at Fort DeRussy. 99

Parties like these no doubt interrupted the doldrums of life in the Defenses of Washington, but they also reinforced individual soldiers’ convictions on the question of the war’s aim to fight slavery.

98 Newell, 10th Massachusetts, 69-71.

99 Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 96, 268.
The Defenses of Washington provided African-Americans with unprecedented economic opportunities. Runaways carved out small farms in the District and Maryland countryside, sometimes from land owned by Confederate sympathizers who fled the area. Produce from these farms often found its way to markets for Union soldiers, providing the latter with another source of culinary escape from their despised army rations. Regiments constructing the forts traded with locals on Sundays, “many of whom were slaves at the time.” Although slaves at the time of fort construction, the District of Columbia Compensated Emancipation Act freed around 1,000 enslaved people in Washington County in April 1862. So while dancing parties and other casual encounters between African-Americans and Union soldiers were examples of cultural exchanges, the bartering of food stuffs and other materials established an economic foundation for extensive, long term African-American settlement in the District of Columbia.

In addition to their role as potential customers for surplus crops, Union soldiers also provided employment opportunities usually taken by African-Americans. Fort construction employed the most African-Americans in the Defenses of Washington, but enterprising soldiers and civilians alike found other avenues for mutual gain. Soldiers

100 Cudworth, First Massachusetts, 79; McGrath, 127th New York, 19; Spicer, Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island, 179.


eager to unburden themselves of chores such as cooking, dishwashing, laundering, and even carrying their packs created opportunities for mutual gain. The 9th Rhode Island Volunteers made ample use of the services of an elderly woman living on a small farm in what is now southeast D.C. In addition to paying her fifty to seventy-five cents per dozen clothes washed, she sold butter and other foodstuffs. Other young boys, such as Abraham Douglass, an escaped slave near Tenleytown, washed dishes and sang for soldiers “for the modest salary of two dollars and a half per month.” Men of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery paid “darkies,” many of them quite young, ten cents to carry “overburdened knapsacks” as they marched from one post to another with no opposition from their commanders.104

Blacks and whites, Unionists, secessionists, and those on the fence, as well as Northern volunteers, confronted a confusing and dangerous reality in the Defenses of Washington. Suddenly forced to coexist, regional identities and the necessities of war clashed, causing a dynamic mix of conflict and negotiation. The military’s mandate to protect the Federal capital necessitated the confiscation of valuable land and material to construct the ring of fortifications around Washington City in 1861-62 and beyond. Confiscation of property convinced some civilians that Northern soldiers were the brutes Confederate propagandists said they were. Simultaneously, Washington County’s ambiguous position directly between the slave South and an ambivalent Maryland reinforced Northern volunteers’ regional assumptions. Soldiers’ material needs mixed with these to create an environment dangerous to local civilians, who often suffered the ruinous effects of property theft. Preexisting Confederate sympathies, as well as

extemporaneous reactions against foraging and racial mixing brought by the Defenses of Washington caused some civilians to fight back through the press, military authorities, or by conspiring to harm Union soldiers. None of these avenues brought relief and only reinforced Union ideas about hostile locals, creating a cycle whereby struggles for scant resources became a test of loyalty. One sympathetic soldier, J. Harrison Mills of the 21st New York Volunteers, summed up the difficult situation for civilians in December 1861:

They could be compensated if only they could prove their *loyalties*. The people living in this part of the country…have a most precarious tenure of their possessions…I think it would be but fair in the government to protect these people first and depend on their loyalty afterward. It is but natural for them to endeavor to save their families from penury…and it is hard that they should for no greater disloyalty than this be stripped of their support for the winter months.  

Although Mills’s words were specifically intended for those living around the forts in Virginia, they just as easily applied for those living in the District of Columbia. As the war continued into late 1862 and 1863, Union civilian and military officials grappled with protecting the Federal government from outside attack while simultaneously maintaining a disciplined fighting force.

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CHAPTER III

THE NADIR OF THE UNION ARMY IN THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON,
AUGUST 1862-MAY 1863

Unauthorized foraging never disappeared from the Defenses of Washington, and events at the end of 1862 further motivated it. Despite superior numbers, McClellan’s campaigns in Spring 1862 ended in retreat and disgrace.\(^1\) Other defeats followed, making 1862 a very difficult year for the Union cause and Washington. “Stonewall” Jackson’s routs of Union armies in the Shenandoah Valley left Washington vulnerable from the north and west.\(^2\) Another battle at Bull Run in August – the biggest Union defeat to date – brought the Confederate army within a day’s march of Washington’s forts.\(^3\) Although a savage fight at Antietam, Maryland, sent Robert E. Lee back across the Potomac, the 13 December disaster at Fredericksburg, Virginia, brought the Union Army to perhaps its lowest in the entire war.\(^4\) All the while, these events made soldiers and civilians in the


Defenses of Washington anxious. Short on supplies during the bitterly cold winter of 1862-1863 and anticipating combat at any moment, soldiers looked to their immediate surroundings for supplies, comfort, and relief. Regulating increasingly difficult civil affairs, military leaders tasked with defending the capital now faced potential assault from Confederate forces.

After a crushing defeat at Second Bull Run on August 30th, 1862, Union General John Pope pulled his army back towards the safety of the Defenses of Washington.\(^5\) Assuming a defensive posture, Union leaders responded with another panicked series of fort construction as they did a year earlier after First Bull Run.\(^6\) John Gross Barnard, the forts’ lead engineer, warned McClellan that “an immense deal of work [needs] to be done to make our defensive lines north of the Potomac respectably strong.” Barnard pointed out that “large areas of timber must be felled, several new works built, and in addition, a connecting series of rifle-pits.”\(^7\)

As soldiers built new forts or extensions upon existing ones, private tracts of lumber belonging to local businessman or farmers melted away.\(^8\) Charles R. Belt, a retired colonel from the Mexican-American War who owned land in what is now the

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\(^5\) Cooling, *Symbol*, 132.


\(^7\) Ibid.

northwest D.C. neighborhood of Chevy Chase, represents a case in point. He wrote to
the newly created Headquarters of the Defenses of Washington on September 16th, 1862,
requesting that soldiers halt the destruction of his timber.⁹ Major General Nathaniel P.
Banks, then the commanding officer of the defenses, ordered an investigation. Barnard
forwarded an opinion that Banks concurred with: after soldiers completed the slashing
necessary for the fortifications, “let the Engineers mark off such parts as are to remain on
the ground and notify the commanders of the neighboring forts to protect it…[notify] the
owners that the rest of the timber is theirs.”¹⁰

Bank’s and Barnard’s responses typify military policies of the day. Union
commanders first prioritized operational needs, but still attempted to maintain an
empathetic posture towards adversely affected civilians. In the end, however, soldiers’
needs at the lowest operational level frustrated senior commanders. Wood was in
demand for more than fortifications: Union unpreparedness and the especially harsh
winter of 1862-63 left many soldiers without fuel for their fires, which led to
unauthorized cutting. Belt wrote again in November that he continued sustaining injuries
to his property “by soldiers and action of the government.”¹¹ To make matters worse,
Defenses of Washington command felt detaching men to cut fuel distracted the Army
from its primary objective: preparing the forts for a Confederate attack.¹² As a result,
authorities ordered inadequate amounts of men to cut firewood for the camps and

⁹ B.32; Vol. 1; Registers.
¹⁰ A.41, J.28; Vol. 1; Registers.
¹¹ B.198; Vol. 1; Registers.
¹² B.10; R.63; Vol. 1; Registers.
hospitals. Sensing opportunity, wholesale wood dealers raised prices to “extravagant” levels, further tying the government’s hands.¹³

Left on their own, soldiers naturally looked to the abundant woods surrounding them and paid little heed to property rights. In November 1862, Allison Nailer wrote that “U.S. Pickets stationed on her farm have burned 4 or 5 miles of fence and several outhouses.”¹⁴ Edward Swan complained soldiers cut down shade trees on his families burial ground.¹⁵ Particularly frustrating for Barnard and other Union commanders, men even resorted to burning forts’ abatis, the ring of pointed sticks that surrounded each fort.¹⁶ Still, Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman, the commanding officer of the Defenses of Washington from late-October 1862, reiterated in January 1863 that “in no event are individuals to trespass on land owned by loyal citizens or on land liable for confiscation” in reference to the issue of fuel.¹⁷ To alleviate the shortage, he endorsed a suggestion by Col. James Tait that the army take advantage of slaves “making large profits” selling wood on the estate of their former owner so it “could be used for government purposes.”¹⁸

Despite these steps, government records of communications received indicate that the “severe cold” of December and January of 1862-63 produced unnecessary

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¹³ R.63; Vol. 1; Registers.

¹⁴ N.18; Vol. 1; Registers. The “U.S. Pickets” in questions were mostly likely the 7th or 9th New York Heavy Artillery, brigaded together under the command of Col. Lewis Morris.

¹⁵ S.151; Vol. 1; Registers.

¹⁶ B.176; Vol. 1; Registers.

¹⁷ T.18; Vol. 2; Registers.

¹⁸ T.18; Vol. 2; Registers.
suffering and death in Washington’s camps. One soldier from Connecticut wrote in November that “we have the hardest frosts here that I ever saw.” General in chief of the Union army, Major General Henry Halleck, and even Congressmen wrote to headquarters to inquire why soldiers and constituents suffered. To make matters worse, Confederate capture of Union supplies in areas around the Defenses of Washington compounded acute shortages of blankets, tents, and rations. A brigade composed of Scott’s 900 cavalry and other infantry regiments patrolled Poolesville, Maryland, thirty miles north of Washington to guard Union stores. Although out of sight of Washington’s forts, these operations had important consequences for local civil affairs. Heintzelman received communications from men of the 114th Pennsylvania on November 22nd, 1862, that “no provision was made by the Q.M. for their rations” near Poolesville. Sent only with three day’s rations, Sergent Hartwell of company L, Scott’s 900, remembered “foraging was an absolute necessity.” Although Heintzelman ordered an investigation into the matter, Confederate partisans took advantage. While soldiers abandoned the stores to find forage, Heintzelman received a report that “‘White’s Guerrillas,’ or a detachment of

19 A.134, C.131; Vol. 1; E.13; Vol. 2; Registers.

20 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Nov 7th, 1863, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.

21 A.124; C.145; Vol. 1; Registers. New York Representative Roscoe Conkling wrote on behalf of “a young soldier of the 146th New York,” Edgar Davis, incarcerated in the Alexandria slave pens on charges of desertion that was near death because he had no wood or blankets. H.W. Egolf wrote to the War Dept. blaming the death of his son on this lack, a charge Heintzelman fiercely denied.

22 D.28; Vol. 1; Registers.

23 R.53; Vol. 1; Registers.

24 Thomas West Smith, The Story of a Cavalry Regiment: “Scott’s 900” Eleventh New York Cavalry From the St. Lawrence River to the Gulf of Mexico, 1861-1865 (Chicago: W.B. Conkey, 1897), 49.
J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry,” captured the supplies without a fight on November 25th.25 Upon hearing about the defenseless stores, Union command scrambled to send troops and wagons to rescue the supplies, but the expedition “accomplished nothing – it was too late.” Cavalry patrols later indicated “rebel horses seemed to be pretty well loaded with blankets.”26

Military authorities and soldiers alike looked to civilians for answers to Confederate activity in Montgomery County. The Defenses of Washington command sent more troops, led by Colonels P. Stearns Davis and Albert B. Jewett, to secure the area. They immediately suspected civilians of helping Confederates hide stolen government property. Davis reported his suspicions to Heintzelman, who in turn responded that “no citizen should be allowed to have property belonging to the government” unless they carried proper authority to do so.27 Davis and his men found nothing in the area.28 They did find, however, government material in other houses further north near the mouth of the Monocacy River, justifying at least some suspicions and no doubt inflaming military assumptions about local loyalty.29

As these Union troops conducted the Civil War version of counterinsurgency in upper Montgomery County, Heintzelman and Davis both sought to balance their mission with civilian needs. To avoid unnecessary arrest and alienating loyal citizens, Heintzelman urged caution when Davis asked permission to arrest civilians heard to be

25 O.24, R.55, S.185; Vol. 1; Registers.
26 D.69, D.71; Vol. 1; Registers.
27 D.86, D.89; Vol. 1; Registers.
28 D.98; Vol. 1; Registers.
29 D.116; Vol. 1; Registers.
“custodians of letters from rebel sympathizers,” a common occurrence in the border states where family’s loyalties were sometimes divided. He preferred Davis withhold action until soldiers witnessed the men delivering the letters. More Confederate raids into Montgomery County, however, undermined this moderate approach. Whites Guerrillas, dressed as Federal soldiers, ambushed men of Scott’s 900 cavalry on December 15th, 1862, capturing pickets and stealing more horses and equipment. Losing patience, soldiers took matters into their own hands. Ten days after this ambush, the postmaster of Poolesville wrote to Heintzelman reporting “outrages committed on citizens by soldiers of the Federal Army,” likely retaliations by frustrated soldiers. Heintzelman ordered Colonel Davis to “see that no more depredations of any kind are committed,” further noting in communication registers that “I am not surprised that the Cavalry should be exasperated at the conduct of some of the citizens of Poolesville.” Still, Heintzelman praised Davis’s “good order” in stopping the mayhem.

The Provost Marshal for Montgomery County, M. Moulder, did not share Heintzelman’s optimism. Immediately after the November 25th raid, he reported “much excitement in his county…on account of Rebel invasion” and asked for troops to serve as provost guards. Davis declined, prioritizing his mission instead of local policing. The raids, however, escalated soldiers’ reactions beyond the abilities of their commanders to


31 D.35; Vol. 2; Registers.

32 D.101, O.24; Vol. 1; Registers; Smith, Scott’s 900, 49.

33 M.155; Vol. 1; Registers.

34 D.99; Vol. 1; Registers.
control, leading to a destabilization of Montgomery County. On January 3rd, 1863, Davis reported “difficulty in controlling his detachment of ‘Scott’s 900’ attached to his brigade,” saying that they could not be trusted without an officer “else they invade citizens homes and extort or entreaty a canteen of whiskey.”

On January 9th, Moulder reported two privates, Hawkins and Smith, plundered John H. Higgins’ store of much needed boots, shoes, and gloves in Rockville, a town on the road leading south towards Tenleytown and Washington and the county seat. Colonel Jewett, commanding another regiment brigaded with Davis, also reported “depredations” by men of Scott’s 900. Heintzelman ordered that violators “must be found and severely punished.” By the end of February, Davis requested increased provost action for “matters at Rockville,” reversing his policy of two months prior.

Civilians’ complaints met with a combination of flippant disregard from enlisted men and concern from regiment commanders. Elias French of the 11th New Hampshire wrote his sister that “we are going to have some Pork” belonging to “an old Secesh…the old Rebel had a son buried Sunday that got wounded in the battle of Antietam he was fighting with the Rebels.” George Dawson, the revenue collector in Poolesville, wrote on behalf of James Poole of the latter’s “suffering military occupation of the 10th

35 D.3; Vol. 2; Registers; P.S. Davis to Headquarters Defenses of Washington, Jan. 3, 1863; D.2, Box 1; Letters Received Sept. 1862-Mar. 1869, Entry 5382, Part 1; U.S. Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393; National Archives Building, Washington D.C.

36 P.9, S.29; Vol. 2; Registers.

37 J.17; Vol. 2; Registers.

38 P.9; Vol. 2; Registers.

39 D.24; Vol. 2; Registers.

40 Elias French to his sister, Oct 13, 1862, Ms89-012, Virginia Tech Library.
Vermont Volunteers.” The only mention in the 10th Vermont’s regiment history of their time in Poolesville refers to hog races, foot races, “shooting matches with revolvers… and [getting] acquainted with…the inhabitants around us.” The regimental historian either failed to realize the effect of their actions or chose not to recount it save with a facetious reference that only 10th Vermonters would understand. Still, Jewett, forwarded reports of these “depredations” and a copy of the order he issued regarding them on March 24th, 1863. Although Jewett, Heintzelman, and Davis wanted to maintain healthy civil-military relations, their compassion, like that of their enlisted subordinates, extended only as far as civilian cooperation. When William Poole complained in March 1863 of foraging and making his house “a misery for the sick” by the 23rd Maine, Jewett responded to Heintzelman’s inquiry, “good enough as he ought not to have refused to allow wagons to pass.” Commanders treated Washington County civilians similarly. United States Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair protested on March 16th, 1863, that “two privates of the 6th Michigan Cav invaded the house of Dr. Maddock, stole blankets and beat the neighbor’s wife.” Heintzelman noted that although the Michigan troopers had searched the house without authorization, “Maddock’s conduct was entirely in the wrong,” demonstrating that the military interpreted resistance as disloyalty.

41 D.53; Vol. 2; Registers.
43 J.43; Vol. 2; Registers.
44 P.70; Vol. 2; Registers.
45 B.107, B.126; Vol. 2; Registers
As events in Montgomery County, Maryland, in fall and winter 1862-63 suggest, outside events affected local civil affairs. Not only did battles cause alarm in Washington, but they brought the area directly in the line of march. Winkle and Leech document the effect of the influx of dead and dying men, but less discussed is the effects of straggling.46 As the army moved, individuals or groups fell out of march because they fell behind or simply grew tired of the war’s privations.47 Some tried to go home, but many made their way to Washington or Alexandria to regroup with their regiments or to enjoy the cities’ pleasures. As a result, the command of the Defenses of Washington and its provost guard absorbed the responsibility of corralling stragglers and distributing them back to their regiments. Lt. Col. George Paul of the 8th United States Infantry reported on September 7th, 1862, just a week after Second Bull Run and five days before the Battle of Antietam, on “the extraordinary number of stragglers in Washington City.”48

The farming communities within the Defenses of Washington’s jurisdiction suffered these roaming stragglers throughout the fall and winter of 1862-63. Starting in September, civilians such as A.B. Bonir wrote military leaders of “depredations of stragglers living on the line of march” in Montgomery County.49 The military governor of Washington City, Brigadier General James Wadsworth, declined sending a permanent provost guard to the county, instead recommending cavalry detachments “pick up and


48 P.2; Vol. 1; Registers.

49 B.14; Vol. 1; Registers.
bring stragglers both on the roads and at the farm houses near it.” As the above examples with Scott’s 900 and 6th Michigan Cavalry show, the use of cavalry patrols backfired. Civilians continued reporting “being constantly invaded by stragglers” looking for food and shelter. Particularly troubling was the murder of a civilian, Thomas Wilson, as the Army of the Potomac marched north towards confrontation with Confederate forces at Antietam. Men of the 22nd Massachusetts stabbed him with their bayonets as he resisted the theft of one of his pigs. Looking to bring swift justice and avoid more unnecessary controversy in Montgomery County, the command of the Defenses of Washington recommended trying the men in a military commission so that “the evidence of the most important witness, the negro Henderson,” could be received. Initially held by civil authorities, Heintzelman demanded their delivery to the military, anxious that Maryland law prevented Henderson’s testimony because of his race. To address the “mischievous practice of straggling,” McClellan issued General Order No. 155 on September 9th, 1862 to condemn its “habitual association with cowardice, marauding, and theft,” and prevent further “damages to fences or crops.”

Sick of the war and seeing little hope for Union victory, many soldiers took straggling to its logical extreme: desertion. The Union defeats in December 1862 and January 1863, the rising anti-war Democrat faction at home, and controversy over

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50 B.14; Vol. 1; Registers.
51 D.3; Vol. 1; Registers.
52 K.11; Vol. 1; Registers.
54 H.90; K.11; Vol. 1; Registers.
Lincoln’s emancipation policy compounded the sinking feeling many Union soldiers already felt. The Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13th represented the worst Union defeat to date and its subsequent “Mud March” offensive proved as frustrating as it was futile. George Lewis of the 4th Michigan wrote his brother after the battle that “the soldiers damn the war the niggers the president the country and hope the Union will go to the devil.”

Desertion and disaffection reached their highest point during this period, underscoring a general malaise in the Union Army during this period. New regiments entering Washington seemed especially prone, as Henry Hart Waldo wrote his wife that “there is a great deal of this going on among the new troops.” Hart’s regiment, the 2nd Connecticut Light Artillery, even nicknamed their winter camp “Camp Disconsolation.”

As soldiers lost faith in the war effort, so went the discipline and professionalism that had held the army together and kept the war legitimate in civilians’ eyes. Particularly to people around the Defenses of Washington in Montgomery County, Maryland, this lapse meant even more lost property, fear, and death than before. As noted above, soldiers within the sight of the forts’ guns also experienced lack of supplies, severe cold, and a sinking faith in the war’s outcome. The sedentary and even boring

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56 George Lewis to his brother, Feb 1st, 1863, Ms2012-015, Virginia Tech Library.


58 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Jan 4th, 1863, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library

59 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Dec 30th, 1862, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.

60 Albert Z. Conner and Chris Mackowski, Seizing Destiny: The Army of the Potomac’s ’Valley Forge’ and the Civil War Winter that Saved the Union (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beattie, 2016), 1-10.
duty around Washington’s forts led soldiers to express their frustrations by acting out. That the 117th New York complained about the “semi-military character” of their duty in Washington and simultaneous complaints by the Secretary of the Interior for their disorderly conduct at the Washington Aqueduct was more than coincidence. Other soldiers reported depression. George Benson wrote his sister that life around Washington was “very dull nothing new from one week to another from morning till night nothing but sit and think.” He hoped for a discharge for illness “for I am sick and tired of a soldier’s life.”

Lack of supplies contributed to this malaise, and soldiers foraged for relief. Official records from this period bring into focus the scope of foraging and commanders’ reactions to it. After receiving complaints that “troops stationed at Forts Mahan, Baker, and Stanton” did not have sufficient rations, Heintzelman shrugged them off: “there [appeared] to be but little ground for this complaint.” While perhaps troops had no less food, and maybe even more, than other regiments throughout the Union army, troop perceptions gave enough cause to forage produce from the nearby farm of John Douglass in late November 1862. Douglass wrote to headquarters “10 or 12

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62 J.A. Mowris, A History of the One Hundred and Seventeenth Regiment New York Volunteers (Hartford, CT: Case, Lockwood, and Company, 1866), 57; I.01, Vol. 1, Registers.

63 George W. Benson to his sister, Jan 30th 1863, Ms1988-083, Virginia Tech Library

64 Ibid.

65 M.124; Vol. 1; Registers.
companies….encamped near him” stole “all vegetables.” Heintzelman referred the matter to a subordinate to “take measures to have the property protected.”66 Henry Hart Waldo wrote that his regiment suffered insufficient rations in northeast D.C. and that “our officers don’t take much interest in the welfare of the men.”67 Within a few weeks, his tone changed: “we are growing fat all the time” and boasted of eating turkey taken from a nearby farm.68

Most civilians complained directly to company or regimental commanders, or even to enlisted men, but some sought redress at the top echelon. A Washington County Justice of the Peace forwarded testimony of John Haskin that United States troops took produce from his garden. In addition to Haskin’s testimony, he sent attestations from Haskin’s neighbors.69 Richard Coxey suffered destruction of his farm in northeast D.C. and responded to inquiries by headquarters by showing “the precise location of his farm, which, he complained, has been damaged by soldiers.”70 David Jackson of Tenleytown complained in September about the “marauding of troops” in his community.71 S.A. Peugh reported “needless damage…to property and crops of some poor people” by cavalry.72

66 D.75; Vol.1; Registers.

67 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Nov 13th, 1862, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.

68 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Dec 5th, 1863, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.

69 C.65, C.68; Vol. 1; Registers.

70 C.98; Vol.1; Registers.

71 J.4; Vol.1; Registers.

72 P.86; Vol. 1; Registers.
Authorities in the Defenses of Washington responded to these conflicts first by examining the loyalty of the victim. An official loyalty oath prescribed by Congress in August 1861 and strengthened by further legislation in summer 1862 distinguished loyal citizens. Refusing the oath brought suspicions of disloyalty and could result in confiscation or even arrest. The Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862 allowed military personnel to take property belonging to disloyal persons. But authorized foraging had a limit: soldiers could not confiscate from citizens who publicly took the loyalty oath. In the words of Brigadier General Henry Lockwood, “no man should be disturbed who acquiesces in the authority of the Government, no matter how cold, or reluctant, or sullen is submission.” Lockwood’s words, which reflected official Federal policy, left no room for subjective interpretation of loyalty when it came to civilian property rights.

Although the oath policy simplified the extremely complicated task of determining civilian loyalty, that simplicity also left room for closeted rebels to acquire government passes to move freely about Washington. That duplicity allowed them to smuggle military information or goods to the enemy more easily than before. Major General Daniel Butterfield suspected local Jews of smuggling goods to Confederate forces in Virginia. A group of Washington Jews were later arrested with contraband goods while carrying government passes, confirming Butterfield’s suspicions. Other


74 Ibid, 236, 304.

75 *OR*, vol. 5, chap. 14, 666.

76 A.63, L.21, P.59, P.77, S.111; Vol. 2; Registers; Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, May 27th, 1863, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.
smuggling operations operated out of southern Maryland.\textsuperscript{77} Greed surpassed politics in some cases, but soldiers still saw these smuggling and spy rings as further evidence of local disloyalty, further irritating civil affairs. Colonel Edward Sawyer of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Vermont Cavalry reported to Heintzelman about “difficulties in stopping thieving from the government and private individuals through the opposition of some officers.”\textsuperscript{78}

The complexity of enforcing property confiscation policies reveals itself in the case of Solomon Hoge, a Virginia farmer who lost horses to Colonel Norvel in March 1863. Both S.M. Janney and Hoge’s relative, John Hoge from Ohio, wrote to the Defenses of Washington command to affirm Solomon’s loyalty and that he intended to retrieve the horses in Washington. Interestingly, John Hoge also reported that Solomon’s neighbor, B.F. Taylor, remained disloyal and thereby deflected attention from Solomon.\textsuperscript{79} Heintzelman did not note any official response to Hoge’s allegation against Taylor, but he did order an investigation into the stolen property. Brigadier General Joseph T. Copeland, who temporarily commanded Norvel, reported that Hoge’s horses were delivered back to him.\textsuperscript{80} Interestingly, however, John Hoge then reported “outrages”

\textsuperscript{77} A.63, L.21, P.59, P.77, S.111; Vol. 2; Registers.

\textsuperscript{78} S.101; Vol. 2; Registers. One officer referred to here was Capt. Frank Hunton. By the time this communication reached Heintzelman, Hunton had been captured by Confederate pickets in Aldie, Virginia. Heintzelman responded that after Hunton’s release, he could be investigated and punished.

\textsuperscript{79} J.24, S.79; Vol. 2; Registers.

\textsuperscript{80} H.82; Vol. 2; Registers.
committed on him, to which Copeland responded he had not “heard them before and do not believe a word of the story.”

Heintzelman’s responses to Hoge and others reflects the Defenses of Washington command’s preference to stop thieving, punish culprits, and return stolen property were all genuine. Even so, Hoge was fortunate to reclaim his property; although official policy since 1861 had been to take receipts of property taken, this policy proved hopelessly difficult in practice. Some officers distributed certificates of delayed compensation, but these left needy citizens with nothing in the short term. Seeing similar dynamics at his post at Harper’s Ferry, Brigadier General William Rosecrans wrote to the Secretary of War in 1862 that treasury notes would better alleviate the suffering caused by thieving, which had served “to embitter and confirm the weak and wavering inhabitants…against the Union.” Rosecrans’s concerns applied just as well to Washington. By late 1862 and early 1863, however, the best Heintzelman could do was detach guards from the regiments to protect private property. Wealthy citizens who owned valuable estates on the rural land just outside the boundaries of Washington City wrote frequently to headquarters asking for this protection. W.T. Stone, Sr., the owner of Mount Pleasant, asked protection from “unnecessary injury” to his property. He quickly wrote to headquarters again when the 1st Maine Cavalry encamped “in the lawn south of his dwelling,” and requested that they be moved elsewhere. Henry Jarvis asked “for

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81 Ibid. Col. Norvel resigned his command of the 5th Michigan Cavalry on Feb. 23rd, 1863, around the same time that charges and specifications were drawn against him; N.13, N.14; Vol. 2; Registers.

82 OR, vol. 12, chap. 24, 92.

83 S.55, S.56; Vol. 1; Registers.
protection for himself and his family” from nearby soldiers.84 Benjamin Ogle Taylor, nervous about the nearby encampment of the 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, asked for guards. Heintzelman responded by asking a subordinate to “pursue the proper course to guard the property.”85

Detaching guards from the regiments, however, came with a fatal flaw: provost guards identified more with soldiers than civilians they were ordered to protect. This understanding reflected changing identities caused by military service.86 Mostly composed of young volunteers seeking new experiences, the Union army around Washington used foraging to escape boredom and reinforce group loyalty.87 Even more so than their regiments or even companies the “mess” remained the basic social unit of the Civil War. Never official and therefore composing an indeterminate number, these informal groups socialized men into army life.88 Soldiers groups bonded through identity and pride in their unit, and with activities such as sports, cards, gambling or foraging, and around campfires. Alcohol flowed through these socializing forces.89 In addition to foraging, consumption of alcohol remained a universally discussed topic during and after

84 J.14; Vol. 1; Registers.
85 T.56; Vol. 1; Registers.
87 Frances Clark, “So Lonesome I Could Die: Nostalgia and Debates Over Emotional Control in the Civil War North,” Journal of Social History 41, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 260; Wiley, Billy Yank, 303. During this period of the war, three-fourths of the Union army was under 30 and more than half under 25.
89 Wiley, Billy Yank, 252-53.
the war. Alcohol, and soldiers’ access to it, composed another key dimension of civil affairs around Washington.

As noted in chapter one, military and civilian leaders alike sought to curb alcoholism’s ill effects on troop discipline. In addition to Congress’s Act of July 31st, 1861, that prohibited the sale of alcohol to soldiers in the District of Columbia, Major General George McClellan and many regiment commanders issued orders against drinking beyond the gill, or one quarter-pint, of whiskey rationed to soldiers for fatigue duty.90 Furthermore, McClellan issued a General Order allowing no alcohol across the Potomac bridges or pass camp guards except for hospital, subsistence stores, or pre-authorized private stores of officers. Similar orders forbade officers and enlisted men from going into Washington City unless they carried a pass authorized by the provost marshal’s command and their regiment commander for official business.91 McClellan established Col. Andrew Porter of the 16th United States Infantry as the Provost Marshal of Washington to enforce these measures. Provost guards policed streets and farmland to regulate drinking establishments, suppress bar-rooms, brothels, and other establishments that tempted soldiers, as well as ensure civilians and soldiers had authorized passes. The disregard for these orders became apparent when McClellan reissued these orders to alleviate “misunderstanding.”92 Even during the fall and winter of 1862 and 1863,


92 Ibid, 30, 688-89.
soldiers moved freely; Henry Hart Waldo had “been out of camp several times wince I have been here to go into the city and visit some of the fortifications.”

Volunteers still grumbled at the apparent tyranny of these regulations. The 16th New York Volunteers grew “upset they couldn’t enjoy the delights afforded by daily visits to Washington” and the 4th New York Heavy Artillery noted with despair how Washington seemed “so near yet so far.” The city’s press, however, lauded the regulations and reported of their successes in the following months. Provost guards arrested C.W. Haydon and Rudolph Krainswald for “selling lager beer to soldiers” in September 1861. Guards caught John Jones and Amandus Baumbach selling alcohol in the vicinity of Tenleytown. Guards similarly arrested many other barkeepers who owned bars on Capitol Hill’s notorious streets, some of whom were government employees. The *Star* reported the story of one private of the 2nd United States Infantry that committed suicide in his quarters, noting “he has been addicted to drink.” The story not only reported the need for more enforcement, but also implied that soldiers found access to alcohol more difficult since McClellan took command.

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93 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Nov 21, 1862, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.


98 “Suicide of a Regular,” *ES*, Sept. 9, 1861.
While soldiers found it harder to drink in public, they found other ways to acquire liquor in rural Washington County. Although some officers attempted to follow the regulations, “still there was plenty of [liquor] brought into camp” while they constructed the Defenses of Washington.\(^99\) The 26\(^{th}\) New York remembered their chaplain because he regularly petitioned for his whiskey ration, “from which he drew inspiration for Sunday labors.”\(^100\) The brigade surgeon of the 10\(^{th}\) Massachusetts conspired with the regiment quartermaster to acquire and smuggle into camp six barrels of whiskey from Washington “to assist in building the forts and counteract the ‘moribific influence’” of extended duty in the Defenses of Washington.\(^101\) The 2\(^{nd}\) Connecticut Light Artillery’s surgeon also ordered extra whiskey rations for relief from the summer heat.\(^102\)

These examples, coming from quartermasters, chaplains, and even medical personnel in high military positions, suggest the universality of alcohol and the desire to acquire it. Indeed, through the first months of the war, “officers returning to their quarters under arrest” for alcohol infractions “could’ve formed a battalion.”\(^103\) Guard houses remained full of drunken soldiers, especially after being paid.\(^104\) To meet the soldiers’ needs, an illicit trade in alcohol proliferated around the Defenses of Washington

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\(^100\) J. Harrison Mills, *Chronicles of the Twenty-First Regiment New York State Volunteers* (Buffalo, NY: Gies, 1887), 71.

\(^101\) Newell, *10\(^{th}\) Massachusetts*, 60.

\(^102\) Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Aug 13, 1863, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.

\(^103\) Curtis, *16th New York*, 52.

\(^104\) Thomas Houck to Joseph Houck, Dec 25, 1861, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.
throughout the war. Sensing economic opportunity, civilians energetically engaged in this trade as both wholesale dealers and small time entrepreneurs. The historian of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery even considered some of their distribution methods “ingenious.”¹⁰⁵ Liquor dealers sold to unscrupulous sutlers and soldiers alike through general goods stores advertising sample rooms. Although provost guards stopped a few of these schemes, others undoubtedly continued through corruption.¹⁰⁶ Civilians floated barrels across the Potomac, where a receiver buried them for later distribution. They also made decoy pies and bibles out of tin and then filled them with whiskey.¹⁰⁷ Colonel Swain of Scott’s 900 inspected the contents of packages from home, but “sometimes a bottle would come inside a roast goose.”¹⁰⁸

Because they more easily dodged suspicion, local women especially engaged in small-scale distribution. Local papers noted “rather meanly clad” women, such as Anna O’Brien, selling sips of liquor to soldiers out of jugs on Washington’s backstreets.¹⁰⁹ Women of Washington’s Irish community especially found common “cause” with soldiers. The transition from Irish immigrant status to Irish-American was “manifested in behaviors American society deemed deviant.” Specifically, Irish women before and during the war were most often convicted of crimes related to drunkenness. One notable example, Susan Dugan, was arrested six times in the first half of 1862 for drunkenness and probably mingled with soldiers in the process. For these women, soldiers presented

¹⁰⁵ Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 41.
¹⁰⁶ “Sample Room in Rear,” ES, Sept. 5, 1861.
¹⁰⁷ Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 41.
¹⁰⁸ Smith, Scott’s 900, 15.
¹⁰⁹ “Selling Liquor to Soldiers,” ES, Sept. 5, 1861.
economic opportunities through selling alcohol and sex. Many locals roamed Union garrisons selling produce and other homemade goods, but women often hid small bottles up their skirts or tied liquor filled hoses around their waists. Isaac Hall of the 97th New York remembered that liquor circumvented confiscation “by various devices employed…chiefly by market women.” An officer arrested one particularly bold woman transporting a keg saturated with kerosene to deter suspicion, but upon closer inspection, “the contents were, less accurately speaking, benzene.”

Civilians participating in this trade invited great risk. Lieutenant George W. Bemis noted that one woman “of a colored persuasion” travelled often between Georgetown and his camp across the Aqueduct Bridge, raising guards’ suspicion. Upon further inspection, sentries discovered one dozen pint flasks of whiskey suspended beneath her skirt. Turned away, she later reappeared, “leading a little girl about eight years old, and her own skirts being clear, she was allowed to pass. A subsequent search revealed the fact however, that the juvenile was loaded in the original style.” Instead of arresting the violator, “the fun commenced. The woman was soused into the old canal and dragged out.” Bemis’ letter implied that the unnamed woman escaped further punishment but the soldiers confiscated the alcohol for their own use. A local German


111 Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 41; Smith, Scott’s 900, 15.


113 Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 41.

114 Ibid.
resident similarly avoided arrest for transporting a barrel of whiskey after pleading with his captors, but the provost guard nonetheless confiscated, and subsequently drank, the whiskey.\footnote{Smith, Scott’s 900, 16.}

The punishment for being caught smuggling alcohol varied. Between Forts Stanton and Carroll in hills of southeast D.C., the Burke family suffered very grievously. Suspected of selling alcohol in milk cans, military guards inspected Mr. Burke’s goods, but “poured milk out of every can.”\footnote{Kirk, 4\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery, 33.} Soon after his departure, however, “the sons of Mars” grew “so jolly and demonstrative” from ardent spirits, Major Allcock of the 4\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery inspected the cans more closely. He discovered a trick used by other local peddlers – the cans’ spouts contained milk but had no connection to the can’s whiskey filled chamber. Upon reporting the violation, Major Allcock received orders to remove the Burkes and destroy the house.\footnote{Kirk, 4\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery, 33; Smith, Scott’s 900, 15.}

Most schemes went on undiscovered and alcohol continued flowing through the Defenses of Washington. Different post-war accounts betray a range of biases towards alcohol that reflected responses to the “sins of camp life.”\footnote{Carol Sheriff and Scott Nelson, \textit{A People at War: Civilians and Soldiers in America’s Civil War, 1854-1877} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 221.} The college students of the 9\textsuperscript{th} Rhode Island, for example, mentioned only in passing how canteens sometimes contained “liquids of a more vigorous and searching character.”\footnote{William Spicer, \textit{History of the Ninth and Tenth Rhode Island Regiments Rhode Island Volunteers, and the Tenth Rhode Island Battery in the Union Army in 1862} (Providence, RI: Snow and Farnham, 1892), 85.} Some soldiers and
their regiment’s postwar memoirs, on the other hand, reveled in the “anti-hero” role, the 4th New York Heavy Artillery and Scott’s 900 especially. Veterans of foreign wars in Italy, Germany, and the Crimean Peninsula in Scott’s 900 officer corps formed a “Symposium Club,” where initiation rites included “having a bottle of whiskey forcibly shoved into a candidate’s mouth and being knocked into a tub of water.” Regardless of individuals response to alcohol, “there were few regiments staying any length of time near Washington that did not have similar experiences” towards it. The Union army reflected Northern American life, and that life included strong alcohol.

By late 1862, a drinking culture existed in force around Washington. Henry Hart Waldo even wrote he thought it best army recruiters rejected his friend “on account of his drinking.” While on the march, provost guards travelled ahead of the army and took possession of taverns, but around Washington alcohol flowed easily. Soldiers who resented the “dog’s life” of digging and drilling in Washington’s forts escaped provost guards’ attention by dressing as civilians, or simply sneaking around their patrols. They enjoyed the “sights of the cities,” which aside from the Smithsonian Castle and the

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120 Smith, Scott’s 900, 20.


122 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Dec. 31st, 1863, Ms2003-014, box 2, Virginia Tech Library.

123 Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Aug 13, 1863, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library.

newly expanded Capitol and its artwork, included “various immoralities which had probably never existed before.”

Despite military prohibition, bars and brothels conducted a brisk business throughout the war, and provost marshals eventually regulated the latter only by cataloguing according to cleanliness. Time spent in Washington “depended entirely on the taste of the visitor…if the scenes sought were questionable, no record was made of them.”

William Benyon Phillips, a twenty-year-old Welsh immigrant and member of the 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery posted at Fort Slocum, gave a rare glimpse of this underground culture in a letter to a friend in mid-December 1862:

I slipped to Washington last Thursday and spent the day in dodging the Provost Guard….and try for a little of the creature [comforts] but that’s forbidden to the soldier in the city. However, we managed it by employing a nigger to buy it for us. I put into a cup of tea with some good lady there and it was a big thing.

Alcohol was an irresistible influence for many soldiers in and around Washington. In bottles of whiskey, men found escape from the tedium of the war, excitement, and the “depressing effects of homesickness.”

Alcohol satisfied soldiers’ needs and bridged cultural gaps between them and civilians, its effects also threatened army discipline. Writing from Fort Craig, Lieutenant

125 Kirk, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 78.


127 Roe, Ninth New York Heavy Artillery, 42.


C.S. Heuth of the 14th Massachusetts Heavy Artillery reported soldiers deserted when “being plied with liquor.” On at least one occasion, men from Scott’s 900 brawled with a nearby regiment over a barrel of confiscated whiskey. Company I of the 10th Massachusetts advanced towards the sounds of gunfire that only turned out to be “some drunken Maryland cavalry, who had been firing off their pistols and carbines.”

Thomas Houck of the 96th Pennsylvania wrote his brother that “our Camp is cursed with a plague it is liquor more than half the Regiment is Drunk they ar [sic] fighting in all the streets the guard house is full.” Brigadier General Robert Cowding, a member of John J. Abercrombie’s Division posted in Arlington, Virginia, complained about drunken cavalry moving freely about the lines. Thomas Reeves, one of the many privates arrested for drunkenness, pleaded his innocence of charges against him that he and other soldiers assaulted a citizen while drunk.

Drunk and disorderly soldiers also put civilians in danger. During the “monotonous and irksome” time in the Defenses of Washington in Fall 1862, “having fun with the darkeys was one means of amusement” for some soldiers. Three members of Company B, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, armed with a canteen “full of whiskey,” harassed a local prayer meeting in a contraband settlement near Tenleytown. After being

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130 H.62; Vol. 2; Registers.

131 Smith, Scott’s 900, 16.

132 Newell, 10th Massachusetts, 49-50.

133 Thomas Houck to Joseph Houck, Dec 25, 1861, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech Library

134 R.26; Vol. 1; Registers.

135 R. 26, 32; Vol. 3; Registers; Ward, Second Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, 281. The charges were apparently dropped; Reeves left the service honorably on May 31st, 1865.
locked out and obviously unwelcome, they drank more and asked themselves “is the
United States Army to be baffled by contrabands? Never!” and broke down the door,
tumbling inside as “the colored people sat dumbfounded and perfectly silent.” The
congregation prayed openly for the men’s’ souls as the meeting continued in palpable
awkwardness. When the same men returned the following week, “a stalwart negro”
refused them entry, explaining that “no white trash was allowed in.” After a fight nearly
broke out, “an old woman” deescalated the situation and said to let in the “good white
soldiers.”

Despite soldiers deriving, perhaps facetiously, “considerable good” from the
prayer meetings, these incidents highlight the difficult position of local African-
Americans. They both depended on the soldiers for protection and economic
opportunity, but also became vulnerable to uncouth and undisciplined solders.
Alexandria widow Anna Engelbelch complained that soldiers had destroyed her saloon
and its contents, amounting to seven hundred dollars, on March 3rd, 1863. Alexandria’s
postmaster, M. Massey, forwarded a letter attesting “her good character.”

M.H. Sullivan, the “past sutler of the 161st Ohio Volunteers,” complained of being robbed of
money and property by 100 men of the 5th New York Cavalry. Heintzelman promised
Sullivan that if the men could be identified, he could punish them, but also noted with
antipathy that “people are in the habit of selling liquor and then complain of them if they
become lawless in consequence of the intoxication.”

136 Kirk 4th New York Heavy Artillery, 78-79.
137 E.14; Vol. 2; Registers.
138 S.77; Vol. 2; Registers.
139 S.77; Vol. 2; Registers.
Senior commanders grew especially frustrated with junior officers’ drinking habits. Colonel Augustus A. Gibson of the 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery complained from his headquarters at Fort Lincoln of lieutenants “visiting Washington without leave of absence” and recommended their prompt dismissal.\(^\text{140}\) Provost guards, despite being a punchline to those who evaded them, nonetheless regularly arrested officers for drunkenness and disorderly behavior.\(^\text{141}\) Second Lieutenant, George Watson, resigned on December 12th, 1862 because he felt “incapable of restraining inclination for intoxicating liquor,” a resignation Heintzelman accepted.\(^\text{142}\) One captain of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery, drank “more fire-water than was really good for his understanding” to escape the cold.\(^\text{143}\)

Drinking among officers especially endangered the Union Army because it trickled down to enlisted men and degraded unit efficiency. An anonymous letter from September 21st, 1863, reported Captain E.H. Ellis of the 12th New York Battery “inattentive to his command, and as often very drunk.”\(^\text{144}\) Further investigation by Brigadier General William F. Barry, reported Ellis “ignorant of his duties” and for “frequent absences from drill; general neglect of duties and from repeated instances of intoxication.”\(^\text{145}\) Barry recommended “Ellis be presented to President of United States for summary dismissal” on November 25th, 1862, a punishment with which Heintzelman

\(^{140}\) G.70; Vol. 1; Registers.  
\(^{141}\) H.20, S.223, W.85; Vol. 1; Registers; A.92, B.76, P.61, T.56; Vol. 2; Registers.  
\(^{142}\) W.94; Vol. 1; Registers.  
\(^{143}\) Roe, *Ninth New York Heavy Artillery*, 41.  
\(^{144}\) E.14; Vol. 1; Registers.  
\(^{145}\) B.168; Vol. 1; Registers.
“fully concurred.”\textsuperscript{146} Barry and Heintzelman’s deference to Presidential dismissal, a rare and humiliating punishment, reflected their desire to make an example of Captain Ellis.\textsuperscript{147}

Seeking to resist alcohol’s temptation and save the souls of their comrades, the temperance movement found adherents in the Union army. Most of the West Pointers in the Union Army high command bristled at alcohol’s influence on the army. Brigadier General Samuel Carroll wrote headquarters in October 1862 about “women peddlers…introducing poisonous trash into camps,” a prescient acknowledgment on the role women played in the liquor trade.\textsuperscript{148} The captain of company B, 9\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery, formed a temperance society, one of the many found within the Union Army. This particular organization even “went out and broke up a liquor hole where the men had been drinking themselves into trouble.”\textsuperscript{149} One Connecticut soldier reported to his wife that despite the “great efforts” by “Christians in organized bodies” and the government, “they can’t prevent it.”\textsuperscript{150} Men who similarly rejected drinking culture found themselves ostracized by their comrades, a sign of peer pressure that motivated others to drink.\textsuperscript{151} Still, efforts against alcohol attracted favor from the Defenses of Washington command. The 45-year old Major Thomas Allcock’s war on alcohol brought him career opportunities; on November 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1862, Division commander

\textsuperscript{146} B.168; Vol. 1; Registers.

\textsuperscript{147} Wiley, \textit{Billy Yank}, 214.

\textsuperscript{148} C.33; Vol. 1; Registers.

\textsuperscript{149} Roe, \textit{Ninth New York Heavy Artillery}, 50; Sherif and Nelson, \textit{A People at War}, 223.

\textsuperscript{150} Henry Hart Waldo to his wife, Aug 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1863, Dec. 31\textsuperscript{st}, 1863, Ms2003-014, Virginia Tech University Library.

\textsuperscript{151} Sheriff and Nelson, \textit{A People At War}, 222.
Brigadier General John J. Abercrombie named him and two others to oversee an Examination Board to identify inefficient officers.\textsuperscript{152} Allcock’s “considerable anxiety” towards alcohol and his rise in the ranks made him unpopular in the 4\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery.\textsuperscript{153}

Sober minded officers and enlisted men fought a hard battle with alcohol in Alexandria, Virginia, during the Winter of 1862-63, directly across the Potomac River from Washington. One of the most heavily fortified areas in the Defenses of Washington, Alexandria was an important “place of exchange” for war supplies and regiments going to the front.\textsuperscript{154} Surrounded by forts, Alexandria was another popular destination for soldiers looking to escape the war. Even with McClellan’s 1861 orders, “many persons are engaged in the sale [of alcohol]…large quantities of bad liquors are disposed of daily to the troops, and its effects are often visible in the streets.”\textsuperscript{155} Although the local population was conservatively Unionist, mutual distrust between soldiers and civilians was strong in Alexandria. Theodore Vaill of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Connecticut Heavy Artillery, noted that Alexandria “had suffered unspeakable things from the troops on duty in her streets…and the Alexandrians had come to regard a soldier as a scoundrel, always and everywhere.”\textsuperscript{156}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 152 A.107; Vol. 1; Registers; Kirk, 4\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery, 41.
\item 153 Kirk, 4\textsuperscript{th} New York Heavy Artillery, 41, 127.
\item 155 “Local News,” Alexandria Gazette, Oct 16, 1861.
\end{footnotes}
The war’s chaos only made matters worse. Union command sought to regroup the Army of the Potomac by establishing a camp directly south of Alexandria to collect stragglers, new recruits, and convalescing soldiers for redistribution. Unclear directions for the camp and a lack of hospital space in Washington caused the camp’s numbers to swell beyond officers’ ability to effectively control it. Men easily slipped into nearby Alexandria City to escape the camp’s hard conditions and enjoy the city’s temptations. Major General Nathaniel Banks and Heintzelman agreed that “the men cannot be constantly going to Alexandria.” To make matters worse, inconsistent enforcement of passes across the Potomac bridges meant thirsty soldiers acquired liquor in Alexandria when they could not in Washington. Confusion over who was responsible for enforcing orders and careless guards made Long Bridge a porous access point.

Heintzelman and the Military Governor of Alexandria, Brigadier General John Potts Slough, sought an extreme solution: total prohibition. Heintzelman and Slough closed all saloons for having “a demoralizing effect,” an action that interfered with local business and symbolized the more straightforward occupation Northern Virginians experienced during late 1862 and 1863. Not surprisingly, Alexandria’s strongly pro-Union mayor, Lewis McKenzie, faced strong constituent pressure. Subtly protesting the order, he inquired as to its duration on November 1st, 1862. Heintzelman referred the

158 B.184; Vol. 1; Registers; M.33; Vol. 2; Registers.
159 A.17; Vol. 1; Registers.
160 A.10, P. 80; Vol. 1; Registers.
161 F.20; Vol. 2; Registers.
162 M.81; Vol. 1; Registers.
matter to Slough, who cautioned about “the danger of allowing the sale of malt liquors” in Alexandria.\footnote{163}{Ibid.}

Meanwhile, Slough doubled his efforts to bring Alexandria under control, requesting an order “limiting the number of officers and men who can be in Alexandria at one time.”\footnote{164}{S.57; Vol. 2; Registers.} When these measures proved futile he dismissed Alexandria’s Provost Marshal, Captain J.C. Wyman, on February 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1863. Wyman had failed to stem “the increase in drunkenness and disorder” in the city.\footnote{165}{S.53; Vol. 1; S.53.} Official records demonstrate Wyman had placed a high priority on helping the growing population of escaping slaves – higher than policing drunkenness.\footnote{166}{W.45, W.58, W.80; Vol. 1; Registers.}

In his place, Slough appointed Lieutenant Colonel H.H. Wells of the 26\textsuperscript{th} Michigan. Wells immediately worked towards restricting the traffic in alcohol. By February 9\textsuperscript{th}, Wells reported that the cellars of his headquarters were so full of confiscated liquor that he did not know what to do with it. On February 11\textsuperscript{th}, he reported that “government teams are bringing contraband liquor into Alexandria in bags of oats and bundles of hay.” An exasperated Heintzelman responded, “it will be impossible to check every wagon, but cannot something be done to check this?” Heintzelman then placed bridge guards under the direction of the Provost Marshal, rather than from their regiment commanders, to end the confusion about pass enforcement. Wells even uncovered schemes in which soldiers and Alexandria locals cooperated with each other in
the illegal sale of alcohol, as was the case with Captain J.G. Holmes of the 7th Pennsylvania Reserves and the proprietor of the Pennsylvania House hotel.\textsuperscript{167}

Local proprietors felt the pressure of the total ban and vigorously petitioned his command. These petitions and their responses make it clear that the military’s objective was the restoration of army discipline and not the punishment of Alexandria’s citizens. On December 8th, 1862, a committee of “Licensed Liquor Dealers, Proprietors of Hotels and Restaurants” received an answer from Heintzelman which made clear that “when the new convalescent camp is fairly well established we may perhaps make some changes without the serious evils now feared.” Until then, he followed Slough’s recommendation that “it is not advisable now to modify the present orders regarding the sale of intoxicating drinks.”\textsuperscript{168} Mayor McKenzie and others tried again in mid-February 1863, hoping that restrictions “on houses of entertainment” might be relaxed. McKenzie even petitioned the Secretary of War.\textsuperscript{169} J.P.L. Wescott and others simultaneously entreated Heintzelman “to discriminate between establishments which serve the public good and those which do not.”\textsuperscript{170} Heintzelman’s adjutant filed these petitions with the others without any further action.

One month later, a group of “Wholesale and Retail Grocery dealers” attempted a compromise: they asked that the “military order now in force in their city forbidding the sale of Spiritous Liquors either to citizens or soldiers may be so modified as to conform

\textsuperscript{167} W.48, W.49, W.52; Vol. 2; Registers.

\textsuperscript{168} S.213; Vol. 1; Registers.

\textsuperscript{169} M.73; Vol. 2; Registers.

\textsuperscript{170} W.53; Vol. 2; Registers.
to the order now in force in Washington permitting the sale of such merchandise to citizens.” Heintzelman finally relented, allowing on March 17th, 1863, that “it would be judicious and no more than justice to the loyal citizens of Alexandria to modify these regulations.” This response no doubt coincided with another important event near Alexandria. Only one day before, Heintzelman boasted that procedural and administrative changes to the convalescent and distribution camp had reduced its numbers to 2,775 men, a huge drop from the 15,000 reported there in Fall 1862.

Alexandrians’ experience with alcohol typifies a trend in late 1862 and early 1863. As the dispirited Union Army in the East regrouped after a terrible 1862, military leaders realized that they had to wrestle with an unruly and dispirited army. In the Defenses of Washington, where the mission required sedentary duty in an area already known for vice, Union leaders not only had to police a potentially disloyal citizenry, but also their own soldiers. Attempts to curb the “evils” of wanton foraging and alcoholism sometimes caused the tyranny of military discipline to fall directly on civilians. Conversely, soldiers sought to make the best out of inglorious garrison duty by escaping that same tyranny. In so doing, civilian life in the Defenses of Washington became a dangerous game of negotiation and conflict. Some civilians found economic opportunity in supplying soldiers with contraband liquor, but even this connection invited retribution from authorities and even their own patrons. Victims of the military’s presence had little choice but to petition its leaders, but the leaders could offer little protection or

171 M.131; Vol. 2: Registers.
172 B.184, Vol. 1; Registers; M.120; Vol. 2; Registers.
reimbursement. By Spring 1863, the war had no end in sight. Civilians, soldiers, and commanders alike braced for more bloodshed and chaos in the campaigns ahead.
CONCLUSION

IDENTITY IN THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, 1861-1863

The tensions which caused headaches for soldiers, citizens, and military leadership in the Defenses of Washington came from the convergence of conflicting identities. Soldiers stationed there never forgot their status as citizens of a republic of supposed equals. Union volunteer junior officers and enlisted men unused to military life expected the same rights and comforts they enjoyed in peacetime. These included alcohol, representation from their elected officers, and freedom from arbitrary rule. Volunteers’ expectations thus inevitably conflicted with the military discipline imposed by West Point trained professionals. In the words of Newton Martin Curtis, “the free-born American citizen, who had volunteered to save the country, began to ascertain that it could only be done by complying with strict military rules.”1 While military discipline seemed to almost invalidate the war’s vision to protect republican democracy, soldiers transformed from civilians and adapted to the strict military rules.

While this transformation is as crucial in professional armies today, Civil War soldiers came into a service that had a less unified code of behavior. The volunteers of 1861-63 certainly experienced a change when they signed up for service, but a jagged

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and inconsistent notion of soldiers persisted throughout the Union Army.\(^2\) In the words of Hyland Kirk, “It is a little remarkable what a change one’s professions makes in his feelings and motives. Let a steady, quiet citizen once don the military garb, and he becomes reckless, fun-loving, and venturesome to a degree he probably never anticipated.”\(^3\) Soldiers noticed the same effect on their comrades. After the war, Colonel August A. Gibson noted that lapses in discipline were “induced more by the novelty of change and freedom from accustomed restraints, than by inherent disposition to do wrong.”\(^4\) In this way, unauthorized foraging, drinking alcohol, and general anti-heroic behavior became more than just a way to acquire good food or escape the war. They also became socializing forces that affirmed group loyalty. Still others simply brought their peacetime reputation as a “rough” with them to the army, and influenced others to follow. One soldier admitted that “an army collects a great many bad men, and their example here is all the more pernicious, because it has a wider range of liberty to develop itself.”\(^5\) The consequences for adopting this new identity could be quite severe. Soldiers addicted to drink filled postwar asylums; William Benyon Phillips, who spent almost two years in


the Defenses of Washington, suffered an addiction that kept him from his wife and children after the war.\textsuperscript{6} He died in San Francisco at age 35.

Encamped in the Defenses of Washington sometimes for years, soldiers had both time and opportunity to express themselves. Hungry and bored, they naturally looked to the civilians around their camps for relief. The distinctions in regional identity that soldiers drew between themselves and civilians enabled them to rationalize property theft and a general disregard for the latter’s well-being. These distinctions soured relations in the Defenses of Washington more than any other factor. Soldiers assumed that the forts were in a fundamentally suspicious, if not disloyal, region of the country. The journey south from their hometowns involved a visible change in scenery and climate. Once they reached Baltimore, the demeanor of civilians changed, too. Thinking that Washington County was part of Maryland, soldiers assumed that the Defenses of Washington likewise lay in enemy territory. While they did find secessionist activity, they more often encountered pro-slavery Unionism, which to some was an equally hostile outlook. Relations between soldiers and civilians suffered accordingly. Stuck around Washington and hungry for the glory of battle, soldiers’ suppression of local civilians made them feel like they contributed to the war effort.

Despite these conflicting identities, the two parties sometimes bonded through music, food, and alcohol, thus demonstrating the power of human adaptation to

circumstances. Even when soldiers felt that they were amongst southern sympathizers, amiable mingling could reflect their pre-war civilian identities. Away from home, peaceful interactions with civilians simultaneously represented an escape from the war’s privations. Similarly, civilians who catered to soldiers were deflecting the harmful effects of occupation, gaining allies, securing army protection, and often making a profit in the process. In this process, alcohol was an especially potent negotiation point between soldiers and civilians, and a central feature of Civil War soldiers’ communities and identities. Soldiers sought it to reinforce social bonds while escaping homesickness, boredom, and cold weather. Alcohol also lubricated social interactions with civilians, for better and for worse. Around the Defenses of Washington where military-civil contact was frequent, this was especially true. Ironically, both civilian and military authorities regulated alcohol to smooth over poor civil-military relations but like most antebellum American communities, Washington was already debating about alcohol and its ill effects before the thousands of newly arriving soldiers ever brought conflict to the fore. The consequent regulation and eventual prohibition of alcohol around the Defenses of Washington has been, until now, a hidden part of America’s historical relationship with alcohol.

These conflicting identities and priorities made civil-military relations around Washington complex and dangerous. Military authorities recognized the need to regulate these relations because securing their nation’s capital meant security from internal and external enemies. To a population whose Union sympathies might fall prey to Confederate propaganda at any time, civilian uprisings around the Defenses of

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Washington were a very real possibility. Civil War era soldiers neither understood nor controlled these relationships in any practical way; there were no guidebooks. Instead, they adapted in an uncertain atmosphere. Militaries of the twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries have also learned that “war is no longer – if it ever was – a spectator sport. Civilians are active participants in all conflicts, making engagements with civil government, civil society organizations, and community leaders a critical combat function.”

Today the United States military is integrating experimental civil affairs brigades into conflict areas to further the mission by mitigating the damage of occupation. The history of the Defenses of Washington demonstrates the complexity of environments where soldiers and civilians operate in the same space. Continued study of such environments will not only promote mission accomplishment, but teach us to protect service personnel more effectively.

While senior commanders applied army regulations and martial law, some soldiers found answers to the problems of civil affairs through religion. The 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery experienced a change when Reverend Thomas Hunt became chaplain after his predecessor, John Hassler, “did not like the office.” “Father Hunt,” as he became known, brought “tact, common sense, knowledge of human nature, shrewdness, and quick perception” to his duties and wielded great influence over the men. According to Colonel Gibson, Father Hunt’s administration caused “the propensity to forage [to] wholly disappear…drunkenness was a rare occurrence. Passes freely given were seldom violated, and the officers abstained altogether from the exercise of arbitrary

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9 Kilcullen and Lee, “Marine Corps Civil Affairs,” 41.
punishment.”10 Worcester Burrows wrote that his regiment’s chaplain also had a transformative effect: “there has been a great change among our boys. Quite a large number have become serious and have given up swearing (which is almost a universal habit among soldiers).”11 Even if it did not always produce results, spirituality was the best regulation of soldiers’ behavior.

After the period studied here, soldiers got the relief from boredom they earnestly sought. When Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant took control of the Union armies in March 1864, he replenished them with the fresh regiments that had been stationed in the Defenses of Washington. These regiments finally got their chance on the battlefield, but the Overland Campaign and Petersburg produced especially heavy casualties. The 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery suffered one of the highest casualty rates in the Union army.12 Even soldiers tried in courts martial in Washington found opportunities to redeem themselves in combat, such as George Hogg of the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery.13 Arrested several times in the Defenses of Washington, he led charges in the Petersburg campaign that catapulted him to the rank of brevet colonel.

After these regiments left, the forts were garrisoned by a patchwork of short term enlistees and Veteran Corps convalescents too injured or sick to fight in the field. The personnel shifts were untimely. Fresh from victories in the Shenandoah Valley,

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11 S. Worcester Burrows to his sister, Sept 27, 1861, Ms2008-007, Virginia Tech Library.


Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early attacked the forts north of Washington on July 11-12, 1864, focusing on Fort Stevens. Hoping to capture Washington and make the Union sue for peace, Early came close to doing so. The Defenses of Washington command scrambled to assemble the force necessary to repulse the attack; even government clerks were rushed to Fort Stevens. In the end, however, the fort system proved too formidable, even without an adequate garrison. The army kept some garrisoned until 1869, unsure where and when the next threat to the capital might arise.\(^\text{14}\)

The Defenses of Washington completely changed the communities of Washington County. Many families were ruined and attempted to receive compensation from the government after the war. Even in the best cases, families received only a fraction of what was lost, and many sought new lives elsewhere. In their place, new communities sprang up in the shadows of the forts. African-American communities that coalesced around the forts thrive to this day. Adjacent to Fort Reno, the Reno City community flourished for decades until the 1930s, when the government forced residents out to build Woodrow Wilson High School. Some soldiers even returned to the area after the war and put down roots while others organized a Fort Reno reunion in 1890.\(^\text{15}\) The postwar years also saw the continued development of the District of Columbia. Prompted by Washington County’s growth after the war, Congress finally incorporated the county into the city in 1871, creating the Washington, D.C. known today.\(^\text{16}\)


This connection makes the Defenses of Washington an essential element in the District of Columbia’s identity; in studying the former we illuminate the latter. While the clear majority of scholarly work on the Civil War in Washington focuses on Washington as the seat of the Federal government, the war affected people with no connection to the government far more adversely. Just as Washington’s status as the Union capital prompted its growth, so, too, did the forts. Their presence produced a new District-wide consciousness. As the District of Columbia pushes for official recognition as a state under the slogan, “taxation without representation,” the Defenses of Washington also provide a historical foundation for imagining the District as a separate community with its own experience.17

Lastly, this study demonstrates the power our self-identities have over our relations to others. We wear our biases and experiences on our faces; words and actions express them. Soldiers and civilians around Washington were no exception. Their ignorance of each other and intransigence in the face of the national emergency imperiled both and could have brought disaster to the Union cause. If we are to form mutually beneficial relations with our neighbors, we must struggle constantly to understand priorities other than our own. Soldiers and civilians of the twenty-first century, take heed.

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Senior commander’s struggles to control alcohol in Alexandria led to extreme policies that interfered with Alexandria’s local economy. As a result, Alexandria’s experience demonstrates a key dimension of civil affairs in the Defenses of Washington.


The National Republican was Washington’s voice of the Republican platform. It was strongly supportive of the war and did not shy from supporting soldiers who emancipated slaves. While the Star tried to calm local concerns over war aims vis-à-vis emancipation, The National Republican openly boasted of Union camps that hid escaped slaves. Concerning civil-military relations, The National Republican was less critical of the army, but nonetheless reported incidents.


The *Evening Star* was the most popular and representative Washington paper during the Civil War. It’s opinions reflected strong pro-Unionism, but did not endorse the radical Republicanism that sought immediate emancipation. It’s strong support for the war motivated its repeated calls for better discipline by the army.

Greg Taylor private collection


Phillips was a young man living around Philadelphia when he enlisted in the 2nd Pennsylvania. Like many others in his regiment, he grew bored of service around
Washington and took to dodging provost guards, drinking alcohol, and foraging from locals as a way to relieve boredom and fully experience the war.


Phillips’s Civil War service led to his post-war struggle with alcohol. Years of service at Washington, along with captivity and the experience of heavy fighting at Petersburg, Virginia, especially wore on him. His experience around Washington and its effects on him emphasize the physical and psychological danger of service in the seemingly “soft” Washington sector.

Virginia Center for Civil War Studies, Virginia State Polytechnic Institute and State University Library, Blacksburg, Virginia.


Part of company A, 8th Pennsylvania Reserve Regiment, Barnett’s daily entries paint a dull picture of the Defenses of Washington. No doubt part of this comes from Barnett’s obvious piety, as every day is marked as being opened with prayers. Not particularly descriptive, his diary speaks more for what it does not say than what it does. His short descriptions of the weather and his devotions to God are interspersed with the army’s waxing and waning morale. Barnett himself died in Summer 1863 from a shoulder injury received in a skirmish earlier in the year.


Benson’s letters start during his time at the Columbian College Hospital in January 1863. His letters to his sister demonstrate his loneliness as well as the slumping morale of him and other patients in the hospital during this period. Boredom accounted for much of this malaise, as there was “nothing new from one week to another from morning till night nothing but sit and think.”


Three brothers of the Burrows family served in the war in a variety of settings. The oldest, S. Worcester Burrows, served in the 27th New York under Col. Henry Slocum. After first Bull Run, Worcester Burrows and his brigade built a number of fortifications around Alexandria, Virginia. In letters to his parents and sister, he described the positive effects chaplain sermons had on men’s morality, as well as his
disgust at the local population. He stayed around the Defenses until being sent with the rest of the Union Army for the Peninsula Campaign.

Campbell, Donald letters, Ms2003-014. Virginia Center for Civil War Studies Collection. Virginia Tech Library Special Collections, Blacksburg, Virginia.

In a letter to his mother in June 1861, Campbell described the extremely hot weather in D.C. and how some locals were very glad to have them around on account of their good character. Campbell did not have a good impression of the area, calling it “a dismal place.”

Clifton, Allen J., Ms89-072. Virginia Center for Civil War Studies Collection. Virginia Tech Library Special Collections, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Clifton was sent to the convalescent camp near Alexandria, Virginia, and wrote letters while there expressing homesickness and the doctor examinations. In Spring 1863, he wrote about being examined and hoping to be discharged. By Clifton’s time there, much of the inefficiency in triaging patient in the camp had been resolved.


Henry Cole was a member of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteers who helped build forts north of Washington City. Cole wrote to his sister about his squad, local scenery, and his impressions of the farmhouses, which he explicitly compares to “pictures you have seen of the southern farmers house.”

Culver, Joshua W. letters, Ms82-004. Virginia Center for Civil War Studies Collection. Virginia Tech Library Special Collections, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Culver’s letters to his friends and family describe his camp’s location just west of Alexandria and the desolation the war has caused there. Houses and fences were “torn down and….tore to pieces by soldiers.” Culver’s description testifies to the war’s especially hard effects on Northern Virginia communities.


Curwin’s discharge from the service of the 45th Pennsylvania at the convalescent camp in Alexandria came at a time when the Defenses of Washington command established exam boards to determine which patients should be reasonably discharged on a surgeon’s certificate of disability.
French family letters, Ms89-012. Virginia Center for Civil War Studies Collection. Virginia Tech Library Special Collections, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Elias French served in late 1862 in Poolesville as part of P. Stearn Davis and Albert Jewett’s operation in Montgomery County. A member of the 11th New Hampshire Volunteers, he wrote about having pork that belonged to “an old Secesh” whose son had recently been killed at Antietam.

Houck family papers, 1861-1863, Ms2003-014. Virginia Center for Civil War Studies Collection. Virginia Tech Library Special Collections, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Thomas G. Houck served in the 96th Pennsylvania, one of the first regiments to reach Washington in 1861. He describes bivouacking in the Capitol and his disgust at Ellsworth’s Zouaves, whose misbehavior he clearly disapproved. He also described the army’s difficulty in providing uniforms and adequate rations. Later in the war, he reports his regiment getting drunk and fighting in the streets of Washington as well as the army’s poor morale after Fredericksburg.

Lewis, George letters, Ms2012-015. Virginia Center for Civil War Studies Collection. Virginia Tech Library Special Collections, Blacksburg, Virginia.

As a member of the 4th Michigan, Lewis saw action throughout the war in the Army of the Potomac’s biggest battles. His descriptions of the sounds of battle are especially informative and insightful. After Fredericksburg, he reported the wish among many in the army for the war to come to a negotiated end and that “soldiers damn the war.”


Lukens, a soldier in the 3rd New Jersey, wrote to his parents in 1861 about locals and their slaves. The local black population especially always told Northern soldiers what they knew about rebel activity in the area.


Nickerson joined the 2nd Maine Volunteers and camped in Northern Virginia after First Bull Run. His letters describe cutting down trees with a “circle of 4 miles” and his eagerness at Confederate forces trying to attack the forts.

Secrist, Robert letters, Ms91-010. Virginia Center for Civil War Studies Collection. Virginia Tech Library Special Collections, Blacksburg, Virginia.
Writing from “Camp Worth,” somewhere in the Defenses of Washington in April 1862, his letters describe among other scenes of camp, “the great Bloodiest Battle of modern times” at “The Battle of Pittsburg Tennessee.” Aside from this curious allusion to the Battle of Shiloh, Secrist reports to his sister that nearby peaches were close to bloom, and there was a “fine prospect” of having some. Also, he describes the weather getting progressively warmer.


A member of the 2nd Connecticut Light Artillery, Hart served in the Defenses of Washington from October 1862 until his regiment departed for service in Louisiana in mid 1864. He was a keen observer of the army’s morale and the war’s geopolitical implications. He describes troop morale being very connected to rations and to the activities of Confederate partisans in Virginia. He does not reporting drinking and disapproves it, but he described its prevalence in the army. Still, he dodged provost guards regularly in order to visit the city’s sights such as the Capitol, the Patent Office, and the Marshall House where Elmer Ellsworth was killed.


A local militia company, the record book has a page featuring a list of soldiers arrested and for what purpose. The chart of arrests records their actions during their time on provost duty in Washington. All but one of the arrests came as a result of drunkenness.

National Archives

Part 1, Department of Washington; Entry 5364, Letters Received Apr. – Aug. 1861. Record Group 393, U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821 – 1920.

There are a few surviving letters from the early days of the war that describe implications for civil – military relations at the time and going forward. Of particular note is the military’s yet undefined policy towards African – American slaves. Influential citizens, such as Maryland Senator James Carroll, took issue with his choices. Other letters include complains from citizens about soldier’s immaturity with firearms and sanitary habits. Still other communications refer to a conflict and confusion over the new orders about alcohol crossing the Potomac bridges.

While the communication registers provide many glimpses of information, the actual letters themselves will allow for greater detail and thus better analysis. Very few letters involving civil-military relations have survived, but they are telling about the tense atmosphere in Montgomery County, Maryland in early 1863.

Vol. 1 April – August 1861; Part 1, Department of Washington; Entry 5363, Registers of Letters Received; Record Group 393, U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920; National Archives Building, Washington, D.C.

This register recorded communications in the first months of the war. At the time under the command of Joseph Mansfield, the communications give few details on local civil-military relations, but they nonetheless demonstrate the War Department’s difficult time supplying and keeping track of incoming regiments.

Vols. 1-12 Sept. 1862 – Dec. 1865; Part 1, Department of Washington; Entry 5381, Register of Letters Received; Record Group 393, U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821 – 1920; National Archives Building, Washington, D.C.

These communication registers cover the duration of the war from Aug. 1862 and describe in summary the communications received at the Headquarters of the Defense of Washington. They contain materials such as court martials, civil relations, unit reports, and other miscellaneous information that give evidence to the nature of relations between the military authorities, the encamped soldiers, and the civilian population. Individual entries are organized alphanumerically.

SECONDARY SOURCES


Abbot argues that prior to the Civil War, Washington, D.C. had a strong southern imprint. Even post-war development actively tried to do away with D.C.’s southern characteristics. Even today, Washingtonians and visitors alike wonder if it is a Southern or Northern place. The war proved a watershed event in the area’s development, as post-war expansion of the Federal government gave it an economic gravity.

Henry Larcom Abbot served as an aide to General John G. Barnard as well as a commander in the 1st Connecticut Artillery in the Defense of Washington. He had perspectives of the high command and those of the soldiers in the forts North of the Potomac.


Alcohol use was a universal part of the Union army; if soldiers did not participate in it they witnessed others that did. Achenbaum and others demonstrate that alcohol abuse was the leading reason Civil War veterans were admitted to asylums after the war. Many of these soldiers used alcohol in sedentary settings like Washington, some for the very first time. Doctors tried to restrict alcohol access the same way military authorities around Washington did.


The definitive study of medical care in the Union Army, it provides a framework of the medical procedures used in Washington. The city served as the main source of care to soldiers during the war. D.C. became the center of Union medical care, and many soldiers sojourning in Washington stayed as hospital stewards or nurses. The convalescent camp south of Alexandria was one particularly important center of medical care, and its development likewise effected local civil-military relations.


Altenhofel’s study of the Irish women community in D.C. demonstrate how the Defenses of Washington affected Irish women. Their own process of ‘Americanizing’ was fraught with the kinds of identity conflicts soldiers grappled with. Both communities interacted to navigate that process, which included alcohol as a common cause.


Barnard’s 1870 report on the Defenses remains the authority on the fort’s engineering and strategic aspects. Barnard also discusses the topographical and geographic features of the forts’ environment, a crucial component of their strategic placement. Barnard does not shy from discussing the forts impact on the local population, which he characterizes as being quite severe.

Originally the 4th Connecticut, the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery was one of the first infantry regiments converted to heavy artillery service. They camped near Fort Richardson in Virginia. After the Peninsula Campaign, the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery returns to the Tenleytown area near Fort Barnard. Bennett describes foraging during this period and their colonel covering for them when civilians asked for recompense.


Bledsoe examines the Civil War junior officer corps, Lieutenants and Captains. Junior officers commanded companies consisting of up to one hundred men. Companies were the basic social unit of the Civil War. Citizens with no military background made up company leadership at enlistment, so they took their peacetime biases with them. Also enlisted men did not freely tolerate “tyrannical” officers who imposed military discipline. Junior officers faced a daunting task, simultaneously maintaining control over their men and lead them into battle. Particularly during idle times, such as fort duty, junior officers struggled to maintain authority.

Blumin, Stuart M. “Age and Inequality in Antebellum America: The Case of Kingston, New York.” *Social Science History* 6, no. 3 (Summer 1982): 369-379.

Blumin’s community study of Kingston, New York, demonstrates that younger generations in the North earned and shared proportionately less in the 1850s than older generations did. This fact has long been known, but Blumin calls for more local studies to better understand this trend. Men ages 18-25 made up three-quarters of the Union army, and economic motives factored into enlistment and their experience of the war.


Studying Union occupation of a more traditional Southern setting, Browning’s findings mirror many of those here. Eastern North Carolina’s agriculture was more similar to that of the Chesapeake than other cotton-based areas. Browning describes Eastern North Carolinians as predominantly “conditional” unionists. In other words, their loyalties depended on their own circumstances and was fluid. Many around Northern Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia were the same way; not ideologically committed to the Confederacy, they nonetheless could be turned away from Unionism.
Many of the Union regiments serving in the forts were from New York and Pennsylvania. Washington City’s lower class was mostly made of blacks and Irish, and this underbelly actively participated in the local liquor trade. Many Union soldiers were also Irish, a connections that the two groups easily made.


This government sponsored historic study of the Rock Creek Park National Park gives great demographic and economic information about local residents. Rock Creek Park bisects the District of Columbia north-south. Most information survives is about the area’s affluent citizens such as Joshua Pierce and Thomas Blagden, but there is also limited, but revealing, information about Washington County’s less affluent residents such as Jacob Hoyle and James Pilling.

Cameron, Robert S. *Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Perryville, 8 October 1862.* Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, [2003?].

Cameron’s book is the staff ride handbook used by military personnel for the Battle of Perryville. Cameron focuses on the role of officer leadership and logistics as a determining force in the battle’s outcome.


Carelli, et. al argue that Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom yielded to later insurgencies because operations did not take into account pre-existing societal conditions. Civil Affairs then must take into account cultural and societal conditions, including local history, that forces can leverage to prevent disorder, give commanders tools with which to communicate effectively with local leaders, and therefore increase chances for operational success.

Understanding that the war “brutalized” and exposed men to trauma, Civil War physicians and reformers worried about men’s responses. Some physical symptoms were blamed on emotional causes, sometimes labeled “nostalgia.” Lapses in discipline, morality, and general well being were also attributed to this emotional separation from home and its restraining influences.


Colvin’s municipal guide clearly anchors Washington County as a legal associate of Maryland. Justices of the Peace hearing cases in Washington County would have read this guidebook, which was also intended for Maryland.


Conner and Mackowski claim that the winter of 1862 and 1863 was the major turning point for the Union Army in the East. Having suffered a series of defeats, the organizational and cultural changes soldiers experienced prepared them for better results at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg especially. Their premise of that winter being the army’s nadir is more important for this thesis. While the Union winter encampment at Stafford, Virginia, may have undergone changes brought by a change in leadership to Joe Hooker, around Washington the slump in morale effected civil affairs.


Confederate partisans operated outside the range of the Defenses of Washington’s guns, harassing patrols and Union loyalists, capturing pickets and supplies, as well as foraging for food. These operations depended on the support of civilians with information, and some aided men like J.E.B. Stuart and John Singleton Mosby. Soldiers around the Defenses of Washington unable to pinpoint the exact source of information looked angrily to civilians throughout the area. Confederate success in these operations unnerved and undermined civil-military relations.


This guide contains important information about the forts, such as their size, design, locations, and strategic qualities. A great resource for 21st century visitors of the Defenses of Washington, Cooling’s call for more information on the forts provides
primary motivation for this thesis. Owens and Cooling also discuss anecdotes about the fort garrisons.

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Cooling is the one scholar who has devoted most of his work on the subject of Washington, D.C.’s fort system. Symbol inserts the Defenses of Washington into Civil War’s larger military narrative. Classifying it as the “shield” of the Union Army, the forts allowed the rest of the Union Army to maintain an offensive posture. Still, Grant’s call for troops garrisoned in the forts left Washington vulnerable to an attack on July 11-12, 1864. Although Jubal Early’s approach at Fort Stevens scared Washington, Early’s attack petered out after limited action. Other times, Robert E. Lee’s army had opportunities to test the forts, but in the end they avoided confronting the Union at their strongest point. In Cooling’s analysis, the forts served as a powerful Confederate deterrent.

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This essay was Cooling’s first publication on the Defenses of Washington. Its analysis of the forts as an active deterrent serves as the foundation for his later work. Like those publications, this essay gives a wider strategic context for the forts.


Costa and Kahn’s quantitative studies supports the assertion that morale reached one of its lowest points during the winter of 1862-1863, assuming desertions indicate army morale. This study concludes that common group identity within soldiers was a key indicator of morale and discipline. Interestingly, they also conclude that these common identities, and not discipline, were what held the Union Army together. They also note that provost guards were often ineffective precisely because most guards associated more with other soldiers than with superior officers.


Written by a veteran of the Battle of Fort Stevens, William Cox’s narrative also describes the homes that were near Fort Stevens and the names of their tenants.

The 1st Massachusetts was one of the critical regiments to the early construction of the Defenses of Washington. They participated in constructing the forts in northeast D.C. The men there reported on their reactions to Washington and their relations with locals in nearby Bladensburg and the area’s black community.


Newton Curtis served with the 16th New York Volunteers throughout Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. Among his battle stories are accounts of the regiment’s part in planning and building Fort Lyon, a major fortification near Alexandria, Virginia. Curtis also discussed passing through Baltimore, the difficulty men faced in adapting to military discipline, as well as their reactions to the local population. Brigaded under Brigadier General Henry Slocum, Slocum attempted to normalize civil-military relations by punishing foragers.


Stewart Davenport demonstrates three main responses by Northern Christians to the rise of market capitalism and its moral consequences. Ranging from utilitarian support to unequivocal opposition, these responses affected the moral persuasion of what was to become soldiers in the Union army. This book is part of understanding the flavors of the society from which soldiers came.


Community is an important concept to this thesis. Washington’s civil-military conflicts often centered around how groups of civilians, soldiers, and government officials identified themselves. Davis, who sees Civil War winter encampments as laboratories for the social historian, he studies the winter encampment in 1863-64 through the lens of music. In Washington, music also served as a socializing force between soldier and civilian groups.

Originally written for a French audience, de Trobriand started his Civil War service commanding the 55th New York Volunteers. Eventually rising to the rank of Brevet Major General, his first months of service were in the Defenses of Washington near Tenleytown. De Trobriand clearly sympathized with civilians, and gives descriptions of the nuances of local loyalty. One civilian who he grew close to was a strong Unionist, but had a son who enlisted in the rebel army. He and his family was ruined by the war.


The 27th New York camped in Washington City during the early months of the war, participated in First Bull Run, and were later brigaded under Brig. Gen. Henry Slocum. Slocum was the regiment’s original commander. Writing glowingly of their camp at Fort Lyon, from which they could see “the dome of the Capitol rising proudly towards the sky,” they nonetheless frightened civilians with their gun drills. When they, along with other nearby forts, fire their guns to celebrate the New Year in 1862, they frighten the locals into thinking a battle had begun.


While most of this article considers the military justice system of regiments stationed in the Western Theatre, it still is a basis for understanding the basics of the institutions in place for handling court martials elsewhere. Courts-martial evolved over time to adapt to the needs of the army. Focusing on a Minnesota regiment, its relationship to discipline was fluid; it responded to place and circumstances surrounding its command structure. Fitzharris gives credence to the idea that stationary duty led to more frequent lapses in morale and discipline.


Like Harrison, Floyd examines the impact the war had on civilian-military relations in Maryland, particularly Baltimore. Lapses in discipline proved a key point of conflict, as did race relations. Many soldiers reacted adversely to the recruitment of African-Americans, and subsequently blamed them for the war, causing conflicts between Maryland African-Americans.

The 40th New York helped build forts in Northern Virginia. Floyd’s observations include the ecological impact of fort construction; he and many other noted how area forests disappeared almost overnight.


Much like this thesis looks at identity as a source of conflict between soldier and civilian groups, Foote looks at competing definitions of manhood as a source of conflict between soldiers. Some men looked at sobriety, or at least a sense of restraint, as an indication of manhood, while others looked to tolerance to pain, alcohol, and chauvinism as another. These conflicts clearly played out in the Defenses of Washington as well. Attitudes towards confrontation also informed these divisions, as defending ones’ honor was important to Civil War soldiers, which no doubt led to conflicts between soldiers and civilians as well.


In a similar vein to *North Over South*, *A Southern Odyssey* looks at southern antebellum attitudes towards the North. In the process, the general tenants of southern opposition to “Yankeeism” comes through. These interacted with the experience of the presence of Union soldiers to create a dangerous atmosphere.


If the existence of the large encampment around Washington is to be understood as an occupation, then analyses of other occupations in the Confederate South provides context and reference points. Chattanooga’s occupation mirrored Washington’s in the sense that Union occupiers distinguished between loyal and disloyal citizens and that Chattanooga attracted large numbers of refugees.


*North Over South* contributes how soldiers’ upbringing affected pre-conceived biases. read as they grew up before the war. Especially for the younger generation of educated students who read accounts of southern backwardness, these colored their perceptions of what they saw. Since most associated Washington County with the South, these biases went with them to encampment around the city. Negative reactions by civilians would have only reinforced and strengthened these biases.
Green provides a narrative of the District of Columbia that includes Washington County’s inclusion into the city’s government. Early Americans first envisioned the District’s development as a natural extension of water commerce. Economic development stalled in Washington, leaving city’s rural outskirts an awkwardly undeveloped territory. Congress even considered ceding Washington Country back to Maryland, but always kept the county under their control. This ambiguous status confused soldiers, which assumed the area’s inherently Southern loyalty.


George Perkins’s battery served in the Defenses of Washington twice during the course of the war, first in 1861 and a second time in 1864. To see how the encampment experience evolved, especially after experiencing the front, will be of value towards understanding the actions of soldiers in the different environment around Washington.


Also called “Conklin’s Rifles,” the 97th New York Volunteers spent time in the Defenses of Washington on two occasions, late 1861 and also after Second Bull Run. While on duty at Forts Corcoran, Woodbury, and Bennet, officers struggled to contain contraband liquor. Hall points out how women especially smuggled it into camp.


One of the thirteen regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, they spent 1861 and early 1862 around Tenleytown. Hardin goes into little detail, but does discuss how the sale of alcohol and other items was forbidden in their camps by their commanding officer.


Harrison’s article provides the kind of perspective this thesis employs. Specifically, it demonstrates how civilians and soldiers could interact when forced to live and operate in close proximity. Fairfax County was particular hard hit, as it was an active
seat of partisan warfare through the Civil War’s duration. This article focuses on the first year of the war. Harrison also looks at the political loyalties of Fairfax and Alexandria counties. In contrast to many expectations, Alexandria was considerably more pro-Union than the rest of the state.


This work gives a foundation upon which to understand the frontier aspects of the place in which the soldiers camped and spent most of their time. Fort Gaines and Fort Pennsylvania (later called Fort Reno), were near Tenleytown, which at the time of the war encompassed the area along the Rockville Pike (now Wisconsin Avenue). The book lists details about local citizens during the war that will help conceptualize the environment and how interactions took place. Helm describes a couple of sides of the civil-military aspect in Tenleytown, such as the conflicts and compromises made between them.


The 86th New York Volunteer regiment spent most of 1861 and 1862 encamped in the Defenses of Washington on the Virginia side of the Potomac River. The letters contained within this book discuss the boredom and anxiety associated with prolonged encampment, a very common complaint among those encamped in the “soft” environments of the Defenses of Washington.


Mentioning very little in the way of details about life in the forts, the 17th Maine Volunteers spent the first few months of their service stationed throughout the Defenses south of the Potomac. This history notes their basic schedule and that there was little excitement for them. This in some way serves to demonstrate the priorities of the soldiers, particularly those early in their war service; specifically they desired to see the enemy and war up close. Either real or imagined, civilians often took the form of that enemy.


The 7th Massachusetts also constructed forts in Washington County. Specifically, they built Forts Stevens and Slocum. In addition to these duties, they also sent guard
details to Long Bridge and seized Captain Charles Griffith’s stash of liquor, resulting in confusion and frustration from Griffith. Their regiment history also discusses the hard and uncomfortable work of fatigue duty.


This recent article justifies historic preservation as a forum for studies in leadership, tactics, and logistics. Present day service personnel visit battlefields where National Park Service employees or scholars give tours that bridge the gap between historical and modern warfare. This thesis argues that the Defenses of Washington are perhaps the best avenue for modern soldiers to learn the complexities of 21st century warfare.


Kilcullen describes the activities and outcomes of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade in Central America and the Philippines. Kilcullen’s observations are that the distinction between combatant and non-combatant no longer apply, if they ever actually existed. In order to protect service personnel and ensure success, Marine operations oversees should engage with civil authorities and citizens to leverage relationships. This thesis looks at civil-military relations around Washington and what effected the social processes between the two groups. Kilcullen and Lee call for greater cooperation between academia and business groups to find solutions to civil-military conflicts.


The 4th New York Heavy Artillery served more than half of its service in the Defenses of Washington in both Virginia and Washington County. Their history discusses their life in the forts at length. Kirk especially highlights their ‘anti-hero’ identity and focuses on the members’ troublemaking. Although Kirk and the members letters he drew from highlights this aspect, he also discusses command’s reactions to it.


This diary serves as a window into the world of those who lives on occupied land. The experience in Virginia was especially dangerous, as troops vied for control with Confederate partisans. These small scale conflicts frustrated the Defenses of Washington
command throughout the war. Frobel was decidedly secessionist, but her diary demonstrates how civilians were stuck between the two forces, regardless of loyalty.


*Civil War Washington* encompasses the digitization project headed by Susan Lawrence and Kenneth Winkle to digitize Civil War information for Washington, D.C. Their scope lies in medical and African-American history, with a special emphasis on Walt Whitman in D.C. Winkle contributes an essay that analyzes the compensated emancipation records after the Compensated Emancipation Act of 1862. Only comprising about a quarter of the District’s land area, the city contained about two-thirds of its slaves.


Leech’s work in *Reveille in Washington*, along with Winkle’s *Lincoln’s Citadel*, are the most popular books on the Civil War’s effect on Washington. Like most similar works, however, the narrative is purely focused on the city and only barely mentions the Defenses of Washington or Washington County. Winkle, in particular, relies heavily on Leech.


This is a remarkably detailed account of the 34th Massachusetts Volunteers service within the Defenses of Washington, which lasted from 1862 – 1864 in the forts South of the Potomac. It details much in the way of discipline and morale and details the peculiar relationship between the enlisted men and their commanders. It seems from this account that the enlisted men carried their own solidarity in spite of their commanders, serving to remind the readers that the distinction between a civilian and soldierly identity in the army was not as distinct as it was idealized to be within the command structure.


Little argues that as of 2013, Army Civil Affairs units have not been effectively integrated into operational environments. Inefficient deployment, poor recruitment strategies, tribalism amongst different Civil Affairs divisions, and inconsistent training approaches means that not only are Civil Affairs units not where they need to be in the field, but when they are deployed they’re not even acting in a Civil Affairs capacity. Studying the Defenses of Washington can be one way to consolidate training.
Lipson, Jeffrey P. “Civil Reconnaissance and the Role of Civil Affairs.” *Marine Corps Gazette* 100, no. 9 (Jan 2016): 76-78.

Lipson discusses the importance of maintaining regular contact and understanding of local affairs in order to anticipate local dynamics and potential for conflict. Noting that “there is no longer such thing as ‘the enemy,’” his conclusions resonate with dynamics around Washington. While not intrinsically hostile, failure to provide coping mechanisms for locals affected by fort construction and garrisons led to civil-military tensions. Simultaneously, Lipson would likely point to Union soldiers’ reliance on intelligence gathered by local Africa-Americans as an ideal way to create local alliances.


In addition to Washington’s many bars, its many brothels concerned military and civilians authorities. Although the Provost Marshal was supposed to suppress these, they catalogued and regulated them according to cleanliness and overall “quality.”


Lowry utilizes his ten-year cataloguing of Civil War courts martial to examine the relationship between Irish and German ethnicity and alcohol. By using “American” regiments as a control, he shows that Irish courts martial are most proportionally related to alcohol, followed by German and American. Although his methodology is questionable, Lowry still gives anecdotal evidence of soldiers on trial for drunken behavior. Also, he gives further evidence of the relationship between sedentary duty and an increase in this behavior.


Any discussion about the relations between civilians and soldiers and Washington, D.C. will include the experiences of both free blacks and escaped slaves who have always carried the historical term “contraband.” Masur’s work is a recent treatment of African – American rights in Washington. Considering this book’s emphasis on the political efforts, it will give a framework and perspective on my own research into the black experience around the forts.

This book provides the closes secondary work to the approach used in this thesis. Mauro demonstrates that Fairfax County, Virginia, particularly felt the ravages of being caught in between Union and Confederate forces. The same could be said for elsewhere within the sphere of the Defenses of Washington, but the conflicts were more local in nature and away from the seat of war.


Composed of men from Long Island, the regiment encamped in the forts in Northern Virginia such as Ethan Allen, Albany, and Ward. There, they cut large swaths of timber to clear firing lanes. McGrath also mentions foraging from people who claimed to be loyal. Once their commanding officer, Col. William Gurney, found out, he made the soldiers pay for stolen sheep. Interestingly, McGrath gives great detail on the weather patterns for late 1862 and early 1863, a period marked by frequent and severe snowstorms.


McPherson’s narrative provides a military context to the Defenses of Washington. Civil War battles effected responses out of Washington and therefore determined command’s shuffling of men and resources.


Miller wrote this book around the same time of *Symbol, Sword, and Shield* and contains mostly the same information. The photographs within the book show the forts in their state of preservation in 1976. The most important contribution from this book is the detailed archival maps showing the locations of the forts and nearby homesteads.


Mills’ described in detail the minds of the men as they passed through Baltimore as well as the war’s effect on the local population. In contrast to many other soldiers, Mills takes a sympathetic stance, understanding that civilians faced enormous and impossible pressures from both sides of the war. Still, he discussed his own participation in foraging.

Minkoff’s dissertation examines archaeological studies of the contraband community that settled near the site of Fort Ward outside Alexandria, Virginia. Other African-American communities sprang up near fort sites that became center of African-American life in D.C. after the Civil War. Many of these faced destruction because of the District’s rapid urban expansion in the early twentieth century.


Mitchell draws from newspapers, letters, and diaries to give reactions by Marylanders to the war. Mitchell’s description of the state’s political contours are especially helpful. Like Washington City and County, and Alexandria County, Maryland contained active secessionist elements, but their loyalty to the Union was not ephemeral; Marylanders generally opposed emancipation and property confiscation, but also rejected secessionism.


This book discusses the psychic world of Union and Confederate soldiers. Soldiers pre-war biases, the experience of the war, and how soldiers changed from their pre-war identities contextualize their approaches to civil-military relations.


The Union Provost Marshal system sprang from the troubles experienced in Washington before First Bull Run. Col. Andrew Porter was the first Provost Marshal of the Union Army, and used Regular and volunteer detachments as provost guards. Among their many duties was the suppression of bars, drinking, and bad soldiers behavior.


One of this thesis’s contributions is to the historical identity of the District of Columbia. Citizens of the District push Congress for representation equal to that of other states, and the Civil War was a watershed moment for the distinct consciousness of the area.
The 117th New York arrived in Tenleytown in September 1862, where they built new Forts like Forts Ripley and Alexander near the Washington Reservoir. Like others stuck on duty in Washington, they loathed its “semi-military” character. Mowris also discusses relations with local African-Americans, who he clearly viewed with curiosity. He describes the people around Tenleytown as mild unionists, which is not a compliment. Interestingly, he notes that some families had mixed loyalties; one of the strongest Unionists had daughters which clearly resented the Union cause.

Nelson and Sheriff’s work looks at the relationship between civilian life during the Civil War. The Civil War sundered civilian life in the field and on the home front. It transformed gender and moral expectations, and the attraction of immoral behavior was strong during the war. This was especially true for Washington where soldiers had relatively easy access to Washington’s many temptations.

Along with the 1st and 7th Massachusetts, the 10th helped build forts in north and northeast D.C. Newell notes with insight how regiment handled the debate over emancipation, but he admits that most were strongly against it. This led to revealing conflicts with locals. Newell seems to value the more sober minded version of soldiering, admitting that soldiers foraged and clashed with locals, they did not endorse drunkenness.

Much like Washington, nearby Silver Spring, Maryland, experienced occupation. Located within sight of the District-Maryland border, Silver Spring was home of the influential Blair family, who used their government connections on behalf of adversely affected civilians.

This thesis approaches civil-military relations from the viewpoint of soldiers and civilians, not from military and civilian authorities. This article, while mostly concerned
with the latter, does mention the importance of modern military officers understanding the importance of ground level civil-military relations.


Like Winkle, Ozer looks at the Civil War’s transformative effect on Washington, D.C. The Federal governments wartime expansion brought a plethora of economic activity to Washington. Washington also became the “seat of memory,” as bold equestrians began to dot the city’s traffic circles.


Pessen’s classic work on the differences and similarities of northern and southern people lend context to how the two sides saw each other. The economic differences between them, even from a quantitative perspective, were negligible during the 1850s. Farming was still the primary occupation in both areas. Pessen even argues they had more in common than different. This is a crucial part of this thesis’s analysis of the relationships forged between civilians and soldiers. Many of the latter viewed the former with a disdain formed from perceptions of regional identity and loyalty.


Christopher Phillips examines how the war transformed the political identities of jurist and politician William Barclay Napton. Although living in Missouri, its clear that civilians living in border states faced hard realities as the result of occupation and nearby battles. Even though Napton was born in Princeton, NJ, he slowly adopts the social and political identity of a “Southerner” because of his evolving ideas about the righteousness of the Southern cause. Some Washingtonians who were adversely affected by the Defenses of Washington underwent similar transformations.


Horses, in particular their traffic and theft, feature prominently in the narrative of civil-military relations around Civil War Washington. The perspective of this article describes the social and biological characteristics of horses and their various connections to the Civil War. The relative inability of Union soldiers to properly care for horses led to high attrition rates, leading to more frequent need.

Piper’s dissertation reflects this thesis’ assertion that studying the complex nature of the Civil War can give insight into modern conflicts. In both, determining loyalty was a crucial task of military operations in areas whose loyalty was critical. Piper looks mostly to the realm of civil-military relations, typically a field that examines the interplay between top government structures. This thesis looks mostly to the lowest level of this interplay, in other words, how individual soldiers and civilians responded to each other on a daily basis. Still, Piper asserts the importance of civil-military relations “on all levels” in complex warfare.


The Ninth New York Heavy Artillery originally signed up as the 138th New York in September 1862, in response to the emergency after Second Bull Run. Using the influence of its commanding officer, William H. Seward, Jr., it transformed into a heavy artillery regiment to stay in permanent detail in the Defenses of Washington. Raised from older farmers from upstate New York, the regiment history speaks little of the “sins of the camp life” that other histories do. Still, it speaks condescendingly of locals. The different attitudes taken towards their service provide a contrast to others who more embrace the “anti-hero” character.


Roemer’s company of state militia enlisted in the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery in 1861. Like most regiments, they first tasted military life upon their arrival in Washington. Roemer’s narrative is very sober; it focuses almost exclusively on his battery’s efficiency. He also condescends Washington’s streets and general appearance.


Originally the 18th Maine infantry, the regiment became the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery in June 1862. They spent most of their Defenses of Washington service in the forts near Chain Bridge in Washington County. Spending almost two full years in the forts, they formed relationships with the households around them. Interestingly, Shaw talks at length about the regiments relationship with Edmund Brooke and his daughters, who are described as southern belles. Upon arriving in D.C., the men heard many stories about civilians trying to kill soldiers through nefarious means.

“Scotts 900” cavalry features prominently in the registers, in particular for a string of operations in Maryland just outside the forts range. These operations were part of an emergency response to an incident involving abandoned stores that Confederate raiders captured in November 1862. Members also discuss their experiences as provost guards around Washington and in their interactions with locals. A healthy economy in selling foodstuffs and alcohol to soldiers existed, with some efforts on the part of their commanders to stop control it.

Spicer, William A. *History Of The Ninth and Tenth Regiments Rhode Island Volunteers, And The Tenth Rhode Island Battery, In The Union Army In 1862.* Providence, RI: Snow & Farnham, 1892.

Mostly composed of Brown University students, these Rhode Island regiments responded to the Secretary of War’s emergency call to protect Washington after Banks’s defeat in the Shenandoah in May 1862. Originally a three-month regiment, their service was of a different character than other regiments. Like most regiment histories, the narrative consists of original letters and diaries. The regiment spoke most positively about freedmen in the forts east of the Anacostia river and most negatively of the inhabitants of Tenleytown, reflecting their New England origins.


Alcohol and its regulation played an important role in the lives of soldiers and civilians around the Defenses of Washington. This thesis argues that its regulation was a hidden victory for the reform movement, and one which the historiography does not recognize. This particular article shows how the temperance movement affected rural mountain communities, giving a point of reference for how people experienced it in the years before the war.


One of the first regiments in D.C., their history discusses getting bored of duty in Washington in Summer 1861. Swinton also records one soldier’s reaction to Ellsworth murder, comparing it to the blood spilled in Baltimore, connecting the two events.

The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was a huge organization of thirteen Pennsylvania regiments that served in northwest D.C. in 1861 and 1862, while Massachusetts and Rhode Island soldiers composed most of the soldiers in northeast. The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps built Forts Pennsylvania (later Reno), Bayard, among others.


The high prices charged by Civil War sutlers caused many cash-strapped soldiers to look elsewhere for goods. This was especially true in 1862 when Union soldiers went many months without pay. Additionally, sutlers’ poor reputation made them a target, as attested by government documents from Washington that commented on the relationship between sutlers’ complaints and drunk soldiers.


Murrell especially examines how border state families, including Virginians, coped with the war where family loyalties were split between union and secession. Observers noticed that in border states, including the District of Columbia, treason and loyalty overlapped. Divided families attempted to maintain filial ties, raising the suspicion of both sides. The Confederacy and Union alike regulated mail and traffic across lines. Around Washington, soldiers looked suspiciously at divided families, and possession of mail from secessionist sympathizers was very dangerous.


Captain George Hogg typifies the kind of “rough” found around the Defenses of Washington. Serving in Forts Woodbury and Corcoran, he shows up a few times in courts martial records for corruption, striking men in his regiment, and drunkenness. Hogg was dishonorably discharged, but the Union Army’s manpower needs meant he reenlisted in the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery before the regiment participated in action around Petersburg. Ironically, he earned distinctions and a promotion to Major and later brevet Colonel. After hearing of Lee’s surrender, he was charged for going on a drinking spree in Alexandria.

Thomas III, Nash, and Shepard look at Civil War Alexandria as an “interstitial zone” between the home and battle fronts. Soldiers became sick in the unfamiliar territory and vast amounts of material flowed through Alexandria. This thesis also looks at the Defenses of Washington as a North/South nexus that produced interesting results for relations between civilians and soldiers.


Tindall’s narrative is full of details on the gradual evolution of the District from sparsely developed to a thriving city. He barely mentions Washington County before 1870. Still, he provides census information that included both Washington County and City and Georgetown.


While *Origin and Government* barely mentions Washington County, his only mention of its in *Synopsis and Government* is that presidentially appointed levy courts handled daily affairs there. Congress legislated this arrangement in 1801 “to manage the local affairs in part of the District outside Washington and Georgetown.” Congress flirted with ceding that part of D.C. back to Maryland, but kept this arrangement until 1870.


This “historic resource study” outlines the official historiography used by the National Park Service to give tours and visitor programs. It gives some mention to civilians who lived in the area, but mostly focuses on the Battle of Fort Stevens and technical details outlined in Cooling’s work.


The *Official Records* are the standard source for original communications sources from the war. Interestingly, none of the volumes treat Washington as a field of operations. Instead, what few materials the editors preserved for them are found with the volumes about operations in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. Where they do
include Washington based information, it comes in the form of general orders about changes in command and other miscellaneous items. The lack of material is telling of their priorities.


Another infantry regiment turned to heavy artillery, the 19th Connecticut did not react better to than most other regiments. Vaill labors to paint the regiment as an especially upright organization that local Alexandrians welcomed as their moral saviors, but Vaill also makes clear the regiment drank often. They didn’t feel positive about the locals either.


The 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery represented another infantry regiment that the War Department redesignated to serve semi-permanently in the Defenses of Washington north of the city. Ward also discusses the regiment’s difficult early months in the forts; poor discipline reigned during Summer 1862. When a new colonel, A.A. Gibson, assumed command, discipline improved. Most interesting are Ward’s descriptions of relations with locals. According to him, soldiers regularly socialized with locals, “even if they were secesh.”


Generals such as S.P. Heintzelman, J.P. Slough, and Joseph K. Mansfield served in command of various parts of the Defense of Washington. As such, they made important decisions that at least attempted to command local civil-military relations. This book will serve as an introduction to these lesser-known figures of the Civil War and the trajectory of their careers.


Women on the Confederate home front grappled with Union occupation the same way Washingtonians did.; their circumstances reflected their responses. If Union soldiers gave them trouble, they complained to whatever they authority they could. These responses won few allies within Union regiments.

Wiley’s work is the standard for understanding the lives of Union soldiers during the war. Wiley shows that they defy generalization, but a few constants remained in their material and social condition. Here, these observations contribute a reference point for understanding how soldiers in the Defenses of Washington lived and saw themselves.


Similar in scope to *Life of Billy Yank*, Wiley comments on the lives of Confederate soldiers. Very similar attitudes and predilections united the enlisted men of the opposing sides, although the peculiar circumstances of each government dictated the course of their material lives. This work provides more reference points to understand the challenges, attitudes, and therefore, everyday life for soldiers around Washington.


Chaplains were involved in administering spiritual authority to the soldiers, with sometimes interesting consequences for the well-being of a unit. This text is an introduction to the world of Civil War chaplains and where and how they delivered that authority. The 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery in particular reported the positive benefit of a new chaplain towards unit discipline, while the registers report on chaplains causing trouble for other units.


The 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery was raised primarily around Philadelphia. Williams barely mentions their service in Washington, but discusses their action in the Petersburg campaigns. Converted back to infantry, they led attacks that led to huge casualties. In fact, the 2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery total battle losses were among the highest of any Union regiment. The regiment had three different colonels: Charles Angeroth resigned soon after coming to Washington due to inefficiency, and his replacement, the well respected Augustus A. Gibson, was relieved for unclear reasons. Col. S.D. Strawbridge finished the war commanding the regiment.


Winkle’s work represents the most original recent work on the Civil War in Washington, D.C. It mostly draws from secondary works and local D.C. newspapers. Kenneth Winkle also worked on the Civil War Washington digital project, which focuses
on documents from medical and racial perspectives. Much of Lincoln’s Citadel does the same but also with a viewpoint from the Lincoln administration. It also focuses purely on the urban portion of the District of Columbia and gives little mention of the forts and their impact on the area. While not a weakness in Winkle’s narrative, it does provide opportunities to study the dynamics of the countryside of the District and Virginia.


The 2nd Rhode Island, along with a brigade under Darius Couch’s command constructed forts in northeast D.C. such as Fort Slocum, which the regiment named after their fallen commander, John S. Slocum. While mostly silent on their relationship with locals, it is clear they felt 1861 and early 1862 was quiet and boring. They did not particularly enjoy duty in the Defenses of Washington.


In contrast to Hardin and other writers of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corp, Woodward writes more loosely on the Reserve Corps experiences. Like other regiment history, he discusses the regiment’s reactions to Baltimore and alcohol. Regarding the latter, Col. Horatio Sickel forbade it, but it still wound its way into camp. Col. Sickel also forbade other activities which he felt detracted from discipline and morality, but apparently failed.