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Fall 2001

### Logos-Sophia: Charles Hartshorne's Letters to a Young Philosopher, 1979-1995

Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society

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THE JOURNAL OF THE PITTSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

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# Logos-Sophia

A special edition commemorating  
the founding of the Society and  
in memory of Charles Hartshorne

*Dr. Donald W. Viney  
Pittsburg State University  
Pittsburg, KS*



Hartshorne  
CHARLES S. HARTSHORNE  
734 SPARKS  
AUSTIN TX

Charles Hartshorne's Letters  
to a Young Philosopher: 1979-1995

Edited by Donald Wayne Viney

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Contents	Page
Introduction .....	1
Charles Hartshorne's Letters to a Young Philosopher: 1979-1995 .....	2
Edited by Donald Wayne Viney	
Appendix I: The Table of Sixteen Options and Neoclassical Theism .....	55
Appendix II: Sample Letter from Hartshorne .....	60
Appendix III: Hartshorne Memorial Statement .....	61
Index .....	63

## Introduction

The Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society is pleased to present the eleventh volume of its journal, *Logos-Sophia*. This issue of the journal breaks the precedent of all but one earlier issue in being devoted to a single theme. It is a commemoration of the founding of the Society in 1987 and it is published in memory of Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). In April 1987 a small group of students accompanied Dr. Viney to Central State University in Edmond, Oklahoma to hear Professor Hartshorne present a paper titled "God as Composer-Director and Enjoyer, and in a Sense Player, of the Cosmic Drama." The presentation stimulated their thinking and inspired them to found a philosophical society at Pittsburg State University. In the early records of the Society, Hartshorne is listed as an honorary member.

Since its founding, the PSU Philosophical Society has remained true to its objectives, as stated in its Constitution, "to promote philosophical activity at Pittsburg State University by sponsoring speakers, supporting library acquisitions, addressing philosophical questions through published writings by the members, and taking trips to philosophical conferences" (*Logos-Sophia*, v. 6, Spring 1994, p. 77). The ongoing legacy of the Society is the periodic publication of the journal, *Logos-Sophia*. Volumes were published in Fall 1988, Spring 1990, Spring 1991, Spring 1992, Spring 1993 (Special issue on Creation and Evolution), Spring 1994, Spring 1996, Spring 1997, Spring 1998, Spring 2000, and now in Fall 2001.

In light of Hartshorne's importance to philosophy, but especially of his role, however unintended, in being the initial inspiration for the Society, the present members of the Society deemed it fitting that this number of the issue be dedicated to him. The members wish to offer a special thanks to Heather Hess for a generous donation that made the publication of this volume possible. Thanks are also due to the PSU Office of Academic Affairs for its assistance.

*Camilla North and Eric Dutton*

Co-Presidents, Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society



# CHARLES HARTSHORNE'S LETTERS TO A YOUNG PHILOSOPHER: 1979-1995

Edited by Donald Wayne Viney

Between 1979 and 1997 I corresponded with Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000)—Hartshorne's last letter was in 1995. I was just beginning my career and he was in the final stages of his. For the first year and a half we corresponded because I was writing my dissertation about his arguments for the existence of God and he was a member of my committee advising me. In later years I continued to ask for his advice on articles and reviews that I was writing. Although he would often mention his and his wife's health, and he once spoke of his dreams, the correspondence never dwelt on personal matters—on one occasion I allowed myself a meditation on the death of one of my dear friends.

The chief value of the correspondence is in Hartshorne's letters. I was fortunate enough to exchange letters with a giant among philosophers and so our letters may interest others for the light they cast on Hartshorne's life and philosophical interests. To be sure, the letters touch upon staples of Hartshornean philosophy such as the importance of Alfred North Whitehead, the ontological argument, and the rejection of classical determinism. In addition, however, there are the following: a letter where Hartshorne explains why he claims to know so little about God (November 12, 1991); letters outlining his knowledge of and estimation of the French philosopher Jules Lequyer (May 21, 1986; July 9, 1988; April 8, 1991; April 25, 1991); his estimation of his most important articles not appearing in his books (see my letter of December 11, 1991); and there is a letter devoted to the question of why we sleep (October 3, 1988). In the final analysis, the letters display a mind that was philosophically acute into its eighth and ninth decades.

I made copies of all of my letters and I kept all of the letters he sent to me—hence, the correspondence is complete. In the letter of November 26, 1988, Hartshorne granted me permission to make the correspondence public. I have not, however, included every letter. Where a letter was a mere formality I have placed a summary of the letter in square brackets. In addition, I use ellipses to indicate material omitted; in a couple of instances information about people still living is omitted, but in most cases the ellipses indicate Hartshorne's suggested corrections and typos in the chapters that I sent to him. Finally, I have taken the liberty to fill out abbreviations (e.g. "argument" for "argmt") and to correct a few spelling and punctuation errors.

In one instance the letters are printed out of chronological order—letters of April 21, 1992 and May 6, 1992 are reversed for obvious reasons. All of Hartshorne's letters were sent from 724 Sparks Avenue, Austin, Texas 78705. With one exception, my letters prior to February 1985 were sent from Norman, Oklahoma—the exception is the letter dated July 25, 1981, sent from Albuquerque, New Mexico. After February 1985, all of my letters were sent from Pittsburg, Kansas.

Appendix I is necessary for an understanding of Hartshorne's letter of April 21, 1992. Appendix II is a photocopy of one of Hartshorne's letters. Appendix III is a tribute I wrote and sent to Emily Hartshorne Schwartz, Hartshorne's only child.

In his memoirs, titled *The Darkness and Light*, Hartshorne included a picture of the two of us with the caption: With Donald Viney, a young philosopher who has written a book on my arguments for God's existence—hence, the name of this correspondence.

Donald Wayne Viney  
Pittsburg, Kansas



Thanks to Donald Crosby, who introduced me to Whitehead's metaphysics, I first saw Charles Hartshorne at a conference in Denver, Colorado in April 1976 while I was an undergraduate at Colorado State University.<sup>2</sup> I did not meet him, however, until November 1979 in Austin Texas. That encounter perfectly exemplifies Hartshorne's belief in the reality of chance as well as his gregarious personality. I was a graduate student at the University of Oklahoma in Norman but I was in Austin to attend a conference with my colleague Peter Hutcheson (now at Southwest Texas State University in San Marcos, Texas). At lunchtime Peter and I searched for someplace to eat besides the school cafeteria. After an exasperating hour of hunting for a place to park we returned to the convention center—to the cafeteria. We happened to sit at a table adjacent to where Hartshorne was eating. When the people at his table left, Hartshorne asked if he might finish his meal with us. For the next half hour he entertained us with philosophical remarks and humorous anecdotes. As a result of that serendipitous luncheon, I began a serious study of Hartshorne's writings. I sent him a letter on December 3, 1979.

December 3, 1979  
Dr. Hartshorne,

You probably do not remember me. We met in Austin last November at the Southwestern Philosophical Society meeting where I had the good fortune of talking with you over lunch. Our conversation inspired me to look more seriously into your writings, (specifically, *Creative Synthesis, Logic of Perfection*, and *Anselm's Discovery*). After some reflection on the Ontological argument I wrote the following rhyme and thought you might enjoy reading it.

Ontological Sonnet  
for Charles Hartshorne

I said to myself as I began to sit down,  
"What couldn't God think if He were around?"  
For anything God could not imagine you see,  
could not be imagined by you or by me.

<sup>2</sup>Donald A. Crosby is author of numerous articles on Whitehead's philosophy. His books include *Interpretive Theories of Religion* (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1981) and *The Specter of the Absurd: Sources & Criticisms of Modern Nihilism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). He is coeditor (with Charley D. Hardwick) of *Religious Experience and Ecological Responsibility* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996). Crosby recounts his own philosophical-religious journey in "From Nature to God: A Personal Odyssey," *Religious Humanism* 25, 3 (Summer 1991): 107-116.

He couldn't imagine a noise with no sound,  
nor could he imagine a square being round.  
All of this says that, if God were no fiction,  
not even He could conceive contradictions.

But could God imagine Himself not existing  
and the world without Him, merely subsisting;  
the condition of all that is real or can be  
floating in the abyss of nonentity?

This God could clearly never conceive,  
and if He could not, then why you or me?

I hope some day I have the pleasure of meeting you again.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

\* \* \*

[Written at the top of the letter] I may be tempted to quote your poem. How about that? With your name? Or without?

Dec. 13, 1979  
Dear Professor Viney,

Yes indeed I enjoyed your poem. By the way it is a verse form I've not seen, like a sonnet in number of lines, but not iambic pentameter lines; also not a usual rhyme scheme, and a few imperfect rhymes. But it skips along with spirit. And makes sense.

Long ago I wrote lots of poetry, and then stopped almost wholly. A mistake perhaps.

Thanks. I hope we do meet again and I'll keep your name in mind.

Charles Hartshorne

\* \* \*

Feb. 19, 1980  
Dr. Hartshorne,

I thank you for acknowledging receiving my "Ontological Sonnet". You mention the possibility of quoting the poem and ask if I would wish my name quoted with it. Should you ever decide to quote the poem, please include my



name. Was it Cicero who pointed out that even a philosopher who writes a book on humility is careful to sign his name to it? I suppose I must plead guilty to this lack of humility. At any rate, I thank you once again and am flattered by your comments.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

[Late in 1980 I wrote a prospectus for my dissertation. My proposed topic was Hartshorne's ontological argument for God's existence. Unbeknownst to me, in a letter dated December 17, 1980, Professor Robert Shahan, chairperson for the department of philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, sent Hartshorne a copy of the prospectus and invited him to be a member of my committee. On January 11, 1981, Hartshorne wrote to Shahan to accept the invitation. Hartshorne pointed out that, contrary to my claim in the prospectus, there existed a book-length treatment of his ontological argument written by George Goodwin.<sup>3</sup> He added that he was just as interested in his five other arguments. I took the hint and wrote the dissertation on Hartshorne's global argument. On February 21-25, 1981, Hartshorne visited Norman and Oklahoma City and we spoke extensively about my dissertation. Hartshorne wrote to me on the day after he returned home.]

\* \* \*

Feb. 26, 1981  
Dear Don,

The English theologian-philosopher with the "empirical" argument (version of the design argument) was F. R. Tennant. I found his name by looking up God in W. R. Reese's *Encyl. Of Philos. and Religion*.<sup>4</sup> What a useful work! If your library doesn't have it it would do well to order it. Tennant died in 1953 aged 91. W. R. Sorley had an argument for theism, a moral argument.

It was fine to have as much time as we had to talk.

Very cordially,  
Charles Hartshorne

\* Humanities Press Inc., 171 First Ave., Atlantic Highlands, N. J. 07716.

<sup>3</sup>George Goodwin, *The Ontological Argument of Charles Hartshorne*, (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1978).

<sup>4</sup>The correct bibliographical information is William L. Reese, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*.

\* \* \*

March 9, 1981  
Dr. Hartshorne,

I want to say once again how much I enjoyed your visit to Norman. After having read so much of your work it was a pleasure to meet the "man behind the work." Our conversations inspired me, and added a needed impetus to my dissertation project.

The paper you find enclosed is one I wrote for Dr. [Kenneth] Merrill last year. I am seriously considering polishing it up and sending it to a journal for publication. I would very much like to know what you think of it. After rereading it I realize it might gain something from your idea that eternal necessities cannot be ugly.

While you were here I mentioned that I had found a short piece of yours not listed in the *Process Studies* primary bibliography.<sup>5</sup> The piece is a reply to [R. H., Jr.] Randall's review of *Beyond Humanism*. It is in the *Journal of Philosophy*, volume 35, n. 5, 1938, pp. 131-133.

The Spring semester comes nearer to an end each day and I am still a bit unhappy with the books I am planning to use in my intersession course on Process Theology. I have forgotten the name of the fellow who coauthored the book with you entitled *Whitehead's View of Reality*. Would you mind relaying that information to me? The book is so new it is not listed in the current Books in Print. I am wondering if the book might be a good introduction to Whitehead's thought for college juniors.

I am still planning to visit Austin (and my cousins) in the Summer. I'll let you know ahead of time. Perhaps we could talk over lunch.

Amicably yours,  
Don Viney

<sup>5</sup>*Process Studies* 6, 1 (Spring 1973): 73-93. Presently, the most up-to-date bibliography is "Charles Hartshorne: Primary Bibliography of Philosophical Works," compiled by Dorothy C. Hartshorne, Revised and Updated by Donald Wayne Viney and Randy Ramal, *Process Studies* 30, 2 (Fall-Winter, 2002).



\*                      \*                      \*

Mar. 14, 1981  
Dear Mr. Viney,

I am very pleased by your essay. I found, and quite likely you have found them, a few typos. . . .

Concerning adequacy. It is probably not relevant to polishing this essay, but of course I hold in a way Whitehead did not clearly do, that the inadequacy of a Godless philosophy is not an empirical but an *a priori* defect in that any conceivable personally ordered experience would either be divine itself or would know its individuality to be immortal or would face Whitehead's problem, and even if it knew itself to be immortal (the possibility of which I question) the problem of importance in the long run would still be there in less obvious ways. It is not the special features of our cosmic epoch that set the problem, as I see it. Of course too Whitehead's argument that eternal possibilities must be somewhere is for me an *a priori* argument valid for any nondivine experience if it is for ours. Metaphysical narrowness would be false in any possible world state, not just in ours.

I found your essay readable and well argued.

Where to try to publish it? . . . [Hartshorne suggested *Journal of Religion*, *Process Studies*, *The Personalist*, and *American Journal of Theology and Philosophy*.]

I'm sending you the new little book on Whitehead. I'm curious to find out if it seems helpful? Somehow I'm too close to it to tell. It's by me and Creighton Peden.

Do you like Cobb's book on Whitehead? Or Lowe's *Understanding Whitehead*?

Sincerely,  
Charles Hartshorne

[On April 6, 1981 I responded and sent Hartshorne a copy of my revised prospectus. The paper on Whitehead that I wrote was never published.]

\*                      \*                      \*

Apr. 12, 1981  
Dear Don,

I like your statement.

If in the idea of God essence and existence are one (though not essence and actuality) then atheism must reject the idea of God even as possibly true. But then no empirical argument for atheism (such as from the Problem of Evil) can be valid. This fits nicely with the cosmological argument as I

develop it and the design argument. Not the particular contingent world requires God to design or order it and thus make it possible, but *any possible* contingent state of things requires God, and divine ordering does not have the function of preventing all disorder or evil. Nor do the particular ethical or aesthetic needs of humanity make divine preservation of achievements and enjoyment of the world's beauty necessary; rather any conceivable being able to put the question would face the essential problem we face that requires God as solution.

Religious intuition seems to imply that the idea of a worshipful being makes sense. But the other arguments try to show that if that idea does *not* make sense, neither do our basic categories of necessity and contingency, order and disorder, good in the long run and on the whole, all-inclusive beauty, or objective truth. In all these cases we seem to find a necessity to assert both the essence and necessary existence of God as making sense, and the nontheistic alternative as not making sense.

These are just some rather random thoughts. I think you can find your way to some worth while points without much help from me. But I will be interested in your results.

I'm about to go to Dartmouth to debate the question, should selective abortion be made illegal? I find this a monstrous proposal and do not greatly enjoy the idea of a formal debate about it. But I think I am well loaded for the fray. Debating is a political activity, not a search for truth. But it has some relation to such a search. I have materials from the abortion rights group. Somewhat to my surprise 27 national religious organizations favor the right to choose side. My opponent is a woman surgeon, perhaps a Catholic, Dr. Mildred Jefferson.

Best wishes.  
Charles

[On the back of the letter]: As you are surely aware there is ambiguity in "empirical". Thus [John] Hick will, he hopes, confirm his belief by finding himself in heaven after death. But he gives us no conceivable way in which it could be disconfirmed. (So the scheme is not empirical, by Popper's criterion.) His view relates to experience, but any view that has meaning at all does that.

C. H.



\*                      \*                      \*

May 1, 1981  
Dr. Hartshorne,

For the record I am sending you a copy of the dissertation prospectus which was approved by the other members of my committee (Drs. [Ken] Merrill, [Francis] Kovach, [Robert] Shahan, and [Tom] Boyd). The prospectus is a slightly revised version of the one I sent you earlier.

My course in Process Theology will not be offered this Spring intersession because of a lack of student interest (only seven people enrolled). I am a bit disappointed. But now my time is free to prepare for our move to Albuquerque. My wife, Chris, has a job there and I'll work on my dissertation. We'll return to Norman for the Fall semester. As I mentioned in a previous letter, I may have a chance to make a brief visit to Austin. If so, I'll let you know beforehand. Perhaps I can hand you one of the chapters of my dissertation in person.

How did the debate at Dartmouth go? I suspect you "nailed them to the wall" if you used the arguments in your recent article in *The Christian Century*.<sup>6</sup> My experience with debates of this sort, however, is that people are more inclined to be persuaded by emotional appeals than by rational arguments.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

\*                      \*                      \*

May 4, 1981  
Dear Don Viney,

Your prospectus reads nicely. I'm sorry you didn't get many students. That happened to me at Harvard the first year. I think I lost more by that than you will. But it probably was not the main reason I didn't get taken permanently into the department. And I'm not sure I regret that anyway. In fact I don't really.

Following A. P. Martinich, my colleague here, I interpret [John Duns] Scotus as holding that all valid arguments for the divine existence are *a priori*. *Franciscan Studies*, 37 (1977), Annual XV. He might have a reprint for you. Department of Philosophy, Austin, TX 78712.

<sup>6</sup>"Concerning Abortion: An Attempt at a Rational View," *Christian Century*, 98, 2 (January 21, 1981): 42-45.

The other arguments than the OA [Ontological Argument] seem to show that deity as defined exists without necessarily going through the OA. Or so I seem to recall them but I've not gone into it afresh.

I incline now to put most stress on the simplest OA.

T for theism

1. T is logically possible, conceivably true.
2. If T is logically possible, T is necessarily true (its falsity is not conceivable).
3. Therefore T is necessarily true.

If the opponent questions (1) then he gives up empiricism. If he questions (2), then he must suppose that, unlike all noncontroversially contingent propositions, T does not affirm an existence having a conceivable cause or a conceivable beginning in time, does not exclude any positive form of existence or particular finite quantity or degree between zero and infinity, or assert any particular kinds or numbers of parts, etc. Thus, all the criteria that render intelligible a distinction between possible and real existence are lacking in this case. Also ordinary individuals are not identifiable by an *a priori* definition, [but] God is. God is an exception to the rule, "existence is contingent and only empirically knowable," because the idea fails to meet any of the criteria that justify the rule. Insisting that it applies to divine existence is merely question begging, all the more since I can explain why this insistence occurs—failure to see the difference between existence and actuality as I define these. All assertions of a particular concrete actuality are indeed contingent.

One form of this simplified OA is in my essay on Hick in *Idealistic Studies*.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps you have that.

I did not win the debate at Dartmouth and I did not debate well. I have never debated formally and don't like the combative, victory at any cost atmosphere. I did get 47 votes, or my side did, compared to 87, as I recall. My two students didn't debate very sharply either, whereas one at least of the other two did. But my students had more interest in the truth I am confident. The audience was packed with fanatics, not all students either.

I have written an effective reply I think to letters to the *Christian Century* on my essay. That way I may win.

Cordially,  
Charles H.

<sup>7</sup>The essay is in *Religious Studies*, 13, 2 (June 1977), pp. 155-165, titled "John Hick on Logical and Ontological Necessity."



July 25, 1981  
Dr. Hartshorne,

Please find enclosed the first completed chapter of my dissertation. I have also written a little outline which will help place the chapter in the context of my overall project. Two more chapters are in preparation. I should like to finish and defend the dissertation by December. The progress of the next couple of months will determine how reasonable this goal is.

As you know, I have been spending my summer in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I have worked on the dissertation and my course for the Fall. My wife has worked for Sandia Laboratories. Albuquerque is nice but we both look forward to returning to Oklahoma in a couple of weeks. The move to New Mexico was so costly I did not have the chance to visit Austin. Maybe another time!

Enough chit-chat. Have you read Barry Whitney's "Process Theology: Does a Persuasive God Coerce?" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 17, 1 Spring 1979? I have some ideas about the article but would like to know what you think. I've been toying with the idea that the laws of nature pertain to aggregates of individuals, not individuals proper. While individuals may not properly be coerced, perhaps aggregates can. I'm still not sure how well this view would fit with the admittedly statistical nature of natural laws.

I'll sign off for now. Take care.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

P. S. My cousin, who lives in Austin, gave me a copy of your letter to the editor on creationism and science.<sup>8</sup> I wonder how many of those advocating Biblical creationism as a rival to evolutionary theory have seriously considered the relationships between religion, philosophy and science.

[Hartshorne responded on August 1, 1981. The letter is one page of suggested changes in the wording of sentences in the chapter I had sent him on the ontological argument. On September 14, 1981 I sent him my chapter on neoclassical theism and asked for a letter of recommendation. I also reported having found a copy of his 1953 book *Reality as Social Process* in Boulder, Colorado.]

<sup>8</sup>See *Austin American Statesman*, Saturday, May 23, 1981.

[postmarked September 17, 1981]  
Dear Don,

I've sent [John] Biro a letter recommending you. I may supplement it when you have finished your dissertation if this seems likely to improve your prospects. I certainly want you to get a position.

Again, I have found little to say about your chapter other than that it is eminently acceptable. . . .

I am a bit uneasy about the reference to Buddhism on p. 20, upper middle. Reincarnation does not, I suppose, mean continuance of an individual's consciousness after death, but the question is tricky, especially if you take the Pure Land Buddhism into account. If you have a Buddhist expert there you might ask him (or her).

There is perhaps some ambiguity in "the world is necessary" as you put it, though the preceding and following pages should resolve the ambiguity. There must be some world or other, but our definite world is contingent. This is perhaps not a flaw considering the context you give the statement.

For the rest it is a flawless account of my view. I'm delighted to learn that I used such a good metaphor as the one about nonidentical twins of risk and opportunity. I had forgotten.

Your upbringing and education has given you a fine command of English grammar. You are lucky. Many students have more trouble at that point. Keep up the good work.

Charles Hartshorne

[In November 1981, I attended a philosophy meeting in San Marcos, Texas and saw Hartshorne there.]

November 23, 1981  
Professor Hartshorne,

What a pleasant surprise to see you in San Marcos! I am only sorry I did not have a chapter of my dissertation for you. Well, here is a chapter [on cumulative arguments], even if I cannot hand it to you in person. I am presently working on your design argument. The work is going smoothly.

I just received a bit of serendipity. My father is going to Harvard in January to do some research on Dorthea Dix, an early Unitarian social reformer (you may know of her). As a combined Christmas and Birthday gift, he has invited me to accompany him. I am ecstatic. I've never been to Boston



and time at Harvard can be well spent in the library working on my dissertation. This opportunity could not have come at a more opportune time.

I hope you like the chapter. Have a good Thanksgiving and a Merry Christmas.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

P. S. I meant to ask you in San Marcos how the work on your latest book is coming.

\* \* \*

Dec. 31, 1981  
Dear Don,

Because of a serious illness of Mrs. Hartshorne's, from which she is recovering now, I have fallen behind in my correspondence farther than usual.

I've now read your Chapter 1 and find it acceptable. I'm pleased to have the setting you give the question. It's a long, long time since I read, so far as I did, [F. R.] Tennant; I don't know [Basil] Mitchell's ideas either. [Michael] Scriven's discussion I did read with care some years ago and I told him why he hadn't refuted me. [Antony] Flew, [Edward] Madden and [Peter] Hare I more or less know. My colleague [A. P.] Martinich has made me aware of [Duns] Scotus's *a priori* view; I think he is the most careful reasoner of the scholastics, and with Anselm the most creative. I've not read [Richard] Swinburne.

There are a few verbal slips. . . .

If I limit my corrections to such trivialities this is partly because I am not a close student of most of those you deal with.

I await further chapters with interest.

I spent about 7<sup>1/2</sup> years at Harvard altogether. My last visit of any length was to take a last look at Peirce manuscripts in the early Thirties. Perhaps my ghostly presence will be almost detectable there.

C. H.

\* \* \*

[On January 28, 1982, I sent Hartshorne my chapter on the design argument and noted that on the trip to Harvard I obtained a copy of his dissertation.]

Feb. 2, 1982  
Dear Don,

Again I have only minor points to make about your new chapter.

If you had read Chapter 3 of my next book you would know why I would scarcely term Plato's design argument crude. I think it was the best for two thousand years. This is partly because of his idea that soul is self-moved, and that the plurality of souls explains there being some disorder. Also Plato was the first to make use of the mind-body analogy and he did well at it (Timaeus).

The account of the argument in *Creative Synthesis* is very brief and, I now think, is one reason it has had so little attention. I don't there but somewhere (where?) make the point that it is value which explains power, so that supreme, cosmic power must mean supreme value.\* Hence the goodness of God is supported. The mind-body analogy can be used here. Bad souls are not wholly bad, and their badness tends to undermine their power over bodies. Wickedness is partly weakness, partly stupidity, and would not explain cosmic and indispensable power.

I'm a little uneasy about the apparent symmetry of your discussion of empirical as imply[ing] falsifiability and verifiability. ([Karl] Popper's asymmetrical view here is important for me as you know). Also we can know a non-empirical view is false if we can see it as illogical. It is not *observationally* falsifiable, but is conceptually so if it is not true.

I'm pleased by your quotation from [C. S.] Peirce about the knowability in principle of reality.

Dorothy is getting better steadily in nearly all respects, perhaps in all. For several days there seemed to be a backsliding in one respect but even that is reversed today, and we are very encouraged.

Keep up the good work.

C. H.

\* If A directly influences B it is because A derives value from B; the cosmic and uniquely necessary and reliable form of this must be supremely valuable. Only indirect power may not mean that the influenced derives value from intrinsic value in the influencer. A gun gives power by extrinsic disvalue, if you see what I mean.



\* \* \*

February 8, 1982  
Professor Hartshorne,

I hope Mrs. Hartshorne's illness has completely reversed. My daughter had a bad cough last week but is now much improved.

Here is the chapter on the Cosmological Argument. I'm not sure, but it may be my favorite aside from the moral argument. As you can see, I have adopted a new method of recording references. To avoid an unmanageable list of footnotes I have put references to your books in parentheses within the text.

Your observation that the brevity of the global argument in *Creative Synthesis* is one reason it has received so little attention may be correct. Still, I have a suspicion that too many philosophers are inclined to the method of convenient ignorance.

I am now working on the second triad of proofs. Your reference to [Alfred] Tarski in the Epistemic argument has me puzzled. I take it you mean to accuse Tarski of begging the question by assuming rather than explaining the relation between appearance and reality. Can you tell me if I'm right on this. Or am I totally off base?

Sincerely,  
Don

[Hartshorne's response is written at the bottom of my letter. His envelope is postdated February 13, 1982.]

\* \* \*

Tarski's "'The grass is green' is true if and only if the grass is green" explains truth in terms of reality. It is assumed that there is green grass, that the word grass has a referent. One may imagine purple grass, but this does not make 'the grass is green' true. I don't say that Tarski begs the question; he merely shows that the word *truth* refers to a relation between thought and reality. The relation of reality to knowledge is a further question that Tarski's definition does not take up. I hold with [Josiah] Royce that knowledge can be defined in terms of experience, and reality is what knowledge knows. Infallible knowledge defines reality, and infallible knowledge (epistemic argument) is defined in terms of the ideal form of *experience* (adequate, distinct intuition; or, as Royce puts it, ideas adequate to percepts and vice versa). The correspondence of thought to reality is internal to experience, relatively so in ordinary cases, absolutely so in the unsurpassable or divine case. . . .

p. 19, near bottom. Good point about ignorance!<sup>9</sup>

p. 22, middle. "Omnipotent" makes me nervous. As usually interpreted it is of course an absurd notion if I am right. Unsurpassable power with universal scope is O.K. but this is taken, as you know, to mean power unilaterally to determine events, thus negating freedom of all but God. . . .

Dorothy is gaining but still not very strong.

Charles Hartshorne

\* \* \*

February 18, 1982  
Professor Hartshorne,

I am delighted by your comments on Tarski. As a matter of fact, I think Tarski would agree with you that his definition of truth does not settle the Roycean problem. I include a quotation from one of his papers to this effect in the chapter on the Epistemic argument, (footnote 4).<sup>10</sup>

I am sorry to burden you with two chapters this time, especially since Mrs. Hartshorne is still convalescing. There has simply been more free time than usual and I've tried to take advantage of the situation. Perhaps I'll have a first draft of the entire dissertation by mid-March. . . .

It goes without saying that your wife has my best wishes that she improve rapidly.

Sincerely,  
Don

<sup>9</sup>Hartshorne was responding to my discussion of Brand Blanshard's idea that contingency has only an epistemic meaning but no ontological meaning. I wrote, "There is more to contingency than the concept of ignorance can exhaust. Indeed, ignorance itself is understandable only in terms of contingency. To be ignorant of something is to fail to know something that *could be known*." See my *Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), p. 73.

<sup>10</sup>Tarski says, ". . . we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving up any epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain naïve realists, critical realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians—whatever we were before. The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues." Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4 (1944), p. 362.



\* \* \*

Feb. 21, 1982

Dear Don,

You keep understanding me well. . . . [C]lassical theism made divine properties not only different in kind but opposite rather than unsurpassable. Not supremely sensitive and responsive but wholly insensitive and unresponsive (impassible). . . .

Dorothy keeps on slowly getting well. Never before with either of us has convalescence been so slow. But the direction seems clear. I read aloud a lot to her and we both enjoy it.

C. H.

\* \* \*

March 2, 1982

Professor Hartshorne,

Besides the introduction, I have only one chapter to go—the conclusion. The enclosed chapters are my latest installment. You will notice that I have added a brief chapter on preliminary considerations. . . .

I found a quote from the Latin American poet Jorge Luis Borges which I am adding to the chapter on the Moral argument.

“Events far reaching enough to people all space, whose end is nonetheless tolled when one man dies, may cause us wonder. But something, or an infinite number of things, dies in every death, unless the universe is possessed of a memory, as the theosophists have supposed.” (*Dreamtigers*, Univ. of Texas Press, 1964, p. 39).

I wonder if Borges sees that one needn't be a theosophist to believe in a cosmic memory? Anyway, he expresses the crux of the Moral argument nicely.

I hope to be teaching my course on Process Theology again this May. It all depends on the number who enroll. I was disappointed to discover that [Eugene] Peters' little book, *The Creative Advance* is out of print. I should like to have used it.

Has Mrs. Hartshorne recovered completely? If not, I hope her convalescence doesn't last much longer.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

\* \* \*

[On April 1, 1982 I sent Hartshorne a reading copy of my dissertation and notification that the oral defense was scheduled for April 22<sup>nd</sup>. Hartshorne responded with two letters.]

Apr. 5, 1982

Dear Don,

It turns out that I have to go to a place 100 miles East of here the 21<sup>st</sup> of April and spend the night there. Probably it is best to leave the date of your exam as it is and probably it is best for me not to try to come to Norman, even though it would be a fine occasion. I have very warm feelings about your work. Tell the committee chairman that I cordially recommend your dissertation. You have done a splendid job and what you do does not duplicate what anyone else has done. I learned from your discussion of my dissertation, for instance, much that I did not know. Also I shall have to look at something I have written about Duns Scotus because of what you report about his view. He comes closer to the cumulative view than I realized.

I'm deep in publication problems with my next book, to be published by State University of New York Press. . . .

Such insignificant flaws are about all I find.

Dorothy is almost well now, but I probably have enough to do without adding the trip to Norman. But it would be a privilege to be there.

Charles

April. 5, 1982

Dear Don,

I don't recall exactly how much you take into account, in considering the design argument and what it proves, the aspect of necessity. If the divine existence is necessary then divine power must be adequate to ensure this. A world orderer must have invincible power to create and sustain some world plan or other. Add that the most intelligible explanation of power, in a psychicalist philosophy, is the possession of worth, value, beauty, charm, intrinsic goodness. In the case of divine power this must be infallible, universally appealing. So I incline to think that the design argument either proves nothing or a great deal.

The above is not a criticism of your dissertation, but merely something for you to use, now or later, if it seems useful.

The theistic question is the question of unsurpassability, in one or both of the two senses. Unsurpassable power, wisdom, goodness, belong together. This is why I disagree with Mortimer Adler's notion that we can prove a



supreme intelligence but not supreme goodness or love. A supreme power or supreme intelligence that is not good or loving (appreciative of the value of others) is not supremely powerful or supremely intelligent, but in some way weak or stupid.

C. H.

\* \* \*

[On April 9, 1982 I sent Hartshorne copies of the "approval page" for my dissertation for him to sign and return. I also asked why Open Court would not be publishing his next book. He replied with the following handwritten note.]

Apr. 13, '82  
Dear Don,

With great satisfaction I've signed the approval forms.

Open Court was willing to publish *Insights & Oversights*. But I have other designs on them. I also think SUNY will distribute the copies better. They can hardly do better printing.

Charles

*Divine Relativity* is now again available in paperback, with a beautiful cover.

\* \* \*

[On May 27, 1982 I sent Hartshorne a bound copy of my dissertation and asked him for another letter of reference, for I had a prospect for a job at East Central University in Ada, Oklahoma. I also told him about a project that, at the time, my father and I were working on concerning free will in psychological literature.]

June 8, 1982  
Dear Don,

Thanks for your excellent dissertation. I am delighted to write a new recommendation and pleased that you have a prospect in your state. I've written what I trust is a strong letter—in your case not nearly as hard as it sometimes is.

*Insights and Oversights* will be published by SUNY Press at Albany. The final manuscript has gone to Albany and they say they will go right ahead with publication.

My book on *American Philosophy* [*Creativity in American Philosophy*] is also done and I'll be considering where to send it perhaps soon. Open Court

would do it, and so possibly would SUNY.

My book of recollections is also done [*The Darkness and the Light*]. I don't want Dorothy to have too much proof reading in the next year or so, and this is one reason I am not in a great hurry.

Your project with your father sounds fine. I wonder if either of you knows Marcus Ford's University Press of America book on [William] James?<sup>11</sup> He argues that James was a psychicalist.

Charles

[On January 24, 1983 I wrote to Hartshorne to ask if he would write a foreword to my dissertation if I could find a publisher for it. I also asked for his suggestions for likely publishers. He returned my letter on January 31<sup>st</sup>, indicating in its margins that he would write the foreword. He suggested State University of New York Press and University Press of America. On February 18<sup>th</sup> I wrote to say that SUNY Press requested the manuscript for review and that I had given the dissertation a new title, *Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God*. On April 1, 1983 my father and I attended the meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Atlanta, Georgia. Hartshorne was there and gave a paper on Leonard Troland (published in *Process Studies* 30, 2). My father and I had breakfast with Hartshorne and accompanied him to the Atlanta airport.]

\* \* \*

April 15, 1983  
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

What a delight to see you again, this time in the lovely city of Atlanta. Your paper on Troland was vintage Hartshorne, but I confess I more enjoyed lunching with you and hearing the witticisms, anecdotes, and philosophical remarks for which you have become so well known. Someone once told me that you are a national treasure. I now see why.

*Insights and Oversights* arrived in the mail a few days ago and I'm already well into the book. The chapter on Aristotle is especially nice.

I'll be teaching my course on Process Theology again this May. The last time I taught the course I used *The Divine Relativity* as an introduction to neoclassical metaphysics. However, the book proved to be too much for many of the students so I've switched to *A Natural Theology for Our Time*. When it is published I'll probably use *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes*.

<sup>11</sup>Marcus Peter Ford, *William James's Philosophy: A New Perspective* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982).



My efforts at publishing remain in limbo. SUNY Press is still considering my dissertation on the Global Argument. The suspense is unnerving. If they reject it I'll probably send it to University Press of America.

Hope you enjoy the enclosed photographs. My father sends his best and says he felt very fortunate to have made your acquaintance. I share his sentiments.

Sincerely,  
Don

[On May 6, 1983 I wrote to Hartshorne to report SUNY's provisional acceptance of the book and I renewed my request that he write the foreword. On July 29<sup>th</sup> Hartshorne's foreword arrived in the mail, without a letter. On August 16<sup>th</sup> I wrote to Hartshorne to say that I had a final agreement from SUNY to publish; however, I explained that their agreement was contingent upon Hartshorne's foreword *not* appearing in the book. Of course, I was distraught at having to write such a letter. The editors at SUNY had not read Hartshorne's foreword when they made the decision. I protested to the editor-in-chief, William Eastman that the board of editors should at least read the foreword before making a decision. Happily, the board reversed its decision and I wrote to Hartshorne on October 8<sup>th</sup> with the good news. I also included in the letter a photocopy of the portrait of Hartshorne by my artist friend Michelle Bakay that would be printed on the cover of the book. I saw Hartshorne once again in mid-April 1984 at a conference in Lincoln, Nebraska. On April 18<sup>th</sup> I wrote a brief note and sent him some photographs from the conference. My next communication from Hartshorne was in June.]

\* \* \*

June 14, 1984  
Dear Don,

Please let me know who is to publish your book? I can't remember or find a letter telling me. I want to refer to it. Probably published in 1984?

I am in fairly good shape. I hope you are in even better shape. Regards to your admirable father.

Charles

[On June 20<sup>th</sup> I responded to remind Hartshorne that SUNY Press would publish the book. On August 21<sup>st</sup> I wrote to Hartshorne again to say that I had been hired to a tenure track position at Pittsburg State University in Pittsburg, Kansas. I gave him my new address and said that I expected my book to be published by Christmas.]

\* \* \*

September 8, 1984  
Dear Don,

Of course I am delighted by your new status.

We've just returned from our trip to Hawaii and Japan (Nagoya), where at each conference (comparative philosophy and process philosophy) I was termed the "keynote speaker." I got an especially enthusiastic reception from the comparative philosophers. I spoke on Sankara, Nagarjuna, and Fa Tsang with some Western Analogues.<sup>12</sup> My health is good, though I found traveling so far and to so many places (7 hotels in 25 days) tedious and somewhat nerve-wracking, partly because Dorothy is only partly recovered from a serious operation. She should complete her recovery soon now I hope.

It will be fine to have your book out. As you probably know my *Creativity in American Philosophy* is now available. I have some fear that I've been publishing books too fast, people will despair of keeping up with me.

I have two trips to make in November but can stay home until November 11<sup>th</sup>.

Cordial good wishes for your new academic life.

Charles

\* \* \*

February 2, 1985  
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

I wasn't sure whether or not SUNY sent you a copy of my book. In any event, here it is. Aesthetically it is not what I had hoped—the little picture corners make it look like a photo album—but otherwise I am satisfied. It came as an honor to learn that Eugene Peters read and approved of the book.<sup>13</sup> He must have read the manuscript shortly before his death. I wish I could have known him.

<sup>12</sup>Published in *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, eds. G. J. Larson and Eliot Deutsche (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press): 98-115.

<sup>13</sup>Eugene H. Peters (January 30, 1929 – May 13, 1983), author of *The Creative Advance* (1966) and *Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics* (1970). It has always been a source of satisfaction to me that I could, in some small measure, promote Peters' reputation by contributing to *Faith & Creativity: Essays in Honor of Eugene H. Peters*, eds. George Nordgulen and George Shields (St. Louis, Missouri: CBP Press, 1987).



The first review of the book I've seen comes from a fellow in Maine. Perhaps you know him, The Rev. Philip E. Devenish. He did the review for *Theological Studies*. It is a brief, and not very critical, book report. I await more hostile critics.

Perhaps you know that I am in a tenure track position at Pittsburg State University in Pittsburg Kansas. It is a humble beginning. However, in these times, one is thankful simply to have a beginning in philosophy.

In the past few months, moving and adjusting to new surroundings have not allowed me to be as productive as I would have liked. Nevertheless, I've managed a little progress on the book with my father on the free-will problem. Maybe we'll get that out before too long.

Again, thank you for the advice, support and inspiration you have offered along the road to publication. Your help and encouragement have been for me pearls of great price.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

\* \* \*

February 21, 1985

Dear Don,

Thanks for the book and the news of your new job. I'm glad to have 2 copies of the one and to learn of the other. As President Mays of [blank space in letter] in Atlanta said to me once, it is easier to go from something to something else than from nothing to something. So you may end up somewhere else but at least [you] will have something. Oh the news about you and your father is also good. You may have to read the book on freedom SUNY is publishing by my colleague here Robert Kane.<sup>14</sup> It is a bit dry in places but very competent and has some original insights I don't find in any other book. He knows the history of the problem of causality and freedom as well as its present status in the profession.

[William] Eastman of SUNY made us a short visit. What a splendid charming fellow he is. His one course with me (in Seattle) really got to him and he is still my student in a fashion. A wonderful combination of ability and sweetness, with no false pretensions of any kind, is in him. What luck to run into such a publisher! I remember your father well. He's another person it is good to know.

Charles

<sup>14</sup>Hartshorne mistakenly wrote "Robert Kant." The book to which Hartshorne refers is *Free Will and Values* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985).

Yes I know Devenish. He's strong for our kind of philosophy. Catholic background if I recall correctly.

\* \* \*

[Rebecca Main (then my fiancée), Joyce Bestor (later Jenkins), Regina Kobak<sup>15</sup> (later Drew), and Debra Smith—all students from Pittsburg State University—accompanied me to St. Louis, Missouri to attend a conference on Process Theology on March 22-23, 1985. Hartshorne was the keynote speaker for the conference. The papers from that conference were published in *The Modern Schoolman*, 62, 4 (May 1985). After the conference I wrote Hartshorne and his wife Dorothy a letter.]

April 8, 1985

Dear Professor and Mrs. Hartshorne,

Enclosed are some of the photographs I took during the St. Louis conference on process theology. The photo of the two of you is a little reminiscent of American Gothic, not unflattering, but not quite flattering either.<sup>16</sup>

My students and I enjoyed the conference. In my philosophy of religion seminar, we have been reading my book, and a couple of the students have read *Omnipotence*.<sup>17</sup> It was a once-in-a-lifetime experience for them to meet the genius responsible for so much innovation in modern theology. We all came away from the conference intellectually stimulated and emotionally charged. My only regret is that I did not submit a paper to the conference.

Mrs. Hartshorne, over the past four years I have caught occasional glimpses of you through your husband's letters (once I think we spoke over the phone). It was a pleasure making your acquaintance. I now see that your reputation for kindness and charm is well deserved.

I look forward to meeting the two of you again.

Sincerely,  
Don Viney

P. S. [Leonard] Eslick and [Lewis] Ford are going to review my book. I have a special admiration for Ford's analytical abilities and am looking forward to reading his review.

<sup>15</sup>See my letter of April 19, 1991

<sup>16</sup>This photograph is reproduced in *Process Studies* 29, 2 (Fall-Winter 2000), p. 191.

<sup>17</sup>Charles Hartshorne, *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984).



I thought you might appreciate George Eliot's poem—a beautiful expression of something besides conventional immorality. [I included a photocopy of Eliot's poem "Choir Invisible."]

\* \* \*

[On December 13, 1985 I sent Hartshorne a copy of my paper "How to Argue for God's Existence: Reflections on Hartshorne's Global Argument," which I described as a rehash of part of my book and which would appear in *The Midwest Quarterly* 28, 1 (Autumn 1986): 36-49. I also told Hartshorne that I had applied for a job at Emory University. Hartshorne responded with the following letter.]

[Written at the top of the letter] (I must either learn how to do it on my new typewriter or stop using this narrow stationary.)

December 22, 1985

Dear Don,

I am of course delighted with your "rehash" of part of the dissertation. Your writing has always been good but this essay is even better than what I have seen of you before. Your summary of my argument will be the best in print.

On the design argument: against A1 [There is no cosmic order], as you know, I would hold that not only is Astronomy as an observational science against it but any conceivable science would be against it. No experience could show that there was no cosmic order, if order allows for freedom in all agents. Any experience would be made possible by an order in its past and would have no good reason to believe there would be no order in the future. Trust in some degree of order is inherent in living.

Concerning the Library of Living Philosophers volume on my philosophy, I have met with one difficulty, there is no psychologist to be a contributor.<sup>18</sup> The few asked have not seen their way to do it. One that seemed a possibility has, after a moderate time since I wrote, not replied. He still might I suppose. I hesitate to put pressure on anyone in psychology because my book on sensation is 41 years old and never succeeded in interesting very many psychologists. My bird book *has* interested ornithologists.<sup>19</sup> (I knew better,

<sup>18</sup>*The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn. Library of Living Philosophers, volume XX. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991).

<sup>19</sup>Hartshorne was looking for a psychologist to write on his first book, *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* (University of Chicago Press, 1934). The other book to which Hartshorne refers is *Born to Sing: An Interpretation and World Survey of Bird Song* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973).

being much older, when I wrote that book than when I wrote the sensation book how to write for specialists in a subject outside philosophy.) The bird book was, in its main concern, a study of animal behavior with the idea that behavior indicates feelings, and at least some slight memory of the past and sense of the future.

I have two essays that summarize the main point about bird song that you may or may not have. Is there any chance your father would be interested. The idea is not to praise but to evaluate my work so far as it bears on experimental or empirical facts. Probably your father already knows from you that I take psychology to be the universal science, so far as active agents "acting as one" are concerned. With the understanding, however, that the farther from the human type of animal one goes, through cells, atoms, and farther, the less can one do much with the more than merely behavioristic side. Also multi-cellular plants are not single agents, only their cells, this being the difference a nervous system makes with animals.

You perhaps have some idea of your father's interests. He might be merely embarrassed by such a suggestion. I admire him and his relation to you. Probably he should not be bothered. I can live with there being no psychologist in the book. But I would like even a severely critical one. There is a man who likes *Born to Sing*, [Lucio] Chiaraviglio, former student, trained as an engineer, expert on artificial intelligence and on Whitehead, and who is to write for the volume on my philosophy, taking the bird book into account and also an essay of mine on "Thinking About Thinking Machines," published, alas, where neither philosophers nor psychologists would see it (*Texas Quarterly*, [7, 1] Spring 1964 [pp. 131-140]).

*Born to Sing* has received a good deal of attention from ornithologists, much of it favorable. No reviewer accused me of not knowing the literature ("he has certainly read about these birds"), nor have I been accused of factual mistakes save in one statistical point on which a leading expert takes my side.

Merry Christmas,  
Charles

[On January 13, 1986, I wrote to Hartshorne to say that I had conveyed his request to my father and I gave him my father's address. I mentioned my work on the philosopher Jules Lequyer<sup>20</sup> and that I was beginning to think about finding a publisher for my book *The God of Process*—a book I partially wrote but never published. On January 22<sup>nd</sup> I wrote again to request a letter of reference to be sent to William Alston to attend Alston's 1986 NEH Summer Institute in Philosophy of Religion. I also asked whether Hartshorne had found someone to write on his sensation book for the LLP volume.]

<sup>20</sup>"Lequyer" is the official orthography, although "Lequier" is also common and is the spelling used by Hartshorne and which I adopted until after 1994.



\*                      \*                      \*

January 30, 1986  
Dear Don,

I've written [Lewis] Hahn to ask your father to write for the LLP volume. And Hahn writes me he has done this. I've found a copy of my sensation book that I can send him if he needs it and am waiting to hear from him. I wrote to him before hearing from Hahn but Hahn was quite willing to include him, though he says the list is about full. Hahn also wrote my ornithological choice and I've written him too. So it seems possible that almost all my main concerns will be covered though I would have liked an expert historian or two like [Gregory] Vlastos or [Richard] Popkin. But one can't have everything. Glad to hear all you're doing.

Charles

\*                      \*                      \*

May 19, 1986  
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

I am writing to thank you for your reference, and to let you know that I was accepted as a participant in Alston's Institute for the Philosophy of Religion in Bellingham Washington in July 1986. I look forward to hobnobbing with other philosophers whose minds are in the same state of confusion as my own (to borrow a phrase from Proust).

I have enclosed a paper on Lequier on omniscience which I read earlier this year at the Kansas Philosophical Society. I don't know yet where I'll send it but I need a piece of historical information from you: When did you first learn of Lequier? The first reference I find to Lequier in your writing is 1949, "Chance, Love and Incompatibility."<sup>21</sup> Of course, long before this you'd come to your present position on omniscience.

Thanks for your help.

Sincerely,  
Don

P. S. My father tells me that his paper for the LLP volume is coming along well! He seems impressed by the extent to which your work is confirmed by current research and attitudes.

<sup>21</sup>Published in *Reality as Social Process* (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1953): 85-109.

\*                      \*                      \*

May 21, 1986  
Dear Don,

I am delighted you are working on Lequier. Also pleased to see once more how good and readable your writing is. Finally I am happy to hear how your father feels about his study of my psychological views.

Your "earliest" of my references to Lequier may very well be the earliest. For I first began looking into Lequier after Jean Wahl in Paris, where he had me give two lectures (the same in two places in Paris) either late in 1948 or early in '49, told me that, considering what I had said in my lecture, I should read Lequier. I probably got my incomplete edition of Lequier in Paris at that time. How right Wahl was!

[Hartshorne here suggested slight revisions in my paper]

Various journals might publish your essay. . . . [Hartshorne suggested, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, *American Journal of Theology and Philosophy*, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, *The American Philosophical Quarterly*, *The Review of Metaphysics*, and *International Philosophical Quarterly*.]

Charles

\*                      \*                      \*

August 28, 1986  
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

Here is a copy of my article on your theistic arguments. There is also a review of *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* on page 144.<sup>22</sup> For some reason the editor hyphenated your last name Hart-shorne, despite my examples in the original draft.

I have just read my father's article on your psychology. I think it is a fine piece. He told me that your book has changed some of his thinking. "Some of the ideas in that book have used me," he said. In particular, he has been taken with the idea that so much of the early psychologies were pre-evolutionary. If evolution is true then one would expect continuity rather than discontinuity among the various senses. In his view, your book was years ahead of its time.

Here's hoping that you and yours are doing well.

Sincerely,  
Don

<sup>22</sup>"How to Argue for God's Existence: Reflections on Hartshorne's Global Argument," *The Midwest Quarterly* 28, 1 (Autumn 1986): 36-49; the review of *Omnipotence* in the same issue is on pages 144-146.



September 3, 1986

Dear Don,

I like your father's essay very much. I expected to like it from the time he agreed to do it.

So far, with 13 contributors, I am not unhappy about a single one.

I also like your essay in *The Midwest Quarterly*. Very lucid and readable.

Dorothy has broken her shoulder bone. We're doing as well as to be expected, in that situation. Friends are helping us and we have some Home Care from our local hospital. Our morale holds up.

Charles

[On April 7, 1987, Hartshorne visited Central State University in Edmond, Oklahoma where he gave a talk titled, "God as Composer-Director and Enjoyer, and in a Sense Player, of the Cosmic Drama" (published in *Process Studies* 30, 2, Fall-Winter, 2002). I took several students to Edmond to hear Hartshorne speak. Afterwards I wrote him a letter about a response I was considering writing to a review of my book in *Process Studies* (15, 3; Fall 1986, pp. 207-212) by Eric von der Luft. I included detailed questions about Professor Luft's review. In the same letter I enclosed an article I had recently published, "William James on Free Will and Determinism," *The Journal of Mind and Behavior* 7, 4 (Autumn 1986): 555-566. As is apparent from Hartshorne's response, he was much more interested in James and the question of freedom than he was in my concerns about Professor Luft. Nevertheless, I eventually published the rebuttal, "In Defense of the Global Argument: a Reply to Professor Luft," *Process Studies* 16, 4 (Winter 1987): 309-312.]

[Handwritten at the top of the letter] If they ask me I'll certainly back you at Emory

May 13, 1987

Dear Don,

Now that I've really read your W. James article I want to tell you how pleased I am with it. It ought to do a lot of good. I have tended to neglect what James's other discussions of freedom added to "[The] Dilemma [of Determinism]." (Hereafter DT) Your article gives this addition admirably. Good research indeed.

You can probably guess how I differ somewhat from James. DT convinced me by itself that determinism cannot be true of human actions. And years later C. S. Peirce's "[The] Doctrine of Necessity [Examined]" convinced me, virtually by itself, that determinism is not true of *any* part of nature, if "effects" are taken in their full concreteness. Determinism forces us to go beyond nature to find any meaning for the idea of *unrealized possibilities*, and thus we have to choose among the following: a particularly bad kind of supernaturalism (as in Spinoza) which rejects such possibilities and hence takes 'necessary' to express no genuine contrast and therefore (principle of contrast) to lose its meaning, or a weird cosmic or supercosmic dice thrower, or the notion of deity as having genuine causal freedom in supreme degree, although no being other than God has such freedom to the least degree! Moreover, the division of nature into the really free in a few spots, but wholly unfree everywhere else is a conceptually bizarre, unappealing dualism. With [Karl] Popper, [A. N.] Whitehead, and [Albert] Einstein I reject positivism as a scientific stance. A minimum of metaphysical commitment is required for the best empirical work. Determinism taken as metaphysical truth served science well in some ways until recently. Now, since [Werner] Heisenberg, scientists find they can do better without it. Einstein's metaphysical determinism hampered him in his last decades. I think James was wrong to ask psychology to be neutral on this issue. And now that physics finds that its laws may all be statistical only, why pretend that psychology, vastly less precise in its measurements, needs to demand or expect more order in nature than physics does? I think it should expect less. If Peirce, well before quantum theory, could accept the statistical view of cosmic order, and if C. Maxwell, still earlier, could do so (as he strongly hints he did), what is the point of still trying to take the Newtonian stance in 1987?

On p. 557 of your essay, 17 lines up from the bottom, you say rightly that determinism and indeterminism are contradictories not contraries. Your next sentence raises the issue I discuss above. Peirce's indeterminism held that *no* events (*in their full specificity or concreteness*) are necessitated. Freedom is a matter of degree, and nature is a vast hierarchy of such degrees, divine freedom being the highest, and particles or atoms being the lowest. On this planet we are almost certainly the highest, with apes and whales next.

Epicurus was the first to take freedom as universal in nature. Peirce was almost certainly influenced by him, as [Max] Fisch has shown, though he is less sure about this than I am. Maxwell seems to take the same view. Crucial of course is the Leibnizian distinction between singular and composite. Only animals, among *visible* things in nature, taken as single wholes, act as one, or have freedom. Not plants but only plant cells act as one. Since composites do not act, but only the dynamic singulars in them, they are neither free nor unfree, and neither sentient nor insentient, except trivially the latter. All action by the really acting agents has above zero freedom, and involves at least



feeling. This Peirce-Whitehead position that Leibniz logically ought to have taken but could not (and no one could at that time) is easy enough to take now. However the main message of this letter is, keep up the good work!

[Unsigned]

\* \* \*

[On June 3, 1987 I sent Hartshorne a copy of my rebuttal of Professor Luft and I thanked him for his remarks on my James paper. I saw Hartshorne again on February 11-13, 1988 in Austin, Texas at a conference given in his honor on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday and in celebration of the coming publication of the LLP volume, *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*. Robert Kane, the organizer of the conference invited me to write a paper on Hartshorne's views on omniscience to be included in the volume of papers to be published from the conference.<sup>23</sup>]

June 5, 1988

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

The enclosed photographs were taken while you were in Edmond, Oklahoma in April 1987. Several of my students accompanied me to Edmond to hear you speak. They were so energized by your talk that they returned to Pittsburg and formed the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society. Early next Fall, volume 1 of the Society's student journal will be published (one of the articles is a critical appraisal of *Wisdom as Moderation*). Much of their enthusiasm for philosophy is attributable to your influence. The photographs and the button are an expression of gratitude for helping philosophy "come alive" in the imaginations of my students. Pittsburg State University's mascot is the gorilla, hence, our Society's logo of the gorilla contemplating the skull.

I am anxious for you to see my contribution to Bob Kane and Stephen Phillips (eds.) *Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Religion*. The paper I am writing is entitled "Hartshorne on Omniscience." I would like one piece of information from you. To what extent, if any, did [Jules] Lequier's work influence your ideas in "The Meaning of 'Is Going to Be'" *Mind* 74, (1965)? Lequier says,

... between contingent past things and contingent things to come there is this difference: of two contradictory affirmations concerning contingent past things, one is true, the other false; but of two contradictory

affirmations concerning contingent things to come, neither the one nor the other is true, both are false (*Œuvres complètes*, 194).

Lequier's view is not far from your own. Had he identified the affirmations concerning the future as contraries rather than contradictories he would have said what you said in the *Mind* article. As you note, "definitely X" and "definitely not X" do not exhaust the logical possibilities; one also needs "indefinite with respect to X". As a point of historical interest, did Lequier's ideas on this point influence your own?

WITH FOND REGARDS,  
Don Viney

p.S. A belated happy birthday!

\* \* \*

July 9, 1988

Dear Don,

Thanks for your fine photos. I hope your father is flourishing. The news about your students is most pleasing.

About Lequier, I agree with your analysis of the close similarity of my views on past and future and Lequier's. I am not aware of being definitely influenced by Lequier on *that* point. I have known for a long time that he was one of the fair number who see time as modal, the past being *necessary* condition for the *possibility* of the present but the future as *not* in concrete detail *necessary* consequence of the present, or the present of the past. But my own adoption of this standpoint was settled still earlier, I think, by [William] James, [C. S.] Peirce, and [Henri] Bergson. Whitehead and others, including [John] Dewey, [Émile] Boutroux, [Charles] Renouvier, still others, including Lequier, confirmed or encouraged me, but my mind was already, I think, made up. I read Lequier only after Jean Wahl told me, in 1948, that I ought to read him, seeing that my views were similar. Then [Harvey] Brimmer, who translated Lequier, after being my student at Emory, made me (about 1960) very aware of Lequier's work. If he influenced me appreciably it was in what he said about God as the one who has "created me creator of myself," thus *closely* anticipating Whitehead's "self-created creatures."

Lequier's greatest influence was through Renouvier to James, and through James to Dewey, in making clear the connection of freedom (as creativity) with chance, setting limits to what even ideal or divine decisions can determine, and making causal indeterminacy almost axiomatic for later French metaphysics. But do not forget that [René] Descartes started France in that direction by insisting on real freedom for human persons. *No other tradition*, least of all the British, has been so resistant to the deterministic tendency of

<sup>23</sup>The paper was published as "God Only Knows? Hartshorne and the Mechanics of Omniscience," *Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Theology*, eds. Robert Kane and Stephen Phillips (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989): 71-90.



early modern thought. What helped *us* to do better than the British was perhaps chiefly the accident of James's and Peirce's great genius but also, at least a little, the forthright candor of the genius Jonathan Edwards in (long before) arguing sharply, though fallaciously, for determinism. This challenge could not be ignored. There was immediate counterargument. How far, if at all, this historical background influenced Peirce, James, or Dewey I do not know, but it may have had some more or less indirect influence. The British and the Germans faced no such clear challenge, especially not the British. Their anti-metaphysical bias made them weak against determinism, which is one of the great metaphysical mistakes and needed opposition on the metaphysical level. The Anglo-idealists were little help in this regard. They substituted teleological for blind causal necessity. And [J. S.] Mill and [David] Hume professed determinism, as did [Herbert] Spencer. [John] Locke and [George] Berkeley are unclear. A strange record for the great proponents of political freedom. However, they (or some of them) were also great imperialists and believers in social castes, a place for everyone and everyone in his largely inherited place. Our millionaire and billionaire families, plus slavery and its legacies, threaten to reintroduce caste (if we ever really got rid of it). I'm never sure if we have taken the ideal of equality of opportunity even half as seriously as we should take it.

More power to you.

My health is good. Dorothy's is tolerable, though in some ways sad. She keeps up her spirits and her wonderful sense of humor. Her fifty-five years of doing the household chores easily reconcile me to doing many of them now.

Charles

I look forward to your essay.

\* \* \*

[On August 25, 1988 I sent Hartshorne a copy of my contribution to the Kane and Phillips volume. I also mentioned that one of my father's colleagues, Professor Frank Vatano was using some of Hartshorne's ideas from *Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* (1934) in some short films he was making which were to be distributed nationwide for use in psychology classes.]

August 27, 1988

Dear Don,

I am *happy* about your essay (nice research!) and also about your letter and the words from your father and about Vatano. Quite exciting. I find no errors in your paper.

Aug. 12-18<sup>th</sup> I was in Oxford where two groups of philosophers, with some overlap, met successively to discuss first theology-and-philosophy, then

social philosophy.\* Plenary session speaker of the first group was yours truly, of the second group Robert Solomon, my colleague here. Met quite a few new-to-me people, mostly American, with a few English and Scotch. My paper got cordial responses. An interesting time.

You don't say whether you've said anything to W. Viney about my solution of the *why we sleep* problem.<sup>24</sup> Combining the budgeting of energy and the Freudian wishfulness idea might do most of the job. I keep having anxiety dreams that are not about my chief real anxiety (my wife's health)\*\* or the secondary one, so many unfinalized publications, but which on waking are, if anything, encouraging. The "only a dream" realization is rather comforting. "At least I don't have *that* reason to worry!" I don't recall much of what Freud says about this.

You're right that I have not gone into [Luis de] Molina. Thanks for having done it for me!!

When I began to be chronologically old I began to wonder, "When will the world begin to dismiss me as an old fogey?" I don't see it happening as yet.

The best to you and yours.

Charles

\* Organized by Creighton Peden and his Highland Institute.

\*\* D.'s health is still sufficiently good for our joint needs and happiness, since mine is so very good. She can still spot misspellings and mispunctuations that I miss.

\* \* \*

Sept. 23, 1988

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

The enclosed paper will be published in Bob Kane's and Steve Phillips' *Hartshorne, Process Philosophy, and Religion* [sic.]. You read an earlier draft of the paper. Although I had to cut it down a bit, it is basically the same paper as you read. Steve said that he and Bob had given you the other papers that will appear in the volume, but that mine was not among them. He asked that I send you my paper so as to complete the set.

I spoke with my father a few days ago and he expressed interest in your idea of why we sleep (although he said he is not "up" on the most recent literature). When I tried to explain your idea I realized that I had a pretty

<sup>24</sup>When I saw Hartshorne in April 1987 in Edmond, Oklahoma, we discussed, among other things, his ideas on why we sleep and I remarked that my father would be interested in these things.



flimsy grasp of the theory, especially the relationship you see between dreaming and conserving energy. My father and I would both appreciate it if you would jot down the outlines of your ideas.

Here's hoping that you and Dorothy are remaining healthy and that the anxiety dreams you mentioned in your last letter are less frequent or have stopped altogether.

WITH FOND REGARDS,  
Don

\* \* \*

[Postmarked October 3, 1988]

Dear Don,

About sleep. My primary point, an obvious one to a biologist, concerns not dreams especially but sleep, the relative immobility and consequently small expenditure of animal energy. This energy comes from food (combining with oxygen), and food is acquired through foraging, which expends energy. Add the great difference between night and day, nocturnal and diurnal conditions, implying that animals specialized for either of the two situations, alternating each twenty-four hours, are not likely to function very efficiently in the other. Eyes adapted to bright light function ill in near darkness, and not at all in total darkness. (Owls and lemurs have huge eyes enabling them to do well nocturnally, but full daylight troubles them.) If, then, animals were wide awake day and night they would be spending much more energy and have to find much more food, and part of this finding would be done inefficiently. It would not be cost-efficient. It has become commonplace in studies of bird behavior that a species must optimally "budget" its energy to be most successful. It does this by using one extreme of light-dark for active pursuits, obtaining food, finding mate, and feeding offspring—in many mammals mostly by mothers—and, during the other extreme, the one for which it is not specialized—economizing its energy expenditure. How better do this last than by sleeping? Note too that it is at night that sleeping, or being maximally relaxed, is the safest from predators. Considering also the importance of sight, to which daylight is favorable, it is not surprising that most species are diurnal. (Even the nightingale is diurnal essentially.) None of the foregoing seems to depend on the function(s) of dreaming. Freud and others have given us some reason to see certain values in that. But deep sleep itself is obviously the most economical of energy.

In view of the foregoing, I am amazed to read about psychologists who say they "do not know why we sleep." The traditional view that we do it to recover from fatigue misses the main point. We do it to avoid wasting precious energy which must be obtained inefficiently. True, our command of fire and electricity, scientific agriculture, etc., etc., alters things, but our genes do not

yet "know" about this.\* On the whole we still function best in daylight. George (?) Wald, a distinguished physiologist, surprised me by declaring that "we do not even know why birds sing most at dawn." I think I may have managed to convince him that we do know. Some birds sing a lot in the evening and some a good deal on moon-lighted nights. Dim light is a safer time, so far as predators are to be feared; above all, it is the time of day when foraging is not yet or no longer efficient for diurnal species; moreover, since sound travels at least as well then as later in the day it is an efficient time to phonetically advertise territory or attract a mate. Q.E.D. We (some of us) do know.

Cordially,  
Charles

\* [Hand written note] I've not thought out what is involved in applying the theory to civilized human beings. [Typed] It is important that time spent sleeping is not wasted. Cells which have died can be replaced, digestive processes completed; because the cortex is less active, waking or beginning to dream means a fresh start and, since thoughts and experiences of the previous day can be partly recalled and seen in a new perspective, given the new perceptions (even in dreams there are some, as Bergson has shown) the variety, the contrasts that furnish the aesthetic richness of life are enhanced.

\* \* \*

November 9, 1988

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

This letter is to request your permission to allow public (primarily scholarly) access to our correspondence over the past several years. I intend to donate our correspondence to the special collections of the University Library here at Pittsburg State (I wrote to the Center for Process Studies and never received a reply). The correspondence would be put on OCLC, a nationwide computer network, making it available to scholars across the country.

With Fond Regards,  
Don

P.S. I sent a copy of your letter detailing your views on why we sleep to my father. He says he is not familiar with current studies on sleep but sees nothing wrong with your ideas. My own feeling is that your views would need to be supplemented by the idea that sleep is necessary, not merely for physical but also for emotional (and perhaps cognitive stability). Aside from conserving energy, sleep may be important for a fully integrated personality—note that sleep deprivation is a method used by some religious cults for purposes of indoctrination and control.



\*                      \*                      \*

November 26, 1988  
Dear Don,

I agree that sleep probably has the function you mention as well as the ones I emphasize.

I have no objection now to your making a collection of our correspondence. It is conceivable that the Center for Process Studies or someone wanting to write about me may wish to see it but I leave that to the future. Rita Brock at Stephen's College in Missouri has some idea of writing a biography, or of editing my recollections if I do not finish the job. I'm not sure how much time the world should be spending on details of my career. My published writing itself is so complicated. Whitehead told his wife to destroy everything he had not already published. And there was almost no correspondence. He was a modest man for a great genius. It's true I have been more of a letter writer than is usual nowadays.

Philosophers and scientists seem to interest the general public as letter writers rather little on the whole compared to poets or fiction writers. True I am a poet and story writer *manqué*. I knew I would be a *writer* well before I knew I would teach philosophy, or teach anything.

Charles

\*                      \*                      \*

January 6, 1989  
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

The enclosed paper, "Does Omniscience Imply Foreknowledge? Craig on Hartshorne" is a response to William Craig's critique of your views on omniscience in a recent issue of *Process Studies*. Lewis Ford suggested that I send the paper to you, as it is some time before PS can publish it. Any comments you may have would be appreciated.

The paper somewhat overlaps my contribution to the Kane & Phillips volume, which you have already read. At Kane's suggestion, I expanded the critique of Craig into another (i.e. this) paper.<sup>25</sup> Frankly, I really enjoyed writing this piece, but found it difficult not to be a bit sardonic. If you were not so well known, I might have thought that Craig had read another Hartshorne, so inaccurate is his presentation of your views!

<sup>25</sup>See William Lane Craig, "Process Theology's Denial of Divine Foreknowledge." *Process Studies* 16, 3 (Fall 1987): 198-202. My rebuttal was published as "Does Omniscience Imply Foreknowledge? Craig on Hartshorne." *Process Studies* 18, 1 (Spring 1989): 30-37.

Here's hoping your 1989 will be productive.

WITH FOND REGARDS,  
Don

p.S. Thank you for your generous permission to allow public access to our correspondence.

\*                      \*                      \*

January 9, 1989  
Dear Don,

Beautiful! Your [Charles] Dickens quote is perfect. There was a master of language. Will and May are nicely distinguished in ordinary speech.<sup>26</sup>

I have one emendation in punctuation. . . .

Part of the trouble is in the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Will he "accept the proposal?" Suppose he will; there are many ways he may actualize his acceptance. He may nod his head, say O.K., and so on. Concretely these are different events or small sequences of events. That he will somehow accept may be much more definite than just how. *Language cannot fully identify the concrete*, apart from direct acquaintance. The hypnotist may have predetermined that the person will open the window, but not just how and just when, or by exactly what motions; also what reason will he give, or not give, for opening it. The hypnotist cannot possibly determine the concrete happenings.<sup>27</sup> Unit events, Whitehead's actual entities, have to be past for our references. Only God could make absolute predictions. Clerk Maxwell rejected determinism as meaning absolute predictions given absolute knowledge of the past or present on the ground that only God could have absolute knowledge of the past or present (or of anything concrete). I add that no human language could express what he would then know.

Happy New Year.

Charles

<sup>26</sup>The quote is from *A Christmas Carol*. Scrooge asks the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, "Are these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they the shadows of the things that May be, only?"

<sup>27</sup>Hartshorne wrote, "The hypnotist cannot possibly determined the concrete happenings."



January 9, 1990

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

Last year about this time I sent you a pre-publication copy of the enclosed article. I received off-prints from *Process Studies* just the other day and thought that you might like a copy. Craig has read the article and he agrees that my exposition of your views is more accurate than his. However, he insists that my clearer exposition only serves to show how "evidently fantastic" your views are. He believes that you evade the issues by redefining central concepts like "future tense statement," "Law of Excluded Middle," and "Bivalence." Apparently my exposition was not so clear as to disabuse him of this particular misconception. It seems to me that your suggestions on how to understand future tensed propositions mark the first real advance on the subject since Aristotle. By conceiving indefiniteness as a predicate one simultaneously preserves the indeterminacy of the future (so dear to Aristotle) while retaining the law of excluded middle (which Aristotle compromised). I know of several philosophers who followed Aristotle's lead (most clearly, Lequier), but I know of none until you who offers the kind of solution found in your writings. Perhaps you have some precursors but I don't know them.

I am anxious to see the Library of Living Philosophers volume on your work but it is slow in being published. Also, I saw an advertisement for the book that Santiago Sia edited (similar to the LLP volume) but it is priced so that few will be able to afford it, including me—\$99.00!<sup>28</sup> I am rather peeved at the publisher.

My best to you and yours.

WITH FOND REGARDS,  
Don

[On March 29, 1991 I sent Hartshorne a bibliography I compiled on 40 books about God and reviews I wrote of his *Wisdom as Moderation* and *The Darkness and the Light*.<sup>29</sup> I asked if he knew how to obtain a copy of his article, "Thoughts on My Life, from the *Bilingual Journal, Lecomte du Nouy Association*, 5 (Fall 1973) which I was having difficulty locating. I also mentioned

<sup>28</sup>Charles Hartshorne's *Concept of God: Philosophical and Theological Responses* (Hingham, Massachusetts: Kluwer Publishers, 1990).

<sup>29</sup>The bibliography, "Oh God! Forty Books on God's Existence, An Annotated Bibliography" and the review of *Wisdom* are in *The Practice of History and Social Science* 26 (Spring 1991): bibliography, pp. 6-15; review, pp. 16-20; the review of *Darkness and Light* is in *The Midwest Quarterly* 32, 3 (Spring 1991): 366-368.

that my work on studying and translating Lequier was continuing and that I was planning a sabbatical leave for this purpose. The following letter indicates that Hartshorne had forgotten that he had already told me about Harvey Brimmer's work (see letter of July 9, 1988).]

April 8, 1991  
Dear Don,

Thanks for your communication. The two reviews are, to use a phrase of a former newspaper columnist, whose name escapes me, Fair Enough. I have no quarrel with anything you say, even "disquieting."<sup>30</sup> I have somewhat shirked the ethical side. I tend to think the final principle is the "category of the ultimate," or sympathy (feeling of feeling), love aiming at happiness of self and others. I can read this into many great philosophers, Plato and Whitehead being the earliest and the latest, with some in Asia. Your letter puts me in two difficulties. I don't know how to find that Come de Noui [sic.] essay and, and the question of translating Lequier has the complication you perhaps don't know that there already is a *rather complete translation*, but that I can't seem to find it and even forget the man's name. He has a French wife who helped him with the French<sup>31</sup> . . . Have you noticed where I refer to such a person[?]? He was my student at Emory, from whose philosophy department I can probably recover the name. I have no reason to think his translation is not good. It's possible I let someone from [the] Center for Process Studies take the translations. I think Emory gave X a Ph.D. . . .

Two documents of Lequier, as I recall the matter, were translated by X, one being a dialogue and the other an attempt to redo Descartes's method of doubt to establish what is really certain. Both defended freedom and change in God & us. I found the dialogue the better of the two. The other seemed to me somewhat boring.

I think there is no problem of copyright. There was only a neat typed and bound copy but not any publication.

How all this bears on your project is the question?

Sorry to be so forgetful. I barely manage to keep up. Lucio Chiaraviglio tells me that with age our brains lose many cells. I can still think and write philosophically, but less easily and rapidly.

<sup>30</sup>In my review of *Wisdom* I wrote, "Hartshorne's vision [of God] is disquieting. He says, 'Ultimately we are but contributory values . . .' (*Wisdom*, p. 90). This seems to deprive fragmentary existents of any intrinsic worth. Hartshorne claims that 'intrinsic value consists exclusively in what an existent does for God' (*Wisdom*, p. 119). However, this sounds like a restatement of the problem. How can intrinsic worth be tied to any ulterior purpose? (The former Governor of Kansas once said, 'There is intrinsic worth in having a four-lane highway for economic development'.)"

<sup>31</sup>Jacqueline Delobel.



The only hint from memory that comes to me for X is Bruner ["Bruner" scratched out], but no other part of the name. You may know. At last I have the name, Harvey Brimmer. That doesn't tell us where the copy is. But it is the right name, I'm sure.

Charles

P.S. At last! Two heavy volumes of typing by Brimmer, his dissertation, under Paul Kuntz, 1975, Emory. The two translations are all in volume 2, 166 & <sup>1/2</sup> pages single-spaced typing. Volume 1 is an elaborate introduction and then an account of the two documents to be translated, partly by brief citations in English and partly by paraphrase. The long introduction is partly historical, starting with Aristotle. Full name: Harvey W. Brimmer, II.<sup>32</sup> Doubtless Kuntz could tell you more than I can. I seem to recall technical questions about the time limit in his getting his degree; suddenly I recall being there for the oral, and watching him do fairly well in the oral. So I think he got the degree. Paul would know. Incidentally I'm getting really fond of Kuntz, also his wife Marian. They're both knowledgeable scholars. She discovered an Italian Postelo (or Postel) who had a position like that of F. Sozzini.

What else should I do about this?

I was impressed by your 40 books about God. Some names were new to me, others only too familiar.

\* \* \*

April 19, 1991

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

I appreciate your warning me about Harvey Brimmer's translation of Lequier, but as you can see from the enclosed material, I have known of that translation for some time.<sup>33</sup> . . .

I will end on a personal note. Last week (April 8<sup>th</sup>) a very dear friend of mine was murdered by her estranged husband. He shot her and then took his own life. She was 40 years old. She was a Methodist minister in Denver—Regina Drew. Her body was returned here to Pittsburg for burial. In 1985 Regina came with me and three others to hear you speak in Saint Louis. There

<sup>32</sup>The dissertation is titled *Jules Lequier and Process Philosophy*. The appendix to the dissertation contains Brimmer's and Delobel's translations of Lequier's *The Problem of Knowledge* (pp. 291-354) and of his *Probus, or the Principle of Knowledge* (an alternate title for *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*) (pp. 362-467).

<sup>33</sup>I enclosed my translation of part of Lequier's *Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*. My complete translation of the dialogue appeared in *Translation of Works of Jules Lequier* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998).

she met you and Dorothy, an experience that I know she cherished, for she held you in high regard. Thereafter she spoke fondly of having met "Chuck and Dotty" (her terms of endearment for you and your wife). My wife and I have grieved her loss. The reason I am telling you this is that I am learning first hand the practical side of process theology. I have never resolved the issue of whether there is a personal survival of death (I blow hot and cold on that question). However, there is a curious kind of comfort in not having to explain Regina's tragedy in terms of God's providence—as if an omnipotent deity could not have created a world with at least as much goodness as ours without allowing (or planning?) Regina's murder. Like you, I have no truck with divine power conceived in that way. I do not believe that omnipotence as traditionally conceived has anything of value to offer one wounded by grief. In addition, process theology allows one to accept that God shares in our suffering (the fellow sufferer who understands, as Whitehead says). Finally, there is healing power in the faith that God helps us rebuild our lives after the loss of a loved one. I am not sure if theology can, or should, do any more than enable us, with logical consistency, to face an uncertain future with the confidence that life is worth the effort. I know for a fact that Regina accepted this kind of thinking, and that too consoles me.

Fond Regards,  
Don

\* \* \*

[After this letter from me, I received two letters from Hartshorne, one in April and one in July 1991]

[Postmarked April 25, 1991]

Dear Don,

Are you sure Brimmer is still alive? They would know at Emory.

I like your brief translation. Something like that with his other long and in part somewhat boring essay might be good.

Lequier was the first to say so explicitly\* that we are not mere creatures and God is not mere creator; we not only create ourselves to some extent but in doing so create something in God. Except for generalizing self-creativity to include creatures as such one already has Whitehead's category of the ultimate. Peirce took that step with his tychism but did not work it out well to include God. Like Whitehead he thought of God as "disembodied." Bergson did not quite do what almost obviously needed to be done but he did say that the past is fully real, and so did Peirce. "The past is what is actual." James was superb on human freedom, but could not decide what to do about the rest of nature, partly because he misunderstood [Gustav] Fechner, or just did not read the great chapter in *Zend-Avesta* on "God and world"; also because, until



Quantum physics, science as a whole seemed to demand determinism ([Willard] Gibbs, [Clerk] Maxwell were I imagine not among James's readings) and Fechner's indeterminism was not quite sharp enough and his form of panpsychism was the wrong form (trees, the earth; as "active singulars" (my phrase), sentient as wholes).

All these people were needed to make process theism.

Charles

\* Lequier knew, Jean Wahl told me, that the Socinians clearly implied it.

\* \* \*

[Postmarked July 29, 1991]

Dear Don,

I just came upon your review of *Omnipotence* in the M'West Q'y. Don't know if I've mentioned it to you before. . . .<sup>34</sup> As to mystery, the categories I use are so abstract that they leave a great deal unsaid and perhaps unsayable. Important in this context is my acceptance of Whitehead's infinite succession of cosmic epochs only one of which we can know much about. So far as the physico-chemical laws are contingent we can know only those of our epoch. And even of ours we do not know how far the presence of higher forms of mind than those constituting atoms and molecules would cause qualifications of the physico-chemical laws. [Eugene] Wigner worries about this; [Henry] Stapp tries to solve this. The basic mystery may be in our inability to think, feel, know, or love as God does these things. Our thinking is so dependent on language that we have trouble imagining or remembering how babies think; God must think without having to do so with language, except in so far as knowing our thinking would bring language in. Another consideration is that much of our thinking is our effort to make up for the radical limitations of our direct perceiving, and our narrow attention span. I recall [Richard] Rorty's saying that theism has to assume that there can be a genuine analogy between thinking with and without language. My only way of definitely "solving" that problem is to say that for divine intuition every actuality is a sign of numerous others, whether as iconic or as indexical (via prehensions as effects intuiting their own causes and possible effects). This is a generalization of the language idea.

Anyhow thanks for your review. My health is still fine. I've written some essays, several rather short, for various purposes. My big philosophical jobs may be about done. If I do another book, it might be in ornithology, focusing primarily on song but writing less for ornithologists and more for ordinary

<sup>34</sup>Hartshorne here remarks on Martin Gardner (cf. letter of November 12, 1991).

educated people. I'm pleased by a cordial letter from Lucio Chiaraviglio about my response to him about *Born to Sing*.

[Schubert] Ogden has done a nice review of *Darkness and Light*, in *Theology Today* for July.

Lots of Good wishes,

[Unsigned]

\* \* \*

[On August 1, 1991 I sent Hartshorne my review of *God, Values, and Empiricism: Issues in Philosophical Theology*, eds. W. Creighton Peden and Larry E. Axel (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1989), a book that contains an essay by Hartshorne.<sup>35</sup> On September 29, 1991 I saw Hartshorne when I traveled to Claremont, California to attend the celebration of the LLP volume by the Center for Process Studies. I sent another letter to him on October 16, 1991 with photographs from the Claremont conference. I also informed him that I would be publishing a review of the LLP volume in *The Midwest Quarterly*—a journal on which I sit on the editorial board—and I requested that he submit a paper to appear in the same issue with my review. In a package postmarked October 19, 1991—no letter included—Hartshorne sent his essay "Can Philosophers Cooperate Intellectually: Metaphysics as Applied Mathematics," which was published in *The Midwest Quarterly* 30, 1 (Autumn 1993): 8-20. My next communication from Hartshorne was in a package postmarked November 12, 1991 which included a brief handwritten note and the paper "Thomas Aquinas and Three Poets Who Do Not Agree With Him." Attached to the paper with a sticky-note was another handwritten note that said, "How do you like this? If too long, take out something, but preserve the intelligibility." I understood Hartshorne to be submitting the paper to *The Midwest Quarterly*, which I did on his behalf. Perhaps he had forgotten that he had already sent me a paper for publication. In any event, the second paper proved a bit too lengthy for MQ. I was unwilling to edit it, even with Hartshorne's permission and instruction to "preserve the intelligibility." The paper was eventually published in *Process Studies* 30, 2 (Fall-Winter 2002).]

<sup>35</sup>Review published in *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 32, 2 (October 1992): 125-126.



[Postmarked November 12, 1991]  
[No salutation]

Concerning M. Gardner & my knowing too much about God, what he & so many miss is that what I claim to know is *very little*.<sup>36</sup> The mystery is not what *extreme abstractions* apply to God, but what the divine life concretely is, how God prehends you or me or Hitler, or the feelings of bats, ants, plant cells, atoms. The one "to whom all hearts are open" knows, or loves the *concrete concretely*. We know nothing in that way. Also past cosmic epochs.

C. H.

\* \* \*

December 11, 1991  
Dear Professor Hartshorne,

I have been invited to write the entry on you and your philosophy for the *Dictionary of Literary Biography* on American philosophers since 1900. The article should contain a list of your books and other important publications. Besides your books, I intend to list the four volumes devoted to your philosophy in which you respond to various contributors. In addition, your most important periodical publications that have never appeared in your books should be mentioned. The following list is preliminary and contains some of the articles that stand out in my mind as particularly significant. Are there other articles that you consider especially important?

"Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics" (I and II) *Journal of Philosophy*, volume 29 (1932).

"The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," *The Philosophical Review*, 53 (1944); and replies to William Elton in the same journal (1945).

"The Meaning of 'Is Going to be'," *Mind*, 75 (1965).

<sup>36</sup>Hartshorne was probably responding to a statement in my review of *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), published in *The Midwest Quarterly*, 28, 1 (Autumn 1986): 144-146. I wrote, "Martin Gardner, the popular science writer and former student of Hartshorne, says that it bothered him that Hartshorne always seemed to know so much more about God than he did." Gardner's statement can be found in his *The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener* (New York: Quill, 1983), p. 251. See also Hartshorne's letter of July 29, 1991.

"Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality," *Review of Metaphysics*, 27 (1973).

"John Hick on Logical and Ontological Necessity," *Religious Studies*, 13 (1977).

"Concerning Abortion: An Attempt at a Rational View," *The Christian Century* 98, 2 (Fall, 1980).

I never wrote to thank you for sending the articles for publication in *The Midwest Quarterly*. Jim Schick, the editor, tells me that "Can Philosophers Cooperate Intellectually: Metaphysics as Applied Mathematics" will appear in a 1993 number of the journal. My review of *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne* [will] appear in the same issue.

One last question. You once told me that you had written a reply to the letters that appeared in *The Christian Century* in response to your abortion article. Was that ever published? Do you still have it?

Fond Regards,  
Don

[Hartshorne returned my letter in December 1991 (date illegible). He had written notes on the letter indicating additions to the bibliography and that he did not have his response to *The Christian Century* letters. In the margins next to the articles I had selected, he wrote "Good selection." To the articles I listed he added "A Mathematical Analysis of Theism," *The Review of Religion* 8, 1 (Nov. 1943) and "Some Theological Mistakes and Their Effects on Modern Literature," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1, 1 (1987). On a separate sticky note he wrote the numbers of items in the LLP bibliography that he thought should be included: 7, 30, 34, 466-68, 476, 477, *Born to Sing*. Hartshorne also included in the letter off-prints of two of his articles, "Hegel, Logic, and Metaphysics," *CLIO* 19, 4 (1990) and "An Open Letter to Carl Sagan," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 5, 4 (1991).]

[My next letter to Hartshorne was on April 10, 1992. Hartshorne sent two replies to this letter, one on April 21, 1992 and one on May 6, 1992. The first letter responded to the essay that I had sent to him whereas the second letter was actually my original letter on which Hartshorne had written, responding in the margins to the particular questions I had asked. He included in the envelope the table of contents of the book that he and Mohammad Valady were working on, eventually published as *The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy* (Peru, Illinois: Open Court, 1997). I include here my letter of April 10<sup>th</sup> with Hartshorne's annotations from May 6<sup>th</sup> placed in curly brackets { . . . }]



\* \* \*

{This letter got mislaid. I did not answer it very well. A few essays come out soon, if there's time I'll try to get you the data.}

April 10, 1992

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

Last December I wrote to say I had been invited to write an article on your life and thought for a *Dictionary of Literary Biography* volume on American philosophers since 1900. I have enclosed a copy of the article. It is much longer than the editor requested, although he has given me some freedom as to length. I decided that the length of the article should be decided by your importance and not by an editor's estimated word count. I hope the editor will believe, as much as I do, that nothing I have written should be omitted. If you think it can be improved in some way please let me know.

Can you please supply me with the following information?

{1870? —your mother's dates?<sup>37</sup>  
1960}

—important recent publications or planned publications of your work? (I have copies of the article on Hegel in *CLIO* and the open letter to Carl Sagan).

—whether "Thinking About Thinking Machines" was reprinted somewhere?

{No, a man trained in physics talks about bringing it up to date in its physics but nothing comes so far.}

—whether your review of *Sein und Zeit* was the first English review of that book?<sup>38</sup> I haven't found any earlier review, but I've asked a friend who knows Continental philosophy if he knows of one. {I know of nothing.}

Here's hoping that you and yours are doing well.

Fond Regards,  
Don Viney

<sup>37</sup>Marguerite Haughton Hartshorne (1868-1959). I eventually obtained the information on Hartshorne's mother's dates by calling his younger brother, the internationally known geographer, Richard Hartshorne (1899-1992), who lived in Madison, Wisconsin. I discovered that Richard was more well organized than Charles when it came to family matters. See my letter of December 14, 1991.

<sup>38</sup>*Sein und Zeit* by Martin Heidegger was published in 1927. It was first translated into English as *Being and Time* in 1962 by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Hartshorne's review, which was indeed the first English language review, was published in *Philosophical Review* 38, 3 (May 1929): 284-293.

{A book by a friend, Muhammad Valady & me is done but we haven't found a publisher. He puts brief questions (very good ones & I answer fairly briefly). This is c. [about] 1/3 of the book. The rest is some essays either published only in a journal or not published, a few written recently. Title: *Points of View and Other Essays*. He modestly calls himself editor, he's more than that and writes a nice introduction. He's a very bright Ph.D. here. He was never in a class of mine. I was Emeritus when he came.}

[On the table of contents for the book referred to above, Hartshorne wrote:] {Publisher not yet decided. Perhaps this is not relevant. My plan is to try UT Press [University of Texas]. Essays being published in '92. 1) "Fifty Years of Aesthetics," for *J. of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. Fiftieth Anniversary of the Soc. for Aesthetics. I was one of the founders. 2) "Metaphysics as Foundation," in *Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc*. SUNY, '92.}<sup>39</sup>

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[In the following, Hartshorne is responding to my lengthy article, "The Life and Thought of Charles Hartshorne," written for *The Dictionary of Literary Biography*.]

April [21], 1992

Dear Don,

How can I adequately express my pleasure in your beautifully readable and faithfully accurate account. You put things sometimes better than I have or now could put them. I've forgotten the destination of your essay? It should help a lot of people to know what my thought amounts to and how it came about.

There is one important discovery of mine that, much more by my mistakes than yours, is missing in your account. I enclose an example. It is not found in the right form in any of my books and in few articles published either. I enclose a copy. Only since my 90<sup>th</sup> birthday have I had this 4 column, 4 row arrangement, and any other is poor, as a mathematician would have told me.<sup>40</sup> The one who did tell me was a theologian at Colorado College [Joseph

<sup>39</sup>The correct bibliographical information is as follows: "Reminiscences of Charles Hartshorne (member since 1942)." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51 (Spring 1993): 286-289. The second article is "God, Necessary and Contingent; World, Contingent and Necessary; and the Fifteen Other Options in Thinking about God: Necessity and Contingency as Applied to God and the World." *Metaphysics as Foundations: Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc*, eds. Paul A. Bogaard and Gordan Treash (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993): 296-311.

<sup>40</sup>See Appendix I for the 4 X 4 matrix and a brief discussion of the four reasons Hartshorne mentions in this letter.



Pickle], whither I went three times to do my last teaching. With this diagram, in Peirce's sense, I can give by far the strongest arguments ever not only for theism but for a definite form of theism, the one Whitehead and Peirce were seeking but failing to find. Why did I find it? Mostly luck, Peirce to edit, and at the same time told to help Whitehead in grading papers of his students so I had to listen to his lectures and get to know him, visiting his summer cottage in New Hampshire (or was it Vermont?) The one right of the 16 options is the intersection of 3 "lines", the third row, the third column, and the diagonal N.n, C.c, NC.nc (or cn, that's the same combination though a different permutation, which is not being counted as a different option, though it symbolizes that capital letters and lower cases, though modally the same have the difference that categories as applied to God are both the same and not the same, the likeness and the differences being equally definite, and a matter of principle). Well, for each of the three lines intersecting there is a logical reason for preferring them to any line. In addition, there is a fourth reason for preference. The last item on the diagonal, the double zero, is the least plausible item in the diagram and it and NC.cn are logical contradictories not logical contraries, of each other. Whichever of the two is false the other must be true. To prefer the double zero is to vote with the negativism of classical theism that ruined theology for the modern world. The famous *theologia negativa* was a worship of negation, which, looked at coldly, appears as blasphemous and an outright contradiction in a religion based on love. Love is the most positive thing there can be. Who were responsible for this absurdity? Aristotle and Plotinus, the two neoplatonists who hid the actual Plato behind their own worship of false gods, mere unity and mere self-sufficiency, immutability, and unlovingness. Genuine unity is through love, not in spite of it.

Cheers!  
C. H.

[Hartshorne reread my account of his life and thought in early December 1992 and sent me another letter concerning it, offering suggestions that saved me from a couple of mistakes.]

\* \* \*

[Postmark December 10, 1992]  
Dear Don,

I came across your wonderful essay of 47 pages on my career. It is superb, and I'm immodest enough to think it only slightly overrates me. Except for page 9, I find no flaws anywhere, and perhaps at least one of the two on that page have been corrected. If X prehends Y and Y does not prehend X this means that X succeeds (not precedes) Y. The other flaw, as I see it, is when in it is said that in perception weprehend the (circumambient) actualities. This is

at least misleading, for the most direct and definite data are inner-bodily, according to me and Whitehead as well. As [Maurice] Merleau-Ponty says, we experience the world through the flesh (really the bodily cells in the central nervous system).

The last time we talked on the phone your voice at one point sounded sad, as though you felt troubled by something I said, or did not say, and I wondered what that was.

I've finally learned to use my SCM Processor rather well. I still have no serious illnesses; moderately deaf on high pitches makes trouble in trying to talk with some women on the phone, especially if they talk fast as well as high; also with amateur women speakers in the UU church [Unitarian Universalist] here. Amateur public speakers almost invariably talk too fast, they read or memorize their talk and rattle it off.

My M.D. says I should reach 100. I think he's proud of my longevity. He once described me as a "Delightful gentleman" when calling to the nearby hospital when I was anaemic, years ago. He is very much a Christian, I've no idea what he knows of my religious views, but he has conservative religious pamphlets for patients to read while waiting to see him. He probably votes republican. I'm delighted the [Ronald] Reagan era is over and see a fair chance for [Bill] Clinton to be a great president, though the times are frightening. The evil empire's collapse shifts the danger, but other would-be imperialists are still around and the Reagan-Bush fascination with unuseable weapons has almost bankrupt the nation. Also the world is dismally overcrowded. Only young people can have the hope and energy that is needed.

My two perhaps last books, one philosophy, the other ornithology, are about in final shape but publication is not yet arranged. *Born to Sing* is reissued, paperback edition at a fairly low price. The same (University of Indiana) press will consider publishing it [the new book]. Title: Why Study Birds? And Other Essays: by a Lover of Nature and Those Who Study Her. I think I wrote you about the other more philosophical book. It just might turn out to be the best book introduction to my total set of ideas. The best essay introduction looks like yours.

Hoping you and yours are flourishing.

C. H.

[Handwritten] What's the present (or final) state or status of your glorious account of my stuff & process?



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December 14, 1992

Dear Professor Hartshorne,

Your comments on my lengthy article on your thought are most welcome. I have made the changes that you suggest. I have only one minor disagreement with you. You say that my article only slightly overrates you. I thought that I estimated your importance accurately!

The article will appear in the volume of the *Dictionary of Literary Biography* devoted to "American Philosophers Since 1990." The book will be illustrated. I sent the publishers the best pictures that I have taken of you over the past decade. The editor has been unable to give me a definite date of publication. As soon as I learn anything I'll let you know.

I will see my father this Christmas and help him to celebrate the publication of his book, *A History of Psychology: Ideas and Context*. I have not seen the book yet but Dad tells me that he mentions your views about sensation. I also look forward to seeing your next books, the one on birds and the other edited by—I think you said—M. Valady.

You mention in your letter that when we talked on the telephone last April, I sounded as though I felt troubled by something you said. It's been so long I don't recall. However, you gave me Richard's number in Wisconsin and, after talking with you, I called him. He had precise information on your parents' dates which I needed for the article. He also volunteered some anecdotes about your mother. Here's the story I particularly liked: When she was 91, Richard took her out to eat. His aunt warned Richard that his mother ate slowly. Sure enough, when others had finished, Marguerite was still eating. She apologized for eating so slowly and said that it was a problem she was working on. She must have been a marvelous woman with a fine sense of humor.

A few days ago I learned of Richard's death in October (a colleague showed me a notice in the *Association of American Geographers Newsletter*). I was saddened by the news but am happy that I had the chance to meet him, if only in a telephone conversation.

I have been awarded a sabbatical leave for the Spring semester of 1994. My plan is to travel to Bretagne to visit Lequier's old haunts and follow up some of my work on his thought. The most serious obstacle I face at this point is finding the money to finance the trip.

It is good to hear that you are in such good health. I imagine that you have a lot of philosophizing left in you.

Fond Regards,  
Don

P. S. I am enclosing my review of *God, Values, and Empiricism* (Peden & Axel, eds.) in which I mention the empirical dimensions of your thought.

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[On May 15, 1993 I sent Hartshorne the proofs of his paper "Can Philosophers Cooperate Intellectually: Metaphysics as Applied Mathematics" with corrections that I had marked and asked that he look them over. He returned the stamped and addressed postcard I had enclosed in the envelope with a couple of changes. He closed with "I'm in *good shape*!!" The last letter I received from Hartshorne was on April 2, 1995 and it is handwritten, but very legible.]

April 2, 1995

Dear Donald,

How are you?

I've just found pp. 109-112 of the MWQU 35, 1, 1993 & had some good laughs.<sup>41</sup>

I now walk almost normally indoors & well enough outdoors with a 4-footed cane to balance me. My broken hip seems healed. Open Court is slow but *Points of View & Other Essays* is to come out in 1996, perhaps about a year from now, by me and Muhammad Valady. I've done 2 essays recently, & feel that's about it.

I can still think, but it takes more time & only my *SCM* word processor makes it possible. Typing no longer possible. Too many mistakes, clumsy fingers.

Donald R. Griffin & David Ray Griffin are 2 of my heroes now, Donald on animals, David on MT (Modern Thought) as self-destructive, Descartes to Kant.

Charles H.

[I sent Hartshorne three more letters. On April 8, 1995 I updated him on my work on my biography of Jules Lequier and my translation of his works. I also told him about Anita Chancey's paper on his views on abortion and I sent him a copy of an article about my and Rebecca's trip to France to pursue the trail of Lequier.<sup>42</sup> On April 21, 1997 I sent Hartshorne my review of *Zero Fallacy*. My last letter was the only one in which I addressed him by his first name.]

<sup>41</sup>The pages Hartshorne refers to contain reviews of two books, *Ring Lardner and the Other* by Douglas Robinson, reviewed by Charles Cagle and my review of LLP volume, *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*. Cagle's review is indeed humorous, in a devastating way; my review is only mildly humorous at one point.



June 4, 1997  
Dear Charles,

Happy Birthday! I'd wish you good luck, but you already seem to be fortune's beneficiary. In celebration of your centenary I offer my summary of your achievements in this booklet.<sup>43</sup> I thank you for all of the richness you have added to my life and the lives of those to whom I have communicated your ideas.

Fond Regards,  
Don

[I saw Hartshorne one more time, on October 10, 1997 at the celebration of his centenary in Austin, Texas. Robert Kane had invited me to Austin to participate in the celebration and to present a paper in Hartshorne's honor. My paper, presented on October 11<sup>th</sup>, was titled "Charles Hartshorne and the Openness of God."<sup>44</sup>]

*Charles Hartshorne died on October 9, 2000 at his home in Austin, Texas at the age of 103. On that day I was serving as a choir member for Yom Kippur services at the temple in Joplin, Missouri.*

<sup>42</sup>My biography of Lequer was published in *Jules Lequer's Abel and Abel followed by Incidents in the Life and Death of Jules Lequer* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999): 107-190. Anita Miller Chancey, my former student, published "Rationality, Contributionism, and the Value of Love: Hartshorne on Abortion," in *Process Studies* 28, 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1999): 85-97. The article I sent to Hartshorne is "On the Trail of a French Philosopher of Genius: Jules Lequer," published in *Pittsburg State University Magazine*, 6, 1 (Winter 1995): 12-14.

<sup>43</sup>*The Life and Thought of Charles Hartshorne* (Pittsburg, Kansas: Logos-Sophia Press, 1997). This is a self-published version of the paper that appears in the *Dictionary of Literary Biography* volume on American Philosophers Since 1900 (forthcoming in 2002).

<sup>44</sup>Papers from the centenary celebration at Austin are published in *The Personalist Forum* 14, 2 (Fall 1998), guest editor William T. Myers.

## Appendix I: The Table of Sixteen Options and Neoclassical Theism

In his letter of April 21, 1992 Hartshorne mentions a 4 column, 4 row table of options for thinking about God and the world. All of the options listed in the table are stated as early as *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* (1970); however, as Hartshorne says, it was not until after his 90<sup>th</sup> birthday (in 1987) that he hit upon the 4 X 4 arrangement, with the help of his friend at Colorado College, Joseph Pickle.

The purpose of the table is to apply a pair of metaphysical contrasts to God and the world (in this case, necessity and contingency) and display all logically possible permutations. Upper case letters are used for divine modalities of necessity and contingency (N, C) while lower case letters are used for worldly modalities of necessity and contingency (n, c). In his earliest presentations of the options and of the table the zeros denoted nonexistence. In later presentations the zeros are, in Hartshorne's words, "interpreted broadly" to mean either impossibility or having no modal status.

The reversal of the order—NC as opposed to cn—is meant as a reminder of the contrast between N and n: the necessity of God's existence is the necessity of an individual, whereas the necessity of the world is the necessity that the set of non-divine individuals not be empty.

Necessity and Contingency as Applied to God and the World	I. God wholly necessary	II God wholly contingent	III God necessary and contingent in different respects	IV. God impossible or no modal status
1. World wholly necessary	N.n	C.n	NC.n	O.n
2. World wholly contingent	N.c	C.c	NC.c	O.c
3. World contingent and necessary in different respects	N.cn	C.cn	NC.cn	O.cn
4. World impossible or no modal status	N.o	C.o	NC.o	O.o



Hartshorne considered the table to “furnish a genuinely new argument for my neoclassical theism, nor is there anything like it for any other theism” (*Zero Fallacy*, 83). In brief, the “new argument” involves, at a minimum, the following: (1) NC.cn includes all that is positive in rows I and II and lines 1 and 2; Hartshorne argues that the most general conceptions cannot lack instantiation and that both sides of the necessity and contingency contrast should be retained. (2) NC.cn, like the other alternatives on the diagonal from N.n to O.o, allows for an experiential basis for God-talk. (3) O.o is the most false view and NC.cn is the most removed from it and hence is most true (*Zero Fallacy*, 83-84). Hartshorne considered his six theistic arguments to play a supporting role in the “new argument” (“God, Necessary and Contingent” 308)—for instance, the design argument shows up problems in O.cn. A full exposition of the argument would surely involve careful attention to the meaning of the zeros.

Hartshorne was justly proud of this table, for it is an elegant summary of much of what he took himself to have accomplished in his pursuit of metaphysical understanding. From the time of *Man's Vision of God* (1941), he complained that discussions in philosophical theology lacked logical rigor. They failed to distinguish the varieties of ways of conceptualizing God and thereby committed the fallacy of many questions. Hartshorne's table shows that the disjunction “theism or atheism” or the slightly more sophisticated “traditional theism, pantheism, or atheism” are far from exhaustive. To be sure, one may locate the standard options on Hartshorne's matrix: Thomistic theism (N.c); Stoic or Spinozistic pantheism (N.n); and d'Holbach's atheism (O.n). The table also invites one to pair up other formally stated positions with what philosophers and theologians have actually believed. One may find Sartrean atheism (O.cn) or extreme or acosmic Advaita Vedanta (N.o); there remain a variety of theistic perspectives: Aristotle's (N.cn), John Stuart Mill's (C.n), William James' (C.c) Jules Lequyer's (NC.c), and Hartshorne's (NC.cn).

At times, Hartshorne would point out that each of the sixteen options has two subdivisions, depending on whether one accepts or rejects Plato's World-Soul analogy for God (cf. *Zero Fallacy*, 83). For example, NC.cn describes the views of both Whitehead and Hartshorne, but only Hartshorne accepts Plato's analogy. This brings the total options to thirty-two. There are, however, *far* more formal

options than this. As Hartshorne notes, comparable tables can be constructed for any pair of metaphysical contrasts, such as infinite/finite or eternal/temporal (Hartshorne denies that the mind/body distinction is a metaphysical contrast). For any pair of metaphysical contrasts there is a 4 X 4 table (= 16), and hence, for any two pair in conjunction, the number of formal alternatives is 16 X 16 (= 256). To generalize, if  $n$  equals the number of pairs of contrasts to be included, the number of *formal options* is  $16^n$  (or  $16^n \times 2$  to include those accepting and those rejecting the World-Soul analogy).

An important way in which the table summarizes Hartshorne's contribution to philosophical reflection on the meaning of “God” is illustrated in the third column. God is characterized as, in different respects, necessary and contingent. This idea runs counter to the regnant tradition of Western theology. Philosophers of the medieval period, taking their hint from Plato (*Republic*, Bk 2), Aristotle (*Physics*, Bk 8 and *Metaphysics*, Bk 12), and a few passages of Scripture (Num. 23.19; Mal. 3.6; Jas. 1.17) denied of perfection any contingent attributes. The most perspicuous expression of this idea of deity is Thomas' declaration that “the creatures are really related to God” but “in God there is no real relation to creatures . . .” (*Summa Theologica* I, Q 13, a.7). For Thomas, there are no contingent aspects of God, in part because nothing the creatures could do could have any effect on God (the denial of contingency in God also implies that God is not self-changed in any way). The great reformers, Martin Luther and John Calvin, agreed in this denial, as did most philosophers of the modern period, from Descartes to Kant. Hence, the only theism taken very seriously was under the first column—God wholly necessary. This group of views, related with conceptual ties stronger than what Wittgenstein called family resemblance, can without exaggeration be called “classical theism.”

So weighty was this tradition that any suggestion that the divine might be other than how classical theism conceived it to be was treated as a changing of the subject. Hartshorne challenged this attitude in three ways. First, he reminded philosophers that, whether one surveys intellectual history or one engages in a formal analysis of theistic options (as in the 4 X 4 table), there is *no single theistic view*. Second, he pointed out the logical problems in classical theism. Finally, he demonstrated how it is possible to conceive God as, in different respects, necessary and contingent. Generalized to apply to



any pair of metaphysical contrasts, this is Hartshorne's doctrine of *dual transcendence*. God is eminently, but in different respects, necessary and contingent, infinite and finite, absolute and relative, being and becoming, cause and effect, and so on. When he was accused of denying God's transcendence he would reply that he believed in twice as much transcendence as others.

Hartshorne noted that there is no contradiction in the NC option if God is not necessary and contingent in the same respect. He distinguished different logical levels at which metaphysical contraries apply to God. He drew a three-fold distinction among *essence* (the most abstract feature of what a thing is), *existence* (the fact that a thing is), and *actuality* (the particular characteristics that qualify an existing thing). For example, "That I shall (at least probably) exist tomorrow is one thing; that I shall exist hearing a blue jay call at noon is another" (*Logic of Perfection*, 63). The difference between the speaker and God is that God's continued existence is not merely probable. The speaker's existence is contingent whereas God's is necessary. However, the experience of hearing a blue jay at noon is as contingent for the speaker as it is for God (or alternately, God's knowledge that the speaker hears a blue jay at noon is contingent). Moreover, in the divine case, essence (*what* God is) and existence (*that* God is) are the same. Thus, Hartshorne usually spoke of the distinction between existence and actuality. Hartshorne summarized the case in this way: "That God exists is one with his essence and is an analytic truth . . . but how, or in what actual state of experience or knowledge or will, he exists is contingent in the same sense as is our own existence" (*Divine Relativity* 87).

The distinction between existence and actuality, more than any other, is at the foundation of Hartshorne's neoclassical or dipolar theism. David Tracy referred to the distinction as "Hartshorne's discovery" (Tracy 259) and Hartshorne remarked that he hoped to be remembered for it (Cobb and Gamwell 74). The distinction allows Hartshorne to preserve the best insights of classical theism while remedying its greatest oversights. For example, the existence and the essence (Hartshorne sometimes says character) of God are, in Hartshorne's view, necessary, immutable, independent, eternal, and infinite; but the actuality of God is contingent, mutable, dependent, temporal and finite. Hartshorne's theory allows one to say, without contradiction, that God is perfect in love, knowledge, and power and

that God's love, knowledge, and power are constantly changing to respond in perfect ways to the decisions of the creatures and worldly processes. The idea of a change in God was anathema to classical theists because it was viewed as a kind of metaphysical virus that infects the whole of the divine reality; if God is in any sense contingent, then the very existence of God is contingent. Thomas is very clear on this point (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk I, 16.2). Thus, Thomas persists in thinking of God in Aristotelian categories (customized to Christian beliefs) as the unmoved mover (*Summa Theologica* I, Q 2, art. 3). Hartshorne teaches one to think of God as "the most and best moved mover" (*Zero* 6, 39).

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
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## Appendix II: Sample Letter from Hartshorne



Dear Don,

Are you sure Brimmer is still alive? They would know at Emory.

I like your brief translation. Something like that with his other long and <sup>in part</sup> somewhat boring essay might be good.

Lequier was the first to say so explicitly <sup>some</sup> that we are not mere creatures and God is not mere creator; we not only create ourselves to <sup>some</sup> extent but in doing so create <sup>something in</sup> God. Except for generalizing self-creativity to include creatures as such <sup>one</sup> already has Whitehead's category of the ultimate. Peirce took that step with his tychism but did not work it out well to include <sup>God</sup> ~~the~~. Like Wh. he thought of God as "disembodied" <sup>ad</sup>. Bergson did not quite do what almost obviously needs <sup>ad</sup> to be done but he did say that the past is fully real, and so did Peirce. "The past is what is actual." James was superb on human freedom, but could not decide what to do about the rest of nature, partly because he misunderstood Fechner, or just did not read the great chapter in Zend-Avesta on "God and world;" also because, until Quantum physics, science as a whole seemed to ~~den~~ and determinism (Gibbs, Maxwell, <sup>my phrase</sup> were I imagine not among Jame's readings) and Fechner's indeterminism was not quite sharp enough and his form of panpsychism was the wrong form (trees, the earth; as "active singular <sup>my phrase</sup> sentient" as wholes.

All these people were needed <sup>to make</sup> Process theism.

*C. Hartshorne*

Lequier knew, J. Wahl told me, that the Socinians clearly implied it.

## Appendix III: Hartshorne Memorial Statement

I knew Charles Hartshorne for the last two decades of his life. One does not easily forget a meeting with him: the smiling eyes behind wire-rimmed glasses; the disheveled eyebrows; the beak-like nose; the voice, pitched high with age, cracking with excitement at some philosophical insight; the contagious sense of self-importance tempered by humility before the genius of a Plato, Peirce, or Whitehead (or a musician); the witty anecdotes; the fondness for birds; the blink and nod that bade a charming farewell. His small frame and his mail order clothes only served to bring into disarming relief that one was conversing with a surviving member of the pantheon of twentieth century philosophers.

Never content to philosophize ahistorically, he self-consciously wove threads from the masters of the past into the tapestry of his own neoclassical metaphysics, often discovering, in the process, unfamiliar insights of great thinkers and great insights of unfamiliar thinkers. He once told me that he sometimes did philosophy by imagining himself conversing with the giants of the past. Perhaps this was only natural for someone who had actually conversed with Lewis, Husserl, Heidegger, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, and many other philosophical titans of his own time. Reading Hartshorne's books, one is able to participate vicariously in that lively conversation. That Hartshorne found no dichotomy between philosophy and its history is a credit to his unique genius. That he articulated a vision of things that, despite its shortcomings (of which he was aware), is often rigorous enough to meet the demands of reason and rich enough to satisfy our emotional nature qualifies him as one of the greatest metaphysicians—perhaps the greatest—of his century. My favorite description of Hartshorne is from John B. Cobb Jr. who called him "a strange and alien greatness."


Time will tell whether I exaggerate, but I wish in this brief memorial only to celebrate the man to whom I and others owe so much. The last time I saw Hartshorne present a paper was at the Center for Process Studies in September 1991 at a conference given in honor of his achievements. He used an overhead projector to display a couple of diagrams and charts. At one point he became tangled in the electric cords and Marjorie Suchocki had to come to his aid. He stood directly between the projector and the screen and pointed at the screen



as he spoke. This was all quite entertaining and somehow appropriate. After all, we had come not only to honor his ideas but to honor the man, and if this day the man eclipsed the ideas it was only fitting.

Donald Wayne Viney

Charles Hartshorne,  
September, 29, 1991,  
Claremont, California



Charles Hartshorne,  
September, 29, 1991,  
Claremont, California



Wayne Viney and  
Charles Hartshorne,  
April, 2, 1983,  
Atlanta, Georgia

## Index

### A

Abortion 9, 10, 11, 47, 54  
Adler, Mortimer 19  
Advaita Vedanta 56  
Afterlife 9, 43  
Alston, William 27  
Aquinas, Thomas 56, 57, 59  
Aristotle 21, 40, 42, 50, 56  
Atheism  
    d'Holbach's 56  
    empirical argument for 9  
    inadequacy of 8  
    Sartre's 56  
Axel, Larry 45, 53

### B

Bakay, Michelle 22  
Bergson, Henri 33, 37, 43  
Berkeley, George 34  
Biro, John 13  
Blanshard, Brand 17  
Borges, Jorge Luis 18  
Boutroux, Émile 33  
Boyd, Tom 10  
Brimmer, Harvey 33, 41, 42, 43  
Brock, Rita 38  
Buddhism 13  
Bush, George H. 51

### C

Cagle, Charles 53  
Calvin, John 57  
Carnap, Rudolf 61  
Chancey, Anita 53, 54  
*Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God* 17, 21, 22  
Chiaraviglio, Lucio 27, 41, 45  
Cicero 6  
Clinton, Bill 51

Cobb, John B. Jr. 8, 61  
Cosmic epochs 46  
Cosmological argument 16  
Craig, William Lane 38, 40  
Creationism, biblical 12  
Crosby, Donald 4

### D

Dartmouth debate 9, 11  
Delobel, Jacqueline 41, 42  
Design argument 6, 15, 19, 26  
Descartes, René 33, 41, 53, 57  
Determinism 30-32, 33-34, 44  
Devenish, Philip 24, 25  
Dewey, John 33, 34  
D'Holbach, Baron 56  
Dickens, Charles 39  
Dix, Dorothea 13  
Drew, Regina 25, 42-43  
Duns Scotus, John 10, 14, 19

### E

Eastman, William 22, 24  
Edwards, Jonathan 34  
Einstein, Albert 31  
Eliot, George 26  
Epicurus 31  
Epistemic argument 16, 17  
Eslick, Leonard 25  
Ethics 41

### F

Falsifiability 15  
Fa Tsang 23  
Fechner, Gustav 43, 44  
Fisch, Max 31  
Flew, Antony 14  
Ford, Lewis 25, 38  
Ford, Marcus Peter 21  
Freedom, 31, 34, 43  
French metaphysics 33



Freud, Sigmund 35, 36  
Future contingents 32-33, 39, 40

## G

Gardner, Martin 44, 46  
Gibbs, Willard 44  
Global argument 8-9  
God  
    classical theism 18  
    dual transcendence 58  
    existence and actuality 8, 58  
    denial of contingency in 57  
    goodness 15, 19  
    knowledge in 46  
    language 44  
    love 46  
    matrix of 16 options 49, 55-59  
    mind-body analogy 15  
    as most and best moved mover 59  
    omnipotence 17  
    persuasive power 12  
    as unmoved mover 59  
Goodwin, George 6  
Griffin, David Ray 53  
Griffin, Donald 53

## H

Hahn, Lewis 28  
Hailey, Chris 10, 12  
Hare, Peter 14  
Hartshorne, Charles  
    and Harvard 10, 14  
    death 54  
    hearing difficulties 51  
    important articles of 46-47  
    on being an old fogey 35  
    on reaching one-hundred years 51  
    his theism 56, 58-59  
Hartshorne's writings  
    *Anselm's Discovery* 4  
    *Beyond Humanism* 7  
    *Born to Sing* 26, 27 47, 51

"Can Philosophers Cooperate  
Intellectually?" 45, 47, 53  
"Chance, Love, and Incompatibility"  
28  
"Concerning Abortion" 10, 47  
"Contingency and the New Era of  
Metaphysics" 46  
*Creative Synthesis* 4, 15, 16, 55  
"Creativity and the Deductive Logic  
of Causality" 47  
*Creativity in American Philosophy*  
20, 23  
*Darkness and Light* 3, 21, 40, 45  
*Divine Relativity* 20, 21  
"The Formal Validity and Real  
Significance of the Ontological  
Argument" 46  
"God as Composer-Director" 30  
"God, Necessary and Contingent"  
49  
"Hegel, Logic, and Metaphysics" 47  
*Insights and Oversights* 20, 21  
"John Hick on Logical and  
Ontological Necessity" 11, 47  
*Logic of Perfection* 4  
*Man's Vision of God* 56  
"A Mathematical Analysis of  
Theism" 47  
"The Meaning of 'Is Going to Be'"  
32-33, 46  
*A Natural Theology for Our Time* 21  
*Omnipotence and Other Theological  
Mistakes* 21, 25, 29, 44, 46  
"An Open Letter to Carl Sagan" 47  
*Philosophy and Psychology of  
Sensation* 26, 34  
*Reality as Social Process* 12, 28  
"Reminiscences of Charles  
Hartshorne" 49  
"Reply to Randall" 7  
"Shankara, Nagarjuna, and Fa  
Tsang" 23  
"Some Theological Mistakes and  
Their Effects on Literature" 17

"Thinking About Thinking  
Machines" 27, 48  
"Thomas Aquinas and Three Poets  
Who Disagree with Him" 45  
"Thoughts on my Life" 40-41  
*Whitehead's View of Reality* 7  
*Wisdom as Moderation* 32, 40  
*Zero Fallacy* 47, 53  
Hartshorne, Dorothy 7, 14, 15, 16, 17,  
18, 19, 21, 25, 30, 34, 35, 36, 43  
Hartshorne, Marguerite 48, 52  
Hartshorne, Richard 48, 52  
Hegel 48  
Heidegger, Martin 48, 61  
Heisenberg, Werner 31  
Hick, John 9, 11  
Hume, David 34  
Husserl, Edmund 61  
Hutcheson, Peter 4

## J

James, William 21, 30, 31, 33, 34, 43,  
44, 56  
Jefferson, Mildred 9  
Jenkins, Joyce 25

## K

Kane, Robert 24, 32, 35, 38, 54  
Kant 53, 57  
Knowledge 16  
Kovach, Francis 10  
Kuntz, Paul and Marian 42

## L

Language 39, 44  
Leibniz, Gottfried 32  
Lequyer (Lequier), Jules 27, 28, 29,  
32, 33, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 53, 54,  
56  
Lewis, C. I. 61  
Locke, John 34

*Logos-Sophia* 1, 32  
Love 50  
Lowe, Victor 8  
Luft, Eric von der 30, 32  
Luther, Martin 57

## M

Madden, Edward 14  
Martinich, A. P. 10, 14  
Maxwell, Clerk 31, 39, 44  
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 51  
Merrill, Kenneth 7, 10  
Mill, J. S. 34, 56  
Mitchell, Basil 14  
Molina, Luis de 35  
Moral argument 16, 18  
Myers, William 54  
Mystery 44

## N

Nagarjuna 23

## O

Ogden, Schubert 45  
Ontological argument 11

## P

Panpsychism 44  
Peden, Creighton 8, 35, 45, 53  
Peirce, C. S. 14, 15, 31, 33, 34, 43,  
50, 61  
Peters, Eugene 18, 23  
Philips, Stephen 32, 35  
*Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne* 26,  
32, 47, 53  
Pickle, Joseph 50, 55  
Pittsburg State University  
Philosophical Society 32  
Plato 15, 41, 50, 56, 57, 61  
Plotinus 50



Popkin, Richard 28  
 Popper, Karl 9, 15, 31  
 Postelo 42  
 Problem of evil 8, 43  
 Process theology 44  
 Psychology as universal science 27

## R

Ramal, Randy 7  
 Randall, R. H. 7  
 Reagan, Ronald 51  
 Reese, William L. 6  
 Reincarnation 13  
 Renouvier, Charles 33  
 Rorty, Richard 44  
 Royce, Josiah 16, 17  
 Russell, Bertrand 61

## S

Sagan, Carl 47, 48  
 Sankara 23  
 Schick, James B. M. 47  
 Scriven, Michael 14  
 Shahan, Robert 6, 10  
 Sia, Santiago 40  
 Sleep 35, 36-37  
 Smith, Debra 25  
 Socinus, Fasto 42, 44  
 Solomon, Robert 35  
 Sorley, W. R. 6  
 Spencer, Herbert 34  
 Spinoza 31, 56  
 Stapp, Henry 44  
 Stoicism 56  
 Suchocki, Marjorie 61  
 Swinburne, Richard 14

## T

Tarski, Alfred 16, 17  
 Teleological argument, see Design argument

*theologia negativa* 50  
 Tennant, F. R. 6, 14  
 Time as modal 43  
 Tracy, David 58  
 Troland, Leonard 21  
 Tychism 43

## V

Valady, Mohammad 47, 49, 52, 53  
 Vatano, Frank 34  
 Viney, Jenny 16  
 Viney, Rebecca 25, 43, 53  
 Viney, Wayne 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 37, 52  
 Vlastos, Gregory 28

## W

Wahl, Jean 29, 33, 44  
 Wald, George 37  
 Whitehead, A. N. 8, 31, 33, 39, 41, 43, 44, 50, 51, 56, 61  
 Whitney, Barry 12  
 Wigner, Eugene 44  
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 57  
 World as necessary 13



Charles Hartshorne and Donald Viney, February, 23, 1981, Norman, Oklahoma. (Jerry Klingaman photographer).

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Cover design by Diane Hutchison

Cover photograph of Hartshorne by Don Viney, March 23, 1985, St. Louis, Missouri.



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In April 1987, a small group of students from Pittsburg State University accompanied their professor, Donald Viney, to Edmond, Oklahoma, to hear Charles Hartshorne speak. As a result of that fieldtrip, the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society was born. This issue of *Logos-Sophia* commemorates that event by publishing the correspondence between Hartshorne and Viney.

Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) was the foremost representative of process philosophy in the later half of the twentieth century. In hundreds of publications spanning the better part of seven decades, Hartshorne made major contributions to philosophy and theology and, to a lesser but not insignificant degree, to psychology and ornithology.

Donald Wayne Viney (b. 1953) is Professor of Philosophy at Pittsburg State University in Pittsburg, Kansas, where he joined the faculty in 1984.