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
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Introduction

"The unexamined life is not worth living."
—Socrates

This has been our motto since the Society's inception in the spring of 1987. What is life, exactly? It is definitely not all fun and games, but a rather complex and chaotic conundrum full of beauty and mystery. The totality of life is quite beyond human understanding, yet we are compelled to probe and question life and its great mysteries. There is truly a good reason why people devote their lives to science, history, philosophy, psychology, sociology, theology, technology, math, physics, art, and literature. People are trying to figure life out, each in their own way, gradually piecing the great puzzle of human existence in attempts to see a big picture. Unfortunately, the answers are not always clear or complete. We may get closer and closer to grasping great truths, but the answers to life's greatest mysteries may only become apparent after we die. But just because the answers aren't always immediately apparent, there is no excuse to blow off the search for greater understanding. Socrates was really saying something to us when he said, "The unexamined life is not worth living." Since ancient times, humans have been searching, learning, and growing. We must continue to question and we must continue to search. As chief editor of the journal *Logos-Sophia*, I invite you to discover and to question.

Peace,
Jenny Janak

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Understanding Three Analogies in The Republic

Il-Ho Choi

Reading Plato's *Republic*, we encounter such words as *justice* and *good*. Socrates and others in the book ask and answer questions about these concepts. For one thing, Glaucon, Plato's elder brother, really wants to know what the meaning of good is, but Socrates refuses to give him a direct answer. In a typical ironic fashion, Socrates says,

> I'm afraid that I won't be up to it (the good) and that I'll disgrace myself and look ridiculous by trying. So let's abandon the quest for what the good itself is for the time being, for even to arrive at my own view about it is too big a topic for the discussion we are now started on. But I am willing to tell you about what is apparently an offspring of the good and most like it. (Plato 1992, 180)

Does Socrates define what the good is in his conversation? It cannot be easily found. What is Plato's intention in his great book, *The Republic*? To some extent, he shows his intention well in three analogies. Actually, Socrates discusses the analogies in the book. They are the analogies of the sun, the line, and the cave. I am going to introduce them briefly, and then explain how they are related to one another. Through this work, I would like to show that the analogies are one of Philosophy's most important contributions to our understanding of human knowledge. Let's take a look at them one by one.

In the analogy of the sun, Socrates divides the world into the visible and the invisible in an effort to find the good. He says, "[T]he many beautiful things and the rest are visible but not intelligible, while the forms are intelligible but not visible" (Plato 1992, 180).

What he means by "the forms" is the things themselves, that is, the reality of the things. According to Palmer,

> Plato's conception of the forms is very complicated, but we can simplify it by saying that they are the eternal truths that are the source of all reality. Consider, for example, the concept of beauty. Things in the sensible world are beautiful to the extent that they "imitate" or "participate" in beauty. However, these beautiful things will break, grow old, or die. But beauty itself (the form) is eternal. It will always be. (61)

In fact, we see beautiful flowers, women, and pictures. But we cannot see their beauty after they wither, die, or fade. Still, Plato maintains, beauty itself, which is not to be seen, exists.

Seeing beautiful things, we use our sight. To use our sight, we need another thing, light. More exactly, it is a visible ray. Where is the light from? Without a doubt, it is from the sun. Finally, the sun causes us to see beautiful things and the beautiful things to be seen. The sun controls the things in the visible world. Therefore, the beautiful things are, in a sense, offsprings of the sun. In a similar way, Socrates makes an analogy concerning the good itself. What the good itself is in the intelligible realm in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things (Plato 1992, 182).

We see the sun be in the visible realm. Why is the good itself in the intelligible realm? Let's go back to the beautiful flowers. When we see the flowers, we think of them as beautiful. Why do we think they are beautiful, and not ugly? What is the source of the truth, they are beautiful flowers? Socrates explains as follows:

> So that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. (Plato 1992, 182)

Understanding the analogy of the sun, we can illustrate with the following;

From the Good => Intelligible Realm (Truth, Knowledge)
From the Sun => Visible Realm (Things)

That is to say, thanks to the sun, we can see the things, and thanks to the good, we can obtain the truth

dialectic, for Plato, is doing philosophy as it should be done—in whatever manner that may be. (129)

The last analogy is about the man in a cave. Socrates asks us to imagine that there are prisoners chained in such a way that they face the back wall of a cave. There they have been for life and can see nothing of themselves or of each other. They see only shadows on the wall of the cave. These shadows are cast by a fire that burns on a ledge above and behind them. Between the fire and the prisoners, there is a wall-lined path along which people walk carrying vases, statues, and other artifacts on their heads. The prisoners hear the echoes of voices and see the shadows of the artifacts and they mistake these echoes and shadows for reality. However, one prisoner is unchained, turned around, and forced to look at the true source of the shadows. But the fire pains his eyes. He prefers the pleasant deception of the shadows. Behind and above the fire is the mouth of the cave, and outside in the bright sunlight (only a little of which trickles in the cave) are trees, rivers, mountains, and sky. Now the former prisoner is forced "up the steep and rugged ascent" and brought to the sunlit exterior world. But the light blinds him. He must first look at the shadows of the trees (he is used to shadows), then at the trees and mountains. Then, finally, he is able to see the sun itself. If this enlightened man were to return to the cave, he would appear ridiculous because he would see sunspots everywhere and not be able to penetrate the darkness. And if he tried to liberate his fellow prisoners, they would be so angry with him for disturbing their illusions that they would set upon him and kill him. In some respect, this analogy is closely connected with the analogy of the sun and line. Socrates says,

> This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before. The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun. And if you interpret the upward journey and the study of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you'll grasp what I hope to convey, since that is what you wanted to hear about. (Plato 1992, 189)

For a chained prisoner, the visible realm is only the cave and the intelligible realm is the upward the cave. If someone were free from the chain binding him, he could see the reality of shadows by seeing the artifacts which make the shadows he has seen before. He also could know what causes the shadows of the artifacts. In fact, the cause is the fire in the cave. This is the visible realm Socrates is trying to talk about.

What is the intelligible realm when it comes to the analogy? Let's say the unchained man goes out of the cave. He could see the real things such as tree, river, and sky. They are not artifacts any more. Finally, he would be able to see the sun which provides light so that he could see the things outside the cave. Illustrating what I explained so far;

However, what will happen if the unchained pris-



oner sees the sun directly without any preparation? He will get his eyes hurt by the sunlight. He will also have some difficulty knowing the sun directly at day as we do. Socrates adds,

> In the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it. (Plato 1992, 189)

Plato's analogies are one of Philosophy's most important contributions to our understanding of human knowledge. The eminent British-American philosopher Alfred North Whitehead once said,

> The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them. (39)

To support this general idea, specific evidence is necessary. My specific evidence would be 'the distinction between reality and image.' What is reality and what is image? In The Republic, Socrates tries to look for reality, which for Plato means Idea not being obtained in the real world where we live. Some examples show this clearly.

If you were asked what the nature of a human being is, what would you say? Some would say a human being is a man or woman. Others would answer differ-

Bums, Aliens, Cowards, and Jail Birds
Hollywood's Secular Christs

Larry W. Ranney

Regardless of what anyone may personally think or believe about him, Jesus of Nazareth has been the dominant figure in the history of Western culture for almost twenty centuries.[1]

With this irrefutable and notwithstanding, often disregarded or even negated statement, Jaroslav Pelikan begins his *Jesus Through the Centuries* (1985) which traces the transfigured images of Christ through disparate cultures and periods. Such an unconditional observation can be somewhat disconcerting in a highly secularized, skeptical, and cynical culture—it is today easy to relegate the importance of Christ to a negligible status. However, the importance of this sacred person in Western culture retains its vibrancy since for millions "it is from his birth that most of the human race dates its calenders, it is by his name that millions curse and in his name that millions pray."[2] Such a significant figure remains intriguing especially as observed through the influential medium of popular cinema.

Hollywood's relationship to filming Gospel biographies has been distinctive—an *amo et odi* affiliation. From the inception of the major studios in the early 1920s, the majority of Hollywood directors, production heads, writers, studio moguls and even the actors and actresses were openly church attending family men and women who mirrored the traditional Christian values of the population who flocked to see their latest productions. The obvious seductions of money, power, and the luxury of a Hollywood lifestyle took the customary toll of susceptible souls, yet the studio heads were able to conceal many celebrated scandals from the public.

With such an atmosphere prevailing in the managerial offices, it would seem axiomatic that biographical films of Christ would abound during the golden age of the studios—what would be a more natural time for transferring the familiar Gospel images such as Christ healing the sick, the Last Supper, the betrayal, crucifixion, and resurrection to the big screen. Since most of the audience already knew the narrative by heart, such productions should be winners on two accounts: they would contribute to a unified religious environment in the theater which would help sustain the morals of the audience along with contributing to the financial returns of the studio.

Contrarily to what was apparently an infallible recipe for success, studio heads, directors, and especially actors recognized the intrinsic hazards of a cinematic rendition of Christ's life. Concerning the difficulties of casting the lead for such films, Gerald E. Forshey in *American Religious and Biblical Spectaculars* (1992) comments :

> The problem of portraying Jesus is also troublesome. Many perceptions about the life of Christ are formed by art—especially by popular art... The question of whether to allow a recognizable actor to play Jesus plagued the Hollywood community. Even more perplexing was how to portray the Christ...The problem is to present a plausible Christ who fits the intentions of the director and simultaneously suggests both spirituality and humanity.[3]

Furthermore, what might seem to be an asset to the film's reception, (the audience's prior knowledge of the Gospel story) could, contrarily, be a significant liability since every viewer would could come to the theatre with a preconceived idea of how the familiar scenes should appear; what to one viewer might be the perfect Christ, to the person sitting one seat over could be offensive or even sacrilegious.*

Under such conditions, it is not surprising that the number of major Hollywood Gospel biographies has been relatively sparse over the last seventy years. The first major production to brave these hazards was Cecil B. DeMille's

* Interestingly, the Greek dramatists worked under similar constraints since the audience knew the narrative events and came to witness how each playwright would handle the material.

silent *King of Kings* (1927). Fourteen minor films, either of Christ's complete or partial life, appeared before DeMille's, however his is considered a masterpiece of the silent era which later directors hearkened back to as a paradigm. In *Divine Images: A History of Jesus on the Screen* (1992) Roy Kinnard and Tim Davis submit that as with many of DeMille's works, King of Kings is seriously flawed in several scenes, yet "few other period films are as well researched and as accurate in costuming and architecture as his, and none have finer pictorial values, such a precise, instinctive sense of dramatically effective visual composition and lighting."[4]

Ironically, although major studios were hesitant to produce and release Gospel biographies, independent church supported film makers have shown scant reluctance. The distribution of such films is trivial in comparison with Hollywood releases, the budgets are meager, actors and crew would often work gratis due to the subject matter, they have a steadfast, almost guaranteed audience, and the opinion of film critics is of little concern.

M-G-M, 20th Century-Fox, Paramount, United Artists, Universal, Columbia and RKO had no secure base of viewers, their film crews and directors would not work for substandard wages because they feel reverence for the film's message, and studio production heads must always calculate the probability of financial returns for every film released. Therefore, even with the critical and financial success of DeMille's silent King of Kings, thirty four years elapsed before a major studio cautiously decided to produce another life of Christ. The studio's solution to this conundrum was intriguing: the Biblical Epics of the 1950s, the Gospel Biographies of the 1960s, and Allegorical Passion Plays.

Biblical Epics

In the 1950s, the major studios released a series of large budgeted spectaculars today appropriately dubbed 'biblical epics.' Set during the early Christian period, the plot revolved around characters whose lives are directly or indirectly altered by Christ's influence. M-G-M's *Quo Vadis* in 1951, 20th Century-Fox's CinemaScope vehicle *The Robe* in 1953 with its sequel *Demetrius and the Gladiators*, Warner's *The Silver Chalice* in 1954, William Wyler's *Ben-Hur* and Frank Borzage's *The Big Fisherman* in 1959, and finally Richard Fleischer's *Barabbas* in 1962 are the examples of this genre.

The biblical epic circumvented the depiction of Christ in an intriguing manner. Although Christ is a major influence in the lives of the central characters, the shot composition did not show his face directly to the audience—only the back of his head, an arm, a shadow, or a disembodied voice. In *Ben-Hur* for example, the central character (Charlton Heston) is chained to other criminals in a Roman penal squad being force marched to the awaiting slave ships. He falls due to exhaustion, and the extended arm of Christ offers water and hope to the dying man. Christ is seen only off-camera, yet the music and the mystified looks of the prisoners and soldiers unmistakably establish his identity as the awaited Messiah. This same technique was used in the crucifixion sequence sequences of *The Robe* and *Barabbas*, Christ meeting Peter in *The Big Fisherman*, and Barabbas seeing Christ after being released from the Roman prison.

Although today these epics receive little attention from film critics and what they do receive is generally deleterious, they remain popular during the Christian season and two have been re-released for wide screen viewing. It must always be remembered that these were huge financial boosts for the flagging studios, and biblical epics were the most popular films nationwide for six years of the decade 1950 to 1960.[5]

Furthermore, Gerald E. Forshey convincingly argues that rather than being simplistic religious vehicles with a cast of thousands designed to provide a 'bread and circus' display for the general public, the biblical epic was a complex cultural barometer for the period and "a vehicle to examine the moral dilemma posed by the relationship between nationhood [American civilization] and sexuality, metaphorically exploring the need to place duty over pleasure."[6]

Gospel Biographies of the 1960s

Interestingly, the 1960s witnessed a drift from the biblical epic and the release of several Gospel biographies. The renewed interest in filming a life of Christ was probably instigated by recent scholarship focusing on Christ, the swelling church attendance in the late 1950s, and finally the success of an unpretentious Gospel biography, Irving Pichel's *Day of Triumph* (1954)—the first American production since DeMille. Although limited in distribution and budget, Pichel's articulation of the Gospel story earned excellent reviews even from such cynical film reviewers as *Variety*:

> A handsomely mounted independent production that abounds in dignity, restraint and distinction... the story has a documentary flavor and is without the familiar embellishments usually added to the so-called biblical yarns...[7]

Such critical evaluations of this low-budget piece drew the attention of the major studios resulting in the 1961 M-G-M remake of *King of Kings* directed by Nicholas Ray and George Stevens' visually opulent *The Greatest Story Ever Told* (1965). A year later, noted Italian director Pier Paolo Pasolini focused on only one version from the New Testament with his *The Gospel According to Saint*

stranger' motif. Generally, a group of characters is in some dangerous situation, and a Christ figure emerges to direct them toward salvation—both physically and spiritually. The major events of the Passion narrative,i.e., betrayal, crucifixion, resurrection, are usually not present and the mysterious stranger's likeness to Jesus is sustained only in a minor key—never openly affirmed. Any 'miracles' which occur are explained away on a physical plain or left as unexplainable mysteries.

Two such films with the mysterious stranger motif are Tay Garnett's *Destination Unknown* (1933) and Frank Borzage's 1940 *Strange Cargo*. In the former, a rum runner is becalmed in the Pacific and the mysterious stowaway (Ralph Bellamy) uses 'miracles' to aid the beleaguered crew. *Strange Cargo*, which was a studio vehicle for the M-G-M team of Clark Gable and Joan Crawford placed escaped convicts from Devil's Island on a hazardous sea voyage with the enigmatic castaway Cambreau (Ian Hunter) showing the desperate men the proper attitude toward life's problems. Of the two, *Strange Cargo* has survived with the least critical abrasions, yet the strongest point of the film remains appealing attraction between Gable and Crawford rather than the awkward narrative and strained events.

Other films, however, depart radically from such traditional images and utilize the Passion narrative in a distinctive manner. One of the most intriguing has an interplanetary visitor as a space-age Messiah: Robert Wise's *Day the Earth Stood Still* released by 20th Century-Fox in 1951. After landing in the nation's capitol, Klaatu played by tall, gaunt Michael Rennie, announces that his arrival on earth is to bring an important message which will effect the whole planet. He is accidentally shot by a frightened Army officer and taken to Walter Reed where his wound miraculously heals within a day. After easily avoiding the Military Police guarding him, Klaatu leaves the hospital to mingle with earthlings to more fully understand the earth's inhabitants.

He assumes the name of Carpenter, is hunted by the military authorities, mystifies Professor Bernhardt the 'smartest man in the world' with his knowledge of astrophysics, and performs a miracle by neutralizing all the electricity on the planet for a brief period. The resemblances to the Gospel events are unquestionable especially the film's conclusion in which Klaatu is betrayed by an acquaintance, shot down by the Military Police, resurrected by the faceless android Gort, and departs back into the heavens after leaving a stern message to the speechless earthlings beside his ship.

The same structural development is also readily seen in Steven Spielberg's 1982 *E.T.* in which Klaatu is exchanged for the lovable little imp who is likewise menaced by governmental authorities, befriended and aided by a small band of devoted followers, performs healing miracles, dies due to ill treatment, is resurrected, and returns to the heavens from where he originally descended. Although the enormous popularity of the film is due to its humor, and attractive characters, the major structural events are still fundamentally the Passion narrative contemporized.

A modest Warner Brothers production, *The Omega Man*, released in 1971 and based on Richard Matheson's *I Am Legend* has a post biological disaster world with Charlton Heston as a survivor whose blood can provide an antidote. He is plagued nightly by a horde of hooded albino vigilantes dedicated to destroying all remaining technology which they blame for the catastrophe. In the conclusion, Heston is speared by the demoniac leader and falls back into a fountain which his spouting blood turns crimson. Heston's crucifixion posture and the importance of his blood as the savior of mankind are unmistakable links with Christian imagery and theology.

Of all such secular Messiahs, possibly the most closely aligned with the Gospel narrative is Stuart Rosenberg's *Cool Hand Luke* released by Warner Brothers in 1967; the parallels are both remarkable and intriguing. Luke, a non-conformist on a southern road gang, is surrounded by a group of disciples led by 'Dragline' a homespun Peter (George Kennedy), tormented by sadistic guards who believe only in rules, performs a minor miracle by eating fifty eggs in one hour, and suffers martyrdom rather than submit to authority. Luke's questioning to 'the old timer up there' in the rain storm, hiding out in an abandoned church asking for a 'sign' before being shot down by the guards, and Struther Martin as the prison's Pontius Pilate announcing "What we have here is failure to communicate" transforms Cool Hand Luke into an effective blend of social commentary supported by the Passion narrative.

Conclusions

If any conclusions which can be discerned from these three cinematic genres—the biblical epic, Gospel biography, and Allegorical Passion—they must necessarily be advanced with considerable prudence. Cinema's contribution to the image of Christ is only as old as the industry itself—eighty years—in contrast to the 1900 year tradition of the plastic arts of painting, sculpture, metal casting, and mosaic. Such a brief entry in conjunction with the limited amount of films produced must place the significance of cinema's contribution to the image of Christ into a distinctly negligible quality.

Secondly, consideration for the actual importance of cinema in society cannot be underestimated. Leonard Quart and Albert Auster in *American Film and Society* Since 1945 (1991) does not lessen the importance of the

Heraclitus & Zeno

Melissa Eker

Setting: 449 BC, the sun is just barely dipping below the horizon above the crystal blue waters of the Mediterranean sea to the west, two men walk briskly upon the sandy shore, each clad in well-worn leather sandals.

Characters: Zeno of Elea (490-430 BC), at age 41*
Heraclitus of Ephesus (504-454 BC), at age 55

* Please note that this is an implicit exaggeration of a fictional meeting between two real philosophers in ancient times in Miletus, portrayed as realistically as possible, to convey the basic truths each man claims to know.

(Walking across a dusty path, the old man stops the younger man and points to the sun.)

Heraclitus: My fair colleague, in this great sunset of splendor and beauty do you see this great truth which I alone have come to know?

Zeno: Dark philosopher, thy truths differ greatly from mine I fear.

Heraclitus: Everything we see in this universe is constantly in motion, with no permanency. This sun will ne'er disappear again as it shall this eve.

Zeno: I do not quite follow, how may this be?

Heraclitus: The universe is none other than a great river whose waters are constantly flowing. Through this mask of permanency, I alone see the truth that all things must change in constant rhythm. The sun will set this evening, and appear to do the same tomorrow. The truth is, however, that the same river cannot be stepped into twice. Hence, the sun will not set twice in twilight the same.

Zeno: This seems to be the case, oh riddler... *(Zeno stops, picks up a rounded stone, and rolls it a short distance from their feet)*, but let's suppose, for argument's sake, that the distance this stone has rolled is one length. In order for the stone to reach this point, do you agree that it must first roll half the distance?

Heraclitus: With this proposition I concede.

Zeno: ...So to reach half of the distance, it must first reach a quarter of the distance....and so on.

Heraclitus: Quite so, but I fail to see your point.

Zeno: Then this stone must reach a certain number of points before it is possible for it to reach the destination point. Is this not so?

Heraclitus: You are correct once again.

Zeno: But it is impossible for the stone to reach an infinite number of points in a finite time. So, one must accept the fact that the ball's motion is therefore impossible.

Heraclitus: I agree.

Zeno: Then you yourself have accepted the conclusion which you have earlier denied. Motion is an illusion, as is the motion of the change in the setting sun.

Heraclitus: There is nothing that doesn't change, for change takes place in means of opposites. The bow of an arrow reveals an image of the tension between opposites.

Zeno: The flying arrow does not fly at all.

Heraclitus: What is this mockery you make?

Zeno: If the arrow is moving, do you agree that it must be moving in the place that it is?

Heraclitus: I would suppose so.

Zeno: But if it is not here, then it must be moving to a place where it is not...do you agree?

Heraclitus: Sure.

Zeno: Then either it must be moving in a place where it is or a place where it is not. The fact of the matter is that it may not physically be in both places at the same time, right?

Heraclitus: I suppose not.

Zeno: Then, my friend, you have just said yourself that it cannot possibly fly and exist at the same time. Hence, you have just proved that change of motion is illusory once again.

Heraclitus: Perhaps we should change the subject.

Zeno: Maybe so, what sayeth your family in Ephesus?

Heraclitus: They know not the truth as I.

Zeno: Do you mind if I ask what might have inspired you to pass on your kingship?
Heraclitus: *(looking up, with a twinge of sadness in his eyes)* It has long disturbed me. I cannot rule over citizens who choose to close their eyes and ears to the truth of the controlling logos. They would not faithfully serve me.
Zeno: What is this logos of which thou speaketh?
Heraclitus: It is the knowledge of the wisdom of all things. It is found in the tension between opposites: good and evil, night and day, birth and death.
Zeno: Ah, but kind sir, I fear your concept of wisdom is ill-conceived.
Heraclitus: *(beginning to shift uncomfortably, clearly annoyed)* Why might thee make such an accusation?
Zeno: The concept of night and day is also an illusion of time.
Heraclitus: You make mad assertions again, I see Parmenides has filled you with much nonsense.
Zeno: Shall I tell you a tale?
Heraclitus: I have little better to do with my time right now.
Zeno: Imagine that the fast Achilles and slow tortoise decide to have a race. There is no possible way in which Achilles could win.
Heraclitus: *(laughing vivaciously)* Now this is quite ridiculous. Please go on.
Zeno: In order for Achilles to capture the slowly crawling tortoise, he would have to reach an infinite number of points.
Heraclitus: What do you mean?
Zeno: Each time that Achilles makes a lap around the track, the tortoise will have moved a little more each time.
Heraclitus: Yes, yes.
Zeno: Achilles can move an infinite number of points, but each time the tortoise will have moved ahead. Achilles will always have to move farther to catch up to the tortoise. The tortoise will always be ahead since the infinite series has no end.
Heraclitus: I am still not quite convinced, for the world is composed of many things and there might be a number of explanations of this and your other paradoxes.
Zeno: I comprehend the world as one entity.
Heraclitus: If you look at the sun, you realize that it is merely a bowl in the sky. When the bowl tips an eclipse occurs.
Zeno: I can't accept this notion alone.
Heraclitus: Why do you refuse to see the real truth? You are foolish, but you seem a rational man, so I feel it is important to share the truth of the cosmos with you.
Zeno: I apologize if I offend thee, but personally, I see space to be a contradictory notion.
Heraclitus: Absurd!!!
Zeno: All things of reality can be divided into an infinite number of parts, right?
Heraclitus: Well, yes.
Zeno: Then it would be absurd to claim the opposite.
Heraclitus: Perhaps, but there is a reality in the opposites which create the fire of the cosmos.
Zeno: *(innocently attempting to conceal a smile)* What?
Heraclitus: My friend, I will humbly offer this advice to you... be virtuous, for virtuous souls do not become water on the death of the body. Instead, they eventually join the cosmic fire.
Zeno: I'm sorry but would you kindly elaborate on this "cosmic fire" of which you speak?
Heraclitus: The cosmic fire is the brilliant fiery stuff which fills the shining sky and surrounds the world.
Zeno: Old man, I have learned much from thee...but there still are a few things which you speak of which I simply cannot accept.
Heraclitus: Fear not, for it is not important to be wise. God alone is the holder of all such wisdom. Learning of many things does not bring one intelligence.
Zeno: Farewell, obscure one.
Heraclitus: Same to thee, tall one. I shall return to my mountains away from society, until they might listen to the truths which I alone know.

Epilogue:

Five years later, Zeno is saddened to hear of the strange death of his esteemed colleague, Heraclitus. Heraclitus had written as a wise man, modeling himself after the Delphi oracle; he rarely stated or concealed the truth, but often gave signs alluding to it. Living as a hermit toward his later years, Heraclitus became very unapproachable and arrogant. One legend of Heraclitus' unfortunate death, claims that Heraclitus fell into a dropsy and came into town. He then asked doctors if they could make a drought out of rainy weather. Since they couldn't understand him, he buried himself in a cow stall full of manure. Heraclitus had hoped that the dropsy would be evaporated off by the heat of the manure. It didn't work, and he died at the age of sixty. Zeno of Elea also lived a long life, and became the author of many paradoxes for philosophers and mathematicians to puzzle over for years to come.

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Existentialism and the Post-modernists

Aaron M. Bruenger

Each era of American literature has a dominant philosophy at its core. During the Colonial era, the doctrine of the Christian Church was the central focus of the literature. The ideas of Transcendentalism were the anchoring concept of the American Romantic writers. Modernists rallied around the ideology of subjective reality. For Post-modern authors, existentialism had a profound impact over the fiction that they wrote. The major Post-modern writers Donald Barthelme, Thomas Pynchon, Stanley Elkin, Anne Beatie, Kurt Vonnegut, and Joan Didion were all heavily influenced by the ideas of existentialism that were prevalent in the American culture of the fifties and sixties.

The term "existentialism" was first used by 19th century philosopher Soren Kierkegaard; he used it to describe his philosophy which opposed the teachings of George Hegel. According to Hegel everything in the world had an essence which shaped the idea, object, or person into what they would become. Kierkegaard believed this view to be preposterous and declared that essence came out of how the individual perceived reality (Needleman 147).

After World War II, there was a resurgence of existential philosophy due to the teachings of Albert Camus, Simmone de Beauvior, and Jean-Paul Sartre. These philosophers made existentialism accessible to the general public by incorporating existential themes into literature. Their teachings were highly influential on the American counter culture of the fifties and sixties, especially the teachings of Sartre, whose phrase "existence precedes essence" became the rallying cry of many neophyte philosophers (Needleman 150).

Although existentialism has been highly influential on Western culture, it is not easily defined. This results from the fact that existential philosophers do not share a singular idea; rather, there are a series of themes that are common to the individual existential philosophers that links them together. Having common themes rather than a ideology allow existentialists to view the world in a similar fashion but apply differing significance on their observations. For example, Kierkegaard was a "Christian Existentialist," who would apply the existential themes to the Christian doctrine; however, Sartre, de Beauvior, and Camus were all "atheistic Existentialists," who used these same themes to prove the non-existence of a higher force (Needleman 147). The major themes of existentialism: a distrust of systems used to view the world, a distrust of symbols, a focus on the absurdity of life, and a belief in free will, are prevalent in the works of Post-modern American authors.

Distrust of Systems

The first major theme of existentialism in that the world cannot be comprehend "with in a conceptual system" (Needleman 148) because systems imply that the world has an essence that existed before the world itself did. There are no great connections between all the events of the world. The existentialists saw the world as a random system where any connections between events exist only in the mind of the individual. The essence of the world comes from how the individual perceives his or her existence, not from so out side source. Because they are individualisticly imposed, any meaning gained from these connections is subjective and incidental.

This theme is expressed well in Donald Barthelme's short story "The Balloon." Overnight, a giant balloon encompasses fourteen blocks in New York City. There were no explanations given for the occurrence, "simply the balloon hanging there" (Barthelme 53). People found "[t]he apparent purposelessness of the balloon" (55) to be frustrating to them, so they struggled to find some meaning in the situation. Some people argued that the balloon must be the expression of some universal emotion, while others viewed it as "if it were part of a system of unanticipated rewards" (56) because the balloon's bright colors gave the people something more pleasant to look at than the drab January sky. It was believed that the balloon held some great significance for all people, and some people even

along with their guards, were the only people in the city who survived. After the bombing, one of the surviving Americans is caught taking a teapot from the ruins; "He was arrested for plundering. He was tried and shot" (215). Later on in life, Billy is the one of the few survivors of a plane crash, simply because of the seat he was sitting in. Through out the novel, Vonnegut focuses on the irony of the situations that Billy is placed in; Billy survives situations that should kill him by dumb luck, while other men who are better equipped to handle the events are killed.

In a similar fashion, Stanley Elkin also shows the random absurdity of life through Ben Flesh, the protagonist and title character of his novel *The Franchiser*. Ben is a man with a quest—to create an island of familiarity and security in a chaotic world by filling the world with franchises. His dream is to have a world where nothing is unfamiliar even if it come at a loss of originality. However, the chaotic universe does not seem to want to go along with the plan, and Ben becomes the victim of bad luck. People who Ben is close to all die in absurdly funny ways: for example, his godniece Kitty, who was a chronic bed wetter, dies of "Uremic poisoning. Her boy choked on her own pee" (Elkin 283). Ben himself cannot escape the randomness of life. He suffers from Multiple Scleroses, which would act up at unpredictable times and effect the way that he was able to handle situations. In the end, it is pure chance that causes Ben's down fall and the destruction of his dream: his new Travel Lodge Hotel goes under because of the construction of I-75, forcing Ben into bankruptcy.

In both of these novels, the authors focus on the randomness of the events. Chance is emphasized blatantly in both stories; by the commentary of the narrator in *Slaughterhouse-Five* and by Ben's godfather ranting on about how lucky Ben was that he was, by chance, a human and not an uncountable number of other things in the universe. In both these novels the chattiness is intensified by the absurd events that engulf each of the protagonist's lives.

Free Will

The last major theme of existentialism is free will. The other major themes all obviously point to this idea. Existence before essence cannot work with the idea of determinism; if some one is determined, they cannot create his/her own essence. Symbols have no meaning in a world where each person is control of his/her own fate, and the idea that the world is random and absurd is impossible with out free will. The existentialist realized the importance of free will and argued that there was no way that man could be determined. Sartre even argued that past choices and actions of the individual had no bearing over his/her future choices; humans are completely free in every choice they make, no matter what they have done before (Needleman 149).

Play It As It Lays, by Joan Didion, shows an excellent example of the strong existential free will through the story's protagonist, Maria Weyth. Maria live a life of emptiness, she has nothing and no one to look forward to. She is an aging actress in Hollywood, a place that has less essence to it than she has. She is past her prime and no longer can find work, and she has gone beyond the point of doing anything else with her life. However, she does not let her hollow life destroy her, "I know what nothing means, and keep on playing" (Didion 214). She keeps on going even though she knows she has nothing to look forward to. She chooses to keep on living for no other reason than, "Why not" (214). It is this type of person that exemplifies the idea of existential free will. She does not make choices based on what she should do or what has happened in her past; she has nothing to gain, but she still chooses to keep on playing the game of life.

The Post-modern movement in American Literature truly had an existential base to it. The ideas that the writers expressed in their works showed how greatly the philosophy had on the American culture. The ideas were widely read and believed, both before Post-modernism became the dominating literary movement and after it came to a close in the mid-seventies. Many of the ideas are still an essential part of the American culture today.

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From Athens to Jerusalem Via Austin

Donald Wayne Viney

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) is among the greatest Christian philosopher-theologians—perhaps the greatest—in the nine hundred years separating Augustine of Hippo (354-430) and William of Ockham (1290-1349). Thus, when we understand that Aquinas spent his entire adult life meditating on the question "What is God?" there is reason to take notice. Aquinas reached the same conclusion about the nature of God as a number of other philosopher-theologians such as Maimonides (1135-1204), a Jew, and Avicenna (980-1037), a Muslim. What is the conclusion? Whatever God is is identical with God's IS. Put another way, God is *pure act*, with no admixture of potency. Anything God could be, God already is. In God there is no difference between *what* God is and the fact (if it is a fact) *that* God is.[1]

Seven centuries after Aquinas, another philosopher-theologian spent a lifetime more than twice as long as that of Aquinas contemplating the nature of God. Charles Hartshorne (b. 1897) celebrated his centenary in June 1997 in Austin, Texas where he has been Ashbel Smith Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas for thirty-five years.[2] History has yet to judge the contributions of Hartshorne but his conclusions are often at odds with those of the Angelic Doctor. Moreover, he formulated his views with full knowledge of Aquinas' philosophy and has invited criticism from Thomists.[3] In this paper I first explain Hartshorne's position *vis-à-vis* Aquinas and then defend an argument he uses against Aquinas. I conclude with some critical reflections concerning a Biblical shortcut one might take to Aquinas' views.

Hartshorne agrees with Aquinas that God must be the very embodiment of perfection. However, he disagrees with Aquinas that perfection excludes every kind of change internal to God. Early in his career Hartshorne distinguished two meanings of perfection, *A-perfection* (for absolute perfection) and *R-perfection* (for relative perfection).[4] To possess A-perfection is to be unsurpassable by any being, including self. To possess R-perfection is to be unsurpassable by any being, excluding self. Neither form of perfection permits decrease in value, but R-perfection allows the possibility of an increase in value in a perfect being. Hartshorne argues that God may possess both types of perfection, albeit in different respects. God may be A-perfect with respect to existence and character. That is to say, God's existence and character (goodness) are not subject to change. However, God may be R-perfect with respect to the divine experiences of the world. For example, as new aesthetic values are added to the world, those values, and God's appreciation of them, are added to God.

Hartshorne accepts the idea that God is A-perfect in some respects and R-perfect in others. In *The Divine Relativity*, he writes,

> That God exists is one with his essence . . ., but how, or in what actual state of experience or knowledge or will, he exists is contingent in the same sense as is our own existence.[5]

Hartshorne insists on this distinction throughout his writings, a distinction he calls the difference between *existence* (or essence, which in God's case coincide) and *actuality*. Existence is always abstract compared to the particular way in which it is instantiated. Hartshorne argues by way of illustration: "that I shall (at least probably) exist tomorrow is one thing; that I shall exist hearing a blue jay call at noon is another."[6] The same is true of God, except that God's existence is not subject to change. In other words, that God exists is a necessary truth. However, that God exists as knowing that I hear a blue jay call at noon is a contingent truth.

Clearly, these views are at odds with Aquinas' claim that God has no other essence than being itself. For Hartshorne, the existence/essence of God is abstract compared with the actuality of God, which is concrete. If this is true, then the full reality of God is much more than God's IS—indeed, the reality of God is an open-ended process, continually acquiring new determinations of being.

Interestingly, Aquinas was familiar with one of Hartshorne's favorite arguments for this view. Consider the conditional, "If God knows W then W," where W is a contingent occurrence. If the antecedent, "God knows W," is necessary, as Aquinas concedes, then the consequent, "W," must also be necessary. Aquinas' response is that "W" is

on the cross as powerful images of divine suffering.

If we take the love and suffering of God seriously then we must imagine that God is a person who interacts with and is affected by the world. I hold, with Hartshorne and many others, that Thomistic metaphysics is ill equipped to do these Biblical insights justice. Aquinas says,

> Since, therefore, God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to the creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are related to Him.[13]

For Aquinas, God "moves" the creatures but is "unmoved" by them. This is a logical consequence of the view that God is through and through impassible. This is the heart of classical theism, but it misses the heart of both Jewish and Christian monotheism. Perhaps it is time to consider the alternative that God is "the most and best moved mover."[14]

NOTES

1. This paper is a revision of a response to Edward M. Macierowski's "Being and God: When Athens Meets Jerusalem" and was presented at the Kansas City Area Philosophical Association meeting in Atchison, Kansas at Benedictine College on November 8, 1997.

2. Hartshorne received the Ph.D. in philosophy at Harvard in 1923. He taught at the University of Chicago from 1928 until 1955. From 1955 to 1962 he was in Atlanta at Emory University. The publication of *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*, edited by Lewis Hahn (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991), volume XX of the Library of Living Philosophers is evidence that Hartshorne has found a place among the great philosophers of this century. On October 11, 1997 a celebration of Hartshorne's centenary was held at the University Texas at Austin (see Hank Stuever's "A Metaphysician Meets His Maker" in *The Austin American Statesman*, Monday, October 13, 1997). Papers from that celebration will appear in *The Philosophical Forum* 1998.

3. Some of Hartshorne's earliest direct discussions of Aquinas and Thomism are found in two review articles; see his review of Étienne Gilson's *God and Philosophy* in *Journal of Religion* 22/2 (April 1942): 221-224 and his twin review of Jacques Maritain's *Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil* and The Maritain Volume of *'Thomist' in Ethics* 54/1 (October 1943): 53-57. Hartshorne and William L. Reese included excerpts from the critical comments on Aquinas' *Summa Theologica* in *Philosophers Speak of God* (University of Chicago Press, 1953): 119-133. In 1976 Hartshorne presented the Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, published as *Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Publication, 1976). Also of note are Hartshorne's response to William Alston in *Existence and Actuality*, edited by John B. Cobb, Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell (University of Chicago Press, 1984): 98-102 and his response to W. Norris Clarke in *Charles Hartshorne's Concept of God*, edited by Santiago Sia (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990): 269-279.

4. *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago: Willet, Clark and Company, 1941): 9.

5. *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948): 87. Hartshorne ceased using exclusively masculine pronouns for God with the publication of *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* (Albany: State University of New Press, 1984).

6. *The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1962): 63.

7. *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas*, volume one, edited by A. C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945): 156 [ST Q. 14, Art. 13, Obj. 2].

8. *Philosophers Speak of God*: 132. See also *The Divine Relativity*: 13-14.

9. *On The Truth of the Catholic Faith, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God*, translated by Anton Pegis, (Garden City, New York: Hanover House, 1955): 100 [SGC, Chapter 16, para. 2].

10. For more information on the tetragrammaton and the interpretation of Exodus 3.14 see *Tanakh* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1985); *The New Oxford Annotated Bible, New Revised Standard Version*, edited by Bruce M. Metzger and Roland E. Murphey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991): 72 [note to Exodus 3.14]; *The Oxford Companion to the Bible*, edited by Bruce Metzger and Michael D. Coogan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993): 738 [article by J. A. Emerton on the Tetragrammaton].

11. *On The Truth of the Catholic Faith, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God*: 121 [SGC, Chapter 22, para. 10].

12. Richard Rice mentions Emil Brunner, Wolfhart Pannenberg, John Courtney Murry, and a number of others who accept this view. See Clark Pinnock, et al., *The Openness of God* (Downers Grove Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1994): 49.

13. *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, volume one*: 124 [ST Q. 13, Art. 7].

14. Charles Hartshorne, *The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy*, edited by Mohammad Valady, (Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997): 6, 39 [Hartshorne is here quoting and amending Fritz Rothchild's description of Rabbi Heschel's God].

Gender Role Socialization and the Feminization of Poverty

David C. Woodard

Americans still cling to a Norman Rockwell vision of society. We love to see our soldiers come home, our sons playing football in a vacant city block, and our daughters wearing cute, pink dresses and holding flowers. A recent Southwestern Bell telephone book depicts two such girls holding pets with the caption: "Children and pets warm our hearts like nothing else can." What a perfect world. The media bombards us with people without problems. Hallmark cards make us believe that there is too much love to go around.

Throw modern medical technology into the mix and we have millions of Americans fawning over precious little miracles. Corporations as well as individuals embrace Kenny and Bobbi McCaughey's septuplets born last week. We are genuinely concerned with the welfare of such anomalies. Like Baby Jessica who fell down the well ten years ago, Americans pour out their hearts and open their pocketbooks, and we feel better about ourselves and perhaps sleep a little sounder at night.

The story changes when things aren't quite so cute. We aren't quite so thrilled about the black sextuplets born to Linden and Jacqueline Thompson in Washington, D. C. at about the same time as the McCaughey seven. "President Clinton didn't even lean out the window and holler 'Hello, Mrs. Thompson'" (Riechmann, 1997). We don't seem to think too much about the countless babies born every day without the help of corporate America or wealthy individuals, born to those members of society least able to care and raise these miracles, born to those members of society raised with that Norman Rockwell vision yet never realizing it themselves.

We told them as children, "Be like Barbie. Let others take care of you. Be submissive; be pretty; be quiet, and most importantly, be feminine." Yet poverty is experienced most deeply by women and their children. There is nothing cute about women and children in poverty. Thesis: In order to fight the feminization of poverty, there is no question we need real welfare reform based on empathy and empowerment; however, to remove gender from the equation, we must also abandon current conceptions of femininity and masculinity thus supporting not only the liberation of women, but also the caring and nurturing capacities of men.

Since the times of chivalry, we have put women on pedestals. We admire their grace and beauty; we fight wars to protect their honor; we abdicate to them all the finer qualities—just as long as they don't think for themselves (Kephart and Jedlicka, 1991). And at what cost? Need we remind ourselves of the legal beatings, the marriage-sanctioned rape, and the denial of property or the right to vote. As Americans began to open their eyes to social injustice, some of the more benevolent would still cling to the chivalric notion of womanhood. They would later embrace the perfect homemaker embodied even today in the person of Martha Stewart.

Then came the '60s. Women's liberation promised to reverse the injustices of history. More women graduated from college, and more entered the work force. Women began to take pride in their bodies, and most emphatically, their sexuality. We realized that women have libido, erogenous zones, and with birth control, they began to realize they could have it all (Kephart and Jedlicka, 1991). Women could now divorce and rightfully so. No longer would they be subjected to the tyranny of the dominant sex. This is not to say that women could take care of themselves. The traditional "beliefs, policies, and programs" required women to be taken care of by men (Dinerman, 1986). But remember that degrading Virginia Slims Ad, "You've come a long way, baby."? Reality was not as reassuring for women. Men felt less obliged to take care of their own children, and with the upholders of the ideal woman leering over their shoulders, they continued their quest for the Norman Rockwell family and Barbie. Women had everything all right—a media-controlled image of

der, feminine, emotional, and appreciative" (Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1994).

No wonder America hasn't opened their arms to those in dire straits. Women who possess strength alienate the rest of us. We would rather dope ourselves with late night television than look around the corner at our neighbors. In the great American traditions of denial and in the belief of Hallmark cards, we rationalize away the realities women face. Men's roles are also prescriptive and limited.

"Males also have a number of traditional gender role expectation in our society. A male is expected to be tough, fearless, logical, self-reliant, independent, and aggressive. He should have definite opinions on the major issues of the day and is expected to make authoritative decisions at work and at home. He is expected to be strong, to never be depressed, vulnerable, or anxious. He is not supposed to be a sissy, or feminine. He is expected not to cry or openly display emotions. He is expected to be the provider and to be competent in all situations. He is supposed to be physically strong, self-reliant, athletic, to have a manly air of confidence and toughness, to be daring and aggressive, to be brave and forceful, to always be in a position to dominate any situation. He is supposed to initiate relationships with women and is expected to be dominant in relationships with them" (Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1996).

It doesn't sound much like Barbie. We won't find too many men welcomed at the neighborhood bar after a long day of diaper-changing and floor-waxing. They might even be ridiculed calling into question not only their masculinity but also their sexuality. Men expressing their feelings are laughed at leading to self-hatred and insecurity. Fearing this, they might choose conformity over integrity, raise their children to do the same, and perpetuate the status quo. Women have always taken care of the children; let it stay that way.

There is no question that the women's liberation movement has done much to balance role expectations. Men should not feel threatened. They now have more freedom to express their emotions and more child-rearing responsibilities. Courts are slowly beginning to grant custody to fathers (Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1996).

Strong, competent women are replacing the traditional stereotypical roles on television. Murphy Brown proves that strength is attractive—even though Dan Quayle might beg to differ. Barbie's measurements will soon reflect a more realistic conception of women's bodies. Change is slow, however, and when we look at the homeless on the streets or the residents of public housing, we see that change is tragically slow.

Norman Rockwell might present an attractive view of America, but it is not a realistic one. It's okay to care for septuplets, but it's not okay when we ignore others just as deserving. We are a rich nation; we can afford it. Morally, we can't afford to let our citizens continue to be degraded and ignored. Ideally, social workers fight social injustice. Few social workers support the status quo. This is not a time for giving in to the current power structure. This is not a time for flag waving. This is a time for competence, strength, independence, empathy, and tenderness. These are qualities that make us human beings, not men or women. When we address women, poverty, and gender role expectations, all of us take one step closer to what we were created to be—precious and free.

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