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Fall 2004

### Logos-Sophia

Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society

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
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# **LOGOS-SOPHIA**

**The Journal of the  
Pittsburg State University  
Philosophical Society**



**Volume 12,  
Fall/Winter 2004**

**Logos-Sophia: The Journal of the PSU Philosophical Society**  
**Volume 12, Fall/Winter 2004**

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**Editor's Introduction**

Donald Wayne Viney

The members of the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society are proud to present the twelfth volume of their journal, *Logos-Sophia*. The Society was founded in 1987. The following year the first number of *Logos-Sophia* was published. The PSU Philosophical Society is dedicated to the belief that philosophical learning is central to a well-rounded education. In an age when philosophy often finds itself as a beggar at the table of higher education, it is all the more important that journals like this be published. As the great American philosopher and psychologist William James said, philosophy is the most important of all college studies.

The articles in this issue of *Logos-Sophia* were chosen for publication by a panel of student readers that included Roy Hatcher (sophomore in Communication), Karen Mayse (junior in English), Brian Ray (senior in Chemistry), and Jonathan Ray (junior in Political Science). Two categories of papers were judged: articles by faculty members and articles by students. The first two articles were written by faculty members. Dr. John C. Ross is Assistant Professor of Composition and Theory in the Department of Music. James McBain is a former philosophy instructor at Pittsburg State who will receive his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Missouri in the near future. The remaining four essays are written by students and former students. Deanna Denny graduated from PSU in May 2004 with a B.A. in Sociology. Rebecca Polok is a senior majoring in Political Science. Jeanne L. Witt is a senior majoring in Social Work. Michael Pommier is a sophomore majoring in Commercial Graphics.

The Society wishes to thank Matt Wilbert for designing the cover of this year's journal. Matt explains that the images in his picture represent various periods in the history of Western philosophy. The

Greek columns are symbolic of ancient philosophy. The chess board represents medieval philosophy. The crow is designed to emphasize the wisdom of the renaissance (Matt points out that, contrary to what most people think, the crow is very intelligent). The mirror stands for philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries since so much of that philosophy reflects what came before. Doubtless, Matt would be open to other interpretations of his work. The Philosophical Society is simply happy to have the work of such a skilled and imaginative artist for the cover of *Logos-Sophia*.

The logo on page 1 was designed by Todd Gimlin, one of the original founders of the Philosophical Society.

## Symbols and Art: Langer and Her Critics

John C. Ross

Throughout her career, Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985) established herself as the author of an aesthetic theory based on symbolization. Langer's theory of symbols was heavily influenced by Ernest Cassirer; and like him, she identified symbolic activity as the defining characteristic of intelligence.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, she moved the discussion of symbols away from the context of Cassirer's idealism—with its speculations on "world-spirit and whatnot"<sup>2</sup>—and placed it firmly in the context of scientific naturalism, with an emphasis on anthropology and biology.<sup>3</sup>

Langer's writing on aesthetics weaves together her belief in the symbolic function of art with the properties of symbols. As she sought to articulate her theory of the nature of art, Langer found it necessary to offer a new definition for the term "symbol" and occasionally changed some of her key terms. During the course of their development, not all of her ideas kept pace with each other. Readers who acquaint themselves with her ideas somewhere in the middle of their development might receive an incomplete view of a subject that was later brought to maturity. This has led to characterizations of her work which are both unfortunate and unfair.<sup>4</sup> By re-examining her writings and the criticisms leveled against them, I hope to identify those areas where criticism was warranted, and well as those areas where it was not. I will focus only on those criticisms which address symbolism and meaning.

It is useful to begin with a brief summary of Langer's use of the term "symbol." The first work in which she rigorously defined "symbol" is *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic* (1937). In this work, "symbol" is used to mean only those functions which she later called "discursive." In *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942), Langer considerably expanded the concept of the symbol; it is here that she

first distinguished two symbolic classes: discursive and presentational. Also in this book, she first proposed the idea that the act of making symbols—the process of symbolization—is a specifically human need. Further, in her attempt to define the various dimensions of symbolic activity in which humans engage, she found the concept of the symbol to be particularly well-suited to the realm of art. Indeed, as the subtitle of this book reveals—*A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art*—she believed that the symbolic process is at the heart of the highest of human endeavors.

The discursive class of symbols includes those symbols which have been traditionally understood as such, as in mathematics, logic, and language. The two main attributes of discursive symbols are conventional assignation and general reference. Conventional assignation means that a symbol and its meaning are linked according to the practice of a particular culture. The relationship between the symbol and its meaning is not due to something inherent in the symbol or the thing symbolized, its meaning. Any discursive symbol reflects a particular cultural practice; and in the context of that culture one understands the relationship between a symbol (such as a word) and its meaning (the symbol's referent); it is established by convention. General reference, on the other hand, means that the object to which a discursive symbol refers is never unique. The range of possible referents is broad. The symbol "water" refers to a multitude of things from that which comes out of the tap, to a puddle, a lake, a river, and the Pacific ocean: all are H<sub>2</sub>O. These attributes have been associated with symbols since the time of Aristotle and are included in Langer's own book on the subject.<sup>5</sup>

Presentational symbols, however, are another matter. By offering a theory for the origin and content of rite and art—activities that seem to be as far as one can get from the rigors of logic—Langer knew it would be necessary to give to the accepted definition of "symbol" a new dimension. She then created a new class of symbols—presenta-

tional symbols. She stressed that this new class of symbols must answer to the common properties of symbols—else, the term "symbol" would not be needed—but that the things expressed by this "presentational" class of symbols are radically different than those expressed by traditional discursive symbols.

Presentational symbols have their origin in sense data, the material furnished by the senses. What the eye sees or the ear hears is not simply a jumble of formless data; the senses render *sensa* into forms, and these forms are abstractions of the real world.<sup>6</sup> In the same way, the mathematical formulae of physics are abstractions of the real world.<sup>7</sup> The difference between sensory forms and mathematical formulae is in the medium of interchange; the mediation of the senses render sensuous perceptions, while the mediation of mathematics (or logic or language) renders theorems, propositions, laws—or, in other words, that for which the medium is suited. In both cases, the symbolism that is operating—be it discursive or presentational—is making something *conceivable*,<sup>8</sup> and "different classes of experience—reason, intuition, appreciation—correspond to different types of symbolic mediation."<sup>9</sup> For greater clarity, it is useful to quote Langer at length:

Symbolization is the essential act of the mind; and mind takes in more than what is commonly thought. Only certain products of the symbol making brain can be used according to the canons of discursive reasoning.<sup>10</sup>

The meanings given through language [or any discursive symbolism] are successively understood, and gathered into a whole by the process called discourse; the meanings of all other symbolic elements that compose a larger, articulate symbol are understood only through the meaning of the whole, through their relations within the total structure. Their very functioning as symbols depends on the fact that they are involved in a simultaneous, integral presentation. This kind of semantic may be called "presentational symbols[.]"<sup>11</sup>

The distinction that presentational symbols are “only understood through the meaning of the whole,” is a crucial one for distinguishing between the two classes of symbols. While one experiences mathematics and language one discrete symbol at a time—that is, successively—one does not experience sense impressions this way; nor works of art.

For Langer, the symbolic process is rooted in a four-fold relationship: a human subject confronts an object; this object is then rendered into a symbol, which conveys a conception, a meaning. It is this four-fold relationship of subject, object, symbol, and conception which forms the basis for symbolization, whether discursive or presentational.<sup>12</sup>

In discussing these four terms, Langer was calling attention to the different ways the word “meaning” is used; as signification, as denotation, as connotation. Connotation describes the relationship between a symbol and the concept it conveys. A symbol and its concept remain wedded in the mind of the human subject; and it is this wedding of symbol and concept that allows thought to take place. Things can be thought about because there are symbols which convey concepts, and concepts are the stuff of human thought.<sup>13</sup> Discursive and presentational symbols embody different domains of human thought; yet, they both involve conceptualization. Conceptualization, then, is the key to all symbolization and all human thought. Experience is rendered into symbols that convey concepts of experience, making experience conceivable to a human subject. This idea is stated repeatedly in *Philosophy in a New Key*.<sup>14</sup>

More will be said about the specific nature of presentational symbols later. At present, it is useful to examine one of Langer’s biggest critics to see if Langer has improperly defined “symbol.” In his review of her book *Philosophy in a New Key*, Ernest Nagel finds fault with a fundamental proposition in Langer’s theory concerning presentational symbols. His criticism focuses on that which is supposedly symbolized by this class of symbols. Of Langer’s example of sensory forms, he asks: if for a human subject the senses organize stimuli into

sensory forms, and if through this experience (of perception) concepts of the sensory forms are made, what object is then symbolized in this process? In physics, there are mathematical formulae that are symbols of relationships among the forces of the physical world; the mathematical formula is the “symbol” and the actual relationship (in nature) is the “object.” In the perception of sensory forms, however, what besides the “object” itself is represented? Nagel suggests that for Langer’s “presentational symbols,” the symbolic relationship fails, for there are only three members present: the subject who perceives an object which leads to a conception of that object.<sup>15</sup> Nagel states: “It is nevertheless not evident in what relevant way sensory form is comparable with physical theory as a “symbol.”

This leads to a second problem for presentational symbols. Langer states that music—pre-eminent among this class of symbols—“can be exploited in a purely formal or syntactical manner.”<sup>16</sup> (According to Nagel, when this happens *in language*, the resulting structure is without a referent, and thus is not operating symbolically.<sup>17</sup>) Langer also admits that, for a given musical example, it is possible to assign more than one appropriate emotive characterization; indeed, opposite characterizations can sometimes both fit equally well.<sup>18</sup> To Nagel, however, this admission implies that music as a symbol is capable of general reference, an attribute reserved for discursive symbols only.<sup>19</sup> Nagel concludes: “. . . she is occasionally dangerously near to the position that music simply presents musical forms which are themselves not “representative at all.”<sup>20</sup>

Coming from a scientific point of view, Nagel’s concern, when discussing symbols, was with the function of representation within the symbolic relationship. As noted earlier, of discursive symbols, the object symbolized is represented by the symbol, and the relationship between object and symbol is established by convention. Conventional assignation gives discursive symbols the quality of general reference. For presentational symbols, however, Langer stated that the relationship between symbol and object is specific and unique.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless,



"[n]o symbol is exempt from the office of logical formulation, from *conceptualizing* what it conveys. . . ." <sup>22</sup> In the process of ordering stimuli into sensory forms, in the formulation of *sensa* into the forms of experience, presentational symbols are comparable to physical theory, because like discursive symbols, they are an expression of something experienced that has been rendered into a symbol, a vehicle for thought. Symbols make the world conceivable; if one can think about something, that thing has been symbolized—whether the thing is the force of gravity or a rose outside the door. Yet, discursive symbols represent something—they can serve as proxy—but presentational symbols, as the name implies, only *present*. It is this difference which Nagel faults.

How can a symbol not "represent" something? Nagel criticized Langer's new class of symbols because, in making an analogy with discursive symbols, he could not find representational function taking place within Langer's presentational symbols. To say that a symbol has a meaning usually implies that the symbol *refers* to an assigned but independent concept. (This is true for discursive symbols.) For Langer, however, a symbol's meaning is primarily the concept it engenders. <sup>23</sup> With presentational symbols, the symbol and concept are not independent, because, as Nagel points out, there is nothing represented. But, is there something *presented*, as Langer is suggesting? And if so, does this presentation merit the term "symbolization?"

For Langer, representation is not a function of all types of symbols. Thus Nagel's two criticisms—the missing symbol of presentational symbols, and their apparent lack of representative function—are really one. To him, the description of perception given by Langer did not necessitate the appearance of a symbol, and without representative function, there is no symbol. Langer's thesis, that sensory forms can function as symbols, is based on her conviction that there is something similar between the way words reify their meanings and the way the senses organize *sensa*. This similarity became the cornerstone for a

new definition of symbolization which seeks to isolate the primary function of all symbolic activity: the formulation of experience through the act of abstraction. Abstraction is "the keynote of rationality." In declaring abstraction—not representation—to be the necessary condition for all symbolic activity, Langer is paving the way for a class of symbols in which the symbol is fused with its meaning such that no representation takes place; only presentation. <sup>24</sup>

Nagel's criticisms were both unjust and just. They were unjust in that he criticized Langer's class of presentational symbols for not having a function—representation—which she clearly said it did not have. But, they were just in that, while granting that abstraction may indeed take place in the perception of sensory forms, it is not yet clear if symbolic function is also taking place.

Langer was aware of Nagel's review. In her next book, *Feeling and Form* (1953), she announced in the introduction, as if to make it abundantly clear, her definition of a symbol: "any device whereby we are enabled to make an abstraction." <sup>25</sup> Because later critics would still be resistant to this definition, she would later revise it to: "any device whereby we are enabled to make an abstraction is a symbolic element, and all abstraction involves symbolization." <sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, in reducing the necessary condition for symbolic activity to the process of abstraction, Langer was only clarifying what she had begun in *Philosophy in a New Key*: a phenomenology of symbolization in which discursive and presentational symbols spring from the same source: the abstraction of the forms of experience.

If abstraction is common to both discursive and presentational symbols, what then is the difference? The difference is found among the members of each type of symbolic relationship. For discursive symbols, the symbol and the object are distinct entities brought together by conventional assignation. <sup>27</sup> For presentational symbols, however, the symbol is inseparable from the object. To Langer, the work of art—to use one type of presentational symbol—is the symbol; <sup>28</sup> that is, for pictorial art, the pigments, the canvas, the shapes,



lines, and colors. The arrangement of these elements peculiar to a given art work is that work's "significant," or "logical form;" and the significant form is isomorphic with aspects of human "inner" or "sentient" life. Thus, when the isomorphism is realized in the mind of a human subject (someone perceiving the art work), what the subject perceives is the art work's "meaning" or, as she later called it, its "vital import." The art work, states Langer, embodies an import unique to its peculiar structure.

We never pass beyond the work of art, the vision, to something separately thinkable, the logical form, and from this to the meaning it conveys, a feeling that has this same form. The dynamic form of feeling is seen *in* the picture [for pictorial art], not through it mediately; the feeling itself seems to be in the picture.<sup>29</sup>

The term "import" is noteworthy. Langer used "import" to mean that which is expressed by a work of art. She abandoned the term "meaning" because of its association with discursive symbols; "meaning" is commonly associated with discourse, and hence, not with feeling. When experiencing works of art, the art work and its significant form are compressed into a single experience; the "meaning" or import is conveyed directly by the work, and no mediation through any discursive symbolism is needed.<sup>30</sup> Langer believed that subjective existence has a structure, and thus, emotions can be conceived of—thought about—because the structure of subjective existence can be perceived through the process of abstraction.<sup>31</sup> (This same process is necessary for the perception of objective existence, because *all* forms, as exemplified in perception, are comprehended by abstraction.<sup>32</sup>)

At this point, one can examine what is perhaps the most thorough critique of Langer's concept of the symbol. In his article, "Langer's Arabesque and the Collapse of the Symbol,"<sup>33</sup> Berel Lang examines the development of Langer's interest in symbolic activity from *Practice of Philosophy* (1930) to *Problems of Art* (1957). With

this broad perspective, Lang reports that Langer's early interest in symbols led her to employ the concept of symbolization in connection with her thesis about the function of art, only to discover later that art is not a symbol at all.<sup>34</sup> The distinctions elaborated in *Philosophy in a New Key* between sign, signal, and symbol, are abandoned. Lang states, "The art work and its 'meaning' are not to be distinguished; the art work no longer symbolizes."<sup>35</sup> Lang suggests that Langer's theory undergoes a major transformation once she made this discovery: he asserts that as Langer relinquished the roles of "meaning" and "symbol" in regard to art, she strengthened her conviction that art is an expression of feeling.<sup>36</sup>

Lang further states that, in anticipation of criticism for not having a valid method to verify the correlation between the art symbol and its vital import—its "meaning"—Langer incorporated the concept of intuition into her theory. By stressing the intuitive apprehension of an art work's vital import as an event that only occurs within an individual's experience, Langer made an "assertion which precludes the possibility of verification." There is no basis for affirming that "feeling is the distinctive quality conveyed by the art work . . ."<sup>37</sup> Lang further states, "Until we know *why* knowledge acquired from art takes the form assigned it by Langer, we must hesitate at her description of that form."<sup>38</sup>

The transformation that Lang sees taking place is based on his understanding that, originally, Langer believed the work of art to *refer* to the life of feeling, whereas later she clearly states that the function of art is embodiment, not reference. This would indeed be a transformation of position! But, as has already been shown, reference has never been a function of presentational symbols. Thus, it remains to be shown how Lang, like Nagel before him, could have still expected that presentational symbols exhibit representational function.

In her book *Problems of Art*, Langer stated that *genuine* symbols—by which she meant those of language and mathematics—have a significant function; they "point" to their meaning. She subsequently

stated that a work of art only articulates and presents; it does not refer.<sup>39</sup> Lang interpreted this as a belated recognition that presentational symbols have no referential function; but there was nothing belated about it. In the passage cited above, Langer was simply reiterating, for the sake of anyone unfamiliar with her work thus far,<sup>40</sup> that reference is not a function of presentational symbols. Her use of the appellation "genuine symbolism" was also a partial concession to some of her critics who objected to her use of the word "symbol."<sup>41</sup>

By calling language and mathematics genuine symbolisms, however, Langer was not retracting her belief in a non-discursive symbolism. "The art symbol . . . is the expressive form. It is not a symbol in the full familiar sense, for it does not convey something beyond itself."<sup>42</sup> Langer saw the primary office of symbols as the means by which experience can be focused, reconstructed, and presented "objectively for contemplation." This is why art works can still be considered symbols. "I said before that [the Art Symbol] is a symbol in a somewhat special sense, because it performs some symbolic functions, but not all . . ."<sup>43</sup> And finally: ". . . the function of what I called 'the art symbol'—which is, in every case, the work of art as a whole, and purely as such—is more *like* a symbolic function than anything else."<sup>44</sup>

Because Lang had understood Langer to be *removing* the function of reference from her theory, he saw the concept "symbol" as, in principle, abandoned. Furthermore, Lang stated that because the "meaning" of an art work, its vital import, is embodied in the work and not referred to, the symbol and its meaning collapse.<sup>45</sup> The symbol and its meaning collapse because, while they may be conceptually separate, they are not ontologically so. Yet, to judge, therefore, that Langer's application of the term "symbol" to her theory of art somehow fails, is to stubbornly refuse her a hearing as to what she had repeatedly called the primary function of all symbols: the formulation of experience.<sup>46</sup> Langer recognized the distinctions between the func-

tions of her two classes of symbols: by admitting that the art symbol performs only some of the offices of symbols, not all; by calling language and mathematics a *genuine* symbolism; and even by tentatively offering the term "quasi-symbols" in reference to works of art. But she continually upheld the formulative function as the basis of all symbol making.<sup>47</sup> It is a curious fact that not once in his article does Lang mention this aspect of her theory.

It follows, therefore, that Lang's criticism that "the art work no longer symbolizes" is, by Langer's standard, simply false. He was either unaware of or unsympathetic to, Langer's division of symbolic activity into offices, some of which are present in works of art. Lang wanted the symbol to be a distinct entity from its meaning, as is the case with discursive symbols. He does not recognize a symbolism without referential function.

Lang also commented on Langer's employment of the concept "intuition." To Langer, "[i]ntuition is the basic process of all understanding, just as operative in discursive thought as in clear sense perception and immediate judgment. . . ."<sup>48</sup> Intuition is the mode through which the observer first becomes aware of symbols, non-discursive and discursive, and the objects they symbolize.<sup>49</sup> Abstraction allows one to perceive form from experience. Intuition allows one to see the similarity of form between different experiences, especially between the symbol and the object symbolized. Therefore, intuition is not a method of discursive cognition, but an event in which the "relatedness—distinctness, congruence, correspondence of forms, contrast, a synthesis in a total "*Gestalt*. . . " of form becomes manifest. For works of art, it is through intuition that the congruence of the vital import of a work of art and the life of feeling, is made.<sup>50</sup> In reference to Langer's definition, Lang makes two relevant comments: (1) the definition was motivated by Langer's realization that her theory had no empirical means of verification; (2) by stressing the role of intuition in the apprehension of artistic import, Langer places the point of verification—that is, the possibility of assessing and analyzing the art work's

cognitive content—within the individual's experience, and thus prevents any establishment of the thesis that "feeling is the distinctive quality conveyed by the art work. . . ." <sup>51</sup> These are perhaps the most incisive criticisms leveled at Langer. Although it would be impossible for Lang to know what motivated Langer to introduce the concept of intuition into her theory, it nevertheless must be granted that Langer's greatest weakness is simply lack of evidence. <sup>52</sup>

Once again, for discursive symbols, the symbol and its meaning are not only distinguishable, but separable, because their relationship is established by convention. The discursive symbol is not unique to its meaning and can be changed; though for the art symbol, according to Langer, this is not the case. The art symbol and its import are ontologically inseparable, but not conceptually. They are distinguishable, but not separable. <sup>53</sup> Furthermore, the fused relationship of the art symbol with its import, for Langer, does not deny its symbolic status, because the necessary condition for all symbolic activity, the formulation of experience, is met. While she has not demonstrated this to be a fact, she is not being inconsistent, if one accepts her vocabulary. The conceptual weight of presentational symbols lies in their *symbolic function*, not in their analogy with discursive symbols.

Further criticism of Langer is simply the result of confusion. In his book *Music as Heard*, Thomas Clifton, in extracting quotes from both *Feeling and Form* and *Problems of Art*, states that the concept of the art work as a symbol is at odds with the notion of music as "self-referential." <sup>54</sup> He expresses this "circularity": "Art is a symbol of human feeling. We can experience symbolized expressions of feeling in works of art. Therefore, art is the symbol of a symbol." <sup>55</sup> There is a problem with Clifton's second proposition. Langer never stated that one "experiences" symbols in a work of art. (An art work may contain symbols, but such symbols are not what she calls the "art symbol." <sup>56</sup>) Rather, her theory states that the experience of works of art can lead to the intuitive apprehension of the art work's vital import, and that this

process is a symbolic process, because an art work's significant form renders conceivable aspects of the life of feeling. Thus, the art work does not refer, either to itself or to anything else.

"Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling." <sup>57</sup> A work of art presents a form which is an objectification of some aspect of sentient life. The relationship among the parts of an art work—the colors, the shades, lines, volumes, timbres, textures, etc.—are isomorphic to the relationship of the elements of the life of feeling. What an artist knows about how life feels is reflected in what she or he creates. Yet, it is not possible to say what an art work's meaning is; one can only know its import through direct experience of the work. <sup>58</sup>

Finally, there is one term that Langer employed which has caused much confusion. In the chapter on music in *Philosophy in a New Key*, Langer introduced the term "unconsummated symbol" to express that, while music does not have a referent—there is nothing to which one can point as the music's meaning—it does very plainly have import. In the absence of an "assigned connotation" <sup>59</sup> therefore, the function of music in the four-fold symbolic process is incomplete; it is "unconsummated." In view of this, Malcolm Budd has written that this lack of connotation "should have forced [a] retreat from the idea [that music is] in some sense a representative art." <sup>60</sup>

The term "unconsummated symbol" came about as Langer acknowledged the absence of referential function in regard to music. (Music is not a referential art.) In *Feeling and Form*, however, she plainly stated that reference is incompatible with all presentational symbols: "A symbol that cannot be separated from its sense cannot really be said to refer to something outside itself. 'Refer' is not the right word for its characteristic function." <sup>61</sup> Furthermore, she recognized that emotive characterizations—which are frequently applied to music—are of a more intellectual nature than the vital import of an art work. That is, a work's import—as known discursively—is often named for the conditions in which feelings similar to those expressed

by the work have been associated. Sadness, cheerfulness, etc., are characterizations of feelings as they are related to events.<sup>62</sup> Ambiguity of emotive characterizations in regard to musical works—the reason a single work can sometimes receive differing emotional labels—is the result of language, a discursive symbolism, being used to describe music, a presentational symbolism. In *Feeling and Form*, Langer states that an art work's import embodies “the course of sentience, feeling, emotion and the *Élan vital* itself,” which “has no counterpart in any vocabulary.”<sup>63</sup>

Those critics of Langer examined here seem to view her struggle to articulate the nature of artistic expression within the context of symbolism as simply inadequate. This is because they have not accepted or were not aware of her basic premise: that the necessary condition for all symbolic activity is logical formulation, the conceptualization of experience. Langer revised her terms in response to critics who objected to them because of their own insistence on making presentational symbols fit the definition of discursive symbols. Langer's goal was to reveal a wider application of symbolic activity than had hitherto been acknowledged, by defining a new category—presentational symbols. The idea of presentational symbols, with particular emphasis on works of art, occupies a large portion of her writings as she articulates first one aspect then another. As a result, to some, her theory seems confusing. One frustrated author writes:

She employs paradoxical notions such as “presentational” symbol and “unconsummated” symbol. The musical symbol is fused with its meaning, she maintains, but she finds subsequently that music has no meaning: it has import instead. Or again, music becomes a virtual image of inner experience. But if the inner experience in question has no existence separate from or independent of the image, how can it be represented or referred to by the music? Finally symbols are said to formulate as well as to refer, and formulation is logically prior to refer-

ence; musical symbolism formulates only. But how, then, can music have meaning?<sup>64</sup>

The main issue addressed by the above author is: can a symbol have meaning without the function of reference? Further, he is challenging the significance of Langer's concept of formulation. If art can formulate subjective experience, does that make it “meaningful”? Does the act of formulation give “meaning” to music? What is “meaning”? In literate societies, particularly the kind in which people who write about art live, “meaning” is most often associated with words. Words have meaning, and the meaning of words is given with words; thus, the dictionary. Yet, is it not possible to imagine a non-verbal type of meaning? While it may be readily admitted that certain experiences are beyond verbal articulation—they are unutterable—why can it not also be admitted that, if such experiences are highly valued, they are “meaningful”? When one is moved to tears or to rapture from the experience of a work of art, does it not seem apt to say that the work which elicited such feeling is “meaningful”? Is there a better term?

In view of Langer's attempt to point out that the tireless symbol-making activity of the human brain encompasses far more than mathematical formulas or Socratic syllogisms, it seems petty to insist that “meaning” be reserved for that which is discursive. The ability of art to move people, the importance placed upon it, both economically and socially, the ubiquity with which artistic activities are engaged in the world over, seem to suggest that for a great many people, art is a “meaningful” activity, however describable or indescribable their experience of it may be.

The criticisms examined in this paper have been concerned with the issue of symbolism and meaning. As pointed out, Langer has been repeatedly misunderstood. Her definition of symbolism, in which reference is demoted and formulation exalted, has been largely ignored, if not confused. Her critics have insisted, sometimes tacitly, that a symbolism must be referential to be meaningful. But, does not this

insistence come from an unswerving (and unquestioned?) belief in the primacy of verbal discourse? Verbal discourse is admittedly a powerful symbolism; but is its power to articulate ideas any greater than the power of art to move human hearts? And are these "powers" so very different? Langer's answer is a resounding no.

#### Notes

1. Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophical Sketches* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 59.
2. Walker Percy, "Symbol as Need," *Thought* 65 (1990): 376-84 (p. 381).
3. Carl Sagan, *The Dragons of Eden: Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977), 63. Sagan notes that, in her book *Philosophy in a New Key* (1947), she anticipates the later neurological research which has found a basis for ritual behavior in the R-complex of the human brain.
4. F.E. Sparshott, "Susanne K(atherina) Langer," *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. Stanley Sadie (London: Macmillan, 1980), 10: 449. "Many aestheticians hold that Langer's basic contentions were decisively refuted by Nagel (1943)."
5. Susanne K. Langer, *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic*, 3rd ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1967).
6. Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 42.
7. *Ibid.*, 92.
8. *Ibid.*, 93.
9. *Ibid.*, 97.
10. *Ibid.*, 41.
11. *Ibid.*, 97.
12. *Ibid.*, 64.
13. Langer, *Philosophy*, 64.
14. "Our merest sense-experience is a process of *formulation*." *Ibid.*, 89. "No symbol is exempt from the office of logical formulation, of *conceptualizing* what it conveys. . . ." *Ibid.*, 97. "Art . . . gives form to something that is simply there, as the intuitive organizing functions of sense give form to objects and spaces, color and sound." *Ibid.*, 263. "No human [sense] impression is only a signal from the outer world; it always is *also* an image in which possible impressions are formulated, that is, a symbol for the conception of *such* experience." Langer, *Feeling*, 376.
15. Ernest Nagel, review of *Philosophy in a New Key*, by Susanne K.

Langer, in *Journal of Philosophy*, 40 (1943): 323-29 (p. 326). Langer states: "In denotation, which is the commonest kind of symbol-function, there have to be four [essential terms]: subject, symbol, conception, and object." Langer, *Philosophy*, 64.

16. Langer writes, "In music we work essentially with free forms, following inherent psychological laws of 'rightness,' and take interest in possible articulations suggested entirely by the musical material. We are elaborating a symbolism of such vitality that it harbors a principle of development in its own elementary forms, as a really good symbolism is apt to do—as language has 'linguistic laws' whereby words naturally give rise to cognates, sentence-structures to subordinate forms, indirect discourse to subjunctive constructions by 'attraction,' noun-inflections to inflections of their modifiers 'by agreement.'" Langer, *Philosophy*, 240.

17. Nagel, 328.
18. Langer, *Philosophy*, 238.
19. *Ibid.*, 96.
20. Nagel, 327.
21. Langer, *Philosophy*, 96. See also note 11.
22. *Ibid.*, 97.
23. *Ibid.*, 61.
24. "An object is not a datum, but a form construed by the sensitive and intelligent organ, a form which is at once an experienced individual thing and a symbol for the conception of it, for *this sort of thing*." Langer, *Philosophy*, 89.
25. Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), xi.
26. Langer, *Sketches*, 63.
27. Nomination—the process of naming—is one of the basic elements of discursive symbols. While a name is a symbol, assigned by convention, the mere act of naming is not itself discursive symbolism. Impressions adhere to denotated things and thus create a conceptual context for the name. Langer, *Philosophy*, 60-1.
28. "The work as a whole is the image of feeling, which may be called the Art Symbol." Susanne K. Langer, *Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1957), 134.
29. *Ibid.*, 34.
30. Ranjan K. Ghosh, a Langer proponent offers the following analysis: "A sympathetic interpretation of the theory of symbols as it occurs in Langer's writing must take notice of a fundamental point of distinction between art and language in respect of the following: discursive language is a 'system of symbols'; and a work of art is a symbol not in the sense that it stands for something other than itself but in virtue of the fact that its internal structure at once uniquely reveals the intuitive character of [the] life of feeling." Ranjan K. Ghosh, *Aesthetic Theory and Art: A*

*Study in Susanne K. Langer* (Malkaganj, Dehli: Ajanta Publications, 1979), 22.

31. Langer, *Problems*, 7.

32. Langer, *Feeling*, 378. Elsewhere, she states: "The material furnished by the senses is constantly wrought into *symbols*, which are our elementary *ideas*." Langer,"*Philosophy*, 42.

33. Berel Lang, "Langer's Arabesque and the Collapse of the Symbol,"*Review of Metaphysics* 16 (1962): 349-65.

34. *Ibid.*, 364.

35. *Ibid.*, 362.

36. *Ibid.*, 362-3.

37. *Ibid.*, 359.

38. *Ibid.*, 364-5.

39. Langer, *Problems*, 133-4.

40. The chapters of *Problems of Art* were originally delivered as lectures; thus there was a need to occasionally reiterate concepts clearly stated elsewhere in her writings.

41. *Ibid.*, 126. "Melvin Rader suggested that one should speak of a work of art as an 'expressive form' rather than as an 'art symbol,' and although I think the latter term perfectly defensible, I have used his term alternatively ever since." Langer,"*Sketches*, 64.

42. Langer, *Problems*, 139.

43. *Ibid.*, 132-3.

44. *Ibid.*, 126.

45. Lang, 362.

46. This idea climaxes in her chapter, "On a New Definition of 'Symbol'." Langer,"*Sketches*, 54-65.

47. *Ibid.*, 64-65.

48. Langer, *Feeling*, 29.

49. *Ibid.*, 377-8.

50. *Ibid.*, 378.

51. Lang, 363-4.

52. Yet, some work has been done which relates Langer's theories to the work of Manfred Clynes, and thus may give her ideas an empirical basis. See Michael M. Piechowski, "The Logical and the Empirical Form of Feeling,"*Journal of Aesthetic Education* 15 (1981): 31-53..

53. Langer, *Philosophy*, 262.

54. Thomas Clifton, *Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), 43.

55. *Ibid.*, 44.

56. This distinction is discussed by Langer in her chapter, "The Art Symbol and the Symbol in Art." *Problems*, 124-139.

57. Langer, *Feeling*, 40.

58. Stephen Davies, *Musical Meaning and Expression* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 125.

59. Langer, *Philosophy*, 240.

60. Malcolm Budd, *Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 14.

61. Langer, *Feeling*, 380.

62. *Ibid.*, 374.

63. *Ibid.*, 373-4.

64. Edward A. Lippmann, "The Dilemma of Musical Meaning," *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* 12 (1981): 181-89 (p.182).

## On Skepticism about Case-Specific Intuitions

James McBain

Moral theorizing is often characterized as beginning from our intuitions about ethical cases. Yet, while many applaud, and even demand, this methodology, there are those who reject such a methodology on the grounds that we cannot treat people's intuitions about ethical cases as evidence for or against moral theories. Recently, Shelly Kagan has argued that the reliance upon case-specific intuitions in moral theorizing is problematic.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, he maintains that the practice of using intuitions about cases lacks justification and, hence, we ought to be skeptical about the evidential weight of moral intuitions. This leads Kagan to conclude that we ought to accept an error theory that maintains most of our moral intuitions are mistaken. In this paper, I will look at the arguments Kagan presents in support of such skepticism – the failure of the intuition/observation analogy, the problem of intuitive disagreement, and the problem of *kinds* of cases.<sup>2</sup> I will argue that each of these arguments is problematic given some features of the nature of intuitions and the nature of the analogy between intuition and observation. Thus, I hope to show that these arguments fail to support Kagan's skepticism about the use of case-specific intuitions in moral theorizing.

### The Failure of the Intuition/Observation Analogy

The first argument begins by considering the "standard" way in which to justify the practice of using moral intuitions as evidence – arguing by analogy from the justification of empirical observation.<sup>3</sup> Since we typically characterize intuitive judgments as 'seeings', we can appeal to the fact that we are very inclined to accept our intuitions just as we are very inclined to accept our observations. Specifically, when arguing for or against an empirical theory, our observations have substantial evidential weight. We appeal to observations to provide support for or against a theory and treat any theory that does not



coincide with our observations as *prima facie* unjustified. Moral intuitions would hence seem to have the same sort of unique weight. We treat moral theories that do not coincide with our moral intuitions as *prima facie* unjustified. And, furthermore, we sometimes build a theory to capture our intuitions. Thus, any adequate moral theory is going to have to accommodate our intuitions.

As Kagan points out, this analogy is initially appealing. But when we analyze the analogy in detail it starts to break down. First, the reason we attempt to make our empirical theories fit our observations is because our observations are in general reliable just as we come to the table assuming our observations are reliable. It is this reliability that forces us to make our theories fit them. Yet, if we are to maintain the analogy, then we must come to the table already assuming that our moral intuitions are reliable. But what justifies this assumption? The analogy *presupposes* the reliability of moral intuitions when that is what is at issue. Furthermore, consider exactly what makes our observations reliable – the fact that we are strongly inclined to believe our empirical observations and that we can offer an overall theory of the empirical world that endorses the correctness of observational claims. It is these two facts that warrant our belief in the production of an account that will explain the non-accidental connection between observation and fact.<sup>4</sup>

The second claim – that we must be able to provide an overall theory of the empirical world that endorses the correctness of observational claims – is what leads to the biggest problem with the analogy. If we are to maintain the analogy, then, in order to warrant our reliance on moral intuitions, we must be able to produce an account of the non-accidental connection between moral intuition and the underlying moral realities. Hence, since we are inclined to accept our moral intuitions and given the existence of an overall moral theory that accounts for those moral intuitions, we are justified in believing that a required account of the “moral sense” may be forthcoming. Only then

would we have the analogy between intuition and observation strengthened.

What the analogy is left in need of is a theory that offers at least a basis of an explanation of the moral phenomena that are the subject matter of our intuitions. It is this that Kagan takes to be the most problematic. Such a task would require (a) determining the precise content of the moral intuitions that we are trying to accommodate and (b) determining the standards we impose concerning what will constitute an explanatorily adequate moral theory.<sup>5</sup> Both of these tasks are daunting. Yet, what is more to Kagan’s point is that he does not believe that we can ever satisfy (b).<sup>6</sup> And, if we are to accept this point, then we are led to skepticism about the use of moral intuitions. The general form of the argument is:

1. If we are to be justified in accepting the use of moral intuitions, then there must be an explanatorily adequate moral theory that endorses most of our moral intuitions, just as we take ourselves to be justified in accepting our observations by virtue of having an explanatorily adequate theory that endorses most of our observations.

2. Theories that attempt to accommodate our moral intuitions fail at (a) or (b) and hence are not plausible.

3. \ We are not justified in accepting the use of moral intuitions as evidence for moral theories.

This, in outline, is Kagan’s argument for his skepticism about taking moral intuitions as evidence. And it is this skepticism that leads him to accepting an error theory which maintains that most of our moral intuitions are mistaken.

#### *Response to Kagan’s First Argument*

The problem with Kagan’s first argument stems from a misconception about the proposed analogy. There is a very important dissimilarity between observation and intuition; namely, one is a sensory awareness and one is a propositional attitude. Intuitions are more like beliefs than like raw phenomenal seemings. This is not to say that

intuitions' *are* beliefs, rather they are *like* beliefs in that they are propositional attitudes.<sup>7</sup> If this is the case, then the analogy should be between intuitions and beliefs formed on the basis of observations. Hence, the justification of our use of moral intuitions is going to be akin to the justification of beliefs about our observations.

Despite this, throughout the literature on intuition there has been a tendency to characterize intuitions as perceptions. That is, we treat intuitions as a *seeing* of the truth of some proposition just as we treat our perceptual *seeing* of some state of affairs. As Robin M. Hogarth points, there are several reasons for this analogy.<sup>8</sup> First, intuition, like perception, is covert in that we do not have access to the process by which you are able to see/intuit what you do. Second, in both cases, you cannot justify what you see/intuit in terms of a conscious, logically formulated process. Next, both processes occur automatically and quickly. Finally, in both cases, the resulting process leaves the agent attending to various "cues or pieces of information."

While the analogy between intuition and perception may be tempting, I believe that it is a mistaken to fully characterize intuitions in this way.<sup>9</sup> The first reason for rejecting this analogy is obvious, and perhaps trivial – when people intuit various cases, they are not constrained by the physical world. As George Bealer points out,—"most things that can seem intellectually to be so cannot seem sensorily to be so."<sup>10</sup> Moreover, when one intuits something, any logically and/or metaphysically possible world can be entertained. Perception only shows what is actually the case, but, as many claim, intuition shows what is necessarily or possibly the case. In this way, intuition is not constrained like perception is.

We must notice a further fact here. In comparing intuitions and observations, there is a dissimilarity between them in that intuitions need not be about observables.<sup>11</sup> Rightness, justice, etc., are all going to be unobservables, but we definitely have intuitions about what cases fit the concept. So, if we can (and do) have intuitions about

unobservables, then we cannot *demand* the production of an adequate theory that endorses most of our intuitions since we cannot *demand* an adequate empirical theory account for unobservables. We may *allow* adequate empirical theories to account for unobservables, but we need not *demand* that they do so since, as some (such as Bas van Fraassen) have pointed out, it is epistemically suspect to do so.<sup>12</sup>

These two points lead us to a slightly different analogy. In order to justify our use of moral intuitions we need to compare it with our account of justifying our use of our beliefs about unobservables for empirical theories. This analogy puts the justificatory status of moral intuitions in the same arena as the justificatory status of general beliefs about unobservables or other theoretical entities. That is, it is outside the arena of the justificatory status of our empirical observations about observables. Thus, we are able to deny the first premise of Kagan's argument. This is not to say that there may not be further problems with attempting to support the analogy as I have presented it, but merely to say that Kagan's argument fails due to its misconceptions about the nature of the analogy.

### **The Problem of Intuitive Disagreement**

The problem of intuitive disagreement starts from the true claim that people's intuitions differ on particular cases. Kagan claims that when we have a case that leads various people to disagree, this result is surprising. It amazes us that others do not share the intuitions that are so compelling to us. The problem here is not that there is mere disagreement, rather that there is *systematic* and *patterned* disagreement. One individual may be responsive to features *f* and *g* of some case, while others may be completely indifferent to *f* and *g* or react to them in quite different ways. Thus, it would seem that moral "senses" fall into distinct types. Furthermore, if it is the case that different people have different moral senses even when thinking about the same case, then surely not everyone's intuitions are going to be reliable. Thus, we have further reason to be skeptical about the use of moral

intuitions.

### *Response to Kagan's Second Argument*

In order to address Kagan's second argument, I must first make a few remarks about how I am conceiving of intuitions. As I stated above, I take intuitions to be propositional attitudes. The content of the propositional attitude is thus going to be a singular classificational proposition of the form "this case, C, is (or is not) an instance of \_\_\_\_". That proposition is going to be about the classification of a natural kind, concept, or predicate. Intuitions must also have certain features. First, intuitions must be non-inferential in that they must not be explicitly reasoned to by argumentation. In this sense, intuitions are spontaneous. Second, they must be held as convictions. Intuitions cannot be mere hunches or guesses. Third, one must have sufficient understanding of the kind, concept, or predicate involved. If one does not understand what the content of the intuition is, then she would not be convinced that the content is being satisfied or the proposition is true. Fourth, I take it that intuitions are fallible.<sup>13</sup> Finally, intuitions are neither memories nor perceptions (as discussed in the last section). I take these to be some basic, uncontroversial features of intuitions.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the account of intuition that I am using is that an intuition is a spontaneous propositional attitude which classifies some case as one of a kind, concept, or predicate.

Given this characterization of intuitions, we see that at bottom there is a classificational scheme at work. That is, since every intuition classifies a case as one of (or not of) x, one must have the requisite concepts and theories involved in making a classification that C is x. In other words, intuitions are theory-laden. The degree to which intuitions are theory-laden is controversial, but I believe we can maintain there is going to be some degree of theory-ladenness.<sup>15</sup> I take it to be an open question still as to whether intuitions are laden with tacit or explicit theories. I believe that it suffices for our purpose here to merely take the theory-ladenness of intuitions as being of the tacit

variety. Thus, we do not have any initial problems of intuitions being merely the reporting of held beliefs.

Yet, why does the theory-ladenness of intuitions matter to the problem of intuitive disagreement? The answer here is two-fold. First, the problem of intuitive disagreement relies on there being a sort of blank slate from which people's intuitions spring. Yet, this does not seem to be the case. People's moral intuitions stem from their background theories or at least from their held classificational schemes. And different people are going to have different classificational schemes at work in the same case. If this is true, then we should not be surprised (as I think we are not surprised, contra Kagan) when people's moral intuitions differ with regard to the same case. Hence, we can explain why there is intuitive disagreement.

Second, we can explain away the problem by noting a further feature about this theory-ladenness. If we accept the theory-ladenness of intuitions, then we should recognize that there should be more evidential weight given to those intuitions of experts in the particular field. In other words, the person who knows more about the relevant background theories and is better able to apply the kinds, concepts, or predicates involved in the case, is going to have more reliable intuitions. That is not to say that normal inquirers' intuitions count for nothing, rather they count for very little. As knowledge increases in the area in question, the reliability of the intuitions increases. Hence, we can further see why there would be wide-scale disagreement and that it would seem systematic and patterned. Not only do different people come to the table operating with different classificational schemes, but those who are experts in the field come to the table with a better ability to classify altogether. And, when different people are presented with a case and it results in disagreement, we ought to put the evidential weight on the intuitions of the experts and move from there. That is, normal inquirers provide a low degree of justification while experts provide a high degree of justification. When there is

disagreement at one level, say among the experts, we can explain it away by noting that different classificational schemes are being employed. The fact that there is intuitive disagreement is not a problem; rather, it is just a feature of intuitions themselves and our use of them.

Now Kagan does have a response to this line of reasoning. He claims that it is dubious that there are these explicit theoretical underpinnings at work in intuitive judgments. He points out that, for many moral cases, such as the Trolley Problem, we are never taught anything like this during our childhood, thus we have no background theory from which to draw.<sup>16</sup> As he claims, "the simple fact of the matter is that most of our case specific intuitions cannot be plausibly explained in this way."<sup>17</sup> Hence, Kagan believes that we cannot appeal to the ladenness of moral intuitions as a way out of the problem.

Kagan's point here is too strong and hence mistaken. It is not the case that every possible scenario is engrained in people in such a way as to be usable in intuitive judgments. What Kagan is referring to are the specifics of the case – the circumstances, goals, actions, and concepts. Yet, this is too strong. When we say that intuitions are laden, we are saying that the kind, concept, or predicate involved is theory-laden with theoretical and conceptual information that the agent has. That is, the agent needs the theoretical and conceptual information in order to be able to apply the content of the intuition. So, in Trolley cases, what is theory-laden is the concept 'rightness', not the whole scenario. Kagan mistakenly assumes that the theory-ladenness claim amounts to something stronger than was intended. Thus, I maintain, given this characterization of intuitions, we ought not to be convinced by Kagan's second argument.

### **The Problem of *Kinds* of Cases**

Throughout this discussion, the question of the justificatory status of intuitions has surrounded, what Kagan refers to as, *case-specific* intuitions; i.e., intuitions about *particular* cases. It is our case-specific intuitions that we treat as having the most evidential

weight, even over our intuitions about general moral principles. The problem is that our reaction to particular cases is really just a reaction to cases of a certain *type*. That is, when we claim that our intuition says that *this case* is, say morally permissible, what we really are saying is that *this kind of case* is one of moral permissibility. Kagan argues that this poses a problem in that we no longer can account for the fact that we give priority to our case-specific intuitions. We can no longer maintain that our case-specific intuitions are more reliable than our case-type intuitions. Thus, we ought to remain skeptical about our reliance on moral intuitions.

### **Response to Kagan's Third Argument**

The problem with Kagan's third argument stems from a problem mentioned earlier. Kagan relies on intuitions being case-specific in the sense that they involve all the *particulars* of the case in question. This requirement is too strong. What we mean by 'case-specific' is that the agent is able to classify the case as failing or not failing to meet the criteria for natural kind, concept, or predicate application. Now, each case will be different, but the kind, concept, or predicate is going to be the same. So, Kagan's distinction between case-specific and case-type intuitions dissolves. Our intuitive judgments involve both the specific circumstances of some case and the general natural kind, concept, or predicate that is in question. This content is general in nature and hence intuitions are both case-specific and case-type. Thus, we should reject Kagan's third argument.

### **Concluding Remarks**

What I hope I have shown here is that we should not be convinced by Kagan's three arguments for skepticism about our use of moral intuitions in moral theory confirmation. Once we look at some basic features of intuitions, we see that the criticisms examined here fail. This is not to say that I think I have provided the justification for taking moral intuitions to count as evidence for moral theories. Rather, I have only attempted to show that Kagan's skepticism is

unwarranted. There may be other problems with justifying the practice of giving evidential status to our moral intuitions, but I maintain that Kagan has not provided good arguments to that end.

#### Notes

1. Shelly Kagan, "Thinking about Cases", *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 18, 2 (2001), pp. 44-63.

2. Just to note, these are my names for these arguments, not Kagan's.

3. It is Kagan that takes this analogy to be the standard way to justify the use of moral intuitions, though this is, I believe, highly questionable.

4. Kagan (2001), 50.

5. Kagan (2001), p. 53.

6. The arguments for this are in his *The Limits of Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). I will not lay out these arguments in detail because they are not immediately relevant to my concerns. I will be addressing how Kagan sets up the use of intuitions and not address the issue of whether we need an overall moral theory in order to justify the practice of using intuitions as evidence.

7. Due to the scope of this paper, I will not attempt to provide a full account of the cognitive structure of intuitions. Suffice it to say, I believe it is fairly uncontroversial that intuitions are propositional attitude states while not being a subclass of beliefs. In any event, I believe it stands that they are more like beliefs than observations to warrant my claim.

8. Robert M. Hogarth, *Educating Intuitions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 8.

9. This is not to say that we should not use perceptual *talk* in discussing intuitions, just that an adequate account of the nature of intuition will not treat them as perceptual states.

10. George Bealer, "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy," in *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 208.

11. Robert Audi makes this point in *Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p 42.). This is not to say that I am endorsing Audi's intuitionism here. I have no intention to defend any version of intuitionism here, merely to provide some justification for the use of intuitions in moral theorizing.

12. I have no intention to enter into the debate concerning the justificatory status of unobservables. I mention this merely to indicate that it is an open question as to whether we are justified in believing in unobservable entities. And, since the

analogy I am drawing is with unobservables, rather than observables, it is an open question as the justificatory status of the practice of moral intuitions.

13. A quick argument for this requirement is that if intuitions were infallible, then all the metaphysical claims that have been claimed to be true throughout the history of philosophy would be true since they all were "intuitive". Yet, this would lead to obvious contradiction since many of the claims that have been made (particularly about rationalist metaphysics) contradict one another. Hence, we have *prima facie* reason to accept the fallibility of intuitions. For sake of space, I will refrain from a more detailed argument here.

14. I include only the uncontroversial features due to space considerations. I recognize that there are questions of whether intuitions include some apparent necessity. I am avoiding these questions for sake of scope, not for sake of importance.

15. There are those that would contest this claim (namely, George Bealer and John Rawls (in "Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics", 1951), claiming that moral intuitions need to be free from any explicit reliance upon moral theories. Yet, this claim has been contested by many. Recently, Hilary Kornblith ("The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry") and Robert Cummins ("Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium" both in *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* edited by Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998)) have provided arguments to both the explicit and tacit theory-ladenness of intuitions. I do not take these views as the final word on the matter, but for my purposes in this paper, I take them to have left the question open (and in my opinion, on the side of theory-ladenness).

16. The Trolley problem is a case where there is a runaway trolley that will hit and kill five children unless you push a button that will make the trolley change tracks; hence saving the five children. Yet, by pushing the button you kill a sixth child who is on the track that you are switching the trolley to (who would not be harmed if you were not to push the button).

17. Kagan (2001), p. 58.

## The Other: Simone de Beauvoir<sup>1</sup>

Deanna Denny

Simone de Beauvoir's transformed the women's movement through her application of the existential philosophy in *The Second Sex*. Beauvoir is often thought of as Jean-Paul Sartre's companion rather than the gifted philosopher and writer she was. Beauvoir lived in a world where men compelled her to assume the status of "the other." She endured conflicts with her parents and heartache with other relationships. Despite or perhaps because of the life of Simone de Beauvoir, she was able to write a ground-breaking study of women that laid the foundation for contemporary feminism. This paper explores the life that contributed to Beauvoir's influential analysis of women in *The Second Sex*.

*Le Deuxième sexe*, Volume I and II, was published in 1949. The English translation, *The Second Sex*, was published in 1953. The main thesis of *The Second Sex* revolves around the idea that woman has been held in a relationship of long standing oppression to man through her relegation to being man's "other." This is Beauvoir's shorthand for saying that woman is the incidental, the inessential, as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute, she is the Other. When Beauvoir claims "one is not born, but rather becomes a woman," (SS, 267) this means there is nothing in the human condition that assigns women to the role as the Other.

Simone Lucie Ernestine Marie Bertrand de Beauvoir was born on January 9, 1908, in Paris to Georges Bertrand de Beauvoir and Francoise Brasseur. Beauvoir's father, whose family had some aristocratic pretensions, had once desired to become an actor but studied law and worked as a civil servant, contenting himself instead with the profession of legal secretary. He was an atheist and a staunchly conservative man. Beauvoir recalls in *Memoirs*, "Papa used to say with pride, Simone has a man's brain; she thinks like a man; she *is* a man" (quoted

in Fullbrook and Fullbrook, 36). Beauvoir's younger sister Hélène is an important figure in her 1928-31 journals. Beauvoir took charge of Hélène's education and became very protective of her. The sisters grew apart over the years as her prettier and more popular younger sister replaced Beauvoir in their father's affections (Simons, 1992).

Beauvoir suggests in *The Second Sex* that young girls often see their mother with more authority than the father; she imitates her mother and identifies herself with her. The mother applies herself to changing the girl into a true woman, since society will more readily accept her if this is done (SS, 281). Beauvoir's mother, from a wealthy bourgeois family, was a deeply religious woman and devoted to raising her children in the Catholic faith. Her religious, bourgeois orientation became a source of serious conflict between her and her oldest daughter, Simone. Beauvoir says of her mother in *Memoirs* that "without her [mother's] approval, I no longer felt that I had any right to live" (quoted in Fullbrook and Fullbrook, 126).

Beauvoir began her education in the private Catholic school for girls, the Institut Adeline Désir where she remained until the age of seventeen. It was here that she met Elizabeth Mabile (Zara), with whom she shared an intimate and profound friendship until Zara's untimely death in 1929 (Mussett, 2003). Beauvoir speaks of Zara in *Memoirs*, "I loved Zara so much that she seemed to be more real than myself, I was her negative; instead of laying claim to my own characteristics, I had to have them thrust upon me which I supported with ill grace" (quoted in Hughes 1994, 126). In *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir speaks from this first hand knowledge to explain the lesbian tendencies in young girls. Man is, sexually, subject, and therefore men are normally separated from each other by the desire that drives them toward an object different from themselves. Woman is the absolute object of desire, and that is the reason why so many special friendships flourish in schools and colleges; some of them are purely platonic and others grossly carnal (SS, 343). Beauvoir tells the story of Zara in the

1958 book *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter*.

Beauvoir was a brilliant, dedicated pupil, but was unkempt and uneducated in social graces and often ridiculed by her wealthy classmates (Simons, 1992). Beauvoir had been a deeply religious child as a result of her education and her mother's training, however, at the age of fourteen, she had a crisis of faith and decided definitively that there was no God. Her rejection of religion was followed by her decision to pursue and teach philosophy (Mussett, 2003).

Beauvoir began her study of philosophy in 1927 at the Sorbonne. John-Paul Sartre attended the elite college Ecole Normale. Both were studying for the agrégation with the hope of earning a position in public education. The Ecole Normale was closed to women but did allow Beauvoir to attend lectures. Sartre had failed the agrégation in 1928 and was studying with a group in preparation for his second attempt at this grueling exam. Beauvoir was invited to join this study group because of her intelligence and knowledge of the history of philosophy. The group included Sartre, Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, René Maheu, and Jacques Nizan. In 1929 Beauvoir, along with the rest of the study group, sat for the exam. The three man agrégation jury agonized over whether to give first place to Beauvoir or Sartre, although all agreed that of the two she was the true philosopher. The jury decided they could not tolerate the idea of a woman outstripping a man so lowered Beauvoir's mark (Fullbrook and Fullbrook 1994; Yates, 2003). Beauvoir writes in *The Second Sex* that woman must constantly win the confidence that is not at first accorded to her: at the start she is suspect, she has to prove herself. Worth is not a given essence; it is the outcome of a successful development (SS, 701). At twenty-one years of age, Beauvoir was the youngest student ever to pass the agrégation in philosophy and thus became the youngest philosophy teacher in France (Mussett, 2003).

✧ In an interview with Margaret Simons in 1972 Beauvoir insisted, "I am not a philosopher, but a literary writer, Sartre is the



philosopher" (Simons 1989, 13). She claims that she often assumed a passive role in philosophical discussions among Sartre's male friends....feeling that she did not think fast enough (Simons 1989, 14). In Beauvoir's journal of 1929-1931, Simons quotes Beauvoir as saying "I adore his [Sartre's] fashion of being authoritarian, of adopting me, and of being of one so severe indulgence.... We argued for hours about good and evil. He interests me enormously, but crushes me, I am no longer sure of what I think, if I think at all" (Simons 1992, 147). Beauvoir describes this learned feminine behavior in *The Second Sex* as she writes that woman must learn the art of managing a man by discovering and humoring his weaknesses and applying flattery and docility (SS, 468).

Beauvoir ironically seems to strive to be "the other" in her love affair with Nelson Algren. The collection of over three hundred letters written by Beauvoir to Nelson, *A Transatlantic Love Affair*, gives evidence of her love for him and her desire to be his other. She writes on Tuesday, September 30, 1947, "I'll be faithful as a dutiful and conventional wife." On October 3, 1947, "my happiness is in your hands..... I will never do things you do not want me to do." May 12, 1950, the letter closes, "Nelson, my heart is full of you, and every breath in every minute will be breathed towards you." We do not have a collection of the letters Algren wrote to Beauvoir so perhaps these were responses to his desire to be her other. The decision by Beauvoir to sacrifice the love she felt for Algren to her commitment to Sartre is a moving story. In *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir describes the woman who wants to hold her husband, while resisting his domination. She struggles with him in the effort to uphold her independence and battles with the rest of the world to preserve her situation that dooms her to dependence (SS, 468). It is this love affair with Algren that provided much of the material for Beauvoir's *The Mandarins*.

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, reflecting on Beauvoir's career a few years after her death, commented that all her

life Beauvoir felt intellectually dominated by Sartre. "It was partly because Sartre discouraged her that Beauvoir renounced the career she had planned as a philosopher and turned instead to literature, literature being considered the proper domain of woman" (Yates, 2001).

Beauvoir often combined real life events with her fictional characters to convey her philosophical views. Her literature helps human beings understand the world around them, the issues that confront them and explores the themes that arise from the human condition such as suffering, alienation, oppression, death, dread, despair, guilt, responsibility, ultimate freedom, and human beings search for meaning. Beauvoir achieved what she dreamed of achieving: she changed the world with her books (Yates, 2001). In *She Came To Stay*, Beauvoir's first published novel, we have a triangle consisting of a man and two women. They are Pierre, writer, director, actor, who is based on Jean-Paul Sartre; Francoise, who has had a relationship with Pierre for ten years, is clearly Simone de Beauvoir, and Xaviere who might be the fictionalized Olga Kosakiewicz with whom Sartre, and perhaps Beauvoir, had affairs. Pierre, trying to assure Francoise that their relationship is the most important to him, tells her, "between us there's reciprocity" (301). In *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir writes, "Marriage has always been a very different thing for a man and for a woman. The two sexes are necessary for each other, but this necessity has never brought... reciprocity between them .... A man is socially an independent and complete individual" (SS, 426).

Most texts on French existential philosophy make only a passing mention of Beauvoir. In "The Roots of Existentialism, An Introduction," by Jean Wahl for *Essays in Existentialism*, a collection of Sartre's writings, we find Beauvoir not worthy of autonomous study. "We might mention, without discussion Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, whose theories are similar to those of Sartre, though sometimes applied in different domains of experience" (1988, 26). Well known anthologies and historical overviews of existentialism

commonly omit reference to Beauvoir or treat her as Sartre's side-kick. Thus Simons notes, "Walter Kaufmann's anthology, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (1956), does not mention her at all. Not that Beauvoir was unknown in 1956 .... English translation[s] of *Ethics of Ambiguity* in 1948 and [of] *The Second Sex* appeared in 1952" (Simons 1990, 491). F.H. Heineman, in *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament* (1958) lists Beauvoir in the index, but the reference implies that Sartre co-authored Beauvoir's *Ethics of Ambiguity*.

Along with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Raymond Aron, Beauvoir helped found the politically non-affiliated, leftist journal, *Les Temps Modernes* in 1945, which she edited and to which she contributed articles; however, Beauvoir's name is often left off as one of the founders. Mention of Beauvoir in literature regarding this journal is usually in terms of her friendship with Sartre.

In an interview in 1976, Beauvoir said she realized during the writing of *The Second Sex* she had abdicated her womanhood and was in fact leading a false life (Gerassi, 1976). Without the life Beauvoir lived she could not have understood the oppression of women. She worked hard to prove her worth both as a philosopher and writer. *The Second Sex*, which to some extent was a self description, pointed the way for woman to become free beings. "The Other: Simone de Beauvoir,"— not merely "the other"; she's not a self-confident feminist blazing the trail for women; she's herself, great in her own weaknesses and in many ways second to none.

#### Notes

1. I would like to thank Dr. Don Viney for his guidance in writing this essay.

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## **“What Has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”**

Rebecca Polok

About two centuries after the death of Jesus a Greek philosopher asked Tertullian about the miraculous life of Christ and he replied, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” In his own way Tertullian, an early Christian leader, was saying that Reason has nothing to do with Faith. His famous reply was perhaps a sign of the apprehension that some of the Christians in his day were feeling about the Hellenization of their society. After all, even though Jesus and his disciples spoke Aramaic, the New Testament itself was written in Greek, the language of the philosophers.

Quintus Septimus Florens Tertullianus was born about 160 AD in Carthage to pagan parents. He was the son of a centurion, trained as a lawyer in Rome, and became a Christian in his later life, probably around the year 197. At first Tertullian was rejected by the church because he seemed to embody the spirit of anti-intellectualism. However, later his theology became accepted and Tertullian was seen as a church father when he wrote:

For philosophy is the material of the world's wisdom, the rash interpreter of the nature and dispensation of God. Indeed heresies are themselves instigated by philosophy... What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What has the Academy to do with the Church? What have heretics to do with Christians? Our instruction comes from the porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart. Away with all attempts to produce a Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic Christianity! We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after receiving the gospel! When we believe, we desire no further belief. For this is our first article of faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides.<sup>1</sup>

Tertullian even became a priest, possibly of the Church of Carthage and rather than continue to promote Greek, the most widely used language, he was instrumental in establishing Latin as a church tongue and as a medium for Christian thought in the West. Later he separated from the church and started his own sect. After his death, the remainder of the Tertullianists was reunited to the church by St. Augustine.<sup>2</sup>

However, Tertullian wasn't the only Christian who had a problem with Athens and Greek philosophy. While Tertullian thought that philosophy and Christianity should not come together, the Apostle Paul in Colossians 2:8, took time to warn against the influence of philosophy:

Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.

If it seems Paul agrees with Tertullian one should remember that Paul was instrumental in seeing that philosophy and Christianity did collide. And later when he penned his Epistles, Paul even used the Stoic philosophical language and argumentative methods in his writings.

Born in Asia Minor around the year 3 A.D. in the affluent city of Tarsus (Acts 21:39), Paul was a product of a metropolis famous for its philosophy and culture. It is therefore only natural that he would have encountered all the distinguishing characteristics of a Greco-Roman city including its teachings in philosophy. But Paul was not the sole contributing cause for the marriage between philosophy and Christianity. A Christian who believes in God's divine plan and the inspiration of the Scriptures would have to believe that philosophical reasoning was part of God's will since He was the one who directed Paul's missionary journeys, guided Paul in his philosophical writings and also gave humans the ability to think and reason. The church at Antioch was also instrumental in bringing philosophy and Christianity together since they supported Paul's missionary journeys and therefore

helped to promote the future synthesis between Athens and Jerusalem, Socrates and Jesus, philosophy and revealed religion.

Antioch, the first Christian church, was located in Syria and established by Greek-speaking ("Hellenist") Jewish Christians. It was this church that sponsored Paul's first missionary endeavors and this church, which was already witnessing to the Gentiles of the city (Acts 11:19-26; 13:1-3). These people supported Paul as he worked in the Greek city of Philippi (Acts 16:11-40), and then as he went on to Athens, the main symbol of Greek culture. Athens was known for its acropolis where the temple of the goddess Athene stood and it was in this city's agora (marketplace) where Paul may have viewed the statue dedicated "TO AN UNKNOWN GOD" (Acts 17:23). It was in this marketplace where Paul would have told the Athenians who their unknown God was and also deliberated with the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers (Acts 17:18-32).

A significant Christian community was not established at that time in Athens, but instead Paul went on to Corinth, which was probably the central business hub of Greece (Acts 18:1-18). The temple to the god Apollo stood at the entrance to the city of Corinth and on the acropolis overlooking the city was the temple to Aphrodite, the goddess of love. It was in this city that Paul labored for over a year.

So what lies behind Tertullian's statement and Paul's warning when we examine the above circumstances? What caused Paul and Tertullian to respond to philosophical teaching as they did? After all, "philosophy" is a Greek word, coined by Pythagoras, meaning "philo" or "love" of "Sophia" or "wisdom." A Christian believes that those who search for wisdom will find God because God and wisdom are one and the same. So were Tertullian and Paul against the search for wisdom or against asking questions such as "Where did I come from?" or "What is life about"? Socrates even says that if we acquire no knowledge from philosophy beyond the knowledge of our own ignorance, the best life is still the one that includes dialectical examination

of ethical concepts, and discussions concerning the good.

Tertullian himself made use of particularly Stoic philosophical ideas in his writings.<sup>3</sup> He even agreed with Plato about the immortality of the soul<sup>4</sup> and believed the philosophers borrowed from Jewish Scriptures.<sup>5</sup> So what bothered Paul and Tertullian? It was the fact that Greek philosophy was a mixture of competing world-views, supported by principles very different from biblical revelation. Tertullian more than Paul seems to have trouble establishing any means that would allow the resolution of the disputes between religion and philosophy.

It wasn't until the period between 400-1400 that a synthesis between philosophy and religion began to take place. This was the period when revealed religion and philosophy seemed to come together in two ways. First, philosophers asked the questions which religious people claimed are answered in religion. Second, however, these answers were framed in the concepts and logical techniques of the Greek philosophers. The language, the concepts, the methods and the logical techniques of the Greeks all had a part in the philosophies of the theologians like St. Augustine, Abelard, and St. Thomas Aquinas. It was a time when philosophy and theology became interchangeable. It was now possible to talk about theistic philosophy as opposed to humanistic philosophy.

No longer did we operate with the minds of children, separating philosophy and religion. We learned to mature in our thinking so that we could bring the two together and with the help of men like St. Augustine we were finally able to see Christianity with mature reason, ripened through philosophy. It is much like the journey John Bunyan talks about in his book *The Pilgrim's Progress*. At the end of the journey is perfection but along the journey we have the chance to grow and learn as we move forward to the end of earthly knowledge into the realm of heavenly knowledge. Paul says in I Corinthians 13:12:

For now we see through a glass, darkly, but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known (KJV).

The idea is a lot like Plato's allegory of the cave. Plato's allegory could be viewed from a Christian perspective in this way:

The people in the cave are prisoners chained to this world (the cave), unable to turn their heads. All they can see is the wall of the cave. Behind them burns a fire (just imagine that this might relate to the Word of God). Between the fire and the prisoners there is a parapet, along which puppeteers can walk (relate this to preachers, teachers, other influential people in someone's life). The puppeteers, who are behind the prisoners, hold up puppets (only the items they want the prisoners to see) that cast shadows on the wall of the cave. The prisoners are unable to see these puppets, the real objects that pass behind them. What the prisoners see and hear are shadows and echoes cast by objects that they do not see. However, the prisoners, if they were to speak to one another would talk about these shadows as if they were the real things. When the prisoners are released (when they've made their journey from this life into eternal life) they can turn their heads and see the real thing (God as he is and not just as others wanted them to see Him). But until then, the lesson in Plato's allegory which applies to each of us today is that we are to learn to achieve a reflective understanding, realizing that at any time what we believe could be wrong.

Of course the above is a "Christianized" version of Plato's parable. Plato was actually talking about more basic elements of life such as people who are untutored in the theory of forms. But the above interpretation is a good example of how Christianity and philosophy can come together. Plato's story is similar to a simple tale about some grub worms:

A family of grub worms was living at the bottom of a dark, moist well. The dark, moist well is all they know about life and yet they are content to be there. However, they often wonder what the world is like outside the well. Then one day a grub worm gets an overwhelming need to go to the surface of the

well. He promises to return and tell his family what lies beyond. However, when he reaches the top he is transformed into a beautiful dragonfly. He finds the world outside is much more attractive than the well had been, and it is even brighter and bigger than the well's dark moist depths. However, he remembers that at the time he had lived there in complete bliss. Now though, he sees the nature all around him, the bright blue sky, the tall green grass, and the colorful flowers. He even feels the warmth of the sun and realizes he has never known such beauty, color and warmth. Yet now he can never return to tell his family about all the things they are missing because if he does he will surely drown. Therefore the other grub worms continue to ponder what is beyond the realm of the well and the same thing happens over and over again as each worm becomes a dragonfly and other grub worms are born.

Just like Plato's allegory and the analogy of the grub worms, much of what we know about God will always be a mystery until it is our turn to leave the well. However it doesn't mean that we have to quit pondering the mysteries of God or stop studying the philosophies of life. Human nature requires us to ask questions and, as many philosophers as well as Christians believe, seek wisdom in order to achieve the better life.

In the twenty-first century there are still people who, like Tertullian, have trouble synthesizing revealed religion and philosophy. But according to Matthew Henry, "There is a philosophy which is a noble exercise of our reasonable faculties and highly serviceable to religion..."<sup>6</sup>

The commentator refers to different kinds of philosophy. The one that is not so noble is the philosophy that holds religious suppositions. Henry is not condemning all philosophy nor is he saying that we should not study Plato, Socrates, Descartes, or Kant. In his commentary on the writings of Paul, Matthew Henry allows us to see that

nowhere does Paul condemn philosophy he only issues a warning. Paul wasn't admonishing us to take a black or white, all or nothing stance, but warned against a philosophy that gives a human viewpoint to religion or becomes a religion in itself. The only two schools of thought, which Paul did challenge, were both systems of Gnostic philosophy:

1) Stoicism: Their notion of morality is stern, involving a life in accordance with nature and controlled by virtue. It is an ascetic system that teaches perfect indifference (*apathea*) to everything external, for nothing external could be either good or evil. Hence, to the Stoics, both pain and pleasure, poverty and riches, sickness and health, were supposed to be equally unimportant.<sup>7</sup>

2) Epicureanism: This philosophy denies that there is any intermediate state between pleasure and pain. When one has unfulfilled desires, this is painful, and when one no longer has unfulfilled desires, this steady state is the most pleasurable of all, not merely some intermediate state between pleasure and pain. Life is capricious.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, it is useless to deny self. Epicureanism inspires the thought: "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die."

Though Paul condemned the stoics and epicureans, there is a philosophy which is a "noble exercise of our reasonable faculties and highly serviceable to religion." It is the philosophy that helps us to reason and therefore better comprehend our world and the essential rules, laws, and theories of it. It's a philosophy that will contradict some with discarded hypotheses but build on others to form a stronger foundation. However, in no way does require Christians to discard the revealed truth of God's word and replace it with human wisdom. In Romans 1:20 Paul seems to encourage us towards a philosophical speculation:

For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse.

In essence Paul tells us that in an intellectual way by reasoning and understanding, by the very light of nature, there are things about God and our world, which we should be able to discover. Even Pythagoras, Plato and the Stoics learned many things about the knowledge of God. They were aware that there are aspects of God we can know even if we do not fully understand Him. A finite being cannot fully know an infinite being but we can have a greater understanding and discern enough that will lead us to our final destination. Paul seems to tell us that there are things that are revealed to us and the knowledge belongs to us and to our children. We each seem to have a duty to ask and reason "why."

Theistic philosophy versus humanistic philosophy is really nothing new. The Apostle Paul as well as Tertullian did not necessarily oppose philosophy, but what they did oppose was the philosophy that gives rise to heresy. After all, for as long as human memory has extended, people have struggled with questions like, Where do I come from? What is my purpose? Do I believe in God? How can I know there is a God? and with a basic understanding of God. Dogmatism and rejecting other philosophies causes us to become so close-minded until we believe all the shadows on the wall are true and we are not open to the possibility that there may be another truth that exists. This doesn't mean we are so open minded that we receive everything others say as truth but it does mean that we test and try and study in search of the truth. Philosophy and religion can survive together and hand in hand strengthen the defense of our faith.

Scientist/Philosopher Thomas Huxley said:

The great deeds of philosophers have been less the fruit of their intellect than the direction of that intellect by an eminently religious tone of mind. Truth has yielded herself rather to their

patience, their love, their single-heartedness and self-denial than to their logical acumen.

And George Boole, the English mathematician, assured us:

Geometric induction is essentially a process of prayer—an appeal from the finite mind to the Infinite for light on finite concerns.

Though they take different routes and use different approaches, one dialectical and the other spiritual, philosophers and people of faith do not have to condemn each other. The two approaches actually mirror different facets of the same reality.

Abdu'l-Baha, the son of the prophet and founder of the Bahai Faith asked:

If we insist that such and such a subject is not to be reasoned out and tested according to the established logical modes of the intellect, what is the use of the reason which God has given man?

"When religion," says Abdu'l-Baha, "shorn of its superstitions, traditions and unintelligent dogmas, shows its conformity with science (philosophy as one of the sciences), then there will be a great unifying, cleansing force in the world, which will sweep before it all wars, disagreements, discords and struggles, and then will mankind be united in the power of the love of God."

#### Notes

1. Tertullian, *Heretics*, 7 [Stevenson, 166-167].
2. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Volume IXV, Copyright 1912 by Robert Appleton Company).
3. Colin Brown, *Christianity & Western Thought* Volume 1. (Leicester: Apollos, 1990), 91.
4. Tertullian, *Resurrection* 3.2 Vol. 3, 547; Richard A. Norris, *God and The World in Early Christian Theology: A Study in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1966), 86.
5. Tertullian, *Apology* 47.1; *Flesh* 9.2 *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. 3, 51-52, 531-532.



6. *Matthew Henry's Commentary on the Whole Bible: Complete and Unabridged in One Volume* [UNABRIDGED] (September 1, 1991).

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## Native American Spirituality

Jeannie L. Witt

Before the Europeans stepped upon Turtle Island, the Americas' Native People from Canada to the Floridas practiced their individual beliefs and ceremonies, just as the many different sects of Christians practiced theirs.

### *Comparison of Words*

It will be useful to have before us a table comparing the words associated with Christian belief and their approximate parallels in Native American Spirituality.

Christian	Native
Genesis	Creation
God, Jehovah	Waken Tanaka, Creator, Great Spirit
Angels	Spirits
Devil	Trickster
Church Services	Spiritual Ceremonies
Armageddon	Change of Worlds

As you read, remember these comparisons, and that each Nation of people had their own beliefs and rituals, just as Christian churches had their rituals. In what follows we begin with an example of Lakota belief which is not necessarily shared by all Nations but which highlights some of the common elements of Native American Spirituality.

### *Native American Spirituality*

In the beginning, prior to the creation of the earth, the spirits resided in an undifferentiated celestial domain and humans lived in an indescribably subterranean world devoid of culture. Chief among the spirits were Takushkanshkan ("something that moves"), the Sun, who is married to the Moon, with whom he has one daughter, Wohpe (falling star"); Old Man and Old Woman, whose daughter Ite ("face"),

is married to Wind, with whom she has four sons, the Four Winds.

Among numerous other spirits, the most important is Inktomi ("spider"), the devious trickster. Inktomi conspires with Old Man and Old Woman to increase their daughter's status by arranging an affair between the Sun and Ite. The discovery of the affair by the Sun's wife leads to a number of punishments by Takushkanshan, who gives the Moon her own domain, and by separating her from the Sun initiates the creation of time.

Old Man, Old Woman, an Ite are sent to earth, but Ite is separated from the Wind, her husband, who, along with the Four Winds and a fifth wind presumed to be the child of the adulterous affair, establishes space. The daughter of the Sun and the Moon, Wohpe, also falls to earth and later resides with the South Wind, the paragon of Lakota maleness, and the two adopt the fifth wind called Wamniomni ("whirlwind").

#### *The Emergence*

Alone on the newly formed earth, some of the spirits become bored, and Ite prevails upon Inktomi to find her people, the Buffalo Nation. In the form of a wolf, Inktomi travels beneath the earth and discovers a village of humans. Inktomi tells them about the wonders of the earth and convinces one man, Tokahe ("the first"), to accompany him to the surface.

Tokahe does so and upon reaching the surface through a cave (Wind Cave in the Black Hills), marvels at the green grass and blue sky. Inktomi and Ite introduce Tokahe to Buffalo meat and soup and show him tipis, clothing, and hunting utensils, Tokahe then returns to the subterranean village and appeals to six other men and their families to travel with him to the earth's surface.

When they arrive, they discover that Inktomi has deceived them: buffalo are scarce, the weather has turned bad, and they find themselves starving. Unable to return to their home, but armed with a new knowledge about the world, they survive to become the founders of the Seven Fireplaces.

#### *White Buffalo Cow Woman*

One-day two Indian warriors came upon a beautiful woman while hunting. One of the warriors showed her no respect....and he was killed on a cloud of smoke....And to the other warrior who thought she was holy, she softly said, "Do not fear me, for I will bring something to your people to help them live." The good warrior rushed back to his people's camp with this news. He told them to prepare for her arrival by thinking honorable thoughts and by performing good deeds.

Some days later, the people heard beautiful singing coming from the edge of their campsite. They stopped working and turned their eyes toward a truly beautiful sight: It was the young Indian woman the warrior had spoken of. But in person, she was far more beautiful than words could tell. She was dressed in white buckskins and her long dark hair glowed like hot, liquid stone. On her face was a most peaceful countenance and her smile showered the people in warmth and happiness.

"I have something special for you," she whispered. Then she opened her bundle and revealed the sacred pipe, and she tells them that in time of need they should smoke from the pipe and pray to Wakan Tanaka for help. The smoke from the pipe will carry their prayers upward. She then instructs them in the seven sacred rites, most of which continue to form the basis of Lakota religion, including the sweat lodge, the vision quest, and the Sun Dance. The people stared in awe as she showed them how to pray with the pipe...and then she blessed the people.

#### *After The Fall*

Shortly before his death in 1950, Black Elk offered this comment: "I have been told by the white men, or at least by those who are Christian, that God sent to men His son, who would restore order and peace upon the earth. Moreover, we have been told that Jesus the Christ was crucified, but that he shall come again at the Last Judgment,

the end of this world cycle. This I understand and know that it is true, but the white men should know that for the red people too, it was the will of Wakan-Tanka, the Great Spirit, that an animal turn itself into a two-legged person in order to bring the most holy pipe to His people, and we too were taught that this White Buffalo Cow Woman who brought our sacred pipe will appear again at the end of this world, a coming which we Indians know is now not very far off."

The story starts with a world already existing. The Creating Power did not like the way that the people were behaving so he decides to sing a song to make it rain. In doing this he will make the people drown. Everyone dies except a crow named Kangi. Kangi begged the Creating Power to create a new land so that he can rest, so the Creating Power agrees and takes four animals out of his pipe bag. The animals he took out were a Loon Dove, Otter, Beaver, and a Turtle. He picked these animals because he knew that they were good swimmers, and he needed good swimmers to get mud from the bottom of the ocean in order to make a new world. All of the animals tried and failed except the Turtle. The Creating Power was extremely grateful and named the new world after the Turtle. The Creating Power then took more animals out of his pipe bag and spread them all over the new land. Then he made people out of the earth. However, he told the people that if they did not live in harmony with each other and the animals they all would be destroyed. In addition, the Creating Power gave them his pipe bag to live by.

In contrast to the biblical book of Genesis, in which God creates man in his own image and gives him dominion over all other creatures, the Native American legends reflect the view that human beings are no more important than any other thing, whether alive or inanimate. In the eye of the Creator, they believe, man and woman, plant and animal, water and stone, are all equal, and they share the earth as partners—even as family. "We Indians think of the earth and

the whole universe as a never-ending circle, and in this circle, man is just another animal," explains Jenny Leading Cloud of the Rosebud Indian Reservation. She continues, "The buffalo and the coyote are our brothers; the birds, our cousins. We end our prayers with the words 'all my relations'—and that includes everything that grows, crawls, runs, creeps, hops, and flies."

Like their human counterparts, the animals depicted in Indian legends can sometimes be wayward or mischievous. Several creatures, the most notable of which are the coyote, raven, and rabbit appear as supernatural tricksters whose antics sometimes turn out to be more foolish than fiendish. To have differences, even among the species of life, does not require that forces be created to gain a sense of unity or homogeneity. To exist in a creation means that living is more than tolerance for other life forms, it is recognition that in differences there is the strength of creation and that this strength is a deliberate desire of the creator.

According to traditional Native American Indian thinking, there is nothing that can be seen or touched, living or inanimate that does not have a spirit. As Lone Deer explains: "We Indians live in a world of symbols where the spiritual and the common place are one. We try to understand them not with the head but with the heart, and we need no more than a hint to give us meaning. All things are tied together with a common navel cord." Everything that exists possesses a soul, and all of these souls are mutually dependent. Mysterious powers abide in all things—the flora, the fauna, the very earth itself. Native Americans believe that they act in accordance with sacred tradition; they maintain harmony between humans and other elements of the natural world. If they violate the sacred ways, however, the orderly workings of the natural world are thrown out of kilter, and the imbalance may cause bad things to happen—sickness, accident, disaster.

For Native Americans, power meant the spiritual power of the divinities that dwelt everywhere—in the earth and sky, in rocks and

rivers, in great herds of buffalo and green stalks of corn. As Indians journeyed along life's earthy trails, they appealed time and again to the spirits for help and guidance. "To us, the spirit world seemed very near, and we did nothing without taking thought of the gods," said a Modern Hidatsa. "If we would begin a journey, form a war party, hunt, trap eagles, fish, or plant corn, we first prayed to the spirits."

Native Americans believe that their physical and mystical connections to their lands are vital not only to the maintenance of their religious practices but also to their very cultural integrity. In these sacred places, many of which are imbued with healing powers, gods abide, supernatural spirits dwell, and vision quests are made. According to legend, these are the loci of creation—points where the first people of a tribe emerged onto earth—and for many, these are the center of the universe, sacred and holy, where the spiritual powers of place bring transformation, harmony, and rebirth.

The vision quest—individual religious revelations through dreams and visions—has long been the focal point of the spiritual life of most Native Americans. Visions provide access to power, the current of supernatural force that course beneath the surface of every aspect of Indian life. The Abenaki say, "The Great Spirit is in all things; he is in the air we breath." The Teton Sioux express the same thought in a different way, "It is the general belief of the Indians that after a man dies, his spirit is somewhere on the earth or in the sky, we do not know exactly where, but we believe that his spirit still lives. See it is with Wakan Tanaka. We believe that he is everywhere, yet he is to us as the spirits of our friends whose voices we cannot hear." As one experienced dreamer once explained, it was only during a dream that "you see something with your inner eyes, with all your soul and spirit." George Catlin once wrote, "I love a people who are honest without laws, who have no jails and no poorhouses." "I love a people who keep the commandments without ever having read them or heard them preached, who never take the name of God in vain, and who are free

from religious animosities."

American Indian religious practices are land-based theologies whose effectiveness is dependent upon access to specific sacred sites. The earth is their altar where they carry out their divinely ordered mandates to protect the earth and all life. It is from their various altar sites that they send their prayers to the four sacred directions of this earth to the powers of the four directions, who guide their hearts and spirits. They are spiritual people, the prayerful children of this earth. Consequently, dispute over land has become undoubtedly the most significant and pressing problem facing Native North Americans today. The essence of Native American religious freedom is the land...Native peoples, however, alone among American citizens, are effectively denied access to their sacred sites.

"The Indian loved to worship, from birth to death, he revered his surroundings" (Luther Standing Bear). He considered himself born in the luxurious lap of Mother Earth and no place was to him humble. There was nothing between him and the Big Holy (Wakan Tanaka). The contact was immediate and personal and the blessings of Wakan Tanaka flowed over the Indian like rain showered from the sky. Wakan Tanaka was not aloof, apart, and ever seeking to quell evil forces. He did not punish the animals and the birds, and likewise, he did not punish man. He was not a punishing god. For there was never a question as to the supremacy of an evil power over and above the power of Good, there was but one ruling power, and that was Good.

He who is our Grandfather and Father has established a relationship with my people the Sioux. It is our duty to make a rite, which should extend this relationship to the different people of different nations. May that which we do here be an example to others.

Through these rites, a three-fold peace is established. First, peace, which is the most important, is that which comes within the souls of men when they realize their relationship, their oneness, with the universe and all its powers, and when they realize that at the center

of the universe dwells Wakan Tanka, and that this center is really everywhere. It is within each of us. This is the real Peace, and the others are but reflections of this.

The second peace is that which is made between two individuals. In addition, the third is that which is made between two nations. Above all, you should understand that there can never be peace between nations until there is first known that true peace which is within the souls of men (Hehaka Sapa, Black Elk).

America is looked on as the greatest democratic nation in the world, and other world powers would find it virtually impossible to believe that indigenous religious rights violations have been allowed to occur here at all. The reality is that such violations are occurring presently, and this country's culturally distinct Native people are engaged in a struggle for their very existence. Their sacred sites are especially vulnerable, and the ones that have been identified number in the hundreds. Some, like Bear Butte, have been developed; others are slated for development, including recreation, tourism, mining, logging, New Age vandalism, oil and gas exploration, and geothermal development, to name but a few.

Perhaps government and corporate America will stop to think and come to understand this sacred, interdependent relationship with the land and afford those who were here first their divine right to worship at their sacred places, in their own ceremonies that keep this earth alive for everyone. It is a simple but critical matter of respecting sacred sites and the freedom of religion so that indigenous people can pray in culturally appropriate ways for all their relations on earth. It has been that way from the past of long ago, Nistaomeno.

If you take the time to understand them and learn from them, you will find they are a very spiritual culture with God at the heart of their culture. Keep in mind that when you do attempt to learn of their culture, remember that there are many different Native American nations and each is different from the others, just as European nations

are different and have different customs. Nevertheless, the common factor among them all is that the Creator is the heart of their culture.

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## **Hazing is Morally Wrong!**

Michael Pommier

### **Introduction**

"It's all in good fun." "They have to earn their spot." "He/She chose to pledge." "We would have stopped." "We didn't mean to hurt them." These are all defenses of a rising problem throughout the nation. This problem is hazing. This happens to boys and girls, men and women. This occurs in high school athletics and organizations, college athletics, and Greek organizations.

Now, what exactly is hazing? The truth is that there really isn't a clear-cut definition of hazing. The basic idea is that it is an action that causes physical pain, mental pain, or embarrassment as a part of an initiation or induction ceremony. Different States, schools, and organizations have their own specifics to what hazing is.

#### **1a. Presentation of Argument**

The argument that I present is as follows:

1. Hazing harms people.
2. Hazing doesn't benefit others.
3. Therefore, hazing is morally wrong.

#### **1b. Explanation of Argument**

The first premise, "Hazing harms people" states that the acts of hazing injures the participant both psychologically and physically through the use of public humiliation and battery.

The second premise, "Hazing doesn't benefit others" states that there is no intrinsic good in hazing. There is no good that the participants can gain from the acts of hazing.

The conclusion, "Hazing is morally wrong" is drawn from the composition of the two premises that hazing is harmful and no good can come of it.

## 2a. Hazing in High Schools

As stated earlier, hazing happens in high school. A vast majority of cases involve kids being initiated into a sports team, but not all do. For example, an *ABC* news article published November 11, 2003 relates that Terrell Lavender, a student at Finney High School, filed suit against the band director and the Board of Education. Lavender claims that he was punched, kicked and hit with wooden paddles. He also claims that "When he tried to drop out of the pledge process, he says he and members of his family were attacked ("High School Hazing Prompts Suit"). This case obviously illustrates both premises one and two of my argument by the fact that the child and his family were attacked upon the dropping out of the pledge process. There is no intrinsic good in this case.

This behavior also happens to girls. An article printed January 24, 2004 in the *Fresno Bee* describes a hazing suit in Sanger. The parents of a 14 year old girl filed suit against the Sanger school district, Sanger High School, athletic director and two of the soccer coaches. She claims she was tied up with duct tape and stripped of her clothing. Following the incident, the girl tried to transfer schools, but was rejected. The school district's lawyer, Robert Rosati, responded by saying, "You have to have good cause, there wasn't good cause. This didn't happen, and they know it didn't happen." The family filed a claim but was rejected a month later, then tried to settle privately but was again rejected. Rosati said the suit "was an attempt to embarrass the school district" (Leedy). This case again illustrates the first two premises by the girl getting injured and not benefiting from her injuries. The only lesson learned is to not join the soccer team.

An April 14, 2004 *48 Hours* segment titled "Dangerous Minds" reported the story of hazing at Mepham High School, a Long Island high

school, whose football season was cancelled due to their "sadistically hazing" of teammates. The mother of a 13-year-old freshman at Mepham High says that the environment her son was in was, "like a prison." Throughout the five days of camp, upperclassmen sodomized their teammates. With broomsticks dipped in mineral ice (liquid heat), golf balls, pinecones, and toothbrushes pushed into their rectums. They also struck the boys with bags of ice until the bags broke. A grand jury reported the boys' pubic hair was ripped off with duct tape, and they were forced to kick each other in the groin. A boy went up to his mother three days after camp and said, "I'm bleeding. I need to see a doctor." When the doctor asked what happened, the boy reluctantly said, "They inserted a broomstick." The actions mentally harm the children as well. For example, the father of one of the victims said, "He was lying in bed with a big butcher knife in his hand" "cause he was so scared. He was just frightened." The three varsity players, Tom Diasparra, Ken Carney and team captain Phil Sofia were tried as juveniles. Diasparra cut a deal and received probation, Sofia was sent to a boot camp, and Carney was sent to a juvenile detention center ("College Hazing Under Fire"). Not only does being "brutally sodomized" by your peers cause a great deal of both mental and physical pain, but there is no good that can come of it. Due to this, hazing fulfills the first two premises of my argument.

## 2b. Hazing in Colleges

Hazing is a big part of college life. Sports teams and Greek organizations always have to watch their backs. The national offices of the Greek organizations are having a hard time keeping some of their chapters in line before the law does. One case happened at the University of Maryland East Shore (UMES), in their chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi, in which five members were hospitalized. This incident opened the eyes of the executives of the Kappa Alpha Psi fraternity. The Kappa Alpha Psi chapter at Kansas State could face expulsion after a 23 year



old alumnus was found severely injured in his apartment. Richard Lee Snow, national executive director of Kappa Alpha Psi, says, "No one should have to undergo something like this in pursuit of an education." Hazing doesn't only happen to pledges. UMES has five members hospitalized. The police stated the UMES members were beaten daily with canes or paddles from February 8 to April 4, 1998. A student from Southeast Missouri State's chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi was awarded \$2.25 million for an earlier incident in 1994 ("Kappa Alpha Phi"). This case shows that not all people grow wiser as they grow older. These people purposefully injured other people for the sake of fun. The assailants probably considered that there were some benefits to them, but they didn't think of the other people, who were being severely injured.

A CBS News article, titled "College Hazing Under Fire", explains the hazing of Corey Latulippe, a 4<sup>th</sup> string goalie from the University of Vermont. The hazing took place at a party known as "The Big Night." The freshman were "forced to wear women's underwear, drink warm beer and hard liquor, and parade in an 'elephant walk', where they moved in a line holding each others' genitals." To some of the freshmen that were going through it, there was benefit, that it brought the team closer together ("College Hazing Under Fire"). This form of hazing doesn't really physically harm the freshmen, but it does publicly humiliate them. This is psychologically harmful, thus fulfilling the first premise of my argument. However, there were some freshmen that didn't see the ritual as harmful and did get some benefit out of it. The NCAA estimates that 80% of college athletes are subject to some form of hazing when joining a team. Colleges are now taking action. For example: the University of Vermont now requires athletes to sign a contract that addresses hazing and alcohol use ("College Hazing Under Fire").

### 3a. State Laws and Punishment

The United States of America doesn't have a law that defines or prohibits hazing of any kind—the closest that you can get to such a law is assault and battery. The duty of enforcing hazing laws has been dumped onto the States and even more, on the schools. The following are a few States' definitions of hazing and the punishment that they prescribe for it, if any ("College Hazing Under Fire"):

#### Kansas - § 21-3434

Class B misdemeanor - prohibits intentionally encouraging another person to perform an act, which could reasonably be expected to result in great bodily harm, for initiation purposes.

#### Missouri - §§ 578.360, 578.363 and 578.365

Class A misdemeanor; Class C felony if the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the person. Educational institutions must adopt written policies prohibiting hazing by student organizations.

#### Oklahoma - § 1190

Punishment for an organization is a fine up to \$1,500 and suspension of rights up to one year. The punishment for an individual is a fine up to \$500 and/or imprisonment up to 90 days. Prohibits dangers to physical and mental health.

#### California - Ed. Code - §§ 32050 to 32051

Hazing is defined as an initiation process likely to cause physical harm or personal degradation. The punishment for committing or conspiring to haze is a misdemeanor with a fine between \$100 to \$5,000 and/or up to one-year imprisonment.

### 3b. College Rules and Punishment

Some, but not all, colleges have some form of a rule against

hazing. The following were found on the colleges' web sites:

#### PITTSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY

##### ARTICLE 23. HAZING AND PRE-INITIATION ACTIVITIES POLICY

P.S.U. prohibits student organizations, fraternities or sororities from engaging in hazing of another person for the purpose of initiation or admission into or affiliation within any organization operating under the sanction of the University. Hazing includes, but is not limited to, any action, activity or situation which recklessly, negligently or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health, welfare or safety of a person or exposes a person to extreme embarrassment. It is presumed that hazing is a forced activity regardless of the apparent willingness of an individual to participate in the activity.

Such activities and situations include paddling in any form; creation of excessive fatigue; ingestion of unusual liquids or solids or the ingestion of liquids or solids of unusual quantities; physical and psychological shocks, scavenger hunts, road trips, or any other such activities carried on outside the confines of the house; wearing apparel in public which is conspicuous and not normally in good taste, engaging in public stunts and buffoonery; morally degrading and/or humiliating games and activities; late work sessions which interfere with scholastic activities; and any other activities which are not consistent with fraternal law, ritual or policy or the regulations and policies of Pittsburg State University and Kansas statutes on hazing (*Code of Student Rights & Responsibilities*).

#### MISSOURI SOUTHERN STATE UNIVERSITY

The College strictly prohibits any form of hazing (to initiate or disci-

pline fellow students by forcing them to do ridiculous, humiliating, dangerous or painful things). Failure to accept the responsibilities of group membership may subject that organization to permanent or temporary suspension of charter, withdrawal of College recognition and/or support, social probation, denial of use of College facilities or other appropriate action (*Student Handbook*).

#### UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

An offense against a person is committed when a student: (1) Threatens the mental or physical health of another person, places another person in serious bodily harm; or uses physical force in a manner that endangers the health, welfare or safety of another person; or willfully, maliciously and repeatedly follows or attempts to make unwanted contact with another person. (2) Engages in hazing of another person for the purpose of initiation or admission into, affiliation with, or continuation of membership in any organization operating under the sanction of the University. Hazing includes, but is not limited to, any action, activity or situation which recklessly, negligently or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health, welfare or safety of a person, creates excessive fatigue, mental or physical discomfort, exposes a person to extreme embarrassment or ridicule, involves personal servitude or substantially interferes with the academic requirements or responsibilities of a student. It is presumed that hazing is a forced activity regardless of the apparent willingness of an individual to participate in the activity" (*Hazing policies statements*).

##### Conclusion

Hazing is a problem, and it has to be addressed at the national level because not all states or schools have policies for it, or if they do, it isn't very strict. Hazing is on the rise, and now it's doing more than making fun of students. It is killing them. How can a fun joke that has the potential to kill students be morally permissible?

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