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Fall 2005

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Logos-Sophia:

The Journal of the PSU Philosophical Society
Fall/Winter 2005



Heather L. Horton, *kathy*, acrylic on canvas

Volume 13

Logos-Sophia

The Journal of the
Pittsburg State University
Philosophical Society



Volume 13,
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Logos-Sophia

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Editor's Introduction

Two-thousand five was a banner year in philosophy for Pittsburg State University and for the PSU Philosophical Society. In the Fall/Winter semester, the department of Social Sciences welcomed James McBain to the faculty as the second full-time instructor in philosophy. A native of St. Louis, Missouri, Mr. McBain received undergraduate degrees in psychology (Truman State) and philosophy (University of Missouri-St. Louis). He received the M.A. in philosophy from the University of Missouri at Columbia and is soon to graduate from there with the doctorate in philosophy. Before coming to PSU, Mr. McBain taught for the past two years at Kansas State University. His teaching and research interests include epistemology, ethical theory, applied ethics, philosophy of mind/psychology, and decision/game theory. With the hiring of Mr. McBain, PSU doubled its "philosophy department" and made it possible to offer a broader spectrum of courses in philosophy and religion.

Mr. McBain's presence has increased the visibility of philosophy on campus and it may help account for the present vitality of the Philosophical Society. He constructed the website for philosophy for the Social Sciences webpage and he is currently working on the webpage for the Philosophical Society. He is also responsible for formatting this number of *Logos-Sophia* in preparation for its publication. PSUPS met on a weekly basis throughout the year, but attendance at the meetings increased after Mr. McBain's arrival. At the four meetings during the Fall semester at which I took attendance, the average number of persons in attendance was ten.

On November 10th members of PSUPS traveled to Manhattan, Kansas to hear Michael Ruse of Florida State University speak on the topic, "Evolution and Atheism: A Marriage Made in Heaven?" Jacob Metz, Karen Pawlus, England Porter, Brian Ray, Jon Ray, Lorna Rogers, and Rusty White accompanied Mr. McBain and me to hear the lecture. Another major event during the semester was a public talk by Dr. Douglas Patterson (Department of Philosophy at Kansas State University), sponsored by PSUPS, on the topic, "Some Issues in the Definition of Truth." Dr. Patterson's lecture was on December 9th and was very well attended.

The Society is particularly grateful to Jon Ray and Brian Ray (no relation) for seeing that PSUPS was represented before Student Government and that it received funds for its activities.

The Society also owes a thank-you to Karen Pawlus for orchestrating the purchase of quality hooded sweatshirts, complete with the PSUPS logo on the front.

The present number of *Logos-Sophia* features articles from two graduates of PSU and former members of PSUPS, the winner of the Women's Studies essay contest, and two essays by current students.

The lead article is by J. Todd Gimlin, a founding member of PSUPS, and the artist who designed the Society's logo. Mr. Gimlin graduated from PSU with a degree in Graphic Design in 1990. He currently lives in Wichita, Kansas with his very logical wife Amanda, where he designs websites for a living and plays bass in the oldest punk band in the Midwest.

Dinara Abjamilova was an exchange student at PSU from Turkey during the 2004-2005 school year and was the winner of the Women's Studies Essay contest. The Philosophical Society is particular happy to publish Ms. Abjamilova's essay and to reinitiate a partnership with the Women's Studies Committee. Winning essays in the contest first appeared in the second number of *Logos-Sophia* (Spring 1990) and were published in four subsequent numbers (Spring 1991, Spring 1992, Spring 1994, and Spring 1996).

Steven W. Hulbert graduated from PSU in May 2005 with a major in Geography, and minors in Marketing and Philosophy. He is pursuing graduate studies in Philosophy at Claremont Graduate University in Claremont, California. He is currently enrolled in classes on Hume, and Belief in God for an Age of Skepticism. In the Spring he will be taking courses in Epistemology, Aristotle, and Wittgenstein. Upon finishing his M.A. his plans are to secure a Ph.D. to prepare him for teaching Philosophy at the university level.

Ethan Smilie is a senior majoring in English with a Philosophy minor. His interests include literature, philosophy, and theology of the Middle Ages, especially Chaucer, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Medieval English Mystics. Besides studying the Thomistic thought of the Medieval English Mystics, he has also studied their use of metaphor and presented a paper on the subject to the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Arkansas Philological Association in Little Rock. Mr. Smilie plans to go to graduate school and one day to become a university professor.

Jacob Metz is a Communication major with a Philosophy minor. He plans to graduate in Spring 2007 and to pursue the teaching of speech and debate at the high school level.

It is with pleasure that I introduce these authors to the reader as evidence of the on-going vitality of Philosophy at PSU, past, present, and future.

Donald W. Viney
Faculty Advisor, Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society

My Brain in a Jar: Confessions of a Former Philosophy Student

J. Todd Gimlin

A few years ago I was out on a date with Sarah, a woman I had recently met. She had suggested that we go to an old-fashioned barn party given by some friends of hers. I told her that I really wasn't a barn party kind of guy, as I had never actually been in a barn before and probably lacked the necessary barn skills. Sarah was persistent, and since I wanted to make a good impression I eventually agreed to go. The party was out in the middle of nowhere and was exactly what I had pictured in my head—hay bales, a bonfire, apple cider and lots of clean-cut people in flannel.

Her friends greeted Sarah and me warmly, and for a while I believed that I might actually enjoy myself. And then I started listening to the conversations going on around me. I discovered that Sarah's friends were the most frighteningly ultra-conservative group I had ever met. They were saying the most hate-filled things, each one of them with the exact same smile plastered on their faces while they said them. They were the Stepford Nazis. At one point in the evening, after I had been subjected to diatribes against blacks, homosexuals, Catholics and the French, I had had enough. Someone was loudly arguing against abortion rights, using the argument that since abortion is murder it has to be illegal, since murder is illegal. Everyone in the barn except me nodded wholeheartedly at the speaker's brilliance. It looked like a barn full of bobble-head dolls in a stiff breeze. Realizing that I was outnumbered, I should have said, "Why yes, you're absolutely right. Your reasoning is flawless." Instead I said, "You have got to be kidding me. That's the worst example of question begging I've ever heard. Your argument makes no sense at all." The crowd lost their ever-present smiles as they turned and glared at me. I quickly excused myself and left before they decided to throw me in the bonfire. I never saw Sarah again, and for this I directly blame Dr. Donald Wayne Viney.

If it hadn't been for the philosophy classes that I took while in college and my involvement in the PSU Philosophical Society, I might not have developed any critical reasoning skills at all. I might have been satisfied to sit at home with my new wife Sarah and watch TV shows where

people claim to talk to the dead, and believe they do because I had never heard of confirmation bias. I could have used the argument from popularity fallacy and said, "Since the majority of Americans think gay marriage would be bad, it must be bad." I might have believed in the false dichotomies politicians use like, "You're either for our policies, or you're anti-American." I might even have used straw man arguments like, "Since evolution says we came from monkeys, there shouldn't be any monkeys left, so evolution can't be true." I can imagine myself happy believing in things without a good reason, or for illogical reasons. But then again, ignorance is only bliss until somebody gets hurt.

In the beginning. So to speak...

I was part of the original group that founded the PSU Philosophical Society in 1987. We had come to the end of a philosophy class, and to celebrate we had gone out as a group to eat. Most of the original framework for the organization came about that evening eating pizza. In fact, I have a vague recollection that *every* decision we made about the Philosophical Society involved food of some sort. At this initial gathering we set out our basic goals for the group, discussed names for the organization, and decided that you couldn't join unless you loved Monty Python and agreed to memorize the lyrics to the *Philosopher's Song*. Dr. Viney paid for the meal, so we allowed him to be our faculty advisor, as long as he wasn't disruptive during the meetings.

Because I was the only one in the original group that had any graphic design experience, I was given the title of Creative Director. It fell to me to create some kind of logo for the organization. You might have seen it. Looking at it now with years of experience under my belt I can tell you that I'm entirely embarrassed by the thing and think it needs to be updated. It just doesn't have the impact it should. I'm working on a new design involving a gorilla throwing rocks at members of the Kansas School Board. I also had the privilege of producing the first issue of *Logos-Sophia*. The journal was to be our voice in the community, a way for us to extol the virtues of philosophy. It was also a vehicle to show how incredibly intelligent we were to our parents and perhaps most importantly, an attempt to raise our grades in whatever philosophy classes we were taking at the time. In fact, I'm hoping this essay will persuade Dr. Viney to raise my grade in the ethics class I took seventeen years ago.

Although the society was involved in several activities while I was there, the one the members looked forward to most was movie night. We'd meet at someone's house and watch a movie, and in the process attempt to find something in the movie to start a philosophical discussion about. Given the quality of most Hollywood movies, this proved to be exceedingly difficult. Most of the time we had little to work with, and were left to make fun of what we were watching, like the time we booed whenever Barbara Streisand broke into song in *Yentl*, or when we decided that George Bailey didn't have *that* wonderful a life, and if angels depended on bell ringing for wings, why didn't they pass out bells in church along with the hymnals?

To raise money for the organization we occasionally held bake sales and sold flowers. These activities didn't do much to promote the macho image we were striving for, but they kept us in popcorn for movie nights. We also tried to involve ourselves in the community. I remember one year we sang Christmas carols to the elderly in nursing homes, which in today's politically correct environment would be the equivalent of singing "holiday carols" to the "age-challenged" in "senior centers." We also partnered with the local humane society to distribute hay for doghouses in the winter. The dogs were appreciative, but had a hard time understanding the copies of *Logos-Sophia* we passed out to them, preferring instead to slobber on them a bit before ignoring them.

Why does it matter?

Part of the reason the Philosophical Society was formed was to spread the word about philosophy and its importance in society. We wanted to dispel the notion that philosophy was nothing more than half-baked hippies sitting around asking questions like "Can God create a rock so heavy he can't lift it?" and "How do you know you're not a brain in a jar and nothing you experience is actually real?" Incidentally, the answers to these questions are, "What the hell are you talking about?" and "You should probably put that down, I think you've had enough." Without seeing the practical side of philosophy, the subject was often looked upon by students as an elitist endeavor in wordplay that didn't produce any useful results.

When I was in college taking philosophy classes, the most common question I got from my friends was, "Why are you taking philosophy? It won't do you any good." Then they'd run off to their art appreciation classes where they would learn terms like chiaroscuro and impasto. Years later, these same people would admit that while they still remember the words chiaroscuro and

impasto, they thought they were brands of spaghetti sauce. Meanwhile, I was taking classes that played a part in shaping who I am today. It's true that I learned the names of a lot of German men

Rather than only dealing with intangible ideas, philosophy taught me the means by which we examine our thinking. The more I learned about philosophy, the more it became increasingly important to me to inspect the reasons behind my beliefs in order to achieve a consistent worldview. Once I started doing that, it was apparent to me that much of what I took for granted to be true might not be true at all, and that some of the positions I held were based on flawed logic. In addition, the most exhilarating and terrifying thing I've found about critical thinking is that a change in one aspect of your thinking can force you to reexamine everything you believe in. For example, if you run across what you believe to be the perfect argument against free will, how would your new belief affect your views on religion, or on crime and punishment? This holistic approach to thinking is perhaps philosophy's most powerful tool.

Carrying the torch.

It's important in the anti-intellectual age in which we seem to find ourselves to spread the word that philosophy has real-world applications and should be held in the highest regard. Human beings are, after all, philosophical creatures by nature. It's what defines us as a species. We discuss and debate difficult ethical and moral questions like stem cell research and the death penalty, trying to sway others to our way of thinking. It's our approach to these debates that often is the problem. It's entirely okay to say that you don't know a definite answer to these questions. It's not okay to say that you definitely *do* know the answer to these questions, and that there is absolutely no way you could be wrong. Philosophy should be viewed as the antidote to that way of thinking, because if nothing else, philosophy calls upon us to examine what we think is true of the world without presupposing that we are correct in our beliefs.

So make an old former student proud and get people interested in philosophy. Give everyone you know a copy of this journal, or photocopy articles and give them to friends. Whenever someone emphatically states an opinion about a subject, ask them why they think that way. Keep asking why until they realize what your point is or they punch you in the face. Stand on the corner and shout passages from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* at the top of your lungs until

the TV crews and the police show up. As you're being led away, tell them that it's all Don Viney's fault.

Winner of the PSU Women's Studies Essay Contest

Kyrgyzstan's Culture of Shaming Dinara Abjamiloua

"A woman's stone stays where it is thrown."

Kyrgyz proverb

Shaming is a part of every culture in the world. Usually, when an individual or a group of individuals has done something that is considered deviant, embarrassing, or unacceptable in their particular social setting, one of the feelings they could experience is shame. In Kyrgyzstan, this particular cultural attribute is probably no different than in other societies; many people try and hide "dark secrets" about themselves and/or their family members from the community in which they live. Nevertheless, what makes Kyrgyzstan's "Culture of Shaming" interesting from a research aspect is the enormous amount of influence it has in controlling societal behavior. Moreover, the control mechanisms that have been established by the "elites" of Kyrgyzstan—respected tribal leaders dating back to the nomadic time period—have disadvantaged and discriminated against women dramatically.

My main argument is that the socialization of shaming and lack of trust in the judicial system are increasing gender inequalities in Kyrgyzstan. Women strongly depend on public opinion; they are afraid to be shamed. In addition, there are proverbial sayings and unwritten laws in this society that greatly influence the increasing nature of unreported domestic violence incidents and make the women keep silent. For example: "If a woman is a good wife, she can turn her husband into a good person." This clearly places the blame for a man's bad behavior onto his wife. And the saying "a woman is the property of another family," reinforces a woman's role as a possession of her husband.

Methods.

In order to understand the influence of the socialization of shaming and the lack of trust in the judicial system as regards the increase of violence against women, I went to the women's

NGOs in Osh and interviewed the directors. I read their statistical information and the analyses of their consultations. In addition, I interviewed abused women from 19 to 45 years of age, using a list of questions I developed, and also interviewed young women of the Faculty of Natural Sciences in Osh State University.

Kyrgyzstan's Culture of Shaming

"Shaming" is a way that a society controls the behavior of people. I think that it comes from the historic past, as from ancient times people have respected their elders, and have tried to follow their guidance. In societies in which one's quality of life depends heavily on the attitudes and respect of close friends, neighbors, and extended family members, things like gossip, rumor-mongering, and public opinion are effective ways to accomplish this control. Where personal peace of mind is tied closely to maintaining harmonious relationships, the fear of losing the respect of one's peers makes people dependent on others' opinions.

In looking at the status of Kyrgyz women in the past, their discrimination began from the moment of their birth. The birth of the girl was looked upon as an unhappy event, while the birth of a boy was cause for celebration. The lives of the women were characterized by the strenuous daily labor needed to run households, which damaged their health, and gave them less opportunity for intellectual development. Also, she was completely subservient not only to her husband, but to all her relatives as well. There were no laws protecting a woman's rights, but today, even living in a supposed civil and democratic society, the violence against women is increasing.

Since Kyrgyzstan became an independent republic, it has adopted several laws, and joined international conventions and declarations that better protect women's human rights. For example, in 1995 Kyrgyzstan participated in the 4th International conference on Women's Status, Beijing Platform of Actions. In 1996, the *Zhogorku Kenesh* (Congress) of the Kyrgyz Republic ratified five international United Nations conventions on the status of women. Furthermore, in 2003, the *Zhogorku Kenesh* adopted two laws concerning gender issues: 1: the law guarantees basic rights providing gender equality in the Kyrgyzstan Republic; and 2: a law on social-legal protection of those who suffered from family violence. Despite these laws,

violence against women—such as battery, non-consensual kidnapping, polygamy, and rape—has increased. The Osh Women's Crisis Center, *Aruulan*, reported 2,218 women were treated for psychological problems, 452 women suffered from battery, and 585 women's husbands had committed adultery'. In addition, many women suffered from depression and alcoholism. *Aruulan's* director, Nazira Eshtaeva, claims most women will not appeal to the militia because they do not trust nor rely on their abilities to help them. She continues that most of the women have found that the local militia blames them for the abuse, treating them disrespectfully. A second women's NGO—*Ak Gurok*—recently reported that 78% of women do not trust the militia and do not ask for their help.² Representatives from *Ak Gurok* claimed that only one of two females using their support services had notified the militia and were not satisfied with the help they received.

One 19-year-old girl from the Nookat region who had been raped in November of 2003 came to the crisis center *Ak-Gurok* for help. Before coming to the crisis center she went to the police on the day the rape occurred. The militia did not file a criminal report and instead, blamed her for seducing the rapist. Next, they sent her to another militia station, which subsequently sent her to yet another militia station. Three days passed and it became impossible to arrest the rapist.³

Another important reason that domestic violence and the abuses women suffer go unreported are directly related to Kyrgyzstan's cultural attributes—the fear of shaming. In Kyrgyz society, under no circumstances, should any shame be brought upon a family or members of that family. Any negative aspect that may be associated with a family's name is guarded very secretly and never spoken of. An uncle may be in prison for raping his niece; a brother could be involved in dealing narcotics; a mother may have given birth to an illegitimate child; all of these secrets will be guarded closely to protect the family's name, status, and tribal affiliation in the village. This of course, is difficult to do, for *yshak* (gossip) is an integral part of society, and women and men

gather for hours on a daily basis and discuss what is happening in their lives and lives of their neighbors.

Socializing Children in a Culture of Shaming

This may very well be one of the first words children learn when growing up. Parents constantly use the verb—*uyat* (shame)—when speaking to their children. Kyrgyz traditional social mores are representative of unwritten laws and beliefs that are developed from early times that require women to be subservient. A woman should be patient, modest, listen to the words of parents. Especially, a father's word is the "law" for the girl; girls never should oppose their elders. After marriage, this subservience is transferred to the mother-in-law and the other elder female relatives in order to protect her family's reputation and that of her parents. There is a proverb that claims, "the daughter-in-law is not bad, her parents are." Thus, for parents, the divorce of their daughter is shameful, even in some cases when a woman is blameless, but tries to protect her family's reputation, in spite of being stuck in an abusive marriage. Most women try to appear to society as clever and ideal wives and daughters-in-law and act the part as well. The actions of these women can be clearly explained by the theory of Erving Goffman. He says that the way an individual appears before others will influence the definition of the situation that they come to be in. "Sometimes the individual will act in a thoroughly calculating manner, expressing himself in a given way solely in order to give that impression to others. Sometimes he will intentionally and consciously express himself in a particular way, but chiefly because the tradition of his group or social status require this kind of expression. Sometimes the traditions of an individual's role will lead him to give a well-designed impression of a particular kind and yet he may be neither consciously nor unconsciously disposed to create such an impression."⁴

From ancient times in the Middle East and Central Asia girls were married very early; when they were about 12-13 years-old they should be legally married. There is a saying that the younger a girl is when she marries, the easier it is for her new family to train her to internalize their rules. According to this tradition, women are born in order to live in the family of their husbands and unquestioningly implement all the requirements of her husband, his relatives and especially—his

mother. Preparing girls to marry begins in their early years. Mothers, grandmothers, and aunts usually assume the role of preparation. From their viewpoints, the highest goal of a girl is to be a wife and mother—other things are not very important. Young women internalize these traditional stereotypes during their early years of childhood development. It is well-known that the process of a person's socialization starts from his or her birth. Even in the family, a child lives in an atmosphere of social and cultural stereotypes that become established through education and upbringing, reinforced by the pressure of public opinion. Traditional stereotypes definitely give a girl/woman a subordinate role, emphasizing only her reproductive function. Women in Kyrgyzstan are taught to be obedient. They are stay-at-home housewives responsible for all the housework, raising children, and today, beginning to contribute more and more to the economic well-being of the family.

Kyrgyz Proverbial Sayings

A Kyrgyz proverb states "a girl is the guest," meaning girls live with their natal family temporarily until they become members of another family. According to this proverb, girls and boys are educated and brought up differently. The education of boys is given more attention, as they are considered to be the future supporters of the family. On the other hand, girls are trained to be obedient, modest, and patient. A second proverb, "The girl is the other family's property," gives the prerogative of a woman's receiving a formal university education to her marriage family. This decision will be left primarily to the woman's mother-in-law.

Other proverbs, that are approved of even today claim "Even a foolish man is better than the clever woman", and "If you beat your wife with a horsewhip, she will become more obedient." These proverbs emphasize the low position of women and give societal approval of physical violence against women. Another example is the proverb that claims "A boy is the star in the sky; a girl is the fur on your shoulder" shows the unequal treatment of boys and girls, emphasizing the high position of boys—the star—compared with the girl as the decoration.

If a young woman does not marry by the age of 18-22, people will say that she has missed her chance, and that she will never find a suitable husband. There will be gossip that she will marry only a man who has been divorced or widowed. In this way, a woman's dignity is insulted; many women accept such "traditions" and remain unmarried or may accept the proposal of any man who offers, under pressure from their families. The remarkable fact is that these "unofficial laws" of society are so pressing upon young women, that if they do not marry in time, they are considered "damaged." When I spoke to young women (ranging 19-20 years-old), they expressed the feeling that if they wait until they graduate university to marry, they will be by that time considered "old ladies."⁵

Many women face unbearable physical and psychological violence within the family. Instead of standing up for themselves and seeking legal counsel, the majority of women try to hide their problems. I argue that the culture of shaming is most powerful in such cases. Only as a last resort will women go to the crisis centers and women's shelters. Unfortunately, in Osh today, both of the women's shelters formerly helping such women have been closed due to lack of financial support, both from the state and the international community. *Aruulan* was the only women's shelter, funded by the Soros Foundation. However, it was only open for 1 year (2000-1). When the shelter was in operation, it housed 12 women. Other women did not want to stay at the shelter because they were afraid that if someone, somewhere found about it, they would be shamed⁶. The primary functions of the shelter were to provide psychological, financial, legal, and medical help to the women and to try to enlist the support of the victims' relatives.

Case Study

I conducted one interview with an abused woman, now divorced, who stated that her husband was jealous, drank alcohol, used profanity, and beat her daily. She claimed she had loved him when they married and was afraid to go to his or her parents, because they would tell

her that she had made her own decision in marrying him. But after the constant physical violence, in desperation, she finally felt forced to appeal to her parents. Nevertheless, as it turned out, they scolded her, saying that she argued with her husband too much and that she must return to him. In addition, her mother feared the community's gossip, inferring that she hadn't brought up her daughter well. At home, despite the disrespect of her husband, she tried to be a "good" wife and convince herself and others that she had a good marriage. She washed his clothes, tried to cook well, and did all the housework. Soon after, she was beaten so badly that her backbone was damaged, and for a long time she was in hospital. Not one time did her husband visit her and she found out later that he had taken another woman. When I asked why she just did not go to the militia or crisis center, she answered that she was too shy to go to the militia and did not know anything about the crisis center.⁷

Case Study

I interviewed a woman who was raped by a boy who lived in the same village as she did. When her parents found out about it, they made the boy marry their daughter. After they were married, the girl went to live in her husband's house. Because of the circumstances of the wedding, her mother-in-law and her husband's relatives did not respect her. They did not buy her anything and made her work very hard. They blamed her for the entire rape incident that had occurred. The young woman could not return to her parent's house because her father was very angry with her as this action had hurt his family's reputation in the community. As a result (during pregnancy), she attempted suicide by swallowing a large number of prescription drug tablets. She was immediately taken to the hospital and her life was saved, but she lost her child. Only after such a tragic event did her parents accept her back in their house and follow through with divorce proceedings⁸.

For women, it has become common for their husbands to physically or mentally abuse them; nevertheless, they are taught to be patient, and endure their suffering. Another Kyrgyz proverb states, "if a wife is good, then she turns her husband into a good person." Conversely, this infers that if a husband is bad, then his wife is bad. In short, if a husband is "guilty," his wife is blamed. This proverb is strongly associated with Kyrgyzstan's "re-tribalized" societal values.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz people sought to regain their unique cultural identity. Many people have returned to the tribal roots that shaped this region of the world only 70 years ago.

Some prominent Kyrgyz researchers, such as Achylova, claim that tribalism is a fundamental aspect of the modern Kyrgyz national consciousness and though it represents another basis for division, it is largely responsible for the survival of Kyrgyz civil society through various periods of subjugation. Tribalism thus is equated with civil society in Kyrgyz understanding, leading to the argument that the origins of the tribal Kyrgyz had roots in democratic principles⁹. But some of these traditions, such as returning to early marriage of girls, non-consensual bride kidnapping, and paying *kalym* (dowry) strengthen patriarchal ideology and reinforce increased gender inequalities in society. Seventy-year-old Sharapat Isakova stated that in the past, girls were only kidnapped if their parents were against the marriage. But nowadays, men kidnap young women even if they do not agree or when boys are just attracted to girls they see, but have never spoken to. Many women who are bride kidnapped (non-consensual) do not stay with the man. They have older sisters who are not married, the groom's family is poor or has a bad reputation, and even sometimes, the women's families will contact the police. Data reveals that only a few women do this and most of them stay with the man and consent to the marriage. The research of Russel Kleinbach, et al, on bride kidnapping in the Kyrgyz republic tells us that approximately 17% of kidnappings do not result in marriage, because either the woman or her family objected.² What makes them to stay, of course, is shame. Bride kidnapping is the act of abducting a woman to marry her.

Typically a bride kidnapping involves a young man and his friends taking a woman by force or deception to the home of his parents or near relative. If necessary, she is kept overnight and is thus threatened by the shame of no longer being a pure woman. There is a common belief among Kyrgyz people that a girl who is kidnapped against her will is obliged to stay. The groom and his relatives actively manipulate this belief that it is shameful for a kidnapped bride to return home. A few girls do return home, but most agree to stay. Girls who are kidnapped against their wills often insist on returning home. But the groom's elders pressure them by reminding them of

the shameful consequences of returning home. Eventually, many girls succumb to this pressure. The girls know that it is almost impossible to keep a kidnapping a secret and a "girl who returns" is labeled as such and thus becomes a less-desirable marriage partner. The results of Kleinbach's bride kidnapping research summarized that there is very little consensus among the population. Approximately 19% of kidnapped women do not know their kidnappers; approximately 54% of the men "loved" the women they kidnapped and 28% of women knew and loved the men who kidnapped them. Although bride kidnapping is illegal in the Kyrgyz Republic (Criminal Code, 1994), there is little or no evidence that laws against it are actively enforced³.

Case Study

I interviewed a young woman who is now divorced. After having received her degree from a medical university, she returned to her village and began to work. Soon after, a man whom she had seen once kidnapped her. He did not work and she did not want to marry him. Then, her parents came and persuaded her to stay. She was already 25 years old and it would be "shameful" for her to return to the family. Many of her family's relatives had already heard she had been kidnapped. Her mother feared shame from the community because her daughter was an "old lady" already. Reluctantly, she married this person and lived in the village. As their married life began, she was required to do all the housework and even when pregnant, when she quarreled with her husband, she was beaten when she refused to do as she was told. She returned several times to her parent's house, but her parents and her other relatives blamed her, and said that she should be clever, patient, and keep silent. She did not know what to do. After giving birth, she left her child with her family, and left for Russia to find work⁴.

Case Study

This interviewee is 40 years old and had been physically abused several times. Her husband drank alcohol and beat her every other day. She did not report the abuse to the militia, to her relatives, nor did she go to the crisis centers. On the contrary, she tried to keep it from her neighbors and relatives because she

had daughters. The proverb states, “if you want to marry a good girl, first see her mother.” As a mother, she felt her reputation would affect her daughters’ marriage opportunities. A woman who complains about her family problems is not considered to be worthy of respect⁵.

Case Study

Arranged marriages are a tradition of the Kyrgyz people. Young people should respect their elders and not oppose them. In most cases, girls should marry the person their parents choose. I interviewed a woman whose parents had arranged her marriage. Her husband was eleven years older and had already been married twice. The young woman’s parents had agreed because the man was wealthy and had paid a large dowry. In addition, he was a distant relative. The young woman did not want to marry; she was still a student in the 11th grade. Nevertheless, her parents could not refuse their relative and forced their daughter to marry him. After marriage, she couldn’t do anything without the permission of her husband. Once, when she cut her hair, he was so angry that he cut her hair himself—very short. She says that the only way to keep her family together is to be patient⁶.

Case Study

Another woman was married by arrangement and her husband paid the dowry that her parents asked. After the wedding, her mother-in-law kept reminding her how much money had been spent for her and made her work without rest. Sometimes she was locked in a room and was not given anything to eat. She told her husband about it but her mother-in-law threatened to commit suicide when her son tried to solve the problem. The woman did not tell her parents, because she was afraid that it would destroy her parents’ reputation. In addition, if she returned home, people would gossip and it would bring shame on her family.⁷

Conclusion

As stated previously, the main argument I am proposing is that the socialization of shaming, combined with women’s lack of trust in the judicial system are increasing gender inequities in Kyrgyzstan. A Kyrgyz woman’s peace of mind and quality of life are closely linked to public opinion, and they are afraid to be shamed. Shaming is a part of every culture in the world. Nevertheless, what makes Kyrgyzstan’s “Culture of Shaming” different is the enormous amount of influence it has in controlling societal behavior.

Overall, Kyrgyz culture idealizes men and demeans women. Men are given superior status beyond their actual contributions to the society. Women, on the other hand, are condemned to a subservient role of bearing children and doing heavy menial labor, and are socialized to accept this condition without complaint.

In order to preserve this status quo, a number of devices are employed. These include the use of shaming as a way of controlling behavior, and the discrimination and the abuse of women is justified by claiming some idealized link to historical precedent. This precedent is defended on the grounds of being derived from traditional proverbs and ancient customs, whose origins precede collective memory and are assumed incontrovertible. Even women have been co-opted into helping support these practices, by acting as agents for the men in coercing and convincing women to accept their fate. Proverbs are also used to help convince women that their subservient roles are somehow ordained in Heaven, and that to flaunt these traditions is to go against God. These concepts are taken to extreme lengths, and somehow women are even convinced into believing that physical abuse, psychological torture, and forcible marriage are justified, and that if there is any blame, it is their own. This situation is strangely paradoxical: the women are damned if they do, and damned if they don’t; they are forced to submit and accept their fates, and if they refuse, they lose respect and their reputations are sullied.

The control mechanisms that keep these practices in place have been established by the “elites” of Kyrgyzstan—respected tribal leaders (men) dating back to the nomadic time period, and have disadvantaged and discriminated against women in a dramatic way. Though, under current laws, these discriminatory practices are illegal, the power structure in the society is such that the government agencies

entrusted with implementing these laws are controlled by the very people (men) whose behavior these laws are intended to regulate.

So, in conclusion, nothing will change until men recognize the discriminatory and unfair nature of these practices, and voluntarily cede power, vowing to enforce the laws. Another thing that will accelerate change is for the women to not only end their participation in these practices, but to begin speaking out, and also by finding the courage to avail themselves of existing legal protections, demanding that their government representatives uphold the law.

References

- ¹ Analyses of consultations in Crisis Center *Aruulan* for 2003, Osh, Kyrgyzstan
- ² Analyses of consultations in Crisis Center *Ak-Gurok* for 2003, Osh, Kyrgyzstan
- ³ The interview from the victim was taken in Crisis Center *Ak-Gurok* 2003, Osh, Kyrgyzstan
- ⁴ See: Erving Goffman "The presentation of Self in Everyday Life".
- ⁵ The interview was taken at the Faculty of Natural Sciences.
- ⁶ The interview was taken from the director of Crisis Center, *Aruulan*, Eshtaeva Nazira
- ⁷ The interview was taken in Osh, Kyrgyzstan 2004
- ⁸ The interview was taken in Karasuu region, Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan 2004.
- ⁹ See: Handrahan L.M. "Gender and ethnicity in Central Asia"
- ¹⁰ See: Russel Kleinbach "The frequency of Non Consensual Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan"
- ¹¹ The interview was taken in village Japalak, Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan 2004.
- ¹² The interview was taken in Karasuu region, Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan 2004.
- ¹³ The interview was taken in Karasuu region, Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan 2004.
- ¹⁴ The interview was taken in Osh, Kyrgyzstan 2004.
- ¹⁵ The interview was taken in Osh, Kyrgyzstan 2004.

Thomistic Thought in the Writings of the Medieval English Mystics Ethan Smilie

The fourteenth century medieval English mystics are remarkably orthodox in their theology. What Richard Rolle, Walter Hilton, the author of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, Julian of Norwich, and Margery Kempe wrote is consistent with what St. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest Catholic theologian, wrote in his *Summa Theologiae* in the latter half of the thirteenth century. Their orthodoxy is interesting for a few reasons. Unlike St. Thomas, the mystics were writing spiritual guides designed to conduct their readers to a direct and individual knowledge of God. In contrast, St. Thomas, especially in his *Summa Theologiae*, focused on spelling out philosophical and universal knowledge about God. Though the ultimate aim of his works was for his readers to be united with God either in this life or the next, the mystics' writings were guides to achieving the union before death or accounts of such experiences. Moreover, the mystics' use of theology ordinarily is not an end in itself. Theological notions are used as a means for contemplation or to help explain how such experiences occurred. Another reason the mystics' orthodoxy is interesting is that Lollardy was present in England at this time, and it seems as though this set of heretical beliefs could have been appealing to the mystics because of the sect's tendency to deny the Church's authority. Nevertheless, they stayed faithful to the Church's teaching, and their own views of the sacraments coincide with those of St. Thomas. This study does not pretend to analyze how much or what sorts of Thomistic philosophy and theology were being taught at Oxford and Cambridge or were influencing sermons of the day in the fourteenth century. What it does seek to do is show that regardless how the English mystics came to their beliefs, they are the same beliefs as those of St. Thomas.

During the fourteenth century numerous Latin and vernacular religious prose texts were circulating in England. Dom David Knowles explains that the Gregorian reform had spread new religious orders to and reformed existing orders in England (44). Wolfgang Riehle comments that as growing numbers of people joined the religious life, "there was a considerable need for contemplative instructional literature which had to be met" (13). Manuscript evidence shows that

the mystical guides were “widely disseminated and highly esteemed,” and though many are addressed for a specific reader, they are often aimed at a general audience (Riehle 16). For instance, Walter Hilton’s *The Scale of Perfection* was addressed to a single person who, chances are, was a “convenient literary fiction representing a whole class of reader” (Clark and Dorward 19). Besides being popular, the mystics’ writings are what Knowles calls “the first examples of great English prose” (47). R.W. Chambers says that John Wyclif’s English cannot even be compared to that of Rolle’s and Hilton’s (cvii).

The most famous Medieval English mystical writers were Richard Rolle, Walter Hilton, the author of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, Julian of Norwich, and Margery Kempe. Rolle (1300-1349) studied at Oxford but left early to become a hermit. He spent the rest of his life in contemplation and writing spiritual works in Latin and English, including *The Bee and the Stork*, two different *Meditations on the Passion*, and an English translation and commentary on the Psalter. Chambers says that “during the latter half of the Fourteenth Century and the whole of the Fifteenth,” Rolle was “probably the most widely read in England of all English writers” (ci). Hilton was born no later than 1343 and was probably educated at Cambridge in civil and canon law. He became an Augustinian monk around 1386 and, until his death in 1396, he served as a spiritual guide. His most famous work is *The Scale of Perfection*. According to Susan Snyder, the *Scale* “went through four editions during the early part of the sixteenth century” (23), and Margaret Deansley, in her work on vernacular books in England during this time, claims that he is second in popularity only to Rolle (355). (To a contemporary reader, these assertions are surprising since the works of Chaucer, Langland, and Wyclif were circulating at the time.) Although little is known about the author of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, his⁸ works were also relatively well known. It is assumed that he studied theology at Oxford or Cambridge, and six other works besides *The Cloud of Unknowing* are attributed to him, including *The Book of Privy Counseling* and a translation of the Pseudo-Dionysius’ *De mystica theologia* (*Deonise Hid Diuinite*). Knowles thinks it a remarkable fact that the author kept his anonymity, because his texts “attracted criticism and attention at once, and were familiar to subsequent writers” (68). According to Lynne Johnson, the two most important English women writers of the late Middle

⁸ Because it is assumed that the *Cloud* author attended a university, the author is thought to be male.

Ages were also mystics: Julian of Norwich and Margery Kempe (820). Julian, born in 1342, was known to be a recluse and may have been a nun. At age 30, she received visions of God, which she related in the shorter version of her *A Revelation of Love* at that time. Twenty years later she expounded on the visions in a longer book. Kempe was born around 1373. She dictated the story of her holy life and many travels to a priest in 1436. The work became known as *The Book of Margery Kempe*, which was only discovered five hundred years after she lived (Spearing 625). Chambers is not surprised that so few copies of Julian’s and Kempe’s writings remain because “we must allow for a very large amount of religious literature which has disappeared by mere attrition, ‘read to destruction’” (cxvii).

A comprehensive comparison of the writings of the Medieval English Mystics and those of the Angelic Doctor is not possible; however, it is possible to establish that numerous ideas from each of the three parts of the *Summa* can also be found in the writings of the mystics. From Part I, I compare the mystics’ views on God with those of St. Thomas. This includes what St. Thomas believed we can and cannot know about God and the Trinity. From Part II, I compare their views on the nature of sin and its relationship to the human will, including the influence demons can have on the will. Additionally, I compare their views about charisms⁹. From Part III, I compare their views on the Sacraments and the Church. In this section, I also examine the loyalty that both the mystics and St. Thomas have for the Church.

In the first part of the *Summa*, St. Thomas examines what we can know about God. He says that we can never fully understand God, but we can establish a few concepts about Him¹⁰. First, he shows that God exists in his famous Five Ways. Next, he uses the *via negativa* to show what God is not. God is not complex or made of parts, He is not finite, He is not composed of matter, He cannot change, He is not limited to time, and He has no peer. Therefore, God is simple, infinite, immaterial, impassible, eternal, and unique. St. Thomas also says that we can use some positive terms to describe God. God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent. He wills His goodness for us and is just and merciful to us. By sharing His being and His very

⁹ There are substantial and interesting similarities between the views of St. Thomas and the mystics on the active and contemplative lives, discussed in Part II of the *Summa*. Nevertheless, as it is the most technical section of my study, it has been omitted due to length constraints.

¹⁰ I follow St. Thomas’ and the mystics’ practice of using the masculine pronoun for God. Interestingly, Julian sometimes refers to Christ as our mother.

existence with us, we are created and sustained. He prudently planned all creation with His Providence. God can perform anything possible; that is, anything that is not a contradiction. He is perfect, lacking nothing. Yet, all of God's attributes are really God's sole attribute: His godhead. This is because, St. Thomas tells us, God and everything that belongs to His nature is identical to His godhead: "God is His own existence" (I.3.5). Therefore, the best name we can give God is "He who is," which indicates God's eternal action of existing. God's attributes, however, are not univocal with our attributes. Knowing for God is by no means the same thing as knowing for us. God is so much our superior that it is difficult to compare Him to us. Nevertheless, attributes are not equivocal either. We are not saying nothing when we speak of God performing actions like loving or planning. God's attributes have some similarity to ours. They are, St. Thomas says, analogical. Though our attributes are not synonymous with God's, they are, so to speak, proportionate to God's. There is obviously a limit to how much we can know about God. We cannot know Him as He knows Himself, not even in Heaven. But we will have a much greater knowledge once we are there, where by His grace, we can see His essence.

Next, St. Thomas examines the Trinity. He describes the orthodox notion that God is one substance comprised of three distinct persons. These persons have real relationships with one another: fatherhood, sonship, and procession. The Father is the beginning and cause of the Trinity. The Son is the Word and Image of God. Word indicates the inner concept found in God's mind, or God's knowledge. Image indicates that the Son originated in the Father. The Holy Spirit is Love and Gift. The Love is the love that exists between the Father and the Son. The Gift is the Holy Spirit given to us to share in God's love. Because the three persons are one substance, the relationships only differ in the persons. Attributes such as will, knowledge, power, and goodness are shared equally by all three persons.

Like St. Thomas, the *Cloud* author travels down the *via negative*. In *Deonise Hid Diuinite*, his translation of the Pseudo-Dionysius' *Mystical Theology*, an image of a block of wood is used to represent all that we can imagine about God. The reader is told to "pare away" all the unnecessary parts of the wood to see the true image of God (124-5). The more we understand God, however, the fewer names we can attribute to Him (125-7). Certainly, as the Pseudo-Dionysius says, we should not attribute any matter, temporality, complexity, contingency, or

passibility to God (127). Ultimately, the author claims that there is a "cloude of vnknowyng" between God and us (*Cloud* 13). God is "incomprehensible to alle [created]" knowable might" though we can love Him (*Cloud* 10). Then, the *Cloud* author admits, that God is "I [know] neuer" (*Cloud* 14). Finally, in *Deonise Hid Diuinite*, the last step is taken and God's "not-vnderstandable [transcendence]" is said to be not just beyond affirming anything to Him but also beyond denying anything of Him (128). We have no knowledge of God and can have no name for God because any attribute of God does not correspond to our understanding of it.

We sey *that* he *hath* no [power], ne he is [power], ne *light*, ne [does] he [live], ne he is [life], ne he is substaunce, ne [age], ne tyme, ne *ther* is any vnderstandable [contact] of hym, ne he is [knowledge], ne *trewthe*, ne [kingship], ne wisdom, ne on[e], ne [u]nitee, ne [Godhead], or goodnes...hym we [may] *neither* [posit] ne [negate], ne on any vnderstandable maner afferme him, ne denie him. (*Deonise* 5; 128)

Thus, like St. Thomas, the *Cloud* author says that terms between God and us are not univocal. And certainly if terms cannot be denied either (for instance if we cannot even say that God is immaterial and, thus, pure spirit), then it seems that they are equivocal. Though in the *Cloud*, the author does say that everything that he writes can be affirmed in his translation of the Pseudo-Dionysius' *Mystical Theology*, he never goes so far as to say that God has no qualities that we can talk about (70). Indeed, he acknowledges God's attributes like His "kyndnes" and "worthines" (14). Besides, even the Pseudo-Dionysius attributes qualities to God, calling Him the "parfite & singuleer cause of al" (128). Nevertheless, the *Cloud* author encourages his audience, which consists of those serious about contemplation, not to rely on thinking about God's attributes. With this suggestion, the *Cloud* author moves toward St. Thomas' notion that God's being is His essence, which he will assert in his *The Book of Priue Counseling* (97). This he considers to be God's most important attribute and urges his readers to think that God only "IS," because all of God's attributes are "hid & enstord in this litil worde" (*Cloud* 80). It would be interesting to know exactly what the *Cloud* author would think of St. Thomas' idea of anagogical terms. Even though he is eager that his contemplative audience avoid thinking about God's attributes altogether (which is probably why he does not deal in depth with Trinitarian ideas), the

¹¹ In brackets I have translated terms and spellings that are unfamiliar to the modern reader.

fact that both the *Cloud* author and the Pseudo-Dionysius mention some attributes of God shows their accord with St. Thomas.

Hilton, like St. Thomas, says that in Heaven we can see God as He is. Yet, no person in heaven or earth can see *what* God is. On earth, we can only see *that* He is. We can know that He is “an unchangeable being; a supreme power, supreme truth, supreme goodness; a blessed life, an endless beatitude” (259). As for seeing God’s essence, that we will never experience. Moreover, Hilton warns against using words such as *above* and *within* to locate God who is pure spirit (261). Unlike the *Cloud* author, Hilton does write about the Trinity. He says that the uncreated Trinity is reflected in the created soul, composed of memory, reason, and will. Memory reflects the Father’s omnipotence, reason the Son who is infinite wisdom, and will the Holy Spirit who is blessed love (113-4). Later, he claims that the third person is uncreated love, who is both the gift and giver of love (264).

Rolle’s aim is not as lofty as those of Hilton and the author of the *Cloud*. In his English writings, which are much less technical than his Latin works, Rolle tries to get his audience to meditate on the Passion, not to achieve contemplation. As a result, Rolle focuses more on how to love God than on any of His attributes. Instead, Rolle supplies or points out easily missed information about the Passion. For instance, in the first text of the *Meditations on the Passion*, he concludes that during the Passion, Christ was hungry and tired because he was awake all the night before (21). In the second text, Rolle says that the men who scourged Him were “stronge and stalwarth and [willing] to slee [Him]” (34).

Similarly, the unlearned Kempe mentions few theological terms in her autobiography. In Chapter 86, though, she recounts that God has spoken to her about the Trinity, telling her that the same attributes are shared by all three persons. Thus, Kempe is not to think that only the Father is “al mighty and al [knowing] and al grace and goodness,” but that the Son and the Holy Ghost have the same properties (374). God also says to Kempe, as St. Thomas believed, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son. He finally tells Kempe that the Godhead consists of “iii dyvers personys and [one] God in substawnce” and all three persons possess the same knowledge and will (374).

Like Kempe, Julian derives her theological knowledge from her visions of God. She states that God creates, loves, and sustains the universe (5). Our father and mother, God is the cause of our nature (76). To Julian, God’s unity is represented when she sees Him as a point (13). He is “good, life, trueth, love, peas,” and she learns of the “[e]ndlessness” and “onchangeabilitie” of the Lord’s love (48, 96). Because God is the “goodness of all,” and possesses “onchangeable goodness,” He cannot ever be angry (7, 49). Like St. Thomas’ thought of the simplicity of the godhead, both God’s mercy and grace work in His love (51). There is no luck or chance in the universe because everything happens by God’s “foreseing wisdom” (13). Julian’s visions also instruct her about the Trinity. The three persons are signified by truth and wisdom that produce love (47). Julian calls God our Father, Mother, and Husband, and explains that Fatherhood represents might, Motherhood wit and wisdom (along with two additional metaphors: brother and savior), and the Husband a reward, the Holy Spirit that St. Thomas calls a Gift (61, 70). Yet, the “iii persons in the Trinite [be] all even in the selfe” (88). Like Hilton, Julian warns against taking metaphors for God literally. The Son does not sit at the right hand of the Father like “on[e] man sittith [by] another in this lif; for ther is no such syttyng, as to my [sight], in the Trinitie” (61).

After discussing what one can and cannot know about God, St. Thomas begins Part II of the *Summa* and analyzes the nature of sin and its relationship to the will as well as the influence demons can have on the will. St. Thomas concludes that God ultimately does not cause sin. In fact, sin has no being. It is no thing, only a privation of good. Nevertheless, He created us with free will and the capability to sin. When a “human action tends to the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right” (I.II.21.1). When we do not act according to the order of reason, then we sin. This is the case, regardless of the results of the action. God does not cause this defect in our wills. Nevertheless, because everything in existence gets its existence from God, He carries out the will’s action.

The mystics have a very similar view of sin. God tells Kempe that “pepil synnyd on me, and yet was I not cawse of [their] synne” (335). Our will, Hilton says, is what ultimately matters in regards to our decisions, not the results of our actions (I.66). He also gives St. Thomas’ orthodox definition of the non-being of sin (53). Likewise, Julian “saw [truly] that synne is no dede” (13). During her thirteenth revelation she learns more details. She does not see sin in her vision

because as far as she knows sin “hath no maner of substance [nor part] of being” (29). Most interestingly, Julian mentions several times that there is a “goodly part” of the will of the elect that never sins. At first, this seems unorthodox, but as Conrad Pepler points out, St. Thomas makes a similar distinction. St. Thomas, Pepler claims, divides the soul into two parts: mind and will. The higher part of the soul, the mind, has two types of reasoning: wisdom and understanding (60-1). The higher of these two is wisdom, which is aided by the Holy Spirit and, according to St. Thomas, is never responsible for sin.

In Part II, St. Thomas also analyzes what is responsible for our sin. He says that demons can affect our decisions, but they only have power because God permits them to act. They can entice us to choose a lesser good. They do not, however, have complete power over our wills. Like other objects of the will, we are only attracted and drawn towards them.

Holding the same view of demons, each of the mystics either warned about or experienced evil spirits. Rolle alerts his readers that devils are trying to plunder our “hony of [pure] lyfe and of grace” (*Bee and the Stork* 55). Hilton, however, tells us that we are not to fear devils because they only work by Jesus’ leave (300). In the *Cloud*, the devil is said to tempt people to judge others with seemingly good motives (55). Yet, the *Cloud* author says that evil spirits do not cause sin; our consent to them does (*A Tretis of Discrecyon of Spirites* 150). After her fifteenth revelation, Julian is afflicted by the devil after she repressed her thoughts about her recent revelations. Nevertheless, she soon recalled all she had seen and regained her faith. During a second temptation she gave no consent and trusted in God. Likewise, Kempe was afflicted by devils, but healed by God.

After discussing God and the virtues and vices of men in general, St. Thomas discusses, among other subjects, the diversity of charisms, which he defines as special graces freely given to some. These include gifts of knowledge, words, and deeds. Knowledge is prophecy. Words are for teaching about God, to please hearers with God’s truth, and to sway hearers to love God. Deeds are miracles that make one credible and ultimately lead those that witness them to God. Thus, charisms are given for the benefits of others. The mystics do not write much about these gifts. Julian does, however, have a similar definition of miracles. She understands that miracles come from the grace of God to “[increase] our hope” (38). Nevertheless, the five mystics

possessed the gift of words. Moreover, there are records of Rolle and Kempe possessing the two other gifts as well.

Rolle, besides possessing the gifts of words, also possessed the gifts of knowledge and deeds. The Office written in preparation for Rolle’s canonization tells of the following miracle. Margaret Kirkby, to whom Rolle addressed his *English Psalter* and *The Form of Living*, was suffering from seizures. Rolle was sent for. He held her during a seizure and promised that she would not have any more seizures while he remained alive. She was cured, but at the moment of his death, her illness returned (Allen 19). Many miracles were reported at Rolle’s tomb, but his canonization was never completed.

Kempe received the three charisms St. Thomas described. God miraculously answered her prayers. Kempe prayed for mercy for a dying woman, which God granted (139). She also prayed to end a fire in Lynn, yet soon after the fire was extinguished by a miraculous snowfall the townspeople believed she was afflicted by the devil (67). The priest who wrote her book tested her. She warned him about a thief and he did not believe her until after he was robbed (24). She prophesied to a wife that her husband would not die. The wife told Kempe: “Now Gospel [must] it [be] in [your] mowth” (363). Finally, her book is filled with her words of instruction she gave to all she met.

The third and unfinished section of the *Summa* deals with the Incarnation, the Life of Christ, and the Sacraments that He instituted. Of the seven sacraments, St. Thomas wrote only about baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, and some about penance. Before he finished, he was granted a mystical experience of his own. Afterwards, he considered all of his writings to be “straw” compared to the secrets he learned in his ecstasy. Immediately, he stopped work on the *Summa*. His views about the sacraments, the pope, Church customs, excommunication, and schisms show that St. Thomas was an orthodox believer that the Catholic Church was the one, holy, apostolic Church that Christ instituted. On his deathbed receiving Viaticum, he said:

I receive Thee, the price of my redemption, for Whose love I have watched, studied, and laboured. Thee have I preached; Thee have I taught. Never have I said anything against Thee: if anything was not well said, that is to be attributed to my ignorance. Neither do I wish to be obstinate in my opinions, but if I have written anything erroneous concerning

this sacrament or other matters, I submit all to the judgment and correction of the Holy Roman Church, in whose obedience I now pass from this life. (quoted in Kennedy)

Later, theologians would have to test their own work against the humble saint, who became the model orthodox Catholic theologian.

The mystics held the same beliefs about the Church and its sacraments. In fact, the mystics believed they needed the grace given in the sacraments to receive charisms. The prayers and devotions that the Church taught served as guides toward their mystical experiences.

Rolle spent a great deal of time working on the Church's Psalter, a book containing the Psalms and other prayers. He translated and commented on the Psalms and made the Psalter accessible to an English-speaking audience. In his commentaries, he uses the same four orthodox interpretations of Scripture that St. Thomas mentions in the *Summa* (I.i.10): literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical. Rolle believed that since contemplatives receive the secrets of God, they are held to strict commandments (*English Psalter* 78). Likewise, St. Thomas believed that those closer to God are obligated to have stronger faith (II.II.2.6).

Hilton tells the reader: "love and honor in your heart the laws and ordinances made by the prelates and rulers of holy church, either in declaring the faith, or in the sacraments, or in the general government of all Christian people" (94). One should do this regardless of whether or not one knows the reason of the rule or if it seems unreasonable. Those preparing for contemplation should make use of prayers taught by the Church "like Matins, Evensongs and the Hours" (98). Baptism and Penance are needed to reform the image of God in the soul (200-4). At the end of Book I, Hilton, humble like St. Thomas, begs his reader to make whatever amends necessary to his book (160).

The *Cloud* author is also humble and wary about giving too much advice. He knows that there are many techniques that he may not know about and that his readers have good ideas of their own (*Cloud* 36-8). In *A Tretis of Discrecyon of Spirites*, he speaks about the "sacrament of schrift" (penance) (152-3). In *A Pistle of Preier*, the author quotes St. Thomas' definition of devotion, which "is not [else], as Seinte Thomas the Doctour [says], [but] a [readiness] of mans [will] to do [those] things that [belong] to the seruisse of God" (102).

During her illness before her revelations, Julian tells that she "took all [her] rites of holy church" (3). After doubting her revelations, she immediately wanted to receive the sacrament of penance (81). God shows some of His secrets through the "prechyng and techyng of holy church; for it is his holy church; he is the ground, he is the substance, he is the techyng, he is the techer" (35). Every day Julian made use of the "common techyng of holy church in which [she] was [before] enformed and [grounded]" (49). When tormented by the fiend, Julian found comfort in thinking of her revelations and the "feith of holy church" (82). Through revelation, she discovered that the Church's teachings along with natural reason and the Holy Spirit allow us to worship God (97).

Kempe went to confession "sumtyme twyes or thryes on the day" and frequently consulted with her confessor (63). She had a special devotion for the Eucharist, even witnessing a Eucharistic miracle (129). Although she lived a life of chastity, she understands the merits of sex (131-2) and does not seek to change the vocation of married women, which St. Thomas also considered meritorious (Supp. 41.4). God is pleased that Margery "belevyst in alle the sacramentys of holy churche and in al feyth that [belongs] therto" (190). When questioned by Church officials, she gave orthodox answers to their questions, mentioning the "ordyr of presthode" who can perform "the sacrament of the [alter]" (234). When accused of being a Lollard and a heretic, she acknowledged the Pope's authority and assured her enemies that she did not preach (which women were not allowed to do) (251-3). Moreover, she acknowledged that even sinful priests could validly perform the Eucharist (234). In contrast, the Lollards of her day taught that the validity of sacraments "was affected by the sinfulness of the minister" (Urquhart).

Five devout English Catholics. Three men who were theologians. One ran away from home to become a hermit. One studied civil and canon law. The other, we can only guess about: an educated man, probably a recluse and member of a religious order. Both women saw visions. One, who if she was not a nun lived like one, on what she thought was her deathbed saw God in all sorts of strange manners and spent twenty years meditating on her visions before writing about them. The other could not write and never stopped crying. As varied and extreme as these writers seem, all were orthodox even though they (except for Rolle) were living in a time rife with Lollardy. More interestingly, their teachings and the ways they lived were consistent with what the

Dumb Ox wrote in Latin during the century preceding them. D.E. Marshall says that despite their different manners of writing, Julian and St. Thomas both were "lovers of God...united in wilfully choosing him, to be lovers 'lastingly without end', realising clearly that God was their good and their all" (341). This is true of all five mystics and St. Thomas. Though their methods of seeking truth and writing about it differed, these six authors all came to the same conclusions. Although the mystics could have become Lollard heretics, disregarding the Church's teaching, authority, and practices, they did not. Perhaps more easily, they could have remained orthodox and become too spiritual, completely spurning the body. Or, they could have spurned reason. Instead, these five very different mystics, like St. Thomas, stayed true to the Church's teachings and employed reason to learn and teach about God for the purpose of uniting and teaching others how to unite with Him.

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The Effect of Phenomenology on Geography with Special Emphasis on Sense of Place and Environmental Ethics

Steve Hulbert

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role that phenomenology has played in geography from 1970 to the present. We will see that it had its heyday in the 1970's, peaking in 1985 with Pickles' *Phenomenology, Science, and Geography*. Then, as far as mainline geography is concerned, it basically goes silent. Through the examination of environmental ethics and sense of place, we will see that although phenomenology's importance is not in providing new results in geography, it does contribute in at least three ways. First, it saves geography from a pernicious form of positivism; second, it explodes the myth about objectivity that positivism promotes; third, it can serve as a grounding for environmental ethics in geography.

Overview of Phenomenology

The purpose of phenomenology is "to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experienter" (Moran 2000, 4). Or to put in more simply, to discover essential structures of experience (Viney lectures).

The person credited with the founding of phenomenology is Edmund Husserl. Husserl realized that his phenomenology could be used for more than just conscious contemplation but could be applied to any "material essence." He felt that it could be put to use in a number of different areas, from geometry to morality. Although Husserl did not specifically explore the relevance of his method for geography, others have, and we shall examine their work in more detail.

Husserl considered it essential to approach your subject without any presuppositions whatsoever. Thus, he conceived a method of ridding oneself of presuppositions. He accomplishes this with the concept of the epoché. We must "bracket" - set aside - from consideration all scientific knowledge and ideas, even preconceived philosophical or religious ideas. We must work from what is given immediately in experience. In order to identify the

essential aspects of experience Husserl employs eidetic variation. According to this method, you use your imagination to picture different situations in as many ways as you can imagine. You're looking for what remains constant through all the variations – this is what is referred to as essence. It is only by bracketing the “natural standpoint” – the underlying fundamental consciousness that exists about the natural world such as my basic awareness and conception of things – that we can realize the experience at its most fundamental level – and this where knowledge begins. Furthermore, we must accept this experience as it appears – untouched by any predisposition towards truth or validity. We deal with its bare essence. We realize this experience through the perception of our ordinary senses “because as he says in *Ideas I*, it is always available to us for inspection” (Moran 2000, 128). Phenomenology is not however, bound by natural sense perception. Fantasy, dreams, memory are all acceptable modes of experiencing. “Husserl believes that the mode of givenness of physical objects is *sense perception*. The mode of givenness of essences is *imagination*. This is what makes eidetic variation the ideal tool for uncovering those essences (Viney lectures).

Husserl talks about seeing something *as* something – I see a tree *as* an object of natural beauty or I see it *as* a natural resource. He calls this the noema or the meaning of perception. “Our interaction with the object has an intentional component. In intentionality, there is an act directed toward an object by means of the noema” (Viney lectures). He also developed the concept of the life-world, which becomes very important to geographers. He “saw the life-world as the universal framework of human endeavor – including our scientific endeavors. It is the ultimate horizon of all human achievement. As conscious beings we always inhabit the life-world.” (Moran 2000, 181). It is the general structure that supports the various cultures that we see in the world – a kind of structure that exists somewhere between nature and culture. Different cultures may have different views of their world, but beneath those views is the experience of the life-world that is common to all cultures. In other words, it is that which geographers study.

Later in his career Husserl posited the idea of the transcendental ego. He believed this to be an underlying “necessary condition for the possibility of experience...Husserl says the transcendental ego is responsible, not just for meaning or sense, but for the being of the world. The transcendental ego constitutes the world as a world of meanings and as a world of objects

(Moran 2000, 169). He told a fellow philosopher, Alfred Schutz, as he lay dying, that his transcendental ego would survive his death (Moran 2000, 169).

Martin Heidegger never accepted Husserl's ideas of the transcendental ego or transcendental subjectivity – he denied Husserl his presuppositionless starting point. He does this by introducing the concept of Dasein. In everyday usage the term applies to “the kind of Being that belongs to persons.” Heidegger uses the term as “This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being (Heidegger 1962, 27. “So, Dasein is always and necessarily situated. There is no way to gain any God-like perspective on our experience. Therefore, experience is always perspectival – so there is no place for a starting point without presuppositions” (Viney lectures). Heidegger felt that phenomenology must change just as science changes: “Like every other scientific method, phenomenological method grows and changes due to the progress made precisely with its help into the subjects under investigation.” (Heidegger 1975, 21). So Heidegger made some notable changes to Husserl's phenomenology. Once *Being and Time* was published the philosophical world accepted that phenomenology was that which was presented by both Husserl and Heidegger.

• As we shall see, phenomenology leads to a hybrid – existential phenomenology. This actually starts with Heidegger and realizes its completion in Sartre. Along the way Maurice Merleau-Ponty adds his perspective. He gives us the idea of body-subject – the center of our experience is the body. “A large portion of his work demonstrates how traditional philosophies and their psychological offshoots have ignored the central role of body in human experience and thus misrepresent the nature of man and his place in the world” (Seamon 1979, 46). Merleau-Ponty believes that the body is active and through this activity determines behaviors. This is the way the body-subject learns – movements become familiar as a result of the body repeating them a number of times and these learned acts become such a part of us that we perform them almost without thinking. We will look at Merleau-Ponty in more detail when we discuss environmental ethics. But we'll reserve most of the ethical discussion for Emmanuel Levinas who first introduces us to the “other” and our relationship with it.

Phenomenology and Geography

I will now examine the history of phenomenology in geography. Phenomenology in geography received a lot of attention in the 1970's and early '80's. Seen initially as a workable response to positivism, it attracted a number of notable geographers.

As early as 1971, Yi-Fu Tuan suggested the use of phenomenology in geography. He pointed out that at first glance, it appeared more relevant to psychology and literature because of their concern with "the nature of experience and with the meaning of being human." (Tuan 1971, 191). He points out, however, that the geographer studies not man or world in the abstract but "man-in-the-world." Therefore, he believed that phenomenology had something to offer the field.

A year earlier, Edward Relph had examined the relationship between the two fields. He first characterizes phenomenology as "a philosophy in which it is assumed that knowledge does not exist independently of man, but has to be gained from man's experience of the world. From this standpoint the world can be understood only in its reference to man, and only through the intentions and attitudes of man" (Relph 1970, 195). Relph draws two concepts from this:

- (1) Every object in the world exists for human use or disuse and was only discovered as that which is needed to satisfy the pursuits of the human creature.
- (2) We can only understand the world in relationship to the human attitudes and intentions toward it. The world changes in response to changes in the underlying attitude.

Relph draws two inferences from this:

- (1) As phenomenology is anthropocentric, so is the human and his world a single entity. He influences the world by his attitudes and intentions.
- (2) This idea of a single entity is not a rigid structure but exists as multiple world-views supported by the common attitudes and intentions of the people who possess them.

Personally, I have problems with problems with Relph's anthropocentric view. It seems that everything revolves around man – he is the beginning and end of all things. When we get to environmental ethics we'll see that non-human beings become very important, something Relph

apparently fails to recognize. Relph gives several examples of how phenomenology has been used in geography (Relph 1970, 196):

- (1) The understanding that resources exist only because man exists.
- (2) Instead of trying to find "the one geography" we should accept that there are a multitude of personal geographies.
- (3) The idea that we have to supplement any objective view of the world with a subjective view.
- (4) The idea that we should study attitudes as they relate to the environment.
- (5) There should be an emphasis on intention of observers as it relates to the environment.

One criticism of phenomenology in geography is that it proposes nothing new. As far as content is concerned, this may be true. However, as far as method is concerned, it is not true. Although positivists would like to reduce all geographical knowledge to theories and laws supported by mathematical models, it's clear that its main weakness is that it ignores the human experience – and thus the meaning for human beings and their experience and their environment. It treats all such as objects that are outside human beings and therefore are either not real or cannot be measured. Phenomenologists disagree with such assumptions. Humans are one with the world they inhabit and they can only gain knowledge about that world from their interaction with and experience in that world. Relph concludes that if geography is all about the establishment of "objective" laws, then perhaps there is not much of a place for phenomenology. But if geography is concerned about human beings and their relationship to the world, then phenomenology has much to offer.

As has been suggested, positivists generally see no place for phenomenology in geography. They believe "through the testing of explanatory hypotheses it will be possible to develop a 'controlled, consistent, and rational explanation of events,' and that this is the most important task facing geographers" (Relph 1970, 198 – from Harvey, 1969).

Positivism has had a significant influence on geography. This influence was a natural outgrowth of the quantitative revolution of the 1960's. Often used to refer to "the scientific method" it improves geography's standing in the scientific world. It can be thought of as adhering

to two main themes – “empirical truth and logical consistency.” (Walmsley 1974, 97). Some geographers have used positivism as a tool to assure empirical accuracy while at the same time, permitting a deductive approach to the discipline. Positivism basically contends that science is the only path to knowledge and the only true objects of knowledge are the underlying facts that support the science. Phenomenologists point out that positivism reduces all observations to that of objects that exist apart from the human and ignores the subjective interaction of the human with the world. In other words, it is our direct experience that leads to knowledge. Furthermore, limiting the definition of “fact” to those factors that support the underlying science is unnecessarily limiting and is another weakness in the positivist approach. However, positivists reject subjectivity because such experiences are not verifiable and replicability is very important to positivist geographers. As a matter of fact, much criticism has been directed at the underlying subjectivity that supports phenomenology.

Anne Buttimer contributes to the discussion in 1976. She makes the following distinction between subjective, objective, and phenomenological modes of knowing experience – “Whereas the subjective mode concentrates on unique individual experience, and the objective mode seeks generalization and testable propositions concerning aggregate human experience, the ‘intersubjective’ or phenomenological mode would endeavor to elicit a dialogue between individual persons and the ‘subjectivity’ of their world” (Buttimer 1976, 282).

Buttimer explains how phenomenology and geography help each other. The phenomenologist will point out that the geographer’s traditional models often ignore direct experience. The geographer will point out a weakness in the phenomenology – taking the direct experience of individuals and translating it to a group as a whole. This “conversation” points out weaknesses in both approaches and ultimately brings the two closer together. Buttimer summarizes her belief – “Phenomenology challenges each individual to examine his own experience, to become subject rather than object of research inquiry, and then reach for common denominators in the experiences of others” (Buttimer 1976, 288).

Another criticism leveled at phenomenology in geography is that there is a lot of talk about the possibilities that exist for study, but very little actual study that has taken place. But some study inspired by phenomenology has been done. An example is the study of movement, rest, and

encounter conducted by David Seamon in the late 70’s. In this study, Seamon uses group inquiry as a phenomenological method.

In 1977, Relph criticized Buttimer for using phenomenology as an adjunct to empirical science – accepting some of the assumptions of science rather than bracketing them and performing real phenomenology. He says that she accepts the current geographic concepts of thought, again without bracketing. He feels this is inappropriate. “Phenomenology is not just an excuse for subjectivity nor does it allow straightforward combinations with existing geographical concepts, nor is it an easy road to enlightenment, and even though it is sympathetic to humanist principles it does not necessarily lead to humanism” (Relph 1977, 179).

In her response Buttimer admits, “I have frankly paid less attention to the ‘letter of the phenomenological law,’ as it were than to capturing some of its spirit and the direction which it seems to indicate for knowledge generally, and for geographic thought and practice particularly” (Relph, Buttimer 1977, 181). In response to Relph’s complaint that she’s using phenomenology as an adjunct to science, Buttimer points out that she specifically did not want to put science and the humanities in two opposing corners. She believes the idea that the two stand in opposition to each other is exaggerated and that we should be striving to find common ground. She also points out that, although phenomenology offers promise to getting us to the place where we can encounter and evaluate direct experience, it may not be the only path.

John Pickles, in his 1985 classic, *Phenomenology, Science, and Geography*, agrees with Relph. He also suggests that phenomenology is being used improperly. He believes science is incapable of empirically delineating its methods from its practice, and must turn to philosophy for help. He believes phenomenology, the practice of “seeing things as they are” – or to use Husserl’s term, ‘back to the things themselves’ – should be a reliable guide, because it shows the world “as it is” before scientific inquiry.

He points out that historically, geography has borrowed the positivists objectivism of science and applied it as science is often applied. Instead of looking at ‘the things themselves’, geographers accept as givens many of the principles of science. This gives science a great deal of power over everything with which it interacts – technology, government, society – as well as the field of geography itself. Pickles asks a key question for geography – “Will phenomenology assist

in explicating geography's basic assumptions and in that sense, secure geography's very foundations by carefully analyzing the invariable structures and interpretatively clarifying the essential characteristics of our various modes of orientation towards the world on the basis of the phenomena immediately in experience?" (Pickles 1985, 7).

Pickles believes there is a difference between "geographical phenomenology" and phenomenological geography. The former's practitioners include Tuan, Buttimer, and others. He sees the practice of using phenomenology as an adjunct to science as a bad thing for geography – because it is misusing phenomenology – and bad for phenomenology because it is being distorted. He quotes Relph to make the point that "phenomenology as a philosophy requires 'perseverance, commitment, critical insight and imagination,' it cannot be an easy crutch for a particular methodological perspective" (Pickles 1985, 47; Relph 1977). Pickles quotes Ley – in opposition to phenomenology – as a warning – "Husserl's method of transcendental reductions (is) 'now little more than a curiosity,' (and) illustrates the failure of 'geographical phenomenology'" and how important methodology is to Husserlian phenomenology and how critical it is to resolve its difficulties to assure that phenomenology remain coherent and not drift into subjectivity and relativism (Pickles 1985, 66; Ley 1980).

After Pickle's 1985 book, there is very little to be found on phenomenology in geography. Gary M. Talarchek made the point in 1977 that because of the lack of actual phenomenological research he thought it unlikely that it would appeal to very many in the geographic community (Talarchak 1977, 24). He did suggest however that some form of phenomenology or at least a non-positivism would probably survive. He appears to have been prescient. The only area where phenomenology has continued to have an impact is in environmental ethics and we'll deal with eco-phenomenology shortly. But first, let's look at sense of place.

Sense of Place

On a basic level place is what geography is all about – the study of place. The sense of place is the study of the individual's relationship to space and place and interaction with his or her lived-space. I will now explore how phenomenology has influenced this area.

When we talk about place we should first talk about space. Yi-Fu Tuan says "what begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with

value...From the security and stability of place we are aware of the openness, freedom and threat of space, and vice versa. Furthermore, if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place" (Tuan 1977, 6).

Relph, from Cukerman (1964) gives six components of the concept of place (Relph 1976, 3).

- (1) The idea of location, is fundamental.
- (2) Nature and culture are integrated in place.
- (3) Each place is unique, but it is a part of a framework.
- (4) Places are localized – and belong to larger areas.
- (5) Places are always arising or becoming.
- (6) Places have meaning.

Cresswell shows us how place is "made and remade on a daily basis...Place is the raw material for the creative production of identity rather than an a priori label of identity...Place in this sense becomes an event rather than a secure ontological thing rooted in notions of the authentic. Place as an event is marked by openness and change rather than boundedness and permanence" (Cresswell 2004, 9).

When we speak of place we often refer to geographies, landscapes, cities, or homes, but Relph tells us the "the essence of place" doesn't lie in any of these things but rather in the experience of "inside" and "outside" (Relph 1976, 49). "To be inside a place is to belong to it and to identify with it, and the more profoundly inside you are the stronger is this identity with the place" (Relph 1976, 49). Relph gives us four types of insideness: (p 52-55)

- (1) Behavioral insideness – being in a place and intentionally paying attention to its appearance.
- (2) Empathetic insideness – concern for emotional involvement in a place
- (3) Vicarious insideness – to experience a place in a secondhand way without actually being there.
- (4) Existential insideness – knowing deep inside that this is "where you belong."

He then gives three types of outsideness: (p 51-52)

(1) Existential outsidership – a sense of not belonging, an alienation from the world.

(2) Objective outsidership – separating oneself emotionally and intellectually from a place – as an academic geographer or city planner might do.

(3) Incidental outsidership – when one has an unselfconscious attitude toward a place as in the case of a truck driver or a flight crew.

Relph goes on to talk about the opposite of place – placelessness. He defines it as “an inauthentic attitude towards places (that) is transmitted through a number of processes, or perhaps more accurately ‘media’, which directly, or indirectly encourage ‘placelessness’, that is a weakening of the identity of places to the point where they not only look alike but feel alike and offer the same bland possibilities for experience. These media include mass communications, mass culture, big business, powerful central authority, and the economic system which embraces all these... In themselves these are not necessarily placeless, nor do we yet live in a world that is geographically undifferentiated. What is important is that these are powerful processes of landscape modification, which do little or nothing to create and maintain significant and diverse places” (Relph 1976, 90).

Environmental Ethics

The field of environmental ethics has been influenced by phenomenology rather significantly. We shall examine the influence of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas on this field.

Brown and Toadvine tell us that “eco-phenomenology is based on a double claim; first, that an adequate account of our ecological situation requires the methods and insights of phenomenology; and second, that phenomenology, led by its own momentum, becomes a philosophical ecology, that is, a study of the interrelationship between organism and world in its metaphysical and axiological dimensions” (Brown and Toadvine 2003, xii-xiii).

Heidegger's Influence

The idea of values is the very crux of environmental ethics. But Heidegger does not propose that living creatures have inherent value. As a matter of fact, he is critical of assigning values to things, stating that by establishing value in a being robs it of its worth. Heidegger's point here is that valuing something – no matter how positively – subjectivizes it, instead of letting it be.

By valuing it, we reduce it to an object for our estimation” (Langer in Brown and Toadvine 2003, 112-113). By letting it be, Heidegger is simply saying that we allow the being to express itself in all its forms.

Dasein does not exist for itself alone but exists for the self-expression of other beings. Heidegger desires to go beyond the notion of humanity existing just for itself (Zimmerman 2003, 79). Heidegger describes Dasein as “the shepherd of Being.” This means not only does Dasein care for other beings and intervene to protect them, if necessary, but recognizes them as beings. (Zimmerman 2003, 79-80). Humans must respect the wholeness and independence of other beings just as they respect the individual personhood of other humans. Just because plants, animals, and eco-systems arise from Dasein's action in the lifeworld doesn't mean they should be treated any differently than fellow humans (Zimmerman 2003, 91).

Merleau-Ponty's Influence

Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that we must respect the place of other creatures, whether they be animals, insects, birds, whatever in our interconnected world (Langer 2003, 115). Abram, points out that although Merleau-Ponty rarely invokes the name of other species, it is clear from his writing that one could not go from bodily self awareness to the consummation of that which he refers to as “flesh of the world,” without coming upon myriad experiences of otherness, other subjectivities that are not human and other intersubjectivities” (Abram 1988, 115). “There is an intrinsic relationship between thought and the body, and between ourselves and others” – others defined as to include non-human entities (Langer 2003, 116). All of this can provide a phenomenological foundation to environmental ethics. Langer mentions several ways this can be accomplished.

(1) Merleau-Ponty's critique of objectivist thinking support those environmentalists who call for a radical divergence from business as usual in terms of how we perceive ourselves and the world.

(2) His phenomenological descriptions can both support and bring out the fundamental shift necessary to realize the appropriate emphasis.

(3) His descriptions of lived experience should encourage those environmentalists who want to encourage descriptions of lived experience.

Phenomenology, especially of the sort that Merleau-Ponty gives us, may be useful in exposing a certain form of value judgment inherent in positivism. The natural world presents to us as saturated with value, yet the positivist discerns the world only as a collection of objects there for our contemplation and use. Perhaps phenomenology is useful as a reminder of these facts. "Moreover, it may be useful to environmental geography which stresses the interconnection of ourselves with the world, including our faculty of judging and of doing science. We are *in* the world, not as a replaceable part in a machine, but as an *actor* and as an *interactor*. Thus, ethics and environmental geography must be mutually relevant" (Viney lectures).

Levinas' Influence

Levinas' primary contribution is to ethics. He introduces us to the concept of the face. "For Levinas, the face can never be fully characterized, never fully represented. It is the 'infinite' or indeterminate element, which breaks up the unity of my world. It is that which calls for conversation, for turning of one's face towards the other, the 'face to face'" (Moran 2000, 348). It is this concern with the other that distinguishes him from other phenomenologists. It is interesting that he is especially critical of Husserl. In his *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*, Husserl basically says that we understand the gestures of the other as they have meaning for us. Levinas criticizes this because he doesn't believe that the other can ever be described by me (Moran 2000, 337). He believes "there is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other" (Diehm 2000, 51). Levinas even gives a definition for ethics involving the other - "concern for the being of the other-than-one-self, non-indifference toward the death of the other, and hence, the possibility of dying for the other - a chance for holiness" (Levinas 1998, 202).

We must ask the question whether the concept of otherness or the concept of face can be applied to animals or other non-human beings. First of all, Levinas states that "the whole body can express as the face. Diehm believes that when Levinas uses the word "face" he actually means "body" and on that basis we can start talking about non-human beings and ethics. "All life - plant, animal, insect, fish, etc. is 'body.'" And we have no grounds, at this level of ethical thinking, to discriminate between the bodies that claim us but should treat them equally. This also goes for "the tree, the flower, the blade of grass, and the bee" (Diehm 2000, 56). In short, "every body is the face, every body is the other" (Diehm 2000, 57).

Levinas does not believe language is a necessary requirement for faces to "speak." He speaks of those who are socially "deficient" or "impaired" and refers to the "faces of brutes." It seems a small step to the "faces" of animals or other non-human beings - or even the "face" of the earth. Clearly, our ethical responsibility goes beyond the human - it may even go beyond the earth.

Environmental Ethics in Geography

Environmental ethics has specific application to geography in the area of environmental planning. Planning can be described as "a universal skill that involves the consideration of outcomes before a choice is made among alternatives" (Lein 2003, 4). Or, put another way, "a method for reconciling choices under conditions of risk and uncertainty" (Lein 2003, 4).

One must establish a balance between a utilitarian approach and a deontological approach. With a utilitarian approach "concern is given to the comparative amount of good produced or the comparative balance of good over bad" (Lein 2003, 190). Some examples include cost/benefit analysis and contingent valuation. "Deontological ethics assert that there are other considerations that make an action right or obligatory besides goodness. These other considerations include the requirement that the action or policy keep a promise, be just, or be commanded by an authority" (Lein 2003, 190). Some examples include land use rights, distributive ethics and social justice, and obligations to future generations.

Lein cites Regan (1995) when he says that "an environmental ethic must be grounded on the basic premises that:

- (1) Non-human beings have moral standing.
- (2) The class of those beings that have moral standing includes, but is much larger than, the class of conscious beings" (Lein 2003, 187).

He continues, "planning decisions are not trivial. They involve making ethical judgments and choices that raise fundamental questions about right and wrong, good and bad. Our role in policy-making now narrows down to the simple fact that ethical judgments are not optional" (Lein 2003, 188). In the past, environmental planning incorporated very little ethics into its planning policies. Instead, it was more concerned with being efficient and cost-effective. Now it is being

recognized that it needs an underlying philosophy to support ethical decision-making and this is where phenomenology comes in.

Lein then outlines three dimensions that determine how a moral community is defined:

- (1) Geographically – For a given policy decision, must planners just concern themselves with the immediate neighborhood or should they consider regional, national, or even international boundaries?
- (2) Temporally – Since a policy decision may affect more than one generation, how far into the future should we project our moral calculations?
- (3) Biologically – For a given policy decision, to what extent must we take into account the rights of other forms of life? (Lein 2003, 189).

Lein complains that it has been difficult to find a connection between “the ethics that have been offered (in planning) and specific moral theories or concepts that can help defend or justify them” (Lein 2003, 188). With its emphasis on values, I believe phenomenology can help satisfy this need. Indeed eco-phenomenology has carved out a place for itself.

Conclusion

There seemed to have been a lot of interest in phenomenology in geography in the 1970's, but there was also concern, expressed first by Relph, and later by Pickles that that which was being practiced was not the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. We heard about existential phenomenology, humanistic phenomenology, about being true to the spirit of Husserl's philosophy but not to the letter of the law. In any event, Talarchak was correct when he predicted that there just weren't that many geographers interested in pursuing phenomenology, as research in the area definitely declines after Pickles in 1985. We still see work however in environmental ethics and it is in this area where we find a suggestion for the future.

Meg Holden, an environmentalist, doesn't believe phenomenology is up to the task of meeting the needs of the environment and offers pragmatism as an alternative. “While phenomenology is interested in full descriptions, pragmatism is more interested in those salient aspects of things, concepts, propositions, that make a difference to people's cognition and understanding, beyond the immediate experience” (Holden 2001, 40). She goes on to point out that pragmatists have not forsaken the scientific method. Holden then makes this distinction –

“Pragmatism offers a way of thinking environmentally without expecting all people to rise to heroes or sink to self-imposed deprivation, by letting people make those choices themselves” (Holden 2001, 56).

An eminent philosopher who supports a pragmatist view is Charles Hartshorne, who just happens to be the brother of the equally eminent geographer, Richard Hartshorne, famous for *The Nature of Geography* in which he proposes the idea that geography is all about defining areas based on their similarities. Charles Hartshorne argues for his ‘eclectic phenomenology.’ He uses as his source, C. S. Peirce. Now Peirce did not originally refer to his work as phenomenology – he used the term ‘phaneroscopy’ – but Hartshorne uses it, so we'll go with it. Although he didn't think too highly of Husserl's epoché – “Bracketing the world, setting aside all beliefs, would mean ceasing to talk or think” (Hartshorne, 15) – he knew Husserl personally, and had great respect for him.

The bottom line you get from Hartshorne is that his kind of phenomenology can be used as a supplement to geography. “Geography, like any science, needs to be reminded that it is driven by human purpose, by human values – it takes a certain intentional stance toward the world. It asks, ‘what are the meanings that we are looking for in the world?’ This can easily be mistaken for “the way things are.” William James tells us about the psychologist's fallacy – we mistake the description or accounts of experience for experience itself. Phenomenology helps us to avoid this. Hartshorne specifically reminds us that we perceive the world by means of our bodies, and second of all, that our experience is saturated with value” (Viney lectures). However, a valid criticism does remain – “it is not possible to prove anything by the phenomenological method” (Billinge 1977, 61 from Mercer & Powell, 1972). In closing, it should be pointed out that a tension exists between the idea that geography is driven by human purpose and human values on the one hand and the idea that non-human beings have moral value. What happens when the two come in conflict? When pressed do we really give non-human beings moral value? Or is it just a convenient position to take when not pressed? We can't answer these questions right now but do they raise interesting issues for future discussion.

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International Politics and Ethics

Jacob Metz

"Politics is repetition. It is not change. Change is something beyond what we call politics." Unfortunately, these words from Kate Millett are once again proving to be true, though maybe not in the sense in which one would normally take them. In this case, I speak of a repetition from throughout history and of repetition and duplication of our own government. The political situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan have come under question from both within their own countries and, though to a lesser extent, from within the US. It has seemed that the US government has manipulated the elections in these countries so that the governments would essentially be puppet governments. It has led to an ethical question of whether the US (or any other country) should be able to politically maneuver elections in another country so that it controls the government and whether or not it is moral for the US to be able to control another country. However, this questioning is usually done without full knowledge of what has taken place in Iraq and Afghanistan. To be able to answer the ethical question of whether the US may politically maneuver the political process in Iraq or Afghanistan, we must first clarify any definitions that need to be known to understand the issue and see that it is not a question of morality about the wars in either nation. After we have clarified the ideas being discussed we can rid ourselves of simple assumptions and find out exactly what the political situation is in Iraq and Afghanistan and determine if there is an ethical problem. Presuming there is an ethical problem, we can then propose solutions to this problem. Those solutions can then be evaluated through moral theories and, after having done so, one can then choose the appropriate solution. Finally, to determine the feasibility of the solution, we can evaluate the consequences of the solution.

So let's begin by defining exactly what it is that we are talking about. There are two main concepts that one needs to be able to understand to truly grasp the issues at hand. The first is what it means to have political autonomy. The seventh edition of *Black's Law Dictionary* defines autonomy as the right of self-government.¹² The basic idea behind political autonomy is that a

country has the right to be able to decide the rules it will abide by and the officials put in place within its government by its own accord without having to be told by any outside party what to do. While this doesn't necessarily entail democracy, the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan deal solely with democracy. Any government type can be used and the political processes therein may be debated over. It is democracy, however, that was imposed on the countries in question. As such, to begin, one must ask whether those countries had the right to political autonomy while they were being helped into a new government by the US. One can argue that, in this state, they were in too deep of turmoil to be able to put form to their governments and, as such, the US was within its rights to be able to impose democracy upon those nations. Knowing this, we can then deal strictly with the democratic processes and deal with political autonomy in those specific situations. The right to political autonomy still applies to these countries when it comes to actually choosing their leaders. By that point, the countries were cohesive enough to be able to come together to choose their leaders without the help or interference of outside parties. Political autonomy does not yet exist for a country when it is unable to choose its own government and, as such, the nation may be helped to pick a government type. However, once the country has this government and the nation is deemed stable enough to elect its own leaders, it has political autonomy and there should be no outsiders influencing the outcome of those elections.

The second idea that needs to be clarified is what it means to be politically involved in another nation's affairs. For the purpose of this paper, the idea of political involvement needs to be separated from the idea of military involvement. While the military may in some cases be a factor in political involvement, this does not mean that there is a military involvement within the country. For this paper, I define military involvement to be the fighting of a war or a police action. I define political involvement to be the manipulation of elections, election officials, or the manipulations of judicial or legislative decisions. This may be done through any number of means that may at some point include use of the military to manipulate the outcome of elections via scare tactics or bullying. In this paper, I do not mean for political involvement to be associated in any way with the actual wars within Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe it is important to make this distinction so that I separate this paper from the debate over the morality of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper does not take a stance upon the wars waged in either country.

¹²Bryan Garner, ed., *Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000), 104.

It is solely concerned with political maneuvering that has taken place in these countries and with the resulting leaders in those governments.

Now that the concepts are defined, we are able to look at what political maneuvering has taken place within Afghanistan and Iraq and eliminate the assumption that there simply was political maneuvering. I will start with the situation in Afghanistan. The political maneuvering of the US government is more easily seen in this situation. The US had openly announced its support of Hamid Karzai, who eventually became president, but it also supported Karzai in several less obvious ways. Originally, the presidential election in Afghanistan was to be held in April of 2005, but the US insisted that the elections be held in October 2004. On the surface this seems fairly innocent, but this move was made with the promotion of Karzai in mind. At the time directly preceding the elections, there was only one other candidate that had any kind of name recognition.¹³ By moving the elections up to October 2004, the US insured that the only candidate likely to be known to voters would be the candidate that the US backed. Another tactic that the US used was in giving aid to Karzai in the way of political party-building programs, allowing him to gain another advantage that the other candidates didn't have.¹⁴ These programs would give Karzai several tools with which to gauge his popularity and with which to be able unite his party. Finally, the US ambassador to Afghanistan at the time, Zalmay Khalilzad, tried to persuade, bully, and bribe candidates to withdraw from the election so that Karzai would be assured of victory. In the aftermath of the election, several candidates were going to call for non-recognition of the results until Khalilzad convinced them to go along with the results.¹⁵ All in all, it's rather clear that the US manipulated the presidential election in Afghanistan.

The same also seems to be true in Iraq. Here the political maneuvering has been more difficult to spot. The most obvious of the political maneuvering is that the US has continually

¹³ Rahul Mahajan, *The Bush Definition of Democracy*, Independent Media Institute.
<http://www.alternet.org/story/20005>.

¹⁴ Adam Entous, *Bush to Aid 'Moderate' Parties in Iraq Election*, Global Policy Forum.
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/election/2004/1009assistance.htm>.

¹⁵ John Cherian, *The Motions of Democracy*, Frontline Magazine.
<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2122/stories/20041105001405300.htm>.

pushed back the elections for the provisional government.¹⁶ I speculate that this is to allow time for the other forms of political maneuvering could take effect, so that the US could try to improve the status of its candidates, and so that the US would be in a position to later call for favors even from those parties that don't particularly like the US. The US did say that it wouldn't back one candidate in particular, but that it would give strategic advice, training, and polling data to the moderate and democratic parties running in the election for the provisional government. How it was decided, however, whether a party was moderate and democratic is unclear.¹⁷ Essentially, this means that the US helped parties based on whether the party and its candidates represented US ideals and on whether or not that party and its candidates would listen to the "suggestions" of the US in the future. One might argue that the US government wasn't the only source of aid for political parties in that election. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) also provided help to political parties in the Iraqi provisional government election. These organizations, the IRI in particular, were seen to help out the candidates and parties that best represented the interests of the US. In actuality though, the US government was supporting specific parties through these groups, providing \$80 million to these organizations for use in political and electoral activities in Iraq.¹⁸ Once again, we see that the US is doing political maneuvering to try and influence the election, or, at the least, put itself in position to ask for favors from the Iraqi government after the election.

The US was doing political maneuvering, however, long before it started aiding particular parties. They began the political maneuverings in the interim constitution. In this constitution, there is a clause that says that the permanent constitution must obtain the approval of at least one-third of the voters in sixteen of Iraq's eighteen provinces. This clause was put in the constitution so that the US friendly Kurds, who are by far the minority in Iraq, would have political strength and would be able to veto the new constitution. This allows the US yet another foothold in Iraq.

¹⁶ Mahajan.

¹⁷ Entous.

¹⁸ Lisa Croke and Brian Dominick, *Controversial US Groups Operate Behind Scenes on Iraq Vote*, New Standard News.
http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=show_item&itemid=1311.

This effectively forced the Iraqi government to craft a permanent constitution that suited the United States, as the Kurds wouldn't likely support a constitution if the United States didn't. Besides this foothold, the US has several more. The debt relief plan for Iraq gives the US another one. Iraq will have the choice of having some of its debts forgiven, but at the same time it will be forced to prioritize foreign investors, tax reform, privatization, and an economic restructuring according to a US plan, or they will have the choice of gaining an enormous debt. Iraq won't have much choice but to choose the former because the new government won't be able to sufficiently act with such a debt over its head. Another lever that the US has is the appointments that Paul Bremer, former Presidential Envoy to Iraq and former Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, made during his short stay in Iraq. He made several appointments into the government or allowed the US imposed Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to make appointments which are to serve five year terms. This allows the US to have a hold in the government as it initially shapes the country and the directions in which it goes. The main lever that the US has is that of its military. The current democratic government would be unlikely to survive the current environment without the support of the US military.¹⁹ As such, the government now knows that it must appease the US so that its military stays. Iraq has no choice but to cater to the wishes of the US if it wishes to survive.

Even more recently, the United States has even manipulated the permanent constitution of Iraq. US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan who influenced their elections, has had a very "hands-on approach" to the writing of the new Constitution, even going so far as to circulate a U.S. draft for their constitution.²⁰ In fact, the US has specifically sought to safeguard its interests in Iraq and has directly intervened in the writing of the constitution so that those interests would be protected. In particular, one article in a previous draft of the constitution stated that there would be no foreign military bases in Iraq. However, the

¹⁹ Milan Rai, *Whoever You Vote For, Washington wins*, Electronic Iraq, <http://electroniciraq.net/news/1875.shtml>.

²⁰ Dahr Jamail, *IRAQ: U.S. Influence Too Much*, Inter Press Service News Agency, <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30141>.

US got Iraq to drop this article so that they could keep forces in Iraq.²¹ This puts the threat of force over the Iraqi government if they don't do as the US asks. The US has done everything that it can to make itself vital to the survival of Iraq so that the country has no choice but to follow the wishes of the US. The political maneuvering in the election and in every other action is forcing the government to become indebted to the US so that they will be forced to appease the US.

Obviously, the US has done much political maneuvering in both countries. This leads us to our ethical question: Is it ethical to do this political maneuvering so that these countries are essentially controlled by the US? If the answer is yes, then the government, the leaders, and everything about the whole situation should be left the same. However, if the answer is no, then new elections and, in the case of Iraq, a new constitution are needed with the concurrent pulling out of any political involvement by the US. But which is the correct solution? That question is answered only by looking at Kantian ethics and consequentialism.

When one talks about Kantian ethics, one talks about Kant's Categorical Imperative. This imperative has three different tests that need to be discussed. The first of these is the notion that we should act as if our actions were to become a universal law.²² In other words, we should act only as if it would be okay for everyone to act that way. In applying the current ethical situation to this, we can find that the US's actions would not hold up. While this political maneuvering and controlling of another government might be very beneficial to the US, it would be quite a different story if the situation was turned around. We would be outraged if some other country came in and tried to control us. It would be to our detriment, as we wouldn't be able to truly act for the good of the people of our nation, but would be acting for the benefit of a completely different country, even if doing so was to our detriment. As such, these actions could not become a universal law as the other nation is always harmed.

The second version of the categorical imperative is that we should always treat persons as ends-in-themselves and never treat them as mere means to an end.²³ Kant typically meant for this

²¹ Jamail

²² Thomas F. Wall, *Thinking Critically About Moral Problems*. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Group, 2003), 38.

²³ Wall, 39-40.

version to be applied on an individual scale. I believe that, while not necessarily backed by Kant, the same idea applies to the actions of nations. If we were to look at a map, you would see a world with numerous individual entities known as nations that make it up. These nations are separate from one another and they have their own beliefs, laws, government, and values. In this respect, I believe that nations are similar to individual people as these differences separate them and make them individual entities, and, as such, we are able to apply the idea of the second version of the Categorical Imperative to them. Another issue I feel the need to address is the idea of respect. Kant holds that individuals need to be treated as an end because they are inherently worthy of respect as humans. When viewed simply as a place with geopolitical boundaries, a nation would not be deserving of respect as individuals are deserving of that respect. Nations are, however, much more than simple geopolitical boundaries. A nation is a group of people that has come together to form the society they live in. When we deal with nations, we don't simply deal with it as an ideal. We deal with and affect the real people that live within it. Because those people in a nation are deserving of respect, a nation is also deserving of the same type of respect as it is made up of those people. When viewing nations in this manner, I believe we can apply the second version of Kant's Categorical Imperative to the actions of nations. The actions of the US certainly do not hold up to this version. Our government's actions are performed for the sole purpose of benefiting the US. We are disregarding the well being of these nations. There could have been better candidates to run their countries. They won't be able to truly look after the well being of their citizens because they will be looking after the interests of the US first, either because they are forced to or because the leaders are controlled by or indebted to the US. As such, these nations and the people in them have been used as a means to an end for the US. They are being used to help ensure further prosperity for the US. However, because these are nations, which are not just boundaries, but are made of people, they deserve respect. This makes the US actions wrong.

The third and final version of Kant's Categorical Imperative is that we, and all others, must be able to act on rules (maxims) by our own free will.³⁴ The actions of the US do not hold up to this element of the Categorical Imperative either, because they don't allow the nations that we are

³⁴ Wall, 41.

controlling to be able to do this. This rule basically states that we must allow ourselves to have autonomy. The US has forced leaders, laws, and rules onto the peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan. We have taken their autonomy from them, because we aren't allowing them to choose and act on their rules by their own free will. We are forcing them to follow rules that we make. They aren't choosing them themselves but are simply being forced to follow them. They aren't being allowed to have autonomy. As such, the actions of the US do not pass the test of this tenet of the Categorical Imperative either.

Another element of Kantian ethics is the idea of duty. This was an important feature of Kant's philosophy. He believed that all people needed to be able to act according to their duty. According to him, it is impossible to be morally good without acting from duty.³⁵ Unfortunately, the US is not acting from duty in their current courses of action. The US has claimed a duty of protector and helper in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. However, by doing the political maneuvering that it has done, the US is doing the exact opposite of that duty. It is forcing these nations to consider the desires of another nation before themselves and, as a result, these nations must work to the detriment of their people. The US thus fails in its duty to help these nations because it is causing them to work to their own detriment. People, and nations, also have a duty to not interfere in the duty of others, or, in other words, to not interfere in their autonomy. However, the US is forcing Iraq and Afghanistan to ignore their duty to their own people and focus on the desires of the US instead. Because the US fails in these duties, we can again see that, according to Kantian ethics, what it is doing is immoral.

However, we have yet to see what consequentialism has to say about the ethics of the US's actions. For something to be ethical under consequentialism, it must produce more good consequences than bad consequences.³⁶ As such, we must look to what the consequences of the US's actions could be. At the current time, it is far too early to be able to tell exactly what the consequences of the actions will be. As such, I am forced to speculate on what I believe those consequences will be. These speculations will not be completely unfounded, but will be based

³⁵ Wall, 36-37.

³⁶ Wall, 21.

upon a mixture of what has happened in past situations, on psychological theory, and upon what the current situations are in those nations. For a little perspective into the historical background of situations like this, we can take a look back at the US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934. The United States took control of this nation in much the same way as is happening now in Iraq and Afghanistan. Marines were sent to Haiti and within six weeks, it was controlled by the US government. The local institutions were run by Haitians, but the administrators in the government were marines. Shortly thereafter, a figurehead president was put into place and he then dissolved the senate, leaving him to be the sole broker of power. This meant that the US, who was controlling him and the rest of the government, had completely taken control. These methods are fairly similar, though less sophisticated, to what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results for Haiti were not good. It resulted in a rebellion in 1918 and the loss of 2,000 Haitian lives and an unknown amount of wounded. The losses on the side of the Americans are also unknown. Following that incident, Haitians had inhumane conditions imposed on them and were basically treated like animals. Again, there would have to have been loss of life due to this treatment, but the amount of the dead is unknown to me. Thankfully this ended when the US left in 1934. Unfortunately, the country was left in such a state that the education system was horrendous, and the country was left as one of the poorest in the world. Also, as a result of all this, the United States was less well regarded by its peers across the globe.⁷⁷

This is the precedent that is seen in this type of situation all throughout history. While the United States may be able to gain economic benefits from these nations as well as being able to claim them as third world allies, I believe that there will eventually be more bad consequences to this situation than there will be good ones. The current mindset in Iraq is split between liking and hating the US for what they have done to Iraq. As such, the political maneuvering and control of the government isn't something that will sit well with the population that doesn't like the US. This group, under the current militaristic attitude, will likely continue and re-ignite attacks within the country, causing more troops to die and more money to be spent trying to police the country. I believe the same will eventually become true in Afghanistan. The US is also likely to be held in lower regard by other developed nations who disapprove of the actions that it has taken.

⁷⁷ *Haiti*, Lockergnome. <http://encyclopedia.lockergnome.com/s/b/Haiti>.

Ultimately, the US may make a little economic gain in this venture, but it will be at the great expense: loss of life in policing those countries, the possibility of full-blown war in those countries, and at the possible loss of other allies. As such, I do not believe that consequentialism supports the US political maneuvering and control of other nations.

Therefore, I advocate allowing new elections and the drawing up of new constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan while concurrently pulling the US political influence out of those nations. Keep in mind that this would leave the US military presence so that they may continue to help with the police action. I believe that this will result in improving relations with allies who have distanced themselves from us as well as with Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, I believe this will make Iraq and Afghanistan likely to do economic business with us in the future. Granted, it won't give us the immediate gross gain that we would have received by controlling the government, but it is likely to get us a higher net gain than we would have otherwise received. One can also see that it would help in settling the current situation in Iraq, thus helping to prevent loss of life. Ultimately, I believe that this would help return credibility to the US in the global community. It seems to me that this change would be to the benefit of all involved, as it is morally right both from a consequential standpoint and from a deontological view. At the moment, politics is still defined as repetition and as being unchanging. Our current actions in Iraq and Afghanistan do nothing to change this view. However, maybe by going back and allowing these countries to govern themselves we can begin to redefine politics to include such changes.

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A Note about the Artist: Heather L. Horton—In Her Own Words...

Heather L. Horton (maiden name being Heather Lynn James) has lived in Girard, Kansas all her life. She graduated from Girard High School and has recently graduated with a Bachelors Degree in Art with an emphasis in Commercial Art from Pittsburg State University. She also has a small cake business, with her mother Cora Murray, that she does on the side. (Sweet Designs: SweetDesigns_ConfectionIllustrations@hotmail.com)

Evidence of Being

Everyone who makes art in any media, during my short lived experience, gravitates towards producing work that deals with aspects in his or her life; personal emotional experiences, dreams, and life questions. In my work all of this is included. I tend to use organic objects to represent people in my life. In my paintings I chose the pear for depiction. The pears in my paintings tend to be bruised, old, and most damaged in some way, whether it be a faint scar or a full fledged bruise, much like many of the people in my life. Each pear brings its own characteristics and when placed together on the picture plane seem to interact with one another. In *Keisha* one might visualize two parents speaking with a rebellious teenager. Or in *Lisa* the emotional response to the work is usually uneasy, much like she might have felt after a miscarriage. While she wasn't physically scarred on the outside, she was emotionally. Each painting is an idiom of how I see my family and the way that they interact.

Photography is another way I chose to capture that warm, awkward, familiar sense of family. The cycle of life is fascinating to me. A woman is born from a mother who passes on her "seeds" to the child. Children grow and have children. The offspring grow old and wither like the worn skin of a pear, and like that pear they too die and are put back into the ground. My images are layered. They start from a blank surface and grow and manipulate into what you see on the wall. Every layer signifies a small alteration in the life cycle of that painting, in turn the sequence of life. Each small series in this show explores the different stages in a life journey. In

the black and white photographs I attempted to capture the brutal beauty that comes with bearing a child and the transformation that the body goes through.

Just like the cycle of life, my role as an artist is a journey. Although you may see pears, and more pears, I see a better understanding, a search for life experience, and an insight to the things that trouble me most in life such as birth and bereavement, evidences of being.

Louisa-Sophia