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THE EDUCATIONAL LEADER



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THE EDUCATIONAL LEADER

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Foreword

THE Great Issues Lectures have been an annual event at Kansas State Teachers College, Pittsburg, since the fall of 1948. For these lectures it has been customary to have one or more speakers from the social science staff of this college and several visiting lecturers. This number of THE EDUCATIONAL LEADER is devoted to the ninth in the series.

Dr. Alvin H. Proctor, who has written the introductory essay to the current series, "Great Issues for Contemporary Man," is Professor of Political Science and History, Head of the Social Science Department at Kansas State Teachers College, and Ford Faculty Fellow (1954-'55).

The first lecture of the present series, "Wilson, Roosevelt, and Eisenhower, Three Approaches to Leadership," was given by a visiting lecturer, Dr. James MacGregor Burns. Doctor Burns is Professor of Political Science at Williams College and author of *Government by the People*; *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox*; and many articles.

Dr. Glyndon Van Deusen, "Presidential Leadership and Andrew Jackson," is Professor of History and Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Rochester. He is the author of *The Life of Henry Clay*; *Thurlow Weed, Wizard of the Lobby*; and *Horace Greeley, Nineteenth Century Crusader*.

The third lecture of this ninth series, "Religion in Twentieth Century America," was given by Dr. T. William Hall, Professor of Religious Philosophy at Denver University. Doctor Hall was former Director of Religious Activities at Kansas State Teachers College and a former Danforth Fellow.

The concluding lecture, "Automation in the Twentieth Century," was given by Dr. Charles J. Dellesega, Associate Professor of Economics, Kansas State Teachers College, and Fellow for the Foundation for Economic Education (1955).

Great Issues for Contemporary Man

By ALVIN H. PROCTOR

This is a difficult century for contemporary man. For many individuals no century is ever an easy one in which to live, but for nations, races, and social classes certain centuries have been at least easier than others. The turbulence and increasing complexity of events have made the twentieth century thus far difficult.

On the one hand, contemporary man has invented, achieved, and aspired as if he were a child of God. He has invented the United Nations, achieved atomic energy, and has aspired to peace and abundance for all.

On the other, he has acted as if he were the devil's disciple. He has racked himself with war, writhed under revolutions and dictatorships, and has endured the grubby agonies of irrational depressions frequently since 1900. He must, moreover, live in a contemporary world which includes both advanced scientific and industrial civilizations and others yet in the stone age, with a thousand variants and blends in between them.

The social scientist is necessarily a part of all of this. He is both scientist and citizen and must be credited with both great achievements and great failures. What will his role be in the next half century? Will he help direct and shape events, using the tools of research and teaching, or will he passively record man's greatness and tragedy?

The Great Issues Lectures are part of an attempt by social scientists and historians in this college consciously and deliberately to help make history. They believe that they can help shape the future in two ways: first, as scholars they must scientifically study man in all areas of their disciplines and communicate with other scholars everywhere. Second, they must as responsible scholars present their data and conclusions not merely in the classrooms but wherever the free market place of ideas affords them a hearing. Only thus can they contribute to the solution of contemporary man's great problems. Only thus can social science throw light on the great issues and help create a climate of opinion which will enable us to act rationally.

What is a "great issue"? What are the great issues which perplex contemporary man? What must he do to be saved—from himself?

The best definition was given by Archibald MacLeish who formulated it for Dartmouth College when they established the senior course in "Great Issues."¹ MacLeish defined a great issue as one which has historical depth, current timeliness, and projection into the future. One can readily use this yardstick to point to some of the great issues in this century.

For example, to understand and control the great force of nationalism is one great issue with which man must struggle. This ism permeates national and international life at all levels. The Girard case which recently involved the United States and Japan is one facet of the recurring clashes of Asiatic and Western nationalism. There is no place on the globe free from this virus.

The wars of this century were above all products of unrestrained nationalism. Sidney B. Fay of Harvard in his classic statement in 1929 of the underlying causes of war pointed to this problem with a two-volume study of *The Origins of the World War*. The phrase in the title, "the World War," seemed to infer an optimistic belief in man's ability to learn from tragedy that World War II, the Cold War, and Korea seem to belie.

Nationalism pervades trade relations, vitiates efforts to strengthen the United Nations, and sparks revolts like that of the Hungarians. Because of the continued impact of nationalism, James Reston of the *New York Times* recently forecast a major war between the U. S. S. R. and Communist China and the resurgence of the German and Japanese "problems."² Few social scientists would scoff at his predictions. Here is clearly a great issue—one on which public attention and understanding around the world must be focused.

Conversely, if man is to leave the wilderness of jungle nationalism for the wider reaches of international law, order, and justice, another great issue demanding much research and educational attention is the yet embryonic movement in this century toward amicable internationalism. Hugo Grotius pioneered the movement for international law and justice centuries ago, but his vision was premature. Such international organizations as were provided by medieval religion and empire fell before the rising tide of nationalism as Europe rose to the apogee of its power in 1914.

Political and military nationalism has not yet run its course as new nations continue to be born, each clamoring for traditional

1. Arthur M. Wilson, "The Great Issues Course at Dartmouth," *Journal of Higher Education*, XXV (May, 1954), 232.

2. *New York Times*, June 9, 1957.

sovereign rights and powers. However, a new internationalism has been conceived and advanced in our time by men like Smuts, Wilson, Roosevelt, Romulo, and others. If one believes, as he must, *that what man can conceive he can one day achieve*, then the social scientist can be certain that eventually law, order, and justice will triumph among nations. This will not, however, happen inevitably or accidentally, and the task of the social scientist is to study and solve many problems related to the main objective, presenting those solutions (if they may be called that) in the classrooms and other free market places of ideas.

The task far surpasses the resources of manpower, money, and facilities allocated to it in the United States. Fear of the intellectuals falls heaviest on the social scientists, even though natural scientists have been more generally the victims in the Congressional arenas of the Communist witch-hunters during the Cold War. Because the social scientist must always deal mainly with human relations, no matter what other factors are involved in his research, he must inevitably be the center of controversy. The social scientist seems naturally averse to injustice of every kind, a fact which often involves him in dispute with the status quo.

Nevertheless, if contemporary man is to be lifted to new levels of perception and aspiration in dealing with his problems, social science must deal with *great issues*—not with sterile, insignificant problems. Research must probe and state the social consequences of science and technology; must study the impact of urbanization on traditional American democracy; must study such questions as the use of governmental power and the distribution of power in government, etc.

Justice Felix Frankfurter stated it well when he wrote a decision in the case of Prof. Paul M. Sweezy versus the State of New Hampshire: "The concern of its [university] scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself."

Their proper tasks will not be carried out by social scientists who are timorous and hesitant as they confront the great issues of this difficult century, for the "superior agents" of civilization are "the social thinkers striking new sparks from established facts."³ They must do their research well and then present it equally well to the public, for it is the public in this democracy which will make all final decisions.

3. A. A. Berle, Jr., "The Democratic Future," *Saturday Review*, January 22, 1955, p. 48.

In this issue of THE EDUCATIONAL LEADER, a political scientist, a historian, an economist, and a religious philosopher join forces to examine contemporary man and to participate in his education. This is that sound idea of interdisciplinary research and co-operation so graphically demanded this year by an able economist, Edwin E. Witte.⁴ Thus can we strengthen contemporary man when, as a child of God, he contends against his baser self to achieve that which he can conceive—a free, prosperous, and just world.

4. "Economics and Public Policy," *American Economic Review*, XLVII (March, 1957), 14.

Wilson, Roosevelt, and Eisenhower

Three Approaches to Leadership

By JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS

Our discussion tonight concerns Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Obviously this could be the subject of a four-year curriculum rather than an hour's lecture, and I will take a problem that runs through the lives of these three men and through the history and destiny of our country. This is the problem of political leadership in general, and in particular the problem of how the man of thought can cling to and advance his principles when he leaves his ivory tower and moves into the dust and tumult of the political arena. While I shall discuss this problem in relation to Roosevelt and Eisenhower as well as Wilson, I shall concentrate on the latter because he is the pre-eminent example of the man leaving the more or less cloistered life of the scholar and thrusting himself into the field of action, and as such, he is both a challenge and a warning for all men of thought in all places of learning.

I have described this as a problem of political leadership; it is also a problem that takes on three other dimensions. In a narrow sense, it is a problem of politics and government—involving the question of the possibilities and limitations affecting the presidency as an office, and the man in the White House. Hence it is a problem with us today, and with us at any time, whenever we turn to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue for action and leadership. In the second place, and more fundamentally, the problem of political leadership is a problem of understanding, of intellectual comprehension, of one's attitude toward history. For it is based on the deeper question whether there is an order or meaning in history. Isaiah Berlin, in his brilliant essay, *The Hedgehog and the Fox*, has remarked that one of the deepest differences, deepest chasms, between thinkers in particular and all human beings in general, lies between those who on one side relate everything to a single central vision and those who pursue many ends, often contradictory ends—that is to say, between those on the one hand who think in terms of one vision or organizing principle, to which they relate all their ideas and perhaps all their actions, and those on the other hand who lead lives and think thoughts that are fragmentary, hit-or-miss scattered,

and diffused. The latter, says Berlin, is the fox, who knows many little things, but the former—that is, the person who thinks and acts by one central code, be it Christianity, or Marxism, or whatever else—is like the hedgehog, who knows one big thing. Clearly the believer or practitioner of political leadership is closer to the hedgehog, because he conceives that the leader can organize thought and action, that the leader can make a difference. For if life is just a collection of odd, unrelated happenings, or if it is just a stream of billions of tiny events, like Ol' Man River it will just keep rolling along, and there is nothing we can do about it; but if events can be changed, or at least controlled or channeled or guided, then mankind, through its leaders, and acting on some basic organizing principle or outlook, can manage events, can control their environments.

And from what I have just said you can see that this problem of political leadership in its ultimate sense is also one of control as well as understanding; if we can understand the stream of events, if there is some order and sense to them, then we can perhaps control them; we cannot stop Ol' Man River, but we can build levees and deepen channels, and perhaps even plan a whole river valley.

So much for the general setting of the problem—let us turn to the matter of how Woodrow Wilson approached it. Wilson, as I said, is a most interesting person to study because he had emphatic ideas about political and presidential leadership as a student of government, long before he entered political life. He summed his ideas up in a lecture that he gave several times during the 1890's, when he was teaching at Princeton University. This lecture was called "Leaders of Men." Wilson never published this lecture; indeed it was not published until just a few years ago. The man who edited the published book believes that Wilson kept the essay from publication because he shrank from revealing so much of the inner struggle that it embodied—his inner struggle over the perils awaiting a "leader of thought" who sought to move from the library to the political lists, who sought to become the true leader, the thinking man of action.

What did Wilson have to say about leadership before he himself became a leader? He advanced a brilliant description of political leadership—but in doing so, I submit, he betrayed a fundamental confusion or ambiguity in his thinking, and one that was to have fateful consequences for him as a man of action.

In this essay Wilson first describes the great leader as one who is essentially a kind of superior representative of the people, or as

an interpreter of the best thinking and highest goals of the people. The leader, he says, distinguishes firm and progressive popular thought from the momentary and whimsical popular mood. Unlike the demagogue, who panders to momentary passions and crass self-interest, the statesman should interpret the long-term, popular purpose. But the leader should do no more than arouse the general sense of the community waiting to be roused, he should simply formulate and make explicit what is inchoate and vague. "Power," he said, "consists in one's capacity to link his will with the purpose of others, to lead by reason and a gift for co-operation." Here was a noble conception of leadership, but also a rather restricted or narrow one. For the leader was not to change the community's ideas, he was to express them. He was essentially a high-level compromiser, not a maker and shaker.

But even in this essay, there is a sudden change, like an unearthly, even tragic premonition of things to come thirty years later. Wilson is making his way through his lecture, with many a graceful literary and political allusion, when suddenly there occurs this passage:

Nevertheless, leadership does not always wear the harness of compromise. Once and again one of those great Influences which we call a Cause arises in the midst of the nation. Men of strenuous minds and high ideals come forward with a sort of gentle majesty as champions of a political or moral principle. They wear no armour; they bestride no chargers; they only speak their thought, in season and out of season. But the attacks they sustain are more cruel than the collisions of arms. Their souls are pierced with a thousand keen arrows of obloquy. Friends desert and despise them. They stand alone: and oftentimes are made bitter by their isolation. They are doing nothing less than defy public opinion, and shall they convert it by blows? Yes, presently the forces of the popular thought hesitate, waiver, seem to doubt their power to subdue a half score stubborn minds. Again a little while and they have yielded. Masses come over to the side of the reform. Resistance is left to the minority and such as will not be converted are crushed.

For a moment Wilson goes on, arguing eloquently that there is a role for the leader who does *not* represent public opinion, for the man who is ahead of his time, for the statesman who takes an unpopular position reflecting his conscience and waits for public opinion to turn his way, or even directs public opinion his own way. But he fails to clinch this point, and he ends up saying in effect that it is the intellectual, the man of thought, who must be ahead of his time, while the leader must represent his time, must, as Wilson puts it, "serve as a sort of sensitive dial registering all forces that move upon the face of Society."

During most of his political career Wilson served as the first of

these two types of leaders—as a man who represented and symbolized the great movements of his time, as a man who gave voice to the progressive forces of the day, who finally united them, who moved with them rather than taking a position ahead of them. He became governor of New Jersey in 1910, after almost a decade of muckraking and protest throughout the nation, and in brilliant fashion he led the progressive forces of that state in the shaping of a progressive program that in hardly two years put New Jersey in the forefront of progressive-minded states, and won Wilson a national reputation. But it is notable that the times were ripe for Wilson's leadership; in fact, some progressives wanted him to go faster than he did. It is notable, too, that Wilson himself had changed in outlook; as a young man he had been a conservative, a Cleveland Democrat; because his horizons had broadened, because he came to maturity during the muckraking decade, because of some of his experiences in Princeton, and because he was an ambitious man who had always wanted to leave the scholar's den for the politician's rostrum, he became a leader of New Jersey's progressive forces.

Wilson's early career as President also shows him as a man reflecting his times, as a man speaking for his people, rather than as a leader moving far ahead of them. His greatness during the first year or two lay in the brilliant fashion in which he welded together his party in carrying through the program behind which the party had won the Presidency and both houses of Congress. But these achievements were also made possible by the radicals and reformers who had paved the way for the changes, by the politicians who were looking for progressive votes, by the scores of newspaper editors, writers, and other intellectuals who were writing books and tracts. Wilson served as a synthesis, or as a catharsis, not as the leader expressing minority opinion moving ahead of the times.

The test of Wilson's leadership lay in areas where he knew he could not lead his party, in situations where he had no instinct himself to move forward. Perhaps the most interesting case involved Wilson's policy toward Negroes. Shortly after Wilson's inauguration in 1913 Oswald Garrison Villard, one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, talked with the President at the White House and left with the understanding that Wilson was wholly sympathetic to Villard's suggestion of the appointment of a National Race Commission to study the whole problem of race relations in the United States. Later Wilson told him that the political situation was too delicate

for any such action, that such a Commission would antagonize Southern Democrats in Congress whose votes Wilson needed for the passage of his legislative program.

Even worse than this, the President allowed a tragic backward step in race relations in the federal bureaucracy. Southern congressmen were riding high in Washington for the first time in many years, and they were demanding segregation in the government departments and the firing or downgrading of Negro civil servants. A good deal of segregation took place; the Collector of Internal Revenue in Georgia announced that the "Negro's place is in the cornfield," and when a militant Negro spokesman from Boston spoke vehemently to the President, Wilson virtually ordered him out. Some of the excesses of Jim Crow were checked, but not really because of Wilson.

According to Raymond B. Fosdick, Wilson once exclaimed to him, "God save us from compromise. Let's stop being merely practical and find out what's right." But Wilson, like all Presidents, often compromised. For example, his tangled interventionist policies in Mexico and the Caribbean were a compromise with the idealistic planks of the Democratic platform opposing intervention and calling for an idealistic hands-off policy. Another example of Wilsonian compromise was his handling of antitrust policy. You will recall that he campaigned in 1912 on a program of enforcing and regulating competition, of trying to cut down the concentrated power and size of big business, while Theodore Roosevelt urged that the government regulate the abuses of big business rather than trying to cut it down to size—a policy that he described as rural Toryism. Administratively, Wilson seemed ready to outlaw by statute every conceivable restraint of trade, while T. R. favored the establishment of a powerful, independent trade commission armed with broad authority and empowered to suppress unfair competition whenever it arose and under whatever guise. I cannot even summarize the tortuous story of antitrust policy after Wilson won election, but to make a long story short, the Administration antitrust policy ended up closer to Roosevelt's position in the 1912 campaign than to Wilson's position.

This shift in antitrust policy symbolizes a basic shift in Wilson's domestic policies from 1912 to 1916—a shift, again, that shows the extent to which events were leading Wilson rather than Wilson leading events. After his 1913 and 1914 domestic reforms Wilson seemed to feel that his domestic program had been executed; he even executed a little swing to the right. By 1916, however, Wilson

faced a crucial campaign for re-election. The great question was, where would the Progressives of 1912 go—would they go to the reunited Republican party, or to the Wilsonian Democratic party? To enlist Progressive support—and doubtless to meet his own ideas of right—Wilson came out for an advanced program of social legislation, including workmen's compensation, limitation of child labor, credits for farmers; he in effect put through a law that gave railroad workers the eight-hour day; he nominated Brandeis to the Supreme Court and stuck to that nomination despite incredibly fierce opposition. His political tactics worked; Wilson enjoyed the support of a substantial part of the leadership of the old Progressive party. Wilson's progressivism of 1916 not only helped win re-election; it gave birth to the modern Democratic party—the party of Roosevelt, Truman, and Stevenson, the party of the New Deal and the Fair Deal. But let me note again—this new Democratic program of 1916 was not something cooked up by Wilson, something on which he rode into power originally; it was something that compelled his attention and his support, something he had to adopt if he wished to stay in office. There is a most interesting parallel with Roosevelt—who shifted from a phase of broker rule to a phase of majority leadership.

We have been talking about Wilson's domestic policy, about how much of it was forced on him, rather than springing from him during his days prior to entering public office. Much the same could be said about Wilson's foreign policy before we entered the war in 1917. Prof. Arthur Link has conclusively proved, I think, that Wilson had no master plan in regard to entering the war; there was no basic strategy; he was largely controlled by events, and especially by decisions made by Britain and Germany in their conduct of hostilities. Wilson, says Professor Link, did not decide for war because of idealistic or even security reasons, but because events compelled it.

This war that was forced on him, this war that arose from a multitude of causes, this war Wilson almost overnight tried to convert into a war for principle, for ideals, for popular goals. "It is a fearful thing," he said in his unforgettable address to Congress in April, 1917, "to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most disastrous and terrible of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things that we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights

and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. . . ." During the sacrifices and brutalities and compromises of the war Wilson continued to exalt these purposes and principles.

Then came his fight for the League of Nations, and for America's participation. We all remember that fight—Wilson's advocacy of a "League of Nations" in the treaty discussions in Paris while Lloyd George and Clemenceau, politicians of *Realpolitik*, cynics and compromisers, or realists if you will, thought mainly of national revenge and security. We remember Wilson's dramatic presentation to the Senate of the treaty embodying the League, stating that the "only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we can accept or reject the confidence of the world." We remember the way that the astute Senator—a fox, who knew many things—outmaneuvered the proud, resolute, unbending, uncompromising President, using all the tactics and tricks of delay and confusion. We remember Wilson's tour of the country, his fervent pleas to the people for the vindication of his great ideal—a trip that collapsed when it was found that Wilson could not stand the ordeal physically. Then came the attack of cerebral thrombosis, the semiparalysis, the six months of not even meeting with his cabinet, and during all this time hopes for American adherence to the League wasted away, as the sick, proud President would not allow the only compromises on the basis of which some kind of adherence to the League might have been gained.

No matter what Wilson's motivations were—some will say he was moved by the highest ideals, others that he was the victim of his own pride, or that he was conscience-stricken over having been a war leader rather than a peace leader, or that he was suffering from illusions and existed, as Professor Blum has said, in a "demi-world of querulous fantasies." To inquire into leaders' motivations is to plunge us into a fascinating but different subject. The striking fact, to my mind, is that the man who had thought about leadership as a representative process and whose leadership had been essentially of the representative type, was now taking a position far in advance of his time, was now acting for a minority and trying to bring the majority around to his views, was, as he said, acting on behalf not of voters but of the voteless—the children of America and the whole world.

He had, as it turned out, come to personify the man he had described in his essay of thirty years before—the man whose soul is

pierced by a thousand arrows, the man whose friends desert and despise them. At the end Wilson stood alone, except for his wife and daughters. He had broken with Colonel House, who had been so close to him that Professor Blum, in referring to the women who hovered around the President, referred to House as an associate member to the White House sorority. Clemenceau dismissed him as a man who talked like Jesus Christ but acted like Lloyd George. One of his cabinet members, who had left the Administration, said of Wilson that he had ideals but no principles. These things may be true, or partly true. The main point, I say, is that Wilson did lead this gallant but hopeless fight, that he met his political death far in advance of the political hosts, indeed while the hosts were in retreat.

What are we to say of this example? Was it purely quixotic; was it even worse than this, the kind of perfectionism or utopianism that forbids the compromises and concessions that make at least a little progress possible? To answer this question we can only speculate as to what would have happened if Wilson had compromised and accepted United States adherence to the League on the basis of the severe reservations required by the Senate. At least we would have been *in* an international organization; one can argue, in fact, that if we had been able to half join in 1920, then we might have strengthened our participation and even the League itself, and that we might have been able to build an even stronger League or United Nations in later years.

I would be inclined, however, to take the opposite line. I would argue that if Wilson had accepted the compromises that his foes demanded, if we had joined the League on the basis suggested, our semiadherence to the League would have become tragically entangled with the dismal international developments of the 1920's—the retreat to isolationism, the rising economic nationalism—and that the League, even with us in it, would not have been able to offset the horrendous developments of the 1930's in the Far East and in Europe. I submit, in short, that the idea of collective security might have become fatally compromised, that people today might be split between the isolationists, on the one hand, who maintained that collective security had helped bring on the war, and perfectionists and utopians, on the other, who maintained that the idea had been tried and found wanting.

As it has turned out, the slate was wiped clean. American participation in the League in any form failed, and the idea of collective security, Wilson's idea of a dominion of peace, stayed

with us, an ideal made all the more lustrous and dramatic by Wilson's own martyrdom. It was an ideal returned to in 1945, when America not only took the leadership in the establishment of the United Nations, but sponsored it at an international conference at a city on its western coast and gave it permanent location at a city on its eastern coast. Who can say that Wilson failed? I would say that Wilson, despite all his personal deficiencies, was able as the man of thought, to carry out the great role of the leader as a representative during the immediate times that demanded it, and then was able to take a new and fateful role as the leader ahead of his times, when people around him fell back into their old complacency, inertia, and shortsightedness. Yes, he was pierced by the thousand arrows of obloquy, but he won the respect and the vindication of history—and what more does the scholar or intellectual demand?

During Wilson's great moments and final downfall on the public stage there was an understudy watching him keenly from the wings. This was Franklin D. Roosevelt. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy and as a state senator in New York before that, Roosevelt immersed himself in the whole Wilsonian tradition. More than this, he shared in the bitter aftermath of Wilson's failure. For after Roosevelt was nominated for Vice President in 1920, he agreed with his running mate, James Cox, that they should campaign largely on the issue of United States membership in the League. Together Cox and Roosevelt visited Wilson in the White House to symbolize their intention. The President sat on the White House portico gray and gaunt, a shawl covering his paralyzed left side. "Mr. President," said Cox, "we are going to be a million percent with you, and your Administration, and that means the League of Nations." The President seemed to come to life, but all he could manage to say was "I am very grateful."

So Cox and Roosevelt campaigned on the League. It was a noble gesture and it failed. Indeed, the election defeat was worse than a failure, for actually the election had been lost for many other reasons than the League, but the Republicans could interpret the result as a popular mandate to stay clear of collective security.

Undoubtedly this sad experience had some effect on making Roosevelt the shrewd and often very cautious politician that he later turned out to be. Perhaps it will seem strange to you that I use these adjectives in connection with Roosevelt, whose name is usually linked with courage and boldness and striking leadership. Yet what has most impressed me as I have restudied the Roosevelt

presidency is the extent to which he tackled problems with the utmost caution, only after sizing up the situation and the terrain most carefully, and sometimes only after delays that greatly annoyed some of his more impatient lieutenants. Theodore Roosevelt, whom F. D. R. had admired and emulated, had once told the boys at Groton School that being good was not enough, that being courageous was not enough, that the politician in a democracy must be shrewd too.

Earlier I described Wilson's leadership during most of his career as representative leadership—as the leadership that pulls together and renders articulate the many voices of the crowd. I would argue that this was the kind of leadership that Roosevelt exerted during almost all his public career. We remember him today as the man who galvanized a fear-ridden and crisis-ridden nation when he took office in 1933. But the more one studies Roosevelt's campaign of 1932 and his actions in 1933, the more one must conclude, I think, that Roosevelt was simply giving voice to the feelings of the people, and even more, he was acting—he was doing things—and this above all the people wanted. Just as I have described Wilson as essentially a representative leader, so I would describe Roosevelt as what I call a broker type of leader, the type of leader who responds to all the major interests and attitudes of the country, and converts them into action. The NRA was the outstanding example of a kind of partnership of all the major—or at least more articulate—interests.

Just as Wilson shifted in 1916 from a mildly liberal posture to a strikingly progressive program, so Roosevelt made a vitally important shift in 1935. We have heard much of the First Hundred Days—that period in 1933 when Roosevelt pushed measure after measure through Congress for the relief of a stricken nation. But of far more enduring importance, in my book, was what I call the Second Hundred Days—the period during 1935 when Congress, spurred and bullied and driven by Roosevelt, laid the foundations of the permanent New Deal and Fair Deal by passing the social security act, Wagner act, radical tax legislation, holding company, and other bills. Roosevelt, like Wilson, shifted to the left, not because he had been elected on a program but—why? Because by 1935 tremendous forces of radical protest were rising in the country—forces symbolized by John L. Lewis, Huey Long, Father Coughlin, Francis E. Townsend, and Upton Sinclair—and Roosevelt wanted to head off these forces to regain election in 1936. He had also found that despite the concessions he had made to con-

servative business forces in his first two years, those forces were not willing to make concessions to him.

Roosevelt, in short, moved to the left only when the situation made it possible—he was not one to move far in advance of the main forces; he was not willing to run the risk of being cut off from his main support. This was also true of his foreign policy during his second term. The accusations of those who said that Roosevelt deliberately led us into war have obscured the fact that the President acted in most cases only when he was sure that he would have enough support; indeed, if we can believe the opinion polls of the time, large segments of the people were often ahead of him in demanding that America take more forceful steps against Hitler. The one time that Roosevelt did get ahead of the crowd—in his famous Quarantine-the-Aggressor speech in Chicago in the fall of 1937—he found that he had done so at his peril—and he hastily pulled back.

Now much can be said of Roosevelt's type of representative leadership, or broker leadership. He pulled the nation together behind emergency action in 1933 and 1934, and he spoke for the great majority of Americans in his progressive shift in 1935. Certainly he did well by this type of leadership—he got re-elected three times, and you don't do that by getting too far ahead of the people. Certainly much of the New Deal was an enduring contribution to government, as its acceptance by Eisenhower and the moderate Republicans testifies. Certainly, too, the fact that the United States wholeheartedly entered the United Nations suggests that Roosevelt had learned a lot from the Wilsonian experience.

Yet with the benefit of hindsight—and what is history but thoughtful and organized hindsight?—I wonder if Roosevelt would not have done better in certain instances if he had been more willing to move ahead of the great majority. I am thinking especially of his second term. That could have been Roosevelt's greatest term. He had a tremendous majority in Congress—Northern Democrats outnumbered Republicans and Southern Democrats combined. He had a magnificent program—to do something about what he called the one-third ill-nourished, ill-housed, and ill-clad. Yet he failed—there were still nine or ten million unemployed by the time war came. Roosevelt never came through on his great pledge of ending the depression, of finding work for the unemployed. The reason he failed lay largely, I think, in the instrument that he tried to work with—the Democratic party. The crying need of the times was the realignment and modernization of the party—Roosevelt knew

this and came back to the problem again and again during his career. But he never put the effort into it that was necessary—he never exerted the kind of long-term leadership that was required. To be sure, he tried to purge some conservative congressmen out of the Senate and House. But this was a badly-planned, last-minute affair—not the kind of systematic effort and dedication and commitment that was necessary.

Could it be that Roosevelt's leadership—successful though it was in so many respects—would have been even better if he had shown somewhat more daring, somewhat more boldness, somewhat more tenacity and conviction?

Finally, let us take a brief look at President Eisenhower in the context of the kind of leadership that I have been discussing. Despite their many differences, Eisenhower and Roosevelt have far more in common than Wilson and Roosevelt. Like Roosevelt, Eisenhower is a nonintellectual, an eminently practical man, a man with only a general and rather vague philosophy of government and politics, but with a full understanding of specific men and problems. Mr. Eisenhower had very little training in government in its more philosophical aspects, but he had enormous experience in a certain kind of public administration, namely army administration, and this experience had widened out during and after the war to embrace the management of coalition armies, with all the administrative and diplomatic problems that this involved.

There are some who might say that Mr. Eisenhower has not been a leader in any sense of the word, but I would disagree. In my judgment, he has been a representative type of leader such as Roosevelt and such as Wilson before the League of Nations phase. The reason that Mr. Eisenhower seems different from the former is that he has presided over a period of consolidation, over a breathing spell, when the stream of history comes momentarily into deep and still waters. His job was not to rush ahead with a moving consensus of a progressive majority, but to induce the conservative elements to accept the basic program that the New Deal and Fair Deal had established, to induce the conservatives to perfect that program and even to extend it a bit. I will draw the veil of charity over Mr. Eisenhower's first two years in office, because the question at that time was not whether he could dominate the conservative Republicans, but whether they would take over his own administration. He had to deal with what one Washington observer has called the "counter-revolution" led by men such as McCarthy and Jenner, and the best we can say of the result is that it was a stale-

mate. But after the Democrats captured control of Congress in 1954, the President came into his own. It was precisely the kind of coalition situation that he was used to. By the time that he ran for re-election this year his popularity was so tremendous both in the Republican party and outside that he could speak with pride and with reason, I think, of a modernized Republican party.

Yet I would raise the same question here that I have about Roosevelt. The trouble with this representative or broker type of leadership is that history may rush on ahead and leave the leader isolated unless he can move with the times. In the cases of both Wilson and Roosevelt, they not only spoke for existing sentiment, but they put themselves at the head of a new and emerging majority, of a fresh program oriented toward the future. They were still representative leaders, but they moved with the progressive-minded majority and hence were able to build programs for the future.

What about Mr. Eisenhower in this regard? To answer this question we must first ask ourselves whether the times call for him to move ahead, to educate and co-ordinate a moving consensus of the people. Or will it be enough to continue to act as a force for stabilization, educating the Republican party to the need of accepting and improving the basic New Deal-Fair Deal programs? Doubtless we would all hope for the latter—hope, that is, that history will continue to allow us to enjoy this breathing spell. But the events of the last few weeks across the seas demonstrate, I think, that the breathing spell is over. The time has come for new departures, for fresh and creative thinking. Walter Lippmann has said that the Eisenhower policies have been a series of hand-me-downs from the previous administrations. But what is sufficient for one era may be tragically wanting in a later one. This is all the case with domestic policy. Defense policies of the past may not be adequate for the future. In the case of civil rights—most notably the gathering resistance to public school desegregation in the South—there simply is no past policy to fall back on. The same may well be true of our educational situation in general—the coming crisis both in educational quantity and even more in educational quality, and in the fields of higher learning as well as secondary education, can be met not with continuing policies of the past but by shaping new programs.

Does Mr. Eisenhower have the capacity to lead in this sense? Any judgment at this point is but a guess—I would guess that he does not. Part of the reason lies in circumstance—in the circumstance, for example, that he is presently barred by the Constitution

from running for a third term. But the answer lies even more, I think, in himself—in his temperamental dislike for sticking his neck out, in his instinct for compromise, in his staff system that is ideal for a period of consolidation but not adapted to a period of crisis.

I have talked so much about the leader himself that I fear I may have left an impression that the great question as to what kind of leadership we have is resolved within the minds and souls of certain key individuals. But I hope my remarks have conveyed the implication, at least, that the issue as to what kind of leadership we have lies in ourselves as well as our leaders. This is true in many respects—but it is especially relevant to the role of the intellectual, of the man of thought. Politicians will never exert any kind of leadership—and certainly not the type that Wilson displayed in his fight for the League—unless nonpoliticians have shown the way, and have shown themselves willing to back up the leader. Such a situation calls for certain actions on the part of the intellectual, or the man of thought. It calls, quite simply and obviously, for the safeguarding of the right of the individual to take a position that most of the community considers unorthodox and even dangerous. It calls for men of thought courageous enough to take the position that their investigations of the truth, as they see it, and their conscience, demands. But perhaps even more difficult, the requirements of leadership involve an assumption by the intellectual, and since I started on this note, I would conclude on it. This is the assumption that man can control his own destiny, or at least broadly shape it; the assumption that man is not simply a chip on a remorseless tide. Such an assumption may be an act of faith, something unproved and unprovable, but certainly the challenge to mankind—the challenge to control our own fates in the face of the perils of war and poverty and disintegration—is enough to spur the man of learning onward under the banner urging on us, as the old saying has it, that we must think as men of action, and act as men of thought.

Presidential Leadership—and Andrew Jackson

By GLYNDON VAN DEUSEN

I propose, tonight, to outline the qualities which seem to me important in Presidential leadership, and then to assay the personality and career of Andrew Jackson with particular reference to those same qualities.

First among the qualities of leadership I would place intelligence. By this I do not mean genius, or even intellectual brilliance. Such qualities might well be detrimental to the nation's commander-in-chief. I mean, rather, common sense; a capacity for understanding problems of state; a capacity for getting the point when briefed on abstract questions of law, of economics, of government.

The lack of this quality of intelligence is almost bound to be catastrophic. Remember Warren Harding's complaint, as told by William Allen White—

I can't make a damn thing out of this tax problem. I listen to one side and they seem right and then—God!—I talk to the other side and they seem just as right, and here I am where I started. I know somewhere there is a book that will give me the truth, but Hell! I couldn't read the book!

Presidential leadership does not emerge from intellectual obfuscation such as that which afflicted President Harding. To be successful in guiding his countrymen, a President must have what Hercule Poirot describes as "the little gray cells."

Scarcely less important than intelligence in a President is the ability to command the services of able people, even though they may be possessed of difficult and even hostile personality traits. In this connection, one calls to mind how, for nearly four years, Washington was able to hold with him both Hamilton and Jefferson, and how Lincoln kept both Seward and Chase together in his Cabinet during the major part of his Presidency. To be capable of commanding the service of talent and to make diverse talents work together is indeed a rare and precious gift.

So, too, is the capacity for attracting popular devotion and a popular following. This is much more than understanding where the crowd wants to go and then going along with them. The kind of leadership we are thinking of is not that of the French politician who, looking out on the Boulevard des Capucines and seeing a mob go roaring down the street exclaimed, as he seized his hat and

stick—"I am their leader, and so I must follow them!" Rather it consists in blazing a trail and in knowing just how far and how fast one may go in this trail-blazing business and at the same time command popular confidence and support. Alexander Hamilton saw the importance of this kind of initiative when he was nineteen years of age. He copied in his notebook the following quotation from Demosthenes—

As a general marches at the head of his troops, so ought politicians—to march at the head of affairs; insomuch that they ought not to wait the *event*, to know what measures to take; but the measures which they have taken, ought to produce the event.

There are a number of other qualities which seem to me of paramount importance in Presidential leadership. It is hard to conceive of an American rising to or maintaining himself in the position of commander-in-chief, if his integrity is under serious question. We are plagued by corruption here in America and the standards of successful politicians are by no means always high, but honesty and good purpose are virtues well-nigh essential to attaining the Presidency, let alone achieving success in that high office.

Along with integrity, I would rank patriotism and humanitarianism. The first is essential to successful Presidential leadership. The latter, while not an absolute "must" (Washington, for instance, would scarcely be classed as a great humanitarian) is still a very useful quality, as the careers of Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt bear abundant witness. Finally, I would class as very high among the virtues of a great political leader, a capacity for taking decisive action, and an ability to know *when* to act. Decision is vital to the creation of public confidence, and timing, the knowledge of when, and *when not* to act, is of equal importance.

And now that we have established the measurements of leadership, let us apply them to the career and character of a man who ranks as one of the most controversial figures of his day—Andrew Jackson.

The history of the United States abounds in arresting and dramatic figures, but among them none have excited a more enduring interest than Andrew Jackson. Books about the man and his era appear with a regularity that has become almost monotonous. At the last meeting of the American Historical Association, the session on the Jacksonian period was packed and people were turned away at the doors. Only a few years ago, a prominent eastern publishing house found itself in the unprecedented position of having to take paper, that had been allotted to the latest pro-

duction of a "big name" novelist, away from this darling of the reading public and award it to a brilliant, if controversial interpretation of the Jacksonian epoch.

One of the many reasons for the historical vitality of the period in which Jackson lived and worked is that it abounded in colorful and dynamic personalities. Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Benton—their oratorical powers, their passionate aspirations, their dramatic roles in the midst of great events, make the pages of history glow and throb with life. But on the roster of the great names in what historians like to call the Middle Period, no name shines quite so brightly, with quite so fierce a light, as that of the great leader and founder of the movement that we still call Jacksonian Democracy.

It is one of the axioms of history that there are two sides to every question and that historical judgment, if it is to be valuable, must be a balanced judgment. This was never more nearly true than it is in the case of the man who was called "Old Hickory" by his adoring followers and a variety of epithets, ranging from "King Andrew" to "barbarian" by the Whigs. I shall begin, therefore, by pointing out some of the limitations of Jackson's mind and character.

One of Jackson's limitations was his lack of what academicians call the discipline engendered by the educational process. His wild, violent, and quarrelsome youth provided scant opportunity for the training of the schoolroom, and what schooling he had produced little effect. As a boy, says Professor Bassett, Jackson was "neither studious nor teachable." He never became so. This was unfortunate. If education means anything, it means the training of the mind so that it will react, with discriminating judgment, to accumulated knowledge, whether that knowledge comes from the remote or the immediate past. Jackson lacked this training. He never became interested in poetry, history, or literature. "There was no time in his life," says his most judicious biographer, "when he was willing to learn of others."

Being an egotist, Jackson was a man of prejudices. Indeed, he was a man of violent prejudices. The list of his arbitrary judgments is a long one. He hated England. He hated the Indians. He hated Whigs. He hated the Second Bank of the United States. There was a veritable roster of individuals he hated, from Charles Dickinson and Senator George Poindexter of Mississippi to Henry Clay.

These hatreds led to rash judgments and to vindictive actions.

In 1806 he killed Charles Dickinson in a duel under circumstances that made the killing little short of cold-blooded murder.

The quarrel that preceded the duel developed over a horse race. To be exact, it arose out of a dispute concerning notes that had been posted and then forfeited in connection with a projected race between Jackson's horse "Truxton" and another horse, "Plough-boy," owned by a Captain Joseph Ervin. Jackson, rightly or wrongly, held Dickinson responsible for certain verbal attacks which were being made upon Jackson by a third party. Jackson wrote a letter to a Nashville paper denouncing Dickinson as "a worthless, drunken, blackguard scoundrel." The scoundrel promptly replied with a scathing and contemptuous attack and Jackson promptly challenged him to a duel. Dickinson, as the challenged party, had the right to name weapons. He chose pistols at eight paces (twenty-four feet). The place was north of Nashville and just over the state border in Kentucky. The date was May 30, 1806.

Dickinson was a crack shot, and there are various stories which, true or not, have centered on this fact. According to one tale, as he rode out toward the duelling ground with his companions, he took a snap shot at the string which held up an inn sign and so severed it that the sign hung down at a crazy angle. Dickinson then told the inn-keeper to show the sign to Jackson when he came along. Another story has it that, at eight paces, he placed four shots in an area the size of a silver dollar.

Jackson and his seconds, knowing Dickinson's skill with a pistol, coolly plotted their strategy. The duellists were to stand at their respective pins, facing in opposite directions. As the word to "fire" was given, they were to turn toward one another and fire at will. Jackson decided to hold his fire, on the chance that the confident Dickinson would fire so quickly as not to inflict a mortal wound. Then Jackson would take deliberate aim and bring down his man. It seems clear that each man fully intended to kill his opponent.

Events worked out as Jackson had foreseen. At the word of command, Dickinson wheeled and swiftly fired. The ball hit Jackson high in the left breast, but if he flinched it was imperceptible to his opponent. Dickinson cried out, "My God! I missed him," and turned as though to flee, only to be brought back by a sharp word of command from the seconds, who would have been obligated to shoot him down, if he had tried to leave the field. Slowly Jackson raised his long arm and sighted, while Dickinson shuddered and turned away his head. The pistol snapped, but that was all.

It had been set at half cock. According to the code, it had to be reprimed, reloaded, and Jackson given a second opportunity to fire. This was done, Dickinson all the while standing helplessly awaiting his fate. When Jackson finally did fire, Dickinson was shot fatally in the groin.

The killing of Dickinson was a vindictive act, calculated, and done with the utmost deliberation. Indeed, Jackson told a witness of the act that he had been determined to kill his antagonist, even if he himself had been shot through the brain. Even in the West of Jackson's day, this was a deed that aroused much and bitter criticism.

Jackson's hatred of Clay stemmed from another hasty conviction, based on circumstantial and inconclusive evidence, that Clay had made a corrupt bargain with John Quincy Adams in 1824, whereby Clay had swung his support to Adams for the Presidency and Adams in return had made Clay Secretary of State, thus putting him in line for the White House. Jackson came to hate the Second Bank of the United States when it was disclosed to him that some, though not all, of its branch managers had fought his election to the Presidency in 1828.

Hatred, too often developed on insufficient grounds, played a prominent role in Jackson's life. Nathaniel Niles, New England Democrat and diplomat, an observer who was close to the leading members of his party in Washington, was even convinced that those who had a real hold on Jackson's affections had it, not because they liked, but because they hated the same persons and things.

Old Hickory was not only egotistical and full of prejudice. He was, in at least one fundamental matter, shockingly ignorant. His ideas about financial matters, public and private, were pathetically inadequate. He once asserted his distrust of all banks—he had distrusted them, he said, ever since he had read about the South Sea Bubble (a speculative movement of the early eighteenth century for which, incidentally, banks had borne no responsibility). He believed in hard money—that is to say, a specie currency—and would have forced it upon the country had he been able to do so, thus championing a policy that was completely unrealistic. The nation's economy, bursting with growth, needed a soundly based but *expanding* currency and credit system. Jackson's course tended to contract both currency and credit, thus exerting an artificial and harmful restraint upon the development of transportation, westward expansion, and the emergence of modern forms of business organization. Old Hickory was also passionately devoted

to extinguishing the national debt. This achievement, he believed, would produce great domestic benefits, and would wipe out what he regarded as the shame of having United States government bonds held by Englishmen. He was likewise a fervent advocate of divorcing the government completely from any connection with banking, a point of view which involved at least partial repudiation of the federal government's constitutional obligation to regulate the currency of the country.

Perhaps the best illustration of Jackson's ignorance in financial matters is to be found in his comment on the causes of the panic of 1837, and the policy which the federal government should adopt toward that disastrous event. This comment was written down by the General in 1837, presumably during the summer of that year, when the country was already deep in the throes of depression. The nation's economic troubles, in Jackson's estimation, were the result of a conspiracy between the banks, the "Aristocracy," Nicholas Biddle, and Baring Brothers of London, "to drain us of our specie, bankrupt the country for the benefit of England, disgrace our government and destroy our credit abroad and rule or ruin at home." The English and American banks, in Jackson's opinion, had encouraged the great wave of speculation that had preceded the panic for the purpose of destroying the system of depositing the government moneys in local banks. Thus they intended to force a return to the Second Bank of the United States, the stock of which was so largely held abroad. But the deposit banks, also, had shown bad faith, and therefore the government should sever all connection with them.

As for government policy in the depression, Jackson recommended strict economy, and hard money. The merchant class, the bankers, and the speculators (his term for this latter gentry was "Gamblers") deserved all the harsh treatment that the government and the people might inflict. "Any indulgence given either to Banks or Merchants now by the Government," said Old Hickory, "must be viewed by the people as injurious to labor and oppressive to them and as an act of favoritism to Banks—and an encouragement to them to repeat the injury—this is what the Government ought not to do."

As an analysis, this Jackson commentary is much more illustrative of Jackson's ignorance and vindictiveness, than it is of the causes and character of the panic of 1837. There certainly had been no conspiracy such as the Old Hero imagined had been concocted. The idea that the English banks were trying to drain specie out of

the United States for sinister purposes was devoid of any basis in fact. There was no truth in the allegation that the United States banks had encouraged the speculative boom for the purpose of destroying the "pet bank" system, and thus forcing the return of the Second Bank of the United States. And the blanket denunciation of the banks and merchants, to say nothing of the hard money panacea, was far more indicative of morbid fancy than of any realistic grasp of the economic situation.

Jackson's limitations sadly impaired the quality of his leadership. The Jacksonian financial policy, the Bank war, hard money, the Specie Circular, the "pet bank" system, the Independent Treasury, were all facets of a negative and restrictive governmental philosophy in economic matters. The General's egotism and violence of opinion involved him in needless factional and time-wasting disputes, tended to make him surround himself with men whose principal attributes were those that pandered to his prejudices, and limited him in drawing upon the country's talent for the service of his administration. In these respects, at least, he lacked the attributes of great leadership. Where and how did he exhibit the qualities of a great national leader?

In seeking to assay the factors that made Jackson a great leader—and such he was—some initial attention must be paid to his enormous physical stamina. The demands that he made upon his physique, whether in war or in peace were very considerable. There were times when his health seemed about to give way, due to sheer physical strain. Indeed, during his first administration, there was a period when he and his friends despaired of his life. But he never sank under physical difficulties, and, on the whole, his body served him well. It was not without reason that his soldiers had given him, during the War of 1812, the title of "Old Hickory." He was in his seventy-eighth year when he died, a ripe old age for his generation.

If Jackson was strong in body, he was also stout in spirit. Courage was one of his great attributes. It took fortitude to attack and destroy the Second Bank of the United States, a powerful institution which had much support from within the Democratic party. It took courage of a somewhat different nature, it is true, to wait for the fire of a crack shot like Charles Dickinson, thus deliberately gambling on not being killed so that he, himself, could take a sure and fatal aim. Enemies and friends alike attested his bravery in military warfare.

Perhaps as good a testimony as any to the quality of Jackson's

courage is to be found in an incident that took place early in 1835, and of which Nathaniel Niles has left a moving account.

It was January, 1835, and Jackson had gone from the White House up to the Capitol. As he started from the rotunda and through the piazza on the east side, one Richard Lawrence, a painter by trade, snapped a percussion pistol at him from a distance of about eight feet. The weapon missed fire. Jackson, who was leaning on Levi Woodbury's arm, started toward his assailant, cane upraised, as Lawrence aimed a second pistol which also missed fire. Had Woodbury not restrained the General, he would have reached and caned his would-be assassin.

Jackson, in commenting to Niles on the attack, remarked that he had received over 500 letters threatening his life. But he did not worry about assassination, said the President, since he meant always to live and act in such a way as to be ready at all times to die. "The manner in which this sentiment was expressed," said Niles, "excited my admiration."

Courage, in Jackson, was joined to the quality of firmness. When Jackson made up his mind, his decision was likely to be as fixed as the rock of Gibraltar. Once he had decided that the Bank had to be killed, there was no faltering as he moved to the attack. Once he had decided that Clay was an unprincipled rascal, the Kentuckian was forever consigned to Old Hickory's black books. His remark that Clay would either win the Presidency or die drunk was only one of many injurious comments on the Hotspur of the West.

Of course this firmness of purpose sometimes degenerated into mere obstinacy. The General hated George Poindexter, United States Senator from Mississippi, with a bitter hatred. When Lawrence made his attempt to kill Jackson in 1835, the President at once leaped to the conclusion that the would-be assassin had been hired by Poindexter, who, said Old Hickory, "would have attempted it himself long ago, if he had had the courage." Jackson undertook to obtain evidence of Poindexter's complicity, and the latter asked for the appointment of a special Senate committee of investigation. The committee was appointed and found him innocent. It is not at all likely that this verdict changed Jackson's opinion of Poindexter's guilt by one iota. But despite the drawbacks inherent in Jackson's firmness of opinion, it was a quality that made it easy to know where Jackson stood; and determined forthrightness was as much admired by that frontier America from which King Andrew drew so much of his strength, as it is by Americans today.

An anecdote popular among Jackson's admirers in the Middle Period illustrates the then current appreciation of his iron determination. According to the tale, a merchant and a broker were riding on a New York omnibus, and the following conversation took place:

Merchant (with a sigh): "Well, the old General is dead."

Broker (with a shrug): "Yes, he's gone at last."

Merchant (not appreciating the shrug): "Well, sir, he was a good man."

Broker (with a shrug more pronounced): "I don't know about that."

Merchant (energetically): "He was a good man, sir. If any man has gone to Heaven, General Jackson has gone to Heaven."

Broker (doggedly): "I don't know about that."

Merchant: "Well, sir, I tell you that if Andrew Jackson has made up his mind to go to Heaven, you may depend upon it he's there."

Closely allied in Jackson's nature with courage and decision was integrity. The General could always be counted on to make good a note that he had signed or endorsed, or a promise that he had made. His word was as good as his bond. Levi Woodbury, who knew him well, has testified to Jackson's hatred of fraud and deceit. "He knew of no compromise," said Woodbury, "or tampering, or halfway measures, with what was wrong." Integrity, that quality so essential in a public man, was one of Jackson's most outstanding characteristics.

There are three other qualities, all-important to political leadership, that Jackson possessed in abundance. One was a sense of timing in the making of political decisions, a quality the possession of which is all the more surprising because of Jackson's fiery and impetuous disposition. But Jackson did know how to control his passions, and how to wait for the right moment to strike. He demonstrated this quality of timing, in part, in the latter 1820's. During those years, when he was campaigning for the Presidency, such great public issues as the tariff and internal improvements were primarily sectional in character. Jackson, therefore, remained uncommitted. Repeated questioning finally elicited from him the information that he was for a "judicious" tariff, a comment which made Henry Clay toss his head, stamp his foot, and exclaim, "Well, I am for an *injudicious* tariff, by God." But Jackson knew that commitment on any question over which the sections were divided could result in a fatal loss of popularity in what might be a crucial area.

Once again, Jackson demonstrated his capacity for timing when, in 1835-'36, despite his deep interest in Texas, he refused recogni-

tion of Texan independence, lest it render hazardous Van Buren's victory in the 1836 election. An excellent illustration of his sense of the proper moment is also to be seen in his handling of the Second Bank of the United States. He was definitely hostile to that institution in its existing form after the election of 1828, but it had many powerful friends, even in the Democratic party. The President, therefore, refrained from aggressive action, until Clay and Webster and Biddle gave him a golden opportunity for such action by the recharter bill of 1832. Then Old Hickory struck with his veto message, and struck with deadly effect.

Another quality that Jackson possessed among those of transcendent importance to an American leader was his devoted and unbending nationalism. In his stern warning to Calhoun at the Jefferson day dinner in 1830—"Our Federal union. It must be preserved"; his even sterner warning to South Carolina in December, 1832—"Disunion by armed force is *treason*. Are you really ready to incur its guilt?"; in the bold and vigorous stand which he took with France regarding the payment of the French debt to the United States; most of all, perhaps, in the admonitions of his Farewell Message regarding the dangers of disunion, he symbolized that spirit of national patriotism which has always been a potent factor in rallying America to the support of its leaders.

It may well be that the greatest asset which Jackson possessed as a leader was his interest in the well-being of the common people and his trust in their judgment. Perhaps the best expression of this faith came in his Farewell Address, when he said—

Never for a moment believe that the great body of the citizens of any State or States can deliberately intend to do wrong. They may, under the influence of temporary excitement or misguided opinions, commit mistakes; they may be misled for a time by the suggestions of self-interest; but in a community so enlightened and patriotic as the people of the United States argument will soon make them sensible of their errors, and when convinced they will be ready to repair them. If they have no higher or better motives to govern them, they will at least perceive that their own interest requires them to be just to others, as they hope to receive justice at their hands.

Old Hickory not only trusted in the good sense and fundamental right thinking of the common man, he also sought to serve the common man, to render justice to the small as well as to the great, to base political democracy upon economic democracy. It was this aspiration which found utterance, with such devastating force, in the Bank veto—

It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of

government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and unnecessary departure from these just principles.

It was of little account, from the point of view of leadership appeal, that the means by which Jackson strove to realize his aspirations for the common man were often defective, and sometimes injurious to the nation's welfare. What was significant was the attitude, the frame of mind, of the man who sought these ends. That attitude, that frame of mind, was truly democratic. If we perceive this, we have come close to the secret of Jackson's claim to consideration as one of the very great leaders of the republic.

Why did the common people trust Jackson, and follow him? In part it was because they felt his trust in them, and understood that his desire was to promote their welfare. But this is only part of the story.

For it must be understood that, just as at various periods in American history there has developed a Jefferson myth, a Lincoln myth, a Franklin D. Roosevelt myth, a Dwight D. Eisenhower myth, so there developed in the early years of the nineteenth century a Jackson myth. It started with the battle of New Orleans, that battle which, though fought after peace had been made and the articles of the treaty of Ghent had been signed, nevertheless saved Americans from a sense of national humiliation in the War of 1812. It did not matter that Jackson had made some bad errors of judgment in the strategy of the battle, and might well have lost it. What did matter was that the forces under Old Hickory's personal command had killed and wounded 1,971 English soldiers at a cost of six Americans killed and seven wounded. What did matter was that the British had been badly defeated in their attempt to capture New Orleans. What did matter was that, in song and story, though in defiance of fact, this defeat was attributed to the unerring

marksmanship of frontier riflemen, the symbols of that West of which Jackson himself became the symbol.

But Jackson he was wide awake, and
wasn't scared with trifles,
For well he knew what aim we take
with our Kentucky rifles;
So he marched us down to "Cyprus Swamp";
The ground was low and mucky;
There stood "John Bull," in martial pomp,
But here was old Kentucky
Oh, Kentucky,
The Hunters of Kentucky,
Oh, Kentucky,
The Hunters of Kentucky.

This feat was immortalized by the ballad-makers and doggerel versifiers of the time. It went far toward making Jackson a legend before he was dead.

The legend grew and grew, fed by Jackson's friends and, as he entered the political arena, by supporting publicists. By 1822, the General was famed in song and story, and not only as a military hero. For by that time he had become magnified into something far greater than a man on horseback. He was being exalted as a spotless symbol of western agrarian purity—a child of the woodlands, a representative of the virtuous, simple, forest life of the West. He was industrious, frugal of his time, a man who made every minute count in his labors for the common good. He was by nature Spartan, a man of iron frame, of iron will, of heroic determination. He was intuitively wise, his knowledge coming from the heart, rather than from books. He was unspoiled by contact with the corrupt courts and worldly institutions of Europe. He was one of Nature's noblemen.

It did not matter that this myth contained a considerable infusion of error. Jackson was not a simple child of the forest. His Tennessee associations had been with conservatives and aristocrats, rather than with the common man. A good part of his learning came from associates who had some pretense to culture. What did matter was the belief in his simple virtue, a belief aptly and naturally conjoined with his elevation to the leadership of a party whose politicians saw the immense value of identifying their political organization as the party of the common man. And when, at Jackson's inauguration in 1829, crowds of ordinary citizens were allowed to swarm unchecked into the White House; when rotation in office became a federal institution; when the Indian was booted

off to the West in the name of opportunity for white men; when the Bank was destroyed in the name of equal opportunity—then the myth took unto itself more and more of the substance of reality. It is not without significance that Jackson is, perhaps, the only President who has retired from the White House as popular as he was when he entered it.

The Whigs were always mystified by Jackson's popularity. Philip Hone, who once spoke of Jackson's retiring to his "dunghill" in Nashville, tells a story by which the Whigs strove to explain Old Hickory's majorities at the polls.

In the early 1830's [so the story ran] a stagecoach driver who was something of a wag pulled up before the postoffice of a frontier Pennsylvania town. There was the usual group of loungers in front of the postoffice and, as usual, they asked if there was any news.

"Haven't you heard?" said the driver, with every appearance of astonishment.

"No. What is it?"

"Well," said the driver, "Andy went over to Philadelphia the other day. He was driving in his coach down toward the Independence Hall and the Crowd got so thick that the coach couldn't make any headway. Andy was being held up. He got madder and madder at the delay and at last he jumped out of the coach, drew his sword, and ran a man right through the body."

There was a moment's pause. Then one of the frontiersmen exclaimed—

"The darn fool. Why didn't he get out of the General's way!"

To the Whigs, this story represented merely the stupidity and fanaticism of those who venerated Jackson. Perhaps it did. But it also symbolized the triumph, in the minds of common men, of the Jackson myth. Whatever this child of the forest did, even to murder, was indubitably right.

It is entirely fitting that we should evoke his spirit in these perilous days. True it is that he had great defects; that he lacked a trained mind; that he was egotistical, and full of prejudices, and, in many respects, ignorant. But he was also "Old Hickory," a man of courage and integrity and great political sense, a man who, according to his lights, fought for political and economic democracy; most of all, a man who believed in America and the freedom for which America stands. The Hero of New Orleans was, throughout his life, a fighter for freedom. He remains, and will remain for generations to come, a symbol and an inspiration for those who believe in freedom, in democracy, in the rights of the common man.

Religion in Twentieth Century America

By T. WILLIAM HALL

The subject, "Religion in Twentieth Century America," is staggering. It is obviously impossible for any one person to have a sufficiently broad perspective to know all about religious trends, or all about any particular aspect of culture. Furthermore, each of us is limited by our intellectual and religious perspective from which we see events and interpret them. And so to be as objective as possible, it seems desirable that we begin this subject by using data from sociologists like Will Herberg, David Riesmann, Robin M. Williams, Oscar Handlin, and others. Other source material has been gleaned from reliable newspapers and from such journals as the *Christian Century* and the *Reporter*. Finally, the observations of this writer have been a part of the data and interpretations selected.

In the first place, it can hardly be denied that this nation is now in the midst of a phenomenal religious interest. (Whether or not it is a deep concern is a controversial subject.) We are struck by the extraordinary pervasiveness of religious interest as seen in institutional forms of religion. One might read, for example, in *Time* magazine, or in the *Yearbook of American Churches*, that never before has there been such a large percentage of Americans who belong to a church or synagogue. Kenneth Scott Latourette in 1955 documented specifically this fact by showing that, in the 1750's, only five out of every one hundred persons belonged to a church. By 1800, seven out of one hundred were church members; in 1850 the number had risen to fifteen; in 1900 to thirty-five; and in 1950, fifty-seven out of every hundred persons belonged to a religious institution. More recent estimates indicate that 100 million, or about sixty-two out of every hundred persons are related to a church.¹

It is also striking to note that even a higher percentage of people consider themselves related to or identified with one of the major religious bodies in America. When asked to identify themselves in terms of some religious preference, a survey showed that ninety-five percent of the American people declared themselves to be

1. Latourette, K. S., *Challenge and Conformity* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955), p. 70.

Protestant, Catholic or Jewish.² Along with such data, it is common knowledge that the town atheist, the corner agnostic, or the speech making or publishing Clarence Darrow, Robert Ingersoll, or Haldeman-Julius type of persons are few in numbers, if not almost a vanished entity in contemporary society.

It is probable that church affiliation means something different in the mid-twentieth century than it did fifty years ago. Except in fundamentalist groups, people think less about conversion, for example, than formerly. Yet this upswing in church interest and identification cannot be passed over lightly. (In a moment we will offer some possible interpretations of it.)

As one gathers more evidence about the state of religion, he discovers that, for the past ten years, books with religious themes have been among the top ten best sellers. Even the fabulous number of Bibles printed and distributed should be noted.

Nor is this religious interest absent from academic life. A series of articles in the winter of 1956 in the *New York Times* indicated wide interest in religious questions on college and university campuses in the East. This interest is not seen necessarily in formal religion, and least of all in evangelistic revivals. Rather, the editors suggested that students are often dissatisfied with the traditional creeds of their fathers, and are deeply concerned to find for themselves what life can mean and what religious beliefs can be intelligently held.

It is also interesting to ponder on an observation made by Will Herberg in his book, *Protestant, Catholic, and Jew*, published early in 1956. He maintains that one's religious community is that person's primary context of self-identification. If a person is to know "who he is" or if he is to have a "brand name" by which he knows himself and is known, that person must be identified with one of the major branches of American religion, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, Herberg argues.³

It is reported that an army sergeant was confronted with some theologically precise recruit (probably a high church Episcopalian) who insisted he was neither Roman Catholic, nor Protestant, nor Jewish. The sergeant exclaimed in exasperation, "Well if you're not a Catholic, or Protestant, or Jew, what in blazes are you?"

Phrasing this prevailing American way of categorizing people in another way, we might follow Herberg's general idea with the

2. Herberg, Will, *Protestant, Catholic, and Jew* (New York, Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 59. Data compiled by the Public Opinion News Service, March 20, 1955.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

following illustration. When a new family moves to town we usually ask two questions: (1) what is the husband's profession and (2) secondly, *what are they?* meaning, to what religious branch do they belong?

Whether or not one agrees with Mr. Herberg, there are other evidences of religious interest all about us. We can, for example, turn on our television sets and hear all sorts of religious spokesmen, hardly being able to avoid Oral Roberts, whose programs are carried on over 600 stations. The radio is filled with less well known self-styled prophets and healers.

And of course, there is Billy Graham. The Associated Press, in January, listed him, as it has done for the previous two years, as one of the top men of the year—and the top man in religion.

Without going into more detail to establish the theory that religious concerns are growing more and more prominent, it is certainly appropriate to ask "why?" Why is religion a means, at least for many, of personal identification? Why do ninety-five percent of the people claim to be affiliated with a church or synagogue. Why does every major magazine include articles on religion in issue after issue? Why are churches bulging at the seams? Why are courses in religion in colleges and universities growing?

I think that there are several reasons often given which are not adequate answers to the question of "why." The resurging religious interest is not a result of people's fear of going to hell, or of being blown there by a hydrogen bomb. Neither is it true that the evangelists have convicted people of sin and they are thus turning to religion. Nor can one support the idea that Americans have come to realize that we are a world power and so we have to set a good example of piety before the world. Nor have millions just by chance begun to read their Bibles, or listened to a Sunday sermon, and have thus experienced a "great awakening." Whatever reasons may be valid are far more complex—and much more closely related to other aspects of our total culture—than any of the previous simple explanations would suggest. Let me propose three explanations. These are not offered as final truth, but as hypotheses to be considered.

In the first place, it is common knowledge, though often forgotten, that our total population, exclusive of the genuine Americans—the Indians—are of immigrant background. By the 1840's the annual number of immigrants reaching our shores topped 400,000 a year. In the 1880's as many as 800,000 came to this

country. In the 1900's prior to the first world war, as many as one and a quarter million came to America.

Contrary to our popular notion, the United States was not a melting pot in which all cultural and language differences were poured and melted into one common American being. Rather, those first generation immigrants settled among their countrymen, speaking their native language and holding to all they nostalgically remembered from the old country. These Polish, German, Irish, Italians, and the rest *did not* become immediately integrated, but remained separate ethnic groups with their language as the core of their unity. Moreover they formed their separate religious groups in many cases. There were German Lutheran, Swedish Lutheran, German Methodists, and even Irish Catholics. The latter felt their own cultural unity as separate from other Catholics (although the Roman Catholic church stressed, as it still does, its universal unity).

It was the second generation, however, who found this separate ethnic grouping full of perplexities and dissatisfactions. It did not take the second generation immigrant long to realize that if he were first a Pole, or Swede or Irish, he was greatly handicapped in his opportunities here in America.

Then too, although the European language was spoken at home, English was the language which he learned in school. So this second generation young adult, consciously or unconsciously, began to revolt against all that his parents stood for, knowing that his success and identity as an American would be handicapped otherwise.

One of the most obvious ways in which he could declare his independence was to sever outward connection with the church of his parents. When once beyond the protection or dictation of the family, church affiliation was shed as a hindrance to his being an American.

There were, of course, other factors in operation. The rapid development of transportation, mobility of millions of people, and the new age of science with Darwin, Freud and others provided an intellectual framework for throwing aside orthodox religion. For others the roaring twenties provided other phases of the social context to make religion less important. At any rate, considerable sociological evidence points out this change in second generation religious and cultural identification.

But, according to some sociologists (Stewart, *American Ways of Life*, and Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, and Jew*), with the emergence of the third and fourth generations another change can be

seen. No longer is revolt against family and institutions necessary. In fact, in the past twenty years, most Americans have come to look upon all major religious institutions as having a place in the scheme of "The American way of life."

As Eric Fromm points out in his book, *The Sane Society*, people still have to have some point of identity, some relatedness if they are to be sane. And through all of the modernization of the American society, the feeling of identity with a religious body seemed to fill this need for a host of people. It may be natural, then, for the present generation to again identify with one of the main religious bodies. And it may be, as Herberg suggests, that at the present time we actually have a vague American Way of Life, subdivided into three main religious groups—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. And it may be true that our present religious interest stems, at least in part, from the third and fourth generation returning to a social identity with the church.

A second interpretation worth considering regarding our present religious bulge takes its clue from the writing of David Riesman in his book *The Lonely Crowd*. Riesman suggests that individuals and society or culture, at various stages in the cultural development, may be described as traditional directed, inner directed, and outer directed.

The first type—tradition directed—may be described as persons being molded by tradition, cultural mores, and in more primitive groups, by taboos. The tradition directed person's possibilities for self-fulfillment are limited by the rigid forces in his society, including his religious tradition. He might deviate slightly, but only to the extent of becoming a holy hermit in India, a shaman in the South Sea islands, or a monk in the Middle Ages. The rigid caste system of the Hindus of not many years ago and the Middle Ages in the West are both characteristic of a tradition directed society. And the willingness of the church in the time from Augustine in 400 A. D. to Thomas of Aquinas in 1100 A. D. to simply accept church authority and dogma is a clear example of this type of culture.

The second type, Riesman calls inner directed. In Western history the society that emerged with the Renaissance and Reformation serves as an illustration, as do the early days of this nation, at least in some respects. This type of man forges ahead, sometimes ruthlessly, toward the goals he has set for himself. The horizons are filled with opportunity for self advancement. He pursues them. Long established institutions like the church do not take the center

of the stage for this inner directed man. If religion is important, it is usually some individualistic type of personal salvation, or uncompromising social action.

But the third type of man, the outer directed, may be characteristic of our day. This type of man has a kind of built-in radar with which he is always at work receiving signals from his peer group. Being sensitive to "what people will think" he readily adjusts to the acceptable social pattern of his fellows. Like the tradition directed person, he is a conformist, but the latter conforms to the middle-class customs and mores. He finds those institutions which have become respectable and he embraces them like others who wear white shirts and narrow brimmed hats, drive a station wagon, and live in the suburbs.

If David Riesman's interpretation of American culture is correct, and since for one reason or another, the church has come to be one of the most respected institutions of every community, then we may see, in part, a reason for the popularity in church membership. I am reminded of a quip of Paul Roberts, Dean of the St. John's Cathedral in Denver. He said, humorously of course, that Episcopalianism is so popular because the Episcopal church is not concerned with either politics or religion.

It may be that from the point of view of an outer directed society we can understand the "Peale appeal." We live in a day when success, prosperity and prestige are coveted by millions of Americans. In a culture where the individual often gets lost in mass production, or mass management by huge corporations; when advertisers convince us we ought to want what we don't need—the appeal to positive thinking, and faith in success, catches fire. The theme song, "you can be better than you are," then, may be a part of a pattern of conformity in which religion is used, often successfully, to help people get that which our society measures as success.

Certainly Mr. Riesman's categories do not give all the reasons for increased church attendance. Nevertheless his approach is worth serious consideration as we try to understand religion in twentieth century America.

There is a third possible interpretation for the religious interest during this part of our century. Now I am well aware that a host of persons go to church only three times in their life. This is for *hatching, matching, and dispatching*. Or to put it differently, they go to be sprinkled three times: With *water, rice and dust*. Never-

theless, there may be a positive way of looking at the contemporary church. At least in some Protestant circles, there has developed in this century a gradual freedom for any person to reject traditional and sometimes antiquated creeds and to search for a religious faith in which he can believe with his whole *mind*. If a person persistently seeks for answers to the most pressing problem of human existence, and if those answers form his religious beliefs, then this century may be giving an opportunity for persons to make this search, unfettered by dogma, or meaningless verbiage simply handed down from previous generations.

And this kind of freedom has opened the doors within many churches for millions to search for religious truth and to find meaning in their religious quest, even though they be extremely to the left—or right—theologically. No person needs to reject the church in these days. He can find a genuine supporting community of like-minded people who are not made to feel guilty because they reject the Bible as literal truth, or the physical resurrection of Jesus. So it may be that religious interest has grown because a host of people find genuine meaning and stability in religious interpretations of life which at one time were shut out from them.

Let us leave this phase of our subject with no final answers to the religious growth in 20th century America. The three partial explanations cited may shed some light on why we see such astounding concern for religion in many quarters.

PART II

It appears clear that one of the major issues of our time is the problem of racial tensions. That racial tension is all about us is hardly disputable—whether it is in the half hidden prejudice in cities like Pittsburg, Kansas, or the conflicts in Clinton, Tennessee (so clearly portrayed on TV on January 6, in the Edward R. Murrow production "See It Now") or whether we look at the open warfare in Montgomery, Ala., where public transportation has been fired upon from city streets. The problem before us is to see, if we can, what role organized religion is playing in this entire complicated situation.

Now in the first place the ideology, the organizational pattern, and the social ethic of the Christian churches are part of our total culture. Whatever we find on the American scene we also find, in part, in the churches. In fact, religion, no matter how much it tries to be a critic of culture, is also one strand in the context of

that culture (or it makes its own culture—as the Amish have done). We can say, with partial accuracy, that religious institutions have contributed little toward integration—they have only reflected the patterns found in secular society.

The accusation is often made that no place in American society can one find racial segregation so solidly intrenched as at eleven o'clock on Sunday morning. In the face of continuous preaching since the days of the social gospel in the 1920's about the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man, the movement toward integration within the church has been like the speed of a snail!

In 1946, Dr. Frank S. Loescher, a sociologist at Temple University, made a study of 17,900 churches of six major Protestant denominations.⁴ Only 860 churches had congregations which included various races. Nearly all of those 860 were white congregations to which one or two Negro families came. Doctor Loescher concluded that those white groups who gathered for worship under the auspices of protestant Christianity and which were *genuinely* integrated, were almost microscopic. A more recent study made by the National Council of Churches indicates that more churches are becoming integrated, but this still includes only eight to nine percent of all churches.

Such a slow change can be understood. During the pre-Civil War days in the South when the mores of the community incorporated slavery, the church did not seriously challenge those customs. Similarly, when segregation, especially in the South, was accepted in school, transportation, and all social situations, the church found itself able to work within that framework. Of course, the church people gave Christmas gifts to the poor Negro janitor, and the white Christians treated the maid, or the garbage collector, with kind paternalistic condescending kindness. When Mose Jona's boy broke his leg, it was the church members who took an offering to get it fixed. But, by and large, the church conformed to the social pattern of a segregated society.

Throughout the entire Bible belt, where evangelistic preaching has always had its greatest impact, one might suppose that the fervor for evangelistic Christianity would have altered the situation. But whatever contribution evangelism has made, its main impact has not been a social one in regard to the race situation. The reason is clear to see.

Evangelical Christianity, especially in its pietistic versions, has

4. Loescher, Frank S., "Racism in Northern City Churches," *Christian Century* (February 8, 1956), pp. 174-176.

not and can never do much to better race relations. This form of the Christian faith relies on an over-simplification of all issues in order to create the "crisis" which prompts conversion. This is done by inducing a conflict or crisis in people as the evangelist makes the person aware that he has transgressed some commonly accepted moral norm and for which his conscience is uneasy, such as dancing, drinking, stealing and not going to church. But when a whole culture holds some practice to be right, such as segregation, the evangelist has a slim chance of convicting one of sin concerning race relations.⁵

And so at this first, though sketchy look, it appears that the church has *not* been a dynamic factor in directing our nation toward the kind of integration which now seems inevitable.

But this is not all of the story. The church in this century has also been a critic of culture, as well as a reflector of the *status quo*. As one looks into the writings of Walter Rauschenbush, John Hanes Holmes, Harry Emerson Fosdick, or Ernest F. Tittle, and Reinhold Niebuhr, one senses that the conscience of each man was uneasy. (If one were familiar with Roman Catholic writers, the same social concern might be discovered. Among Jewish writers, this concern is evident.)

With the influence of such leaders, a ferment of change began to work in the minds of many white churchmen. Furthermore, youth groups throughout the country began to exchange visits with youth groups across racial lines. By the close of World War II, many cakes of democratic yeast were at work among the youth in churches and colleges across the country.

Then when the U. S. Supreme Court made its historic decision regarding integration in the public schools, every major Protestant denomination, with the exception of the Southern Baptist and the Lutherans, declared officially their support, saying that the decision was a Christian one.

Furthermore, since this court decision (in fact for four to five years previous to it) editors of *The Christian Century*, probably America's most influential Protestant news journal, have written continuously on the subject. Scarcely an issue passed without a news story or an editorial, which stated in clear terms the obligation of the church in taking leadership in moving toward racial integration; and the result has been more than words.

For example, in Chicago, the First Baptist church and the St.

5. See Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Church and Race Relations," *Christian Century* (August 8, 1956).

James Methodist church (both on the south side) have led the way. Since the second world war, they found their communities rapidly absorbing Japanese Americans and Negroes. Both churches either had to sell out and move or let the church be of the people. Both churches, nearly dead in 1946, are now centers of thriving activity. The worship is formal, almost high church. But the spirit of adventure, comradeship, and integration cannot be disputed.

Finally, the most significant and creative leadership has come from the Negro churches. The most publicized person is of course Martin Luther King, of Montgomery, Ala. All reports indicate his calm leadership in guiding a non-violent campaign for equality of treatment in public transportation.

Of striking importance, moreover, was an article written by the Reverend Doctor King in the December, 1956, magazine *Liberation*. In writing primarily to Negro readers, he said that their task had only begun with bus integration. "Now," he said, "it is our task to conduct ourselves as responsible citizens. Now our religious faith must overflow in attitudes of respect for all persons, in loving forgiveness, and in actions worthy of our democratic gains."

Here, then, are several concrete examples of leadership within the church which cannot pass without our consideration. Whereas organized religion is on the one hand imprisoned by culture, on the other it is also seen as a critic and a leaven for cultural change.

This century gives promise of being one of the greatest in our history—that is, if we solve our major problems. And it may be that religion is playing its part in directing us toward a creative solution to the major issue of racial integration.

PART III

Finally, the question should be asked, "What's new in the way of serious religious thinking?" Of course books by Norman Vincent Peale have shown a new trend in what has been called "the cult of reassurance." But with all the jabs we throw at Peale about making a pal of God, and of thinking your way to success and prosperity, his approach has been meaningful for many people.

But among the academic theologians, Peale is mostly ignored. The question of "What's new" in religious thinking is not a good question. Although there are many creative theologians, probably ninety percent of the thinking and writing shows a return to orthodoxy.

Among the voices of theologians these days, one hears the pronouncements that man is a sinner—that he is separated from God and he can do nothing by himself, by reason or moral works, to

restore that relationship. Seldom does one hear the older liberal hope that man has undreamed of potentialities, or that he can know and serve God.

Man, it is being said, cannot achieve knowledge of God or religious truth by his experience and reason. Man must be confronted by God, they say. The few liberals who still believe in the value of man's search for religious knowledge are hard to find.

Since it is being said that a person cannot develop a religious faith from his reason and experience, he must begin on faith. Actually these new orthodox writers are returning to Augustine of the fourth century, who said, "We *believe* in order that we may know." Only a faint murmur is heard from the philosophically minded theologian who might say, "We *know* in order that we may believe."

The neo-orthodox insists, for the most part, that religion is born in the depths of tragedy and suffering. At those times man is confronted by God. Man knows he is chosen by God, and all that he can do is to confess or witness to others this new life. The person who insists that religious faith may be built, with the aid of science and clear thinking, is looked upon as a 19th century liberal.

The Bible is not said to be a source book of religion or a record of the religious experiences and convictions of man. The Bible is considered by most contemporary theologians as *The Revelation* of God. Similarly, little concern is being given in scholarly circles to the historical Jesus or his ethical teachings. Most emphasis is placed upon the Biblical faith as depicted in the letters of Paul. It is faith in the resurrected Lord which is gaining attention again in this century.

Some of the new theologians see a wider and wider gap between science and religion. Religion has its own source of knowledge, they say. This is revelation. One gains knowledge of his Christian faith as he first embraces the historic tradition of that faith as his own. Then he finds illumination to know truth. The sciences, they say, are useful in their own place, but they give us no data for religious understanding.

It is the conviction of this writer that religious faith can and must learn much from the sciences. Psychology, for example, is a most fertile field for gaining insights into man's nature. In physics, chemistry, and biology are undreamed of and unused data for understanding the universe. I have been trying to demonstrate that from the social sciences we can gain many insights about

religious institutions. Literature, art and music will always be means for man's expressing his deepest convictions and feelings. And clear and critical thinking, I believe, is indispensable in the development and clarification of a meaningful religious faith.

I hopefully predict that, as more people study religion, and as more are related to a religious community, there will grow a group of religious beliefs which will thus join the strengths of liberalism with the strengths of the new-orthodoxy. And we may see this new synthesis developing very soon.

What, then, is the condition of religion in the 20th century? At least we can say that religious beliefs and institutions are part of the total complex culture of this nation. Institutional religion may also be a critic and guide for that cultural development. And, at least, every concerned person can put forth his greatest effort to see that his religious convictions and subsequent actions are rooted not only in tradition, but in all available knowledge. Then religion will be able to serve man's deepest needs, help him answer his most basic questions, and guide society toward moral progress.

Automation in the Twentieth Century

By CHARLES J. DELLASEGA

It is a real pleasure to be here tonight to present the fourth and last Great Issues Lecture of this year on the subject of "Automation in the Twentieth Century." The importance of automation is reflected in the fact that it is second only to atomic energy in being the most widely discussed topic in industry today. Moreover, for many years management has been spending billions of dollars on the study of automation; labor too has its committees which are constantly seeking to analyze the effect of automation upon the labor force; and just within the last few weeks, before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Joint Council of the Economic Report, hearings were held with labor leaders, management executives, and government officials, to probe into the present and future effects of automation upon the American economy. This paper is not an attempt to discuss or to analyze all of the problems of automation, but rather to present some of the major problems involved in a change from an economy utilizing man-tendered machines, to one using machines that tend themselves or guide other machines.

Because of the complex nature of automation one ought to approach the subject with a deep sense of humility. Industry spokesmen say that a thorough study of automation machinery must be made continuously because the new machinery of today could become the obsolete machinery of tomorrow.

Since World War II, we have heard automation discussed as a potential threat to the national economy; as the answer to the need for increased leisure and opportunity; as a mysterious science utilizing robots and electronic brains; as a mechanical monster that threatens unemployment on a disastrous scale; and as a newspaperman's description of automation control from the kitchen toaster to the computing brain. One need only refer to the newspapers, trade magazines, television, or any other type of circulating media to find articles and programs describing automation both as a blessing and as a curse or as a Doctor Jekyll or a Mr. Hyde. In this paper, I will try to present a workable definition of automation, its historical background, and its advantages and disadvantages. I shall also attempt to draw conclusions as to what we can expect of automation in the future.

The modern concept of automation is in its infancy. It is so new that our dictionaries do not contain a definition of the term. What is automation? Some authorities point out that it is the automatic handling of units as they become an integral part of a production process. Others claim that it is a completely new philosophy of production or a new manufacturing technique. To obtain a practical definition of automation perhaps it would be well to look at our economy and describe what is happening on the industrial front. John Diebold, one of the most eminent authorities on automation today, has described this changing kind of technology as a basic change in production philosophy. He describes this philosophy as follows:

Our original and traditional attitude toward the organization of industrial processes has been to organize our industry according to the division of labor. When we first organized factories and businesses, we found it necessary to break down the work, to allow for a division of labor according to specific skills. Later activities were mechanized and machines were introduced into factories and this mechanization occurred around the division of labor. Now through automation we are beginning to see our industrial processes as complete integrated units, from the introduction of raw materials until the completion of the final unit.

The unit produced utilizing automation techniques may be a commodity such as an automobile or it could be a giant computer like Univac. Diebold has defined automation in another way by saying, ". . . it is a means of organizing or controlling production processes to achieve optimum use of all production resources—mechanical, material, and human."

The underlying mechanical principles of automation are certainly not new. As far back as 1784 Oliver Evans built an automatic flour mill in the city of Philadelphia. This mill was operated without the use of human labor from the time the grain was received at the mill until it became flour. In 1801 Joseph Jacquard invented an automatic loom controlled by punched paper cards utilizing the same basic techniques as used in our modern-day office equipment. The British navy was employing some automative principles in biscuit making as early as 1883.

It can be established then that we have had some forms of automation organization and control for the past two centuries. However, until the last two decades the development was slow and sporadic. Automation developed before World War II was especially fitted for accomplishing only a few tasks along the production line. Since 1943 we have seen the development and use

of automation on the mass production line as well as the utilization of a great number of self-correcting and self-operating machines. These automatic machines can correct errors and make other adjustments without the utilization of manpower.

In order to understand the principles of automation operation and control, we must look at the three main subdivisions of automation. The first type is called Detroit Automation. Here the tools are utilized on one large base and the parts to be machined are automatically loaded, machined, and then unloaded. No human labor is involved except a skilled operator who watches the electric panel board to make sure that everything is going according to schedule. He stops and investigates the progress of the machine only when his panel board indicates that some trouble has occurred in the operation. *Business Week* described one example of Detroit Automation in the machining of jet engines:

Using 55 carbide tools at about 600 HP, this many-armed monster does at one clip for 90¢ what used to cost \$1,200. It condenses a 2 acre plant into 20 square feet. It cost \$500,000 but replaced \$52 million worth of machines.

A second subdivision of automation is known as "Feedback" Automation. This type of automation employs the technique of self-correction. If a production process doesn't operate correctly, employing the wrong speed, thickness, etc., the gauge attached to the machine will automatically compensate for it and make the necessary correction. The thermostat in our homes is another example of "feedback." If one sets the dial at seventy and the room temperature is under seventy, the furnace clicks on, heats the room, and when the desired temperature is reached it clicks off. When the family leaves the house everyone assumes that the furnace will operate on this basis.

The theory and use of "feedback" was an essential part of the war effort during World War II and was studied and analyzed by scientists in the United States and Great Britain. The following illustration is cited by Diebold:

The introduction of rapidly moving aircraft very quickly made traditional gun-laying techniques of antiaircraft obsolete. It was impossible to follow such rapidly moving targets manually. As a result a large part of the scientific manpower in this country and in England was directed toward the development of self-regulating devices and systems to control our military equipment.

The principles of automation involved in the use of "feedback" comprise the very core of automation. Using a master control panel a few workers may watch a refinery go through the process

of guiding crude oil through its various stages until it emerges as a finished product. An oil industry spokesman has said that a refinery that employs 800 people with modern instrumentation could do the same job with twelve people, if instruments were utilized to the greatest possible extent.

A third kind of automation is called Computer Automation. Within the last few months we saw computers such as Univac predict our election result. Many companies are spending sums from \$200,000 to \$700,000 annually, solely to study the feasibility of using electric brains. Machines that tell exactly the financial condition of a business each day, and even every hour, are among the new helps for harried management. Two new data processing machines are in use which, in a single step, will adjust all manufacturing records—inventories, cost figures, and amount of goods in transit—after each transaction occurs. An electric typewriter that can “read” business forms, and fill in the blanks accordingly, has been invented recently. An advanced feature of the new accounting machines is the method whereby an individual can question the machines regarding a particular item. For example, typewriter operators at remote inquiry stations may “ask” the machines for a sales total or an inventory figure. Instants later the answer appears on the typewriter.

Just within the last few days, the Army has displayed its newest electronic brain. This machine, called Bizmac, keeps record of 100 million facts. It takes 100 people to operate it and covers over 20,000 square feet of floor space, and includes 220 units of nineteen different types of equipment. Is this machine efficient? Let us look at the facts. Bizmac can complete in forty-eight hours an inventory that once took three months to complete. In an hour it can complete as much computer work as 400 people operating calculating machines. Within a year this machine will reduce by eighty-five percent the Army’s visible records which will be a tremendous saving both in manpower and paper costs.

Automation will also bring advantages to the housewife. An appliance under consideration at the present time is a combination unit that stores frozen precooked foods, and at the touch of a button, sends a package of frozen food into a thawing chamber, delivering the food ready for serving at the table in a matter of minutes. The package in which the food is frozen and defrosted, say the designers, will be of a type that is attractive enough to place on the table, doing away with the need for a separate cooking utensil and serving dish. In the not too distant future a machine

will be developed that will be programmed to adjust the thermostat in the morning, turn on the radio to awaken you, start the coffee, turn on the lights, close the garage doors after you have driven out, start the dinner on time and turn it off when cooked, turn on the porch light at the correct time each evening and turn on the automatic washer in the wee hours of the morning so that there will not be a drain on the hot water at bathing or dishwashing time. Engineers are dreaming of the day when the electrostatic cleaning wand will be available for use in the home. Wave the appliance over the dusty table, floor, or furniture, and all dust within a few feet of the wand is attracted to it. When the wand is loaded, wash it off and it's ready for use again. These illustrations are just a few of the hundreds of different types of automatic controls that will be utilized in the future.

So far we have defined and given a short history of automation as well as pointed out some illustrations of the practical use of it. The remainder of the time will be spent in discussing factors that promote as well as retard automation. We must keep in mind that these factors are not opposites so far as the theory and practice is concerned; a factor which retards automation may under a different set of circumstances promote an increasing use of it. Such factors as whether or not we are in a period of prosperity or depression, the size of the labor force, the amount of unemployment, and management's and labor's reaction to it, are important in determining whether or not continued automation is possible.

It is on the employment of labor that automation has its greatest impact. David G. Osborn recently published a doctor of philosophy dissertation which revealed that in twelve cases of automation ranging from Univac Computer to Printed Circuit Fabrication, the percentage of employee requirements ranged from a minus ninety-two percent to a minus thirteen percent with an average reduction of 63.4 percent. In the oil refining industry, employment has fallen from 147,000 to 137,000 in the last seven years, although output has risen twenty-two percent. The Federal Reserve Index shows that production in mining and manufacturing was about the same at the end of 1954 as at the beginning, but total employment in these industries was down almost a million. It is often said that such declines will be offset by increases in employment in the more dynamic sectors of the economy, but even in the expanding electrical industry, employment remained constant at about 1,100,000 employed from 1952 to 1954. During the last decade or so there has not been any excessive unemployment due to automation because

our economy has been expanding rapidly enough to re-employ those that are displaced. The difficulty of displacement will arise when the economy levels off or there is a downswing in production causing recession or depression.

One of the most difficult types of displacement to analyze is the so-called hidden unemployment of downgrading. With the introduction of machinery there will be a need for new skills, which will require additional training and education. Many of the workers who are unable to make the transition will be downgraded in work even though there may be no loss of pay. They will have to work at jobs below their capacity because of the elimination of their present positions and the inability to move up into the more technically skilled positions. Other workers may find themselves technologically unemployed with little possibility of obtaining steady employment in the future.

Even though there are some major problems of displacement in the short run, labor unions as well as management feel that automation will provide us with a better standard of living, greater leisure time, and an adequate program of national defense. If properly utilized, automation will rid us of the many routine jobs along the assembly line. On the other side of the ledger there are such problems as the dislocation of the labor force, geographical shifts of industry, the upgrading of labor, training and retraining the labor force, and the need for rapidly growing markets.

Labor unions do not oppose technological innovation and the automation that results from it. They are interested in making the transition to automation with the least possible hardship on the American public. Labor officials point out that science and technology have given us the tools of economic abundance—this economic abundance will only come about when we use our resources and our technology, fully and effectively, within a framework of economic policies that are morally right and socially responsible.

Being pragmatists, labor leaders are more concerned with the short run than they are with long run goals. Union officials feel that automation makes the need for vigilance all the more important because the instability of the short run could be as great as the problems created by the industrial revolution. Long ago labor officials learned that one does not keep a dues-paying organization alive by promises of what the future holds. The idea of survival has been a part of the basic philosophy of labor unions from the time of their origin.

Labor has spelled out its program for making the transition to the automated age. It feels that purchasing power will have to be maintained at a high level in order for the American people to consume the many billions of dollars of goods that automation will provide. Labor officials feel that the program of guaranteed annual wages, unemployment compensation, retraining of labor, and other pertinent factors will have to be dealt with not only by labor but by management and government as well.

In dealing with the short-run problems of automation, the laboring man feels that the guaranteed annual wage represents the greatest security to the worker. It will serve as a cushioner or as a regulator of technological innovation so that automation will be introduced when there will be the least hardship on the working man and no mass layoffs would occur. In other words, the introduction of machinery would be geared to periods when there were expanding markets so that other jobs would be available for the workers displaced by automation.

As mentioned earlier, one of the advantages claimed for the greater use of technology is that it would eliminate the routine jobs involved in mass production. The upgrading of labor will present a difficult problem for both management and labor in the future. The National Manpower Council has this to say:

Many of today's electricians will have to learn electronics if they are to retain their skilled status. Pipefitters will have to learn hydraulics. A skilled worker who formerly measured with calipers and now uses a micrometer will soon have to learn to work with tolerances measured with light waves. . . . There may be almost no place left for the unskilled workers.

The semi-skilled also face the same problem, according to the Industrial Relations Editor of *Factory Management and Maintenance*:

The jobs that will be eliminated by automatic production are mainly the semi-skilled ones, such as machine operating and materials handling. Some observers believe that the factory of the future may go so far as to wipe out this great middle class of industry.

The premise can be made that the high gross national product and national income of the American economy can be attributed to two basic factors: First, the national resources that we have in abundance; secondly, the utilization of technology. Inherent in the use of technology and automation is a program of mass education. Undoubtedly our educational system has largely been responsible for attaining the standard of living that we enjoy in our American economy. However, it is also the greatest limiting factor.

In the recent congressional hearings on automation, Walter S. Buckingham pointed out that a National Science Foundation study shows that out of the upper twenty-five percent of high-school students about half are unable to go to college and another thirteen percent drop out before finishing college. Thus, nearly two-thirds of those with the greatest potential for scientific leadership never receive a college education. Less than one-quarter of one percent of these continue through to the doctor of philosophy degree. Perhaps businessmen might find it to their own self-interest to increase endowments for deserving impoverished students.

In order to combat shortages of skilled personnel in industry, many business executives are calling for readjustments in curricular offerings to "put greater emphasis on the electrical, mathematical, and mechanical sciences." However, they do not want this specialization to produce individuals who would be at home only in a scientific vacuum but rather would want individuals who have a knowledge of the liberal arts. Management executives point out that to be successful in business, people must understand human relations, economics, psychology, and sociology. As an experiment, the Bell Telephone Company is sending groups of young executives to the University of Pennsylvania for ten months' exposure to the humanities.

Another source of irritation to the American people who are worried over the lack of skilled personnel, is that Russia is apparently getting ahead of us in science education. During the year 1956, the United States graduated 27,000 engineers, Russia graduated 50,000 engineers; we graduated about 50,000 technicians and Russia graduated thirty-two times that number.

The reasons for Russian supremacy seem to be based on two factors: first, they encourage their bright college-age students to train for engineering and give as an incentive the postponing of military service; secondly, they promote the training of well-qualified and well-paid teachers. Dr. Edwin Nourse, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, states it this way:

I think there is no doubt that Russia is doing a very good job in training its people . . . They are doing good teaching. A very important aspect of that is that their teachers are respected. They are regarded as men of attainment . . . Russia simply puts the finger on a man and says to him, "You are a teacher," whereas in this country we are likely to say, "You are an industrial employee at three times your previous salary."

In recent congressional hearing on automation practically all present, business executives, labor leaders, and government officials,

thought that higher teacher salaries plus teacher recognition would help solve at least a part of the problem of teacher shortages. In addition, these people thought that a system of national scholarships for bright young men and women and possible deferment of military service might help solve the shortage of technically trained people.

One of the big problems in the training of future scientists and skilled people is to give adequate exploratory work on the secondary-school level. Through this type of curricular offering perhaps more people will become interested in the sciences and continue their education through college. Lack of equipment, the teacher shortage, the small high school, and many other problems confront communities and curriculum makers when challenged to revise the pattern of courses.

In addition to formal education, more schools need to provide an adequate program of vocational education. This type of instruction augmented by training in industry would help supply the industrial economy with the manpower necessary to carry out a program of increasing productivity.

In order to assure industry of a ready pool of skilled personnel, practically all major industrial plants have training programs of their own. "The factory of the future," says one executive, "may not look like a college, but it's going to look more like one than you think." Why has industry undertaken the training of its employees? First of all there is a vast shortage of available trained personnel, so industry must train them if manpower quotas are to be filled. Secondly, many industrialists think that an in-service program of education will enable the companies to hold their personnel and will also pay off in more efficient and profitable production. This training that is presented by management is largely a matter of survival—to compete effectively, a steady stream of well-qualified personnel must be available. Just recently management executives pointed out that the greatest limiting factor in our continued expansion of productivity was the lack of skilled personnel.

How does the businessman stand with respect to the introduction of automation? He feels that the limitation on automation is not a matter of techniques or instruments, it is a matter of costs and of the supply of highly-skilled individuals.

In our system of economic activity, production is guided by the theory that a profit should be made for producing a commodity. If a particular machine costs too much when compared with the cost of labor in putting out the same amount of production, the

machine will not be introduced. To cite an example: Suppose that a company has to pay \$1,000,000 for a machine that will do the work of twelve men. Management must be reasonably sure that the unit cost is reduced when the machine is utilized—if this is not the case then the company will continue to use labor rather than utilize the machine. In addition to the lowering of costs there are other important factors. A company must be sufficiently large to utilize equipment—this of course means that they must have a sizable amount of capital available for the purchase of machinery. Then there is the depreciation and obsolescence, which is quite costly to a company. The element of risk is greater when a company uses high fixed costs. If the need for liquidation arises it is almost impossible to get the dollar value out of the fixed assets or machinery. In other words, when a company spends large sums of money for machinery, it has high fixed costs whether it produces or not. This is not true when labor is utilized instead of machinery since the company can always lay off and rehire laborers as their sales fluctuate. Labor cost, or variable cost, as it is sometimes called, is far more flexible, particularly for the smaller companies.

It can be established then that the major elements in a production method are the costs of labor and the cost of machinery. The assumption may also be made that in utilizing a particular production method it is the relationship or ratio between labor costs and machinery costs that finally determines the production technique used. It is also a truism that cost analysis has been given far greater priority than other factors in determining whether or not automation will be used in our industrial society. Why is it that the cost of labor rises faster than the cost of machinery? The trend is explained by the fact that the managements which produce industrial machinery are themselves pressed by rising labor costs. In response, they introduce labor-saving methods, with the result that comparable machines may be produced with fewer high-cost-man hours.

Thus the increase in the price of the machines is not so great as the increase in the cost of man-hours. The relationship also holds among countries. In 1950, United States industrial workers were paid about four times as much as British workers. At the same time the prices of a sampled group of United States-made products were not more than sixty percent higher than the prices of comparable British machines.

An interesting point of view is expressed by Mr. John L. Snyder, Jr., president of the United States Industries:

It often has been thought that automation in its ultimate sense in any industrial plant is a desirable goal because it will reduce labor costs . . . but reduction of labor costs is only a part of the point. Another highly desirable feature of automation in relation to labor is the fact that machines are easier to control than people.

One wonders, however, how income would be distributed so that this tremendous population of ours would be able to buy the many products produced by automation in the short run. This point of view may be emphasized by the following story: Not too long ago one of the executives of the automobile industry was escorting Walter Reuther through a miniature factory completely automatic from the very beginning until the finished product came down the assembly line. The executive asked Mr. Reuther where he would get his union members when factories of this sort became commonplace. Mr. Reuther then asked, "And where will you get your customers?" The introduction of machinery to cut labor costs is then only one particular phase of short-run problems of automation. With our economy producing a gross national product of 415 billion dollars, we must think not only in terms of full productivity but also of full consumption. Automation in the short run could provide us with greater productivity as well as diminishing purchasing power.

Another reason for the increasing use of automation in the last few years has been the favorable depreciation rate given to industry. This depreciation allowance, called the declining balance method, enables management to write off considerably larger depreciation allowances in the early years of the life of the new machinery. This rate depreciates forty percent of the cost of the asset in the first quarter of its service life and two-thirds of the cost in the first half of its life. The depreciation rate is aimed particularly at minimizing revenue losses and obtaining maximum incentive effect.

More liberal depreciation allowances would have far-reaching economic effects. These allowances must be well-timed to help maintain the present high-level investment in plant and equipment. This acceleration is of critical importance in the decision of management to incur risk. The faster the tax writeoff the more working capital that will be available for the financing of new expansion. This allowance encourages management to replace the machinery before it normally would be changed, and leads to investment in more complex automated machinery. Conversely, any unfavorable

tax policy would tend to retard automation. For all segments of the American economy, liberalized depreciation policies would assist in modernization, an expansion of industrial capacity, and a higher standard of living.

The small businessman may find the road to automation a particularly rough one. Small business has been hard pressed in the last two or three years as indicated by the number of business failures which rose sharply in 1954 and remained high throughout 1955. A part of the answer lies in the fact that small business is not able to compete with the big corporation in the scrapping of old and purchasing of new equipment which is essential to efficient and low-cost operation. It is true that some computers and other types of automatic machinery may be available to small and medium-sized businesses because of the relatively low cost. However, in most cases the machinery will be quite expensive and not within the reach of anyone except the largest of the corporations.

It is imperative then that assistance be given to the smaller industries in making the transition to automation. How might this be done? First government policy should be aimed at assisting small businesses to maintain their existence. A generally liberal credit policy, long-term loans, and low interest rates, should be made available to small and medium-sized industries. In addition, the Justice Department should be more vigilant in their prosecution of monopolistic practices. Government procurement policies should be aimed at helping small companies receive more government contracts. If these policies are followed, perhaps the transition to automation will not be as painful as it might have been for small industry.

Another result of automation will be the reduction of the work week and an increased amount of leisure time. Many economists feel that until automation actually forces a far greater leisure on the American working force, thereby fostering new businesses and services to cater to that leisure, it is not likely to inspire any tremendous wave of secondary investment. Professors Walter S. Buckingham and Sherman F. Dallas, in a paper presented to the Southern Economic Association, flatly predicted that, by its very nature automation, "will not make the far-reaching investment expression that the introduction and later improvements in automobiles, railroads, and canals created."

In the last analysis it is this steady increase of leisure time that will have to be relied upon to solve the problem of the technologi-

cally displaced. As fewer and fewer people are needed in industry, other businesses such as those offering recreational opportunities, entertainment, adult education, and rebuilding of roads, will come into being and will re-employ many of those displaced by automation. Not all of the burden of the adjustment should fall on industry; labor unions and government will have to share the responsibility. A drastic change in our educational institutions will be needed to educate people for the new leisure. The thirty-two-hour week which is probably as close as 1960 will provide additional time for people to become better informed, so that they can function more adequately in our technological society. Recreational, cultural, and education facilities are already overcrowded. We must have a large scale expansion of these facilities. Leisure time would be meaningless without the proper economic resources, adequate physical activities, and a positive social program. If we do not solve these problems, we will be faced with the dilemma that Robert Hutchins posed for America. He said, and I paraphrase him, "Americans can either blow themselves to bits with thermonuclear weapons or bore themselves to death with the leisure time that automation provides."

In conclusion, it may be stated that automation like the atom has unlimited possibilities. No one can safely predict what our economy will be producing in gross national product and national income within a decade or two. Optimists tell us that we will increase our productivity from fifty percent to one hundred percent within a decade or two and this will mean a better standard of living for all Americans—more television sets, electrical appliances, and other goods that make living a little easier. The road to increased productivity will not be an easy one—the problems of unemployment, cost, more equitable distribution of income, and other factors relative to the introduction of automation will have to be dealt with. We must, therefore, study automation trends so that we can better understand it, control it, and direct it into avenues for increasing human welfare and betterment.

Through long-range planning, corporations know fairly well what types of automated equipment they will install in the years to come. However, as yet there has been no clearinghouse established to assemble, integrate, and study this technical information so that the necessary steps can be taken to cushion the economy against rapid introduction of automated machinery. Perhaps a government agency needs to be established, with labor, manage-

ment, and government acting as a clearinghouse and collectively working toward a solution of problems that continued automation will bring.

Finally, if automation is properly utilized and controlled, it will provide us with an economy of abundance with the opportunity of relieving hunger and scarcity for the first time in the history of the world. However, the economic implications must be carefully analyzed so that the mistakes of the first industrial revolution can be avoided and the benefits of the new technology more equitably distributed.