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Spring 1996

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
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# LOGOS-SOPHIA

*Philosophical Journal  
of the  
PSU Philosophical Society*

**Spring 1996**

Volume <sup>7</sup>8

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*Philosophical Journal of the  
PSU Philosophical Society*

## Board of Editors

Aaron Bruenger

Anita Chancey

Jenny Janak

Sarah Niegisch

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The journal you are about to read is the eighth volume of Logos Sophia, the journal of the PSU Philosophical Society. The Society was founded in May of 1987 and published its first journal in the Fall of 1988. Today, as in 1988, we are proud to present a group of writings that address many various philosophical questions through a variety of literary styles.

Philosophical issues are discussed weekly by the group at Coffee by the Book (special thanks go out to Jan and Roger O'Conner, proprietors). Officers for the 1995-96 school year were Russ Prophet, President and Jennifer Janak, Vice-President. The group co-sponsored two panel discussions on religion on April 5, 1995, and November 14, 1995, with the International Students Association. Also co-sponsored, this time with the Department of Social Science, was a lecture entitled "Science and Nature: A Gender Question?" by Dr. Mahasweta Chadhury of Calcutta, India, on November 14, 1994. On October 19, 1994, an informal discussion with Dr. Charles Hedrick, a member of the Jesus Seminar and a teacher at Southwest Missouri State University in Springfield, on Biblical Criticism was sponsored. Finally, the group has petitioned the administration to hire an additional philosopher at PSU.

Members of the PSU Philosophical Society have been active in individual pursuits as well. Anita Miller Chancey presented her paper on Hartshorne to the Sixth Annual Undergraduate Philosophy and Religion Conference in Kirksville, Missouri, on November 4, 1995. Furthermore, Anita will present the paper again at the Society of Christian Philosophers meeting in Logan, Utah, on March 27-28, 1996. Jennifer Janak and Aaron Bruenger attended the Society of Christian Philosophers meeting in Boulder, Colorado, on March 25, 1995. Russ Prophet presented two papers at the Great Plains Honors Academy. Finally, members Anita Miller Chancey, Anna Atanasova, and Russ Prophet attended the Kansas Philosophical Society meeting in Manhattan, Kansas, on February 10, 1996.

The PSU Philosophical Society is happy to present Logos Sophia, reason and wisdom. Always — question and enjoy.

Peace,

Sarah Niegsch

# Charles Hartshorne: A Philosopher's View of Abortion

Anita Miller Chancey

Charles Hartshorne has written dynamically about abortion in the latter part of his career, yet his opinions and thinking on this issue have never been gathered into a cohesive whole. This essay delineates Hartshorne's position on this controversy, attributes the highest form of experiencing, and therefore the highest value, to the Divine life. Hartshorne's views on cosmopolitanism, aesthetic value, linguistic clarity, and generic identity underpin his position on abortion, contributing powerfully to his focus on rationality as the standard by which human persons, as he defines them, surpass all other creatures.

Charles Hartshorne is not a household name, but for those familiar with contemporary philosophy, he is one of the best known living philosophers. A prolific writer, at ninety-eight he has published sixteen books and countless articles on a variety of philosophical subjects. Thirteen of his books were written after the age of sixty-five. Other philosophers have found his work exceptionally useful, leading to four major publications on his philosophy in the last ten years.

Abortion is a recurring theme in Hartshorne's later works. He discusses abortion in *Wisdom or Moderation* (1987), *Onnipotence and Other Essays* (1984), and in his autobiography *The Darkness and the Light* (1990). "Concerning Abortion: An Attempt at a Rational View" drew a heated response—ten letters to the editor were published in a following issue, with a final letter, the only one from a woman, published a month later. In 1981, Hartshorne also accepted an invitation to debate abortion with pro-life advocates at Dartmouth College, an action he later called "unwise" (*Bioethics* 33). He stated afterward in personal correspondence:

I did not win the debate at Dartmouth and I did not debate well. I have never debated logically and don't like the coercive, victory at any cost atmosphere. . . . [but] my audience had more interest in the truth I am confident. I have written an effective reply. I don't intend to let the *Liberalism Quarterly* do my work. That way I may win.

His "effective" reply was the article "Scientific and Religious Aspects of Bioethics."

## Articles



# Charles Hartshorne: A Philosopher's View of Abortion

Anita Miller Chancey

Charles Hartshorne has written dynamically about abortion in the latter part of his career, yet his opinions and thinking on this issue have never been gathered into a cohesive whole. This essay delineates Hartshorne's position that rationality contributes the highest form of experiencing, and therefore the highest value, to the Divine life. Hartshorne's views on contributionism, aesthetic value, linguistic clarity, and genetic identity underpin his position on abortion, contributing powerfully to his focus on rationality as the attribute by which human persons, as he defines them, surpass all other creatures.

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Abortion is a recurring theme in Hartshorne's later works. He discusses aspects of abortion in *Wisdom as Moderation* (1987), *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* (1984), and in his autobiography *The Darkness and the Light* (1990). In 1981 his article "Concerning Abortion: An Attempt at a Rational View" drew a heated response—ten letters to the editor were published in a following issue, with a final letter, the only one from a woman, published a month later. In 1981 Hartshorne also accepted an invitation to debate abortion with pro-life advocates at Dartmouth College, an action he later called "unwise" (*Bioethics* 38). He stated afterward in personal correspondence:<sup>1</sup>

I did not win the debate at Dartmouth and I did not debate well. I have never debated formally and don't like the combative, victory at any cost atmosphere... [that] my students had more interest in the truth I am confident. I have written an effective reply  
I think to letters to the *Christian Century* on my essay. That way I may win.

His "effective" reply was the article "Scientific and Religious Aspects of Bioethics."



Despite the timeliness of the abortion question, and the relevance and potency of Hartshorne's views, no scholarly work has been published on this area of his thought. The recent spate of books containing critical essays and Hartshorne's personal responses<sup>2</sup> have disregarded his opinions on abortion as though they were non-existent. Unfortunately even the prestigious Library of Living Philosophers volume fails in this respect. Valuable opportunities have been lost for Hartshorne to add a unified response to his discussions on this sociologically and philosophically significant topic. Given Hartshorne's age, this is regrettable.

Hartshorne calls attempts to legally abolish abortion, an issue which lacks clear public consensus, "tyranny" (Abortion 45). He is critical of those who automatically value a fetus over the productivity and activity of the mother, and condemns those, particularly men, who would dictate the limits of her choices. Hartshorne's "pro-choice" position is a natural outgrowth of his view of those qualities which make humans uniquely valuable.

An examination of the roots of Hartshorne's position on abortion begins with his vision of what I call the "creaturely continuum." Hartshorne views all life on a rising continuum which represents the value of creatures. He boldly states, "I hold that the ultimate value of human life, or of anything else, consists *entirely* in the contribution it makes to the divine life" (Wisdom 118). Hartshorne refers to this as the doctrine of contributionism. While he maintains that every life and life form contributes in some way to the Divine life, he also claims that our individual capacity for rational thought allows humans to contribute more to God than other creatures.

Under no circumstances does Hartshorne see lower creatures as valueless. Like diamonds of differing sizes, they are merely less valuable in a world that is completely precious. This is a difficult fact to keep in sight, however, for in discussing abortion Hartshorne consistently focuses on the variations in creaturely value, which are represented by movement up or down the creaturely continuum.

Hartshorne's position on abortion is also influenced by his theory of aesthetic value,<sup>3</sup> which emphasizes that a diversity of experiences balanced by an aesthetically pleasing amount of complexity and orderliness contributes to life, and God, more fully than less balanced experiences. Creatures capable of enjoying aesthetic value contribute richer, more diverse experiences than simpler creatures. This richness of experience is seen at its ultimate in moral or aesthetic feelings, experiences, and actions which are humanity's unique contribution to God.

The creaturely continuum does not represent possible or potential value to God. Rather, it is an ever-changing continuum that reflects all the value a creature is able to contribute directly to God at that particular moment. When discussing abortion, the human contribution of rationality is Hartshorne's sole determinant of value.



A fetus of any sort, be it pig, primate, or human, begins its life at the bottom of the creaturely continuum as a single egg cell, in a position similar to a single-celled paramecium or amoeba. Each creature ascends the continuum, attaining at least whatever level its genetic programming allows. Any adult mammal will be higher on the continuum than any fetus, for one is reaching its apex, while the other is just beginning its ascent. The specific species is not the relevant issue. How much diversity of experience each creature can incorporate at that given moment, is.

An adult porpoise, capable of experiences that include the use of sophisticated communication and socially interactive behavior, is clearly higher on the continuum than a newborn human baby, whose experiences are primarily basic reflexive actions, and less interactive.

Consider the creatures at the high end of the continuum: members of the primate family, porpoises and whales, and at the very top, humans. It takes only a few months for a human baby to pass all creatures but the most capable large-brained mammals. Soon even these are passed, as the very young child begins to demonstrate the higher cognitive functions that are found only at the top of the continuum.

Why are we so special? What separates us from the whales and apes and puts us at the very top of the creaturely continuum? Language, for a beginning. It is no small accomplishment to grasp abstract thinking and represent it symbolically (Wisdom 100, 124).

We are also the most creative and inventive of all creatures, showing tremendous diversity in our actions. But most importantly, we are able to reason and develop morals by which we recognize right and wrong. Hartshorne sees this as a powerful component of value, one that, so far as we know, only humans are able to substantially contribute to God.

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. sums up Hartshorne's position succinctly:

All else being equal, the contribution of moral agents who can experience the world in a rich and deep sense will be greater than that of less developed and less complex experiencers of the world. We do not all equally contribute to God. (*Philosophy* 162)

According to Hartshorne, the top of the continuum is not gained, nor is it retained, simply by being a creature of human origin. It is attained as we develop those qualities that characterize humans as different from other animals. He states, "The line between the human and the subhuman is crossed in the life of each one of us, if by human one means, actually rational" (Wisdom 119).

Hartshorne would not elevate the human fetus or infant to any point on the continuum that it could not sustain through its capacity for experience. Nor would he allow persons in a coma, who are incapable of experiencing, or the feeble-minded elderly, who have an impaired ability for rational thought, to remain at the top of the continuum.



This is no mere academic exercise for Hartshorne, but a strongly personal view that leads him to state:

Does this distinction apply to the killing of a hopelessly senile person (or one in a permanent coma)? For me it does. I hope that no one will think that if, God forbid, I ever reach that stage, it must be for my sake that I should be treated with the respect due to normal human beings (*Abortion 44.*; cf. *Darkness 115*).

A careful definition of the word "person" is essential to understanding Hartshorne's arguments on abortion. Indeed he quotes Webster's dictionary, and names it as the "secret source" of the entire abortion controversy. There are two definitions: the first, which is most commonly used by "pro-life" proponents, is simply a human being or individual. The second, more specific definition, is that of a being who is able to reason and distinguish right from wrong.

This second definition is the basis of Hartshorne's position (*Wisdom 32*). He is adamant that rationality is the measure of personhood, stating,

It is clearly false to say that a fetus, infant, or child is strictly identical with an adult, even though the adult grew out of the child. It is also clearly false to say, as "pro-lifers" seem to say, or imply, that because the fetus or infant came from two persons and can (with much help from persons) grow into a person, therefore it already is a person (*Omnipotence 99*).

Hartshorne is not alone in this view. Mary Anne Warren refers to human beings in a moral sense, as "a full-fledged member of the moral community" whose traits include, but are not limited to, consciousness and the ability to reason. She also specifies a genetic sense of the term, in which "any member of the species is a human being, and no member of any other species could be" (*Warren 53*).

Hartshorne has no patience for those holding a genetic view of personhood, who claim that the potential represented in a fertilized human egg cell is equivalent to an actual person. He pointedly observes that "no one denies that its origin is human, as is its possible destiny. But the same is true of every unfertilized egg in the body of a nun" (*Abortion 42*).<sup>4</sup>

Contributing invaluable to Hartshorne's view of genetic identity and abortion were the differences between his twin brothers, James and Henry. Despite sharing identical genetic structure, they had highly individual personalities. Hartshorne attributes this to differences in the life experiences each encountered, including differences in prenatal experiences, such as their position in the womb. According to Hartshorne, this individuality simply cannot be accounted for genetically:

What crude thinking it is that identifies individuality with mere genetic chemistry! What made my twin brothers, now no longer living, physically individual was something more than the chemistry of their cells. This something more was the structure of their nervous systems. And that is just not there in the fertilized cell. Nor could it be



predetermined by the cell, for then my brothers Henry and James would have been mere duplicates. They were far from that (*Darkness* 57).

Hartshorne is supported on this point by the emergence theory of psychogeny, (the study of the origin of the mind) and by its criticisms of the identity theory of psychogeny. The emergence theory holds that individuality is not defined genetically. According to Wayne Viney and William Douglas Woody,

"Psuche [mind] is not conceived as a given or as a completed work at any time; it is never guaranteed or safe. If conditions are favorable, it grows and such growth, according to at least some forms of emergence theory, is not just quantitative, it can be truly qualitative. If conditions are unfavorable, either in the biological substrate or in the environmental context, growth may falter. Whatever else Psuche may be, it is not an absolute (Viney 10-11).<sup>5</sup>

For Hartshorne the ability to think rationally, on at least an elementary level, is a milestone in human life. It is a juncture, a line we cross from being an animalistic human "creature" to being an individual human "person." Yet it is impossible to cross this line unaided. Whether one speaks of a fetus, an infant, or a very young child, no development at all is possible without a great commitment of time, effort and care, first from the mother bearing the child, then after birth, by her and other caregivers.

There are contingencies to contend with during and even before development: Is the egg healthy? Was the egg fertilized? Is the mother addicted to alcohol or drugs that might overwhelm the developing cells? Does the mother have a disease such as diabetes that makes maintaining pregnancy difficult? An unhealthy or addicted mother's problem may destroy the fetus entirely, or may stunt its development so severely that there is little hope for normalcy after birth. Here the fetus's welfare is inescapably in the hands of the mother.

The newly born infant is incapable of all but the most rudimentary, reflexive actions. Without continual tending from other persons, it would quickly die, and personhood would never be attained. But life or death is not the only issue. Mental and emotional health are essential factors if the infant is to develop into a rational creature capable of the actions we consider human (*Omnipotence* 116, *Darkness* 244). Hartshorne reminds us:

A fetus is not like a seedling in a forest which, with luck and being let alone, will grow into a mature tree; on the contrary, a fetus can become rational and moral only if a lot of human effort is devoted to that end (*Wisdom* 59).

The continuation of life, too, has many contingencies. Simply stated, babies require time, attention, and love. One only has to remember the terrible stories of under-socialized babies in war-time orphanages to recognize that the need for love and care. If it is not met, the resulting child may be human, but still not be capable of anything beyond animalistic experiences.



When we return to the creaturely continuum, it is easy to see that no matter what point the fetus or infant has progressed to on the continuum, its mother, already a fully rational person, is clearly situated at the top. The fetus and the infant simply do not display the characteristics of rationality that Hartshorne considers an essential component of personhood. They cannot, therefore, counterbalance the needs and desires of the mother, for they cannot match her value—the experiences she contributes to the Divine life.

Despite his belief in the intrinsic value of all creation, fetuses and even infants are, in Hartshorne's mind, only shadows of persons yet-to-be. Therefore, he considers neither abortion nor infanticide full-fledged murder (*Wisdom* 125). He states:

I have little sympathy with the idea that infanticide is just another form of murder. Persons who are already functionally persons in the full sense have more important rights even than infants. Infanticide can be wrong without being fully comparable to the killing of persons in the full sense (*Abortion* 44).

Hartshorne is critical of people, particularly men, who would legislate or in any way order pregnant women to do what men themselves are not capable of—bearing a child (*Bioethics* 35, 38). The consequences of such legislation are simply too grave. He states his position plainly and forcefully;

Abortion is indeed a nasty thing, but unfortunately there are in our society many even nastier things, like the fact that some children are growing up unwanted. This for my conscience is a great deal nastier, and truly horrible (*Abortion* 44).

There lies the root of Hartshorne's view of abortion. It is bedded in the rich soil of his philosophical thinking on value, identity, linguistic clarity, and rationality. It is fortunate for both philosophy and for society that such a gifted thinker turned his mind to this significant issue.

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## Author's Notes

<sup>1</sup> I am deeply grateful to D.W. Viney for his generosity in sharing and allowing me to quote from his personal correspondence, and for enthusiastically contributing time, expertise, and guidance to this essay.

<sup>2</sup> Cobb, John B. Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell, eds. *Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.; Hahn, Lewis Edwin, ed. *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*. The Library of Living Philosophers Volume XX. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991.; Kane, Robert and Stephen H. Phillips, eds. *Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and Theology*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.; Santiago Sia, ed. *Charles Hartshorne's Concept of God: Philosophical and Theological Responses*. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> This theory is swiftly understood by examining Hartshorne's Diagram of Aesthetic Value, which has a more elegant clarity than description, and can be found in *Wisdom As Moderation*, on page three.

<sup>4</sup> A humorous misprint occurred in a reprint of this article. It read "But the same is true of every fertilized egg in the body of a nun." From Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (eds.) *The Ethics of Abortion*. 1st edition, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1989), p. 110.

<sup>5</sup> I am indebted to Wayne Viney and William Douglas Woody of Colorado State University for the insight into psychogeny found in "Psychogeny: A Neglected Dimension in the Teaching of the Mind-Brain Problem" to which I was graciously allowed access prior to its publication.



# **The Omnipotence of Nature in Coleridge's *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner***

Jenny Janak

"I readily believe that there are more invisible than visible Natures in the universe. But who will explain for us the family of all these beings, and the ranks and relations and distinguishing features and functions of each? What do they do? What places do they inhabit? The human mind has always sought the knowledge of these things, but never attained it. Meanwhile I do not deny that it is helpful sometimes to contemplate in the mind, as on a tablet, the image of a greater and better world, lest the intellect, habituated to the petty things of daily life, narrow itself and sink wholly into trivial thoughts. But at the same time we must be watchful for the truth and keep a sense of proportion, so that we may distinguish the certain from the uncertain, day from night" (Burnet 68).

Humans vaguely acknowledge the existence of Nature, let alone its sublime power and influence. Coleridge uses this quote to set up the role of Nature in his poem *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*. Nature is a mysterious work of God which makes an active contribution in the Mariner's narrative.

Forces of Nature, created by God, do exist. The ability to fully understand these powers is unattainable to man. God through Nature takes control of the universe in mysterious ways. Coleridge reveals the certainty of Nature and of its divine power and influence in dealing with man. This is illustrated with the Mariner's crime of shooting the albatross, the bird of good omen. The albatross is Nature incarnate which steers the ship safely through the icy perilous waters of the Arctic. The Mariner's crime embodies human arrogance and man's disregard for Nature. Most men, like the Mariner, are thoughtless in their actions towards Nature. Man's unconscious awareness is tainted with compulsion and contempt to destroy that which is good and pure. Man is hungry for the goodness and purity found in Nature; however, by his own nature, man is out of tune with the spirit of that which he so desires. Therefore, he will either chose to gain or destory that



which is good. The spirit is gained through "love and reverence to all things God made and loveth" (Coleridge 1553).

*He prayth best, who loveth best  
All things both great and small;  
For the dear God who loveth us,  
He made and loveth all (1553).*

Destruction is a sign of man's hopelessness and contempt for the quest of the spirit. The Mariner exemplifies this loss. His crime is unrehearsed and casual. Little does he realize the omnipotence of Nature. The consequences of his action are not recognized until he is forced to become aware by the spirit of Nature itself.

The spirit of Nature is eminent through celestial bodies of the sky. The moon is one of the most powerful natural forces Coleridge manipulates in the poem. The moon is the mystic, looming Emperor of the Night, illuminating the ship with unearthly brilliance.

*Beyond the shadow of the ship  
I watched the water snakes:  
They moved in tracks of shining white,  
And when they reared the elfish light  
Fell off in hoary flakes (1544).*

The moon watches over the children of Nature like a faithful sentinel. Clarity is bestowed by the mysterious beauty of the moon. The moon in alignment with the stars sends messages to man. "The horned Moon, with one bright star within the nether tip," signals a bad omen. This sign appears just before the Mariner's crew drop dead on deck of the ship (1542).

Mystic allusions celebrating the power of Nature are also made to the Sun as the Ghost ship of judgement approaches.

*And straight the Sun was flecked with bars,  
(Heaven's Mother send us grace!)  
As if through a dungeon grate he peered  
With broad and burning face (1542).*

The sun is light, warmth, and hope for the Mariner. The one pure element man associates with the living pulse of reality sinks fast behind the bars of the skeletal Ghost ship. Light is imprisoned. There is no elapse of twilight and all hope is distinguished in one weird, eerie drop.

*The Sun's rim dips; the stars rush out:  
At one stride comes the dark (1542).*

Coleridge presents Nature as this supreme force which is able to avenge crimes against the spirit. Shortly after the albatross is shot, Nature avenges the loss of the blessed bird by taking wrath upon the Mariner. The movement of the ship comes to a halt. St. Elmo's fire



thrashes about in the sky, signaling the crew of upcoming disaster. The men on the ship become dehydrated. Their throats are parched and their lips shrivel and bake. The Ghost ship of judgement approaches, boarded with the spirits of Death and Life-in-Death. Thus the invisible is made visible through the devastation of the Mariner and his crew.

The death of the crew greatly affects the Mariner. Tragic isolation brings on a heightened sense of awareness. The scene of the water snakes, slithering through the boiling waters, poses a potential threat, yet the Mariner is mesmerized by the sight.

*Within the shadow of the the ship  
I watched their glossy attire:  
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black,  
They coiled and swam; and every track  
Was a flash of golden fire (1544).*

The Mariner is touched by Nature. Despite its danger and mystery he senses the significance of its beauty and power. Overwhelmed, he responds, "A spring of love gushed from my heart, And I blessed them unaware" (1544). The divine power of Nature is revealed and the Mariner's spirit is reconciled.

Justice is served in the realm of Nature. This is a poem of consequences. The fate of the Mariner is assured by the Polar Spirits of Nature, "The man hath penance done, and penance more will do" (1548). The Mariner is punished by Life-in-Death and further condemned to forever tell his tale to relieve his soul. The power of Nature is enforced. It affects man as he acknowledges its existence and considers its meaning. Nature holds knowledge for us of which a full understanding is unattainable but, as Coleridge points out, it is important to respect its existence. It is also worthy of contemplation. To recognize the beauty and love of Nature is to "Come forth into the light of things," (Woodsworth 1375). Coleridge accomplishes this affect in the poem. He transforms the exotic and super-natural spirit of Nature into divine truth.

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# The Economics and Philosophy Connection

Russ Prophet

Modern wisdom holds that the two academic fields of economics and philosophy are anything but similar. Economics is a science, an inquiry into how human beings can coordinate their unlimited wants with the world's scarce resources (D. Colander 6). It is concerned with study of numbers and business statistics derived from real world research. The science of economics attempts to take these numbers and construct from them an explanation of why they occur, and if possible, use them to predict future events. Economics seeks to create concrete theories that may be tested and used (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 4). The implications of economic theories are, in short, highly functional, scientifically testable, and mathematically provable.

Philosophy, on the other hand, approaches academic inquiry in an entirely different manner. The questions it attempts to evaluate have little, if any, physical evidence to examine. Mathematical research and scientific hypothesis are exchanged for analogy and mental abstraction. Charts and graphical analysis are of little use to philosophers; their study goes beyond number crunching into the nature of the eternal truths that lie behind the figures. Charles Dyke refers to this in his book *Philosophy of Economics* when he says that, "Philosophy is nothing more than taking that one step back and engaging in a critical examination of basic issues (2)."

These two areas, while certainly dissimilar in many respects, do contain a great number of overlapping ideas. The similarities between economics and philosophy have been examined by many individuals, with one author summarizing his interest in the field by stating that "the philosophy of economics is an area that cuts right across the interests and expertise of both philosophers and economists (Dyke viii)."

This should come as no surprise, however, when one is reminded that economics had its earliest origins as an underdeveloped branch of philosophy. The father of economics, Adam Smith himself, was actually a philosopher by profession. Smith's first great literary success was a book about philosophy, not economics, entitled *The Theory of Moral*



*Sentiments*, published in 1759 (Heilbroner 33). It is almost ironic, in fact, that Smith's economic masterpiece, *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, was written in 1776 at a time when he held the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow (L. Colander 47-48).

Economics has, in any case, much more in common with philosophy than that of merely using it as a point of origination. The developmental paths of these two fields have continued to entwine themselves about one another, providing a vast number of intersections in which philosophy must be utilized to understand economics on the one hand, and economics used to make sense of philosophy on the other.

Take, for instance, the classic economic model of rational man and an application of philosophy to it. At the base of most economic theory is an assumption of consumer rationality, that is, that consumers act in a manner that makes sense. The economist has modeled this assumption of rationality on an assertion that consumers seek to conduct themselves in a manner that will gain for them as much value as possible for the exchange of the smallest amount of value that the consumer may expend (Dyke 29). Thus, a consumer seeks to purchase goods with the highest level of utility at the lowest price. With the behavior of consumers modeled in this manner, the economist is then able to understand consumer actions in the marketplace and predict such things as consumer demand for products and the consumer reaction to price changes.

This idea of economic consumer rationality was eventually seized and expanded upon by another great thinker of Smith's time, Jeremy Bentham. Bentham saw in Smith's conception of value a method of weighing decisions to arrive at an appropriate course of action. If people were to act rationally, they would necessarily act in a manner that gained for them the largest net increase in utility. From this general idea Bentham carefully crafted the ethical theory of utilitarianism. In its final form, taken from Bentham's book *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*, the Principle of Utility is stated as:

that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness (2).

As one can then see, the concept of consumer rationality had evolved from a purely economic assertion to the basis of an ethical decision rule that Bentham believed would help to reform society's corrupted morals (Rachels 91). The connection between philosophy and economics in this case, though subtle, is still very evident.

Let us return once again to the rational model of economic man. This model speaks of "utility" and "value", but just what is it, exactly, that these words refer to? If one is to



adhere to Bentham's argument, utility and value refer to happiness, the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain (Dyke 31). But herein one encounters an interesting dilemma; a dilemma that both philosophers and economists have argued over for a great length of time: the conflict of altruism with egoism and how best to design an economy that works with these two ideals.

The conflict of altruism versus egoism arises in the model of economic man and Bentham's ethical theory of utilitarianism simultaneously with the question of how to increase the overall happiness of society. The question one must answer becomes a decision of whether unselfishly donating to one's fellow man or serving one's own self-interest best increases the happiness of society.

Let us first examine the argument for egoism and analyze its eventual economic implications. While an immense number of arguments exist that argue on the behalf of an egoistic morality, let us restrict our examination to three of the better known arguments.

The first argument in favor of egoism is based on the positive social results of egoistic behavior. The argument claims that if everyone pursues policies of self-interest the eventual outcome will be one in which everyone maximizes their own happiness, and as a result, maximizes the happiness of society as a whole. Consider it this way, each individual is placed in a unique position to understand exactly what it is that they truly desire. No one is better equipped to fulfill a desire than the person who fully understands the nature of that desire and has it implanted within them. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the efforts of any person, other than the individual who originates the desire, to fulfill a want will be inefficient at best, and pure interference at worst (Rachels 78). Thus, as Robert G. Olsen phrases it, "The individual is most likely to contribute to social betterment by rationally pursuing his own best long-range interests."

The second argument takes a much harsher stance as it supports egoism. Under this argument, one becomes an egoist instead of an altruist in order to maintain respect for the value of an individual. If one is an altruist, then one must be willing to lessen the value of one's own life in order to improve the value of some other person's life. As Ayn Rand, a major proponent of egoism, states in her work *The Virtue of Selfishness*, "If a man accepts the ethics of altruism his first concern is not how to live his life, but how to sacrifice it (27)." If one sacrifices the value of one's own life, then perhaps one does not have an appropriate sense of life's true value. Egoism provides the only ethical framework, egoists argue, that assigns life all of its true value and worth (Rachels 81). Thus, one must be, by necessity, an egoist in order to avoid denigrating the sanctity and full value of life.

The third argument in support of the egoist's point of view takes a radically different approach from the previous two. This argument observes that human beings in a com-



plex society perform an immense array of different tasks. These tasks are apparently motivated by an equally diverse number of emotions and desires. But, the egoist under this argument would claim, all of these different emotions and desires can really be condensed into a single motivating factor: self-interest (Rachels 82).

This argument is then used to explain away any apparently altruistic actions. An egoist avoids committing harmful actions because if he did do harm to people, he would be stigmatized by society and punished by its law. The egoist acts morally in order to receive the benefits of being judged a moral person by society and avoids unethical deeds to sidestep the negative consequences such actions garner. Apparently altruistic actions are not altruistic at all, if this argument is correct, because the participants in the act are motivated by their own desire for personal gain.

With these three arguments, one can begin to see the case for egoism as a motivating philosophy behind the actions of a rational economic man. The combination of the two ideas of egoism and economic man yields a model of behavior in which the individual acts to obtain the greatest amount of utility for themselves at a minimum cost to themselves. While this may seem to be only a minor adjustment to the original model of economic man, the addition of exclusive self-interest to utility has far reaching economic implications.

Perhaps the single most influential of these implications is the development of an understanding of the economic system of capitalism. It appears, in fact, to be a direct economic derivative of the combination of egoism and rational man.

To observe this phenomena, one needs only to analyze a definition of capitalism to understand just how greatly it is influenced by the individual's pursuit of self interest. For this analysis the definition provided by David Colander adequately describes capitalism when he says that, "Capitalism is an economic system based upon private property and the market in which, in principle, individuals decide how, what, and for whom to produce (61)."

Private property rights, a vitally necessary component in a capitalist economy, are an obvious indication of the pursuit of self-interest. If one was more concerned for promoting the welfare of the society in which one lived than pursuing one's own self-interest, than there would be no need to establish any boundaries on property. Anyone who needed to use a particular resource would just use it, and the remainder of society would be pleased to altruistically forfeit its right to the use of that resource. With the placement of one's own interest above that of the rest of society, however, control over particular resources must be established to prevent chaos. Personal property rights impose the necessary order on the control of resources that becomes important when individuals actively pursue their own self-interest.



A second key component in capitalism, the market, also appears to require an egoist philosophy. Markets originated in order to help facilitate the egoists in their attempts to improve their personal satisfaction. By allowing for the specialization of labor and reducing transaction costs, markets provide the egoist with additional paths to pursue self-interest (Mishkin 34).

One comes to understand with the analysis of the definition of capitalism just how integral a part the philosophy of egoism is in it. Egoism helps explain the need and use of two of the key components in capitalism, private property rights and the market. The involvement of egoism, though, goes far beyond simply being an integral part of the capitalist economic system. Capitalism encourages the individuals that participate in it to increasingly follow an egoist impetus. As David Colander simply states it, "In capitalism, individuals are encouraged to follow their own self-interest (62)."

Having now spent a considerable amount of time examining the egoist's participation in economics, let us now focus our attention on the effect of altruism on an economic system. Once again, the availability of numerous arguments in favor of altruism necessitates a limit of the discussion to three lines of reasoning.

The first argument to be analyzed in defense of altruism is an appeal to the nature of morality. Under a theory of egoism, two competing individuals become locked in conflict. Both individuals seek to overcome the other due to the polarized state of their unique self-interests (Rachels 84). It is in contestant A's self interest to overcome contestant B, and contestant B is motivated under the same rationale of self-interest to overcome contestant A. Both A and B are trapped in a conflict from which their chosen decision rule of egoism is unable to free them. Kurt Baier points out the absurdity of this situation when he writes in his book *The Moral Point of View* that:

For morality is designed to apply in just such cases, namely, those where interests conflict.

But if the point of view of morality were that of self-interest, then there could never be moral solutions of conflicts of interest (189-190).

If this is the case, then the altruist would assert that egoism fails critically in its function as an ethical theory in resolving disputes. Altruism then becomes the theory of morality that is used to resolve the situation, and in so doing, proves its superior worth.

The second argument for altruism is somewhat more complex and brings to question whether egoism is self-contradictory. This possible fault with the theory of egoism can be brought to light by using a slightly different analysis on the previous example. In the dispute between contestant A and contestant B it becomes apparent that it is in A's self-interest to defeat B, and in B's self-interest to foil A's attempts to do so. Motivation by self-interest in this situation then faces a curious dilemma. It becomes both right and wrong for contestant A to attempt to overcome B under the ethical theory of egoism



(Rachels 86). This raises the possibility that ethical egoism contradicts itself in the aforementioned example by promoting an act as both morally correct and morally corrupt. Altruists again point to this inconsistency in egoism as an indication of its faultiness and the need for society to adopt the superior policy of unselfishness.

The third and final argument in favor of altruism centers on a claim that egoism is, by its own definition, arbitrary. A doctrine of egoism forces the individual to separate the world into two distinct categories, the self and everyone else. Egoism then affords the member of the first group, the self, preferential treatment over that of everyone else. In order for the member of the first group to receive preference over the members of the second group, however, there should exist some basic difference between the two groups that merits the disparity of treatment between them. Egoism is flawed in this respect, though, because both groups of individuals have no greatly justifiable differences (Rachels 89). In this manner, the egoist behaves in a similar fashion to that of a racist, arbitrarily awarding preferential treatment to one category over another. Due to egoism's arbitrary nature, it becomes less valuable as an ethical theory compared to that of altruism. This argument for altruism is summarized nicely by James Rachels in his book *The Elements of Moral Philosophy* when he reasons that, "We should care about the interests of other people for the very same reason we care about our own interests; for their needs and desires are comparable to our own (89)."

With the case for altruistic behavior supported by any of the preceding arguments, one begins to wonder how an individual motivated in an unselfish manner would act economically. The combination of the ideas of altruism and economic man does provide some limited insight into this question. An economic man driven by the desire to help others would seek to gain a maximum benefit for society from the output of his labor. David Collard appears to agree with this analysis in his book *Altruism & Economy* when he writes, "The rational individual sees that benevolent impulses felt towards particular others must be universalized — that benevolence towards one individual must be generalized and extended to unknown others in that same category"(180).

There springs from this concept of an unselfishly inspired labor force one very notable economic system: socialism. A socialist economy is one based upon government ownership in which central planning is used to coordinate economic activity and production (D. Colander 62). This economic system effectively eliminates the drive for an individual to pursue their personal self-interests by ensuring that the physical needs of everyone in society are met for by a carefully planned cooperative action of the labor force. Robert Heilbroner speaks of this emancipation from self-serving competition in his book *Marxism: For and Against* when he says that socialism "becomes that phase of history in which mankind will be released both from the bondage of material insufficiency and from its servitude to the power of mystification (148)."



Once the members of society have been freed from the shackles of capitalism, socialists argue, they can pursue the noble goals of altruism. This ability of the population to focus on the needs of other individuals is perhaps the single most significant rationale for the adoption of a socialist economy. The framework of a socialist economy comes to act upon society as a catalyst for altruistic acts. Heilbroner contrasts this capability of socialism against the less noble motivations of capitalism when he states that, "A socialist society, to be sharply differentiated from a capitalist one, should be as suffused and preoccupied with the idea of a collective moral purpose as is bourgeois society with the idea of individual personal achievement (Marxism For and Against 168)."

This examination of the economic model of rational man and the effect of two different modes of calculating value in its decision making process, while limited in its scope, does serve to illustrate one very important fact. Economics and philosophy are related and, in many instances, dependent upon one another. The taxonomic distinctions that initially appear to be drawn so clearly between the two fields begin to blur upon a closer examination. Though the debate may continue over whether socialism is preferable to capitalism, or if altruism is a more acceptable alternative to egoism, one thing can be known for certain: these debates do not exist separately from each other. It is only with an analysis of both the philosophic and the economic that a complete understanding of either issue can be achieved. In this manner our base of knowledge evolves through the cooperative study of both fields, and society is benefitted with a more complete understanding of the human condition.

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# Idols of the Indian Theater

Sarah Niegsch

*Note: This essay incorporates my field experiences of Semester at Sea with the History of 16th and 17th century Western philosophy by examining the position of the Dalits, or Untouchables, in India in relation to Francis Bacon's Idols of Man, specifically the Idols of the Theater.*

There is a difference between Eastern and Western philosophy — that is undisputable. Modern day Western philosophy began acquiring its current characteristics in the sixteenth century, a time during which phenomenal changes in the Western world took place. The first of these major changes was the discovery of the "New World", where people lived having none of the moral and religious traditions common in Europe. Furthermore, the commonly accepted theories in astronomy and physics began to crumble beneath the weight of evidence provided by Galileo, Copernicus, and Kepler and others. Desiderius Erasmus, Montaigne and Martin Luther revived the ancient Greek argument of skepticism, which questions if it is possible for humans to have any knowledge. This reintroduction of skepticism, according to Richard Popkin, marks the beginning of modern Western philosophy (Popkin).

The philosophy of Francis Bacon is a direct result of the reintroduction of skepticism and a significant landmark in the development of the Western mind: he tries to answer the skeptics by creating a totally new foundation upon which we can gain true knowledge. Bacon reasoned that the human intellect makes its own difficulties by not soberly and judiciously using the true helps which are at man's disposal. By not using the helps properly, ignorance follows. From this ignorance follows mischief. Because of this mischief, he thought all trial should be made to restore the commerce between the mind of man and the nature of things to its perfect and original condition. If the perfect and original condition can't be attained then at least a betterment of the condition can be attained. From this coordination of the commerce of the mind and nature comes knowledge — true knowledge — which should be used for the benefit and use of life (Edwards 83-88).

In order to get to this perfect and original condition, one must examine the human mind. In examining the mind, one finds that there are Idols, or false notions, that exist



in the mind and inhibit true understanding. These Idols are deeply rooted and beset the mind in such a manner that the truth can barely enter it. Furthermore, even if the truth does enter the mind, the Idols can still cloud it. This is man's plight unless men, being forewarned, can fortify themselves against the Idols. In order for men to be forewarned, and therefore fortify themselves, Bacon outlined the Idols.

The first Idols are of the Tribe, illusions created by the senses and the physical structure of humans. The second is the Idols of the Cave which are tendencies, dispositions and habits which are individual and are created, in part, by education. Idols of the market-place are those distortions created by relations with other humans and are largely related to language. Finally, Idols of the Theater are false notions which are imposed on the human mind by preexisting philosophies. These Idols of the Theater are said to be dangerous especially when coupled with religious elements: "But the corruption of philosophy by superstition and an admixture of theology is far more widely spread, and does the greatest harm . . ." (Edwards 97).

In the East, there was no similar movement to eradicate the precarious foundations upon which knowledge was based, thus the enormous split in philosophies. Because there was no parallel movement, much knowledge in India is based upon poor (Western) philosophical foundations. The four walls of this foundation are the four basic religio-philosophical theories in India: Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam; the Idols of the Indian Theater. A glaring "mischief" that is created by these Idols is the continuing existence of the Untouchables as a distinct out-caste social group.

The first and oldest religio-philosophical movement in India is Hinduism. Literally, the religion divides all people into four ascribed castes. The highest caste is the Brahmins who are priests and holy men. The second caste is the ksatriyas, or the warrior caste. Third is the vaisyas, or merchant, caste. Last is the shudras, the laborers. Below the shudras is a group of people who have no caste. They are literally "out-castes" and are destined to do such work as cleaning the streets, cleaning everyone's excrements, and taking care of garbage — the worst jobs that exist. These out-castes are called "Untouchables" or "Dalits".

There is no social mobility within the Hindu caste system. One cannot move up based on achievements or marriage. Furthermore, to want to move up in caste is to deny one's duty which is determined by caste. Hinduism preaches that one should be content with his/her station in life. If one is content and performs his/her duty, as he/she should, one is performing good karma, or moral action. If one does complain and does not abide by the caste system, that person is performing bad karma. Unequal and unjust conditions are rationalized on the basis of Karma which, in turn, is the inexorable law of reincarnation. Hindus believe that the soul of a person is reborn over and over until moksha, the spiritual



release of the soul, is attained. The type of karma one performs in one life will affect the life lead in the next life. For example, if one performs bad karma in the present life, one will feel the repercussion in the next life by having a bad reincarnation. That is, the soul will be born into a lower caste. Consequently, the lower castes are kept downtrodden by the same logic. The reason given by the twin doctrines of karma and reincarnation that they are in the lower caste is because of bad karma performed in a previous life. The only way for the lower castes to aspire to a higher caste is to perform good karma, which means performing their duty in *this* life without complaining.

The second religio-philosophical tradition in India, Buddhism, is commonly believed to have developed out of Hinduism (This is disputed by some. See Reat chapter one). Siddhartha Gautama lived in modern day Nepal from approximately 560-480 BCE. Legend has it that before Siddhartha's birth, ministers predicted that the unborn child would either become a great king or a great religious leader. The father, delighted by the thought of his son becoming a great ruler but deathly scared of him becoming an ascetic, protected the child from the unpleasantness of the world. Siddhartha married at sixteen and had a son. Thirteen years later, as a result of fate, Siddhartha finally saw the unpleasantness of life. Thereafter, he renounced his luxurious lifestyle for that of a wandering mendicant. Years later, he attained Nirvana. Although this legend is acknowledged as a legend, the fact that Siddhartha was a wealthy man who left his father's home to lead a life of asceticism is undisputed (Reat 1-15).

The Buddha believed in Four Noble Truths. First, all mundane life is suffering. Second, the cause of all suffering is desire. Third, the cessation of desire is called Nirvana. Finally, there is a practical and applicable way of achieving Nirvana. To renounce the material world is to renounce selfish desire and therefore suffering, thus achieving Nirvana (Reat 31).

Because Siddhartha was rich and untroubled by the problems encountered by an ordinary person he necessarily chose poverty voluntarily. The path he chose for himself was appropriate.

But for those who are either born poor or forced to poverty and who never tasted the value of human life, notions such as "renunciation" and "desirelessness" may not make any sense. For desire which, in the case of a poor man, is the source of effort and therefore development, is itself condemned in Buddhism as the source of sorrow. Interestingly enough, if Hinduism denies one of the 'will to die', Buddhism deprives one of the 'will to live' . . . If Hinduism develops among the poor a self-disrespecting psyche, Buddhism offered them a self-denying ethos. Hinduism discredits life of the wretched on the earth; for they are supposed to have committed several untoward Karmas in their previous life. Buddhism on the other hand devalues one's future. The Nirvana of Buddhism is an internalized present which cuts the very roots of one's historical future. The Indian



underprivileged and the underdeveloped are, in this way, made to live between the unknown and unknowable past and the uncertain future. With such religious themes the possibility of the underdeveloped ever regaining their lost humanity is systematically negated (Wilson 5).

The third religio-philosophical movement in India is Christianity. Although Christianity was brought to India by the West, it has not maintained a completely Western doctrine. Instead, the inward ethos of the religion is very much in line with Hindu thought.

All types of social evils condemned in India have become part of Indian Christian reality. Added to this already inherited fatalistic world-view, they are now fed with a different kind of deterministic world-view through such doctrines as the doctrine of predestination, the doctrine of sin, the freely given salvation through non-human efforts, the transitoriness of the world, the idea of life as a sojourn and the doctrine of eschatology offering a new heaven and a new earth etc. (Wilson 7).

As a result, human effort and self-effort are not valued in Indian Christianity. Focus is not on this world but on the next.

The last major religio-philosophical movement in India is Islam. Islam, as it exists in India today, is a dogmatic, authoritarian religion that expresses no distinction between the civil society and the religious community. Islam, in its dogmatism, does not allow for the enlightenment of the ignorant which includes the poor and women (necessarily then the Dalits). Furthermore, as in Christianity, man is devalued and gains value only in relation to God (Wilson 8-9). Again we see that human effort and self-effort are not valued. Focus is again not on this world but on the next.

All of the religio-philosophical systems that compose Indian thought keep the down-trodden downtrodden; the Idols of the Indian Theater create many mischiefs. Evidence of this is the fact that the several underprivileged communities that have embraced Buddhism have found their situation unchanged (Wilson 5), despite "Christianization," Christian poor continue to be poor (Wilson 7), and most striking is the fact that although the caste system was legally abolished and outlawed in 1948 with the new Indian constitution, discrimination and segregation based on caste still flagrantly exists. I make the last assertion because of what I saw with my own eyes during a visit to a Dalit village.

My Dalit village stay started by visiting the Dalit Liberation Education Trust, which is an organization designed to help the Dalits by educating and uniting them. We were given a brief lecture by the leader of the organization. We were told that Hindu villages are arranged around a temple, with the Brahmins living the closest, then the ksatriyas, then the vaisyas then the shudras. The untouchables aren't allowed to live in this village. They must live apart from all of the other castes in their own village. In fact, they can't even worship at the temple in the main village or drink from the same well.



Once at the village, eleven of us stepped off of our van into another world. It was totally dark and we were in the midst of approximately 30 villagers. Soon a woman arrived with a pitch-fork like tool with two softball sized balls on the end. These balls were on fire, and that was our light. We followed the woman with the light through the village along a dirt path which ran in between thatched huts. Dense vegetation enveloped us and drums were beating as our procession followed its path through the village. As we passed familial huts, people came out to watch and touch us. Many joined our procession and soon we had close to one hundred people with us. On the walk, we saw a Hindu temple. It was tiny and in disrepair, but it existed and we were told that it was an active temple.

Two people slept in the van while the other nine of us spent the night in a concrete hut, one of the two concrete huts in the village. It belonged to an elder, who had a wife and 3 children. The only furniture in the hut was one twin bed frame, with no mattress. The hut itself was tiny, and there were many leaks in the roof. In the morning, we toured the village in the light and saw the inside of the thatched huts. The huts were very small, barely tall enough to stand up in and were one room dwellings. Next, we visited the upper caste village. There all of the huts were concrete. The one we visited was two-story and had many rooms including a dining room with table and chairs, a hutch, a wall clock, and bedrooms with bed frames and mattresses. The differences between the villages was obvious, striking and shocking.

In order to remedy the mischiefs that exist in India, I believe that an internal philosophical revolution, similar to that experienced in the West in the 16th century must take place. Eradicating these idols which exist in India will be a very difficult task because they are deeply entrenched as, of course, all Idols are. Furthermore, the Idols of the Indian Theater contain elements of theology and superstition against which Bacon made specific warnings and which he said can do the greatest harm. Bacon seems to have been giving a specific warning, unknowingly, to India and the way its philosophies create a vicious cycle that feeds on itself: "A caution must also be given to the understanding against the intemperance which systems of philosophy manifest in giving or withholding assent; because intemperance of this kind seems to establish idols and in some sort to penetrate them, leaving no way open to reach and dislodge them (Edwards 98)."

*May India find a way.*

**Epilogue.** I have received many arguments against the ideas I have presented in this paper. There is one that I will address here. Many argue that my conclusion is not founded because the same uneven distribution of wealth and resources exists in every country. Therefore, because other countries have the same problems and they do not



have the same Idols, my conclusion is false. I argue that the problems created by the Idols are NOT the same in every country. What exists in India with the Dalits is a unique situation. Yes, it has to do with the distribution of wealth and resources, but it does not end there. The philosophies discussed in the bulk of the paper address this point. Furthermore, many are fascinated to find that Hinduism has no organizational heirarchical structure and no founder. Because the problems created are not the same as problems of distribution of wealth in other countries, my conclusion cannot be false on the grounds of the argument presented.

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# **The Teleological Justification**

## **'The End and the Means' in Three Media: Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, and Lewis Milestone's *The Strange Love of Martha Ivers***

Larry W. Ranney

As accurately as such ancient and fragmentary writings permit, teleological contentions can be traced in western philosophical tradition to the pre-Socratic philosopher Anaxagoras who saw nature and the physical universe as purposefully "drawn from the ordered movements to a rational cause...acting according to ends."<sup>1</sup> This small rivulet from Miletus acquired depth in Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*<sup>2</sup> and breadth in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.<sup>3</sup> with the ethical aspects and significance of the 'Final Cause' argument examined in *Nicomachean Ethics*,<sup>4</sup> Jeremy Bentham in the late 19th century expanded this philosophical theory and later John Stuart Mill in his *Utilitarianism* (1861) "agrees with Bentham that happiness, or the greatest good of the greatest number, is the *summum bonum* and criteria of morality."<sup>5</sup> It was from a unification of utilitarian theories and the Hegelian dialectic that Marx derived his hypothesis of historical determinism and thus to the legitimization of terrorism. James Billington observes that "the communists belief in the inevitability of an egalitarian order legitimized, if not did not lead to, violence."<sup>6</sup> The belief in an ineluctable historical conclusion gave the Socialist and Communist terrorists a powerful rationalization: if the world is moving toward socialism as an end of the dialectic then, as a dedicated member of the party, any deed which advances the revolution is automatically justified no matter how criminal, violent, or reprehensible—a perfect teleological pretext for violence, robbery, and murder.<sup>7</sup>

Considering the extended implications of such teleological ethics, the question has repeatedly been asked by writers, theologians, political theorists and philosophers concerning the individual's rights in juxtaposition to the requirements of the society, collective, or other group: Is it proper and moral for an individual or individuals to perform



some deed considered criminal by most civilized cultures in order to insure or provided 'the greatest good of the greatest number.' For some, the answer is unequivocal: yes. Arthur Koestler's novel of political disillusionment and betrayal, *Darkness at Noon*, has an Orwellian confrontation between the 'old' Bolshevik Rubashov and a younger Communist Ivanov who has to interrogate the senior on his loyalty to the cause. Rubashov waxes philosophically over whether the student Raskolnikov from *Crime and Punishment* has the right to kill the old pawn broker and concludes that the murders are unethical. Contrarily, the pragmatic Ivanov retaliates with a caustic remark about burning all such books which deal with "humanitarian fog-philosophy":

Your Raskolnikov is, however, a fool and a criminal; not because he behaves logically in killing the old woman, but because he is doing it in his personal interest. The principal that the end justifies the means is and remains the only rule of political ethics...There are only two conceptions of human ethics...One of them is Christian and humane, declares the individual to be sacrosanct...The other starts from the basic principle that a collective aim justifies all means...<sup>8</sup>

Other artists have responded to such justifications conversely such Albert Camus who early deviated from the Communist party's 'ends and means' mentality. In his play *Les Justes* (*The Just Assassins*, 1949), the revolutionary terrorist Stepan Fedorov is placed in juxtaposition to the moderate Ivan Kaliayev. During a debate similar to Koestler's, the zealot Fedorov attacks Kaliayev for refraining to throw a bomb at the Grand Duke because he was surrounded in the imperial carriage by his children:

**Stepan [vehemently]:** There are no limits!...how, I ask you, could the deaths of two children be weighed in the balance against such a faith [in the coming revolution]. Surely you would claim for yourselves the right to do anything and everything that might bring that great day nearer!<sup>9</sup>

Camus' views provided fuel for the now infamous quarrel with his fellow Frenchman Jean-Paul Sartre who remained steadfastly loyal to the Communist cause. Camus' biographer Germain Bree relates:

As a logical consequence, he (Camus) also rejected the idea that in politics the end justifies the means. Since in his eyes there was no inevitable orientation in historical events, no predetermined March of History, as the Marxists believe, there existed no predetermined end to justify the means.<sup>10</sup>

What is so intriguing and ensnaring about the teleological approach and makes the arguments of the Ivanovs and Stepanovs so compelling is its stark rationality. Most would agree that given particular circumstance, it is ethical to tell lies or perform acts which are considered criminal if the final result is beneficial to another person or a collective group. We all know of such hypothetical situations as the knife carrying mental patient chasing a friend or the 'whom to save in the lifeboat' question much beloved by psychologists; under particular circumstances to commit a 'crime' in order to save a life is tacitly sanctioned by society. Contrarily, like Camus' Kaliayev—a man of limits—the



question begs to be asked concerning who is allowed to perform such deeds for the 'good' of society and under what circumstances.

Although many works have focused on this ancient ethical conundrum, three works in different media separated by oceans of time and culture have conspicuous similarities: Sophocles' *Philoctetes* (409 b.c.e.), Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, (1866) and Lewis Milestone's Film Noir *The Strange Love of Martha Ivers* (Paramount, 1946). The following chart illustrates the striking resemblance among these works:

Work	<i>Philoctetes</i>	<i>Crime and Punishment</i>	<i>The Strange Love of Martha Ivers</i>
Protagonist	Neoptolemus	Raskolnikov	Sam Masterson
Tempter	Odysseus	Napoleon (Extraordinary Man Theory)	Martha Ivers (O'Neil)
Victim	Philoctetes	Aliona Ivanova	Walter O'Neil (husband)
Desired Act	Deception (theft)	Murder	Murder
Desired Results	To retrieve Hercules' bow for the Greeks	Economic security and validate theory of 'extraordinary man'	Removal of husband in order to marry Sam Masterson
Actual Results	Neoptolemus refuses to acquire the bow through deception	Confesses he killed the pawn broker to the police	Refuses to murder the drunken husband
Conclusion	Philoctetes agrees to deliver the bow	Sent to a Siberian penal colony	Commits suicide with husband

Odysseus' Deception: *Philoctetes*. The play retains its title from the hapless Greek archer who had innocently wandered into a sacred shrine and was bitten by a serpent while en route to Troy; the festering wound became so horrid and unbearable that Agamemnon and Menelaus instructed their soldiers to maroon Philoctetes on a deserted island where he remained in isolation and misery for many years. As the play opens, Odysseus and the son of Achilles, Neoptolemus, have returned to the island to bring Philoctetes and his famous bow to Troy for only with his aid can the city be taken. Immediately, the distinctive personalities of the two Greek warriors are established: the 'wily' or 'skilled in craft' Odysseus wants to trick Philoctetes into surrendering the bow and then take him by force since the suffering archer's hatred for him and the other Greeks will cause him to resist any attempt to return to Troy. Since Odysseus understands the reluctance the younger man will have for such deception, he believes the only sure method to achieve the end required is through convincing Neoptolemus that his is the only course. If they fail in their mission, Troy will never fall and the countless Greek dead will have been sacrificed in vain:

**Odysseus:** Son of Achilles,  
our coming here has a purpose; to it be loyal



with more than your body, If you should hear  
some strange new thing, unlike what you have heard  
before, still serve us; it was to serve you came here

**Neoptolemus:** What would you have me do?

**Odysseus:** Ensnare the soul of Philoctetes with your words.<sup>11</sup>

Odysseus explains why they must trap Philoctetes and how the deed is to be performed. Odysseus then waxes philosophical concerning any reservations Achilles' son may have over such undertakings and establishes his teleological justification for the deceptions they are about to do to the miserable castaway:

**Odysseus:** I know, young man, it is not your natural bent  
to say such things nor to contrive such mischief.  
But the prize of victory is pleasant to win.  
Bear up: another time we shall prove honest.  
For one brief shameless portion of a day  
give yourself, and then for all the rest  
you may be called the most scrupulous of men.<sup>12</sup>

From a strictly utilitarian and even practical stance, Odysseus has a powerful argument. The Achians are in a horrible struggle with a determined enemy and often actions must be performed to safeguard the majority of the troops at the expense of a single individual or group. Military commanders in combat accept this responsibility in such situations and act accordingly. Even more significantly for Greek theological concepts, the requirement for the bow of Hercules and Philoctetes presence has been commanded by the gods; it is a sacred mission to fulfill demands of the Olympian host and to disobey or fail to complete the required task will result in disaster.

Additionally, unlike a volunteer in a group who knowingly and willingly accepts the decisions of superiors, Philoctetes is not amenable to be dragged back to Troy after being treated so harshly earlier. Noted Greek scholar H.D.F. Kitto observes that the Greek commanders had the right to remove the wounded archer from the ranks, yet "they had no reason for marooning him on this uninhabited island instead of sending him home as an honorable ally who had become incapacitated."<sup>13</sup> Finally, unlike Neoptolemus, Odysseus realizes the danger inherent in openly meeting Philoctetes since his aim is so deadly and his brooding hatred of the Greeks is so apparent that he could easily kill both before they could utter a word in their defense.

Odysseus' teleological justification for this additional violence and insulting of Philoctetes is solid and reasonable considering the situation and his arguments prevail over Neoptolemus; the son of Achilles wins the confidence of the wounded man and gains the bow. However, after witnessing Philoctetes suffering and in conjunction with his own dislike of telling lies and desire for justice, Neoptolemus is unable to carry through with the deception; he denounces Odysseus' plans :



Neoptolemus: I practiced craft and treachery with success...  
 It was a sin, a shameful sin, which I shall try to retrieve...  
 I have no fear of anything you can do,  
 when I act with justice; nor shall I yield to force.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, this confrontation is resolved through *adeus ex machina* when the original owner of the desired weapon, Hercules, appears to tell Philoctetes that his anger is excessive toward the Greeks and he must return to Troy. The central teleological issue is sidetracked without a satisfactory conclusion since both Odysseus' and Neoptolemus' valid and cogent arguments are never brought to a dramatic confrontation requiring a resolution. Interestingly, Aristotle later commented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* on the correctness of Neoptolemus' moral stance concerning the falsehoods Odysseus wants him to voice:

And if moral weakness makes a man abandon any and every opinion, moral weakness will occasionally be morally good, as, for example, in the case of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*. Neoptolemus deserves praise when he does not abide by the resolution which Odysseus had persuaded him to adopt, because it gives him pain to tell a lie.<sup>15</sup>

Modern critics have additionally argued along similar lines such as H.D.F. Kitto who views Neoptolemus as the central character and the nucleus of the play as his ethical development and spiritual journey.<sup>16</sup> Beniamino Stumbo similarly views the play as a conflict "between two principles, one legal and political embodied in Odysseus, the other ethical and universal in Neoptolemus."<sup>17</sup>

Philosophical Murder: *Crime and Punishment*. Two millennium later, Dostoevsky was not ambiguous about the teleological question and resolution in *Crime and Punishment*: the individual has a sanctity and worth which negates any utilitarian theories or 'end and means' justifications. His impoverished student and philosophical murderer Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov had developed a theory and published his ideas in "The Periodical Review" concerning the polarity in society between the 'ordinary' and the 'extraordinary man.' Naturally, he believes himself to be one of these 'extraordinary' individuals, and he attempts to prove his status through the murder of a hateful old pawn broker. After the deed, Raskolnikov is interrogated by the wily police investigator Porfiry Petrovich during which he explains the 'extraordinary man's' inherent teleological rights and privileges over the "lower people, the just stuff... good only to reproduce their own kind":

The only bone I have to pick is I don't really insist these extraordinary people are absolutely bound and always obligated to commit excesses, as you say...I merely suggest that the 'extraordinary' man has the right to permit his conscience to transgress... certain obstacles, but only in the execution of his idea—which might involve the salvation of all mankind—demands it.<sup>18</sup>



Raskolnikov uses as an example of the privileges of an 'extraordinary' man Napoleon who had not hesitated to leave his army in Egypt or Russia thus causing the deaths of thousands of soldiers; therefore why not follow Napoleon's example who would not have hesitated to kill the old pawn broker if she impeded his career. As Raskolnikov haughtily tells the police inspector:

What's more, as I recall, my article goes on to develop the notion that all the...well, for example lawgivers and architects of our humanity, from the most ancient on through the Lycurguses, Solon, Mohammeds, Napoleons, and so forth—they were all criminals, to a man...Nor did they stop short of bloodshed if blood could be of use to them...You might even take note that these benefactors and architects of our humanity have been for the most part especially fierce at shedding blood.<sup>19</sup>

As an 'extraordinary man', Raskolnikov's teleological justification is that with this wealth he could be shed of his grinding poverty and have the financial stability to work for mankind's greater benefit. This idea of murdering the pawn broker and using her wealth for benefiting others was earlier established when Raskolnikov overheard a student and an Army officer discussing the same theory during a billiard game; Raskolnikov viewed this as being 'the working of special influences and coincidences':<sup>20</sup>

Well, listen. On the other hand, we have fresh young elements [people] going under with no help—by the thousands, everywhere. This old woman's money, which is going to be sequestered in a monastery, could beget a hundred, a thousand good deeds and fresh starts! Hundreds, perhaps thousands of lives could be put on the right path, dozens of families rescued from poverty, from ruin, from collapse, from decay, from the venereal wards of the hospitals—all this with her money! Kill her, take her money, dedicate it to serving mankind, to the general welfare.<sup>21</sup>

Similarly to the crafty Greek warrior's rationale two thousand years earlier, Raskolnikov's rationalization for his actions is that the extraordinary individual has the right to perform a criminal action knowing that the one small deed will be canceled in the plethora of beneficial works which will result. However, unlike Odysseus, Raskolnikov's 'certain obstacles' is not the theft of a bow but murder.

In distinction to Raskolnikov's extraordinary pretensions, the actual deed is a horrible farce of incompetence, stupidity, errors, and ill luck: he leaves the door wide open as he searches for the old woman's cash box which is never located, is able to locate only a small purse and a few pieces of jewelry, is compelled to interrupt the search as two customers bang on the door for the old woman and barely escapes being caught by them, and, most significantly, must murder the pawn broker's simple-minded half sister Lizaveta who unfortunately arrived in the middle of the robbery.

Unlike Sophocles, Dostoevsky's position is unequivocal in his condemnation of Raskolnikov's teleological justifications for his actions. In the novel's denouement,



Raskolnikov's escalating spiritual and philosophical agony as he attempts to justify his actions finally culminates in his confession to Sonia that his experiment in philosophical murder was a horrible malfeasance:

"Well, of course, killing the old woman—that was bad. But enough!" ...

"Oh, no, no," Sonia mournfully exclaimed, "how could it be like that....

No, that isn't it, not like that!"...

"Sonia, I only killed a louse—useless, vile, pernicious."

"A human being a louse!"...<sup>22</sup>

Raskolnikov's revelation is inexorably linked with Dostoevsky's belief in suffering as a prerequisite to Christian enlightenment, redemption, and salvation. Sonia's advice to the suffering 'extraordinary man' is to first symbolically bow down and kiss the earth "which you have defiled" and to confess the crime to the police. She ardently exclaims, "You must accept suffering and redeem yourself by it..."<sup>23</sup> Raskolnikov eventually accepts her advice, confesses his crime, and goes into penal exile in Siberia followed by the faithful Sonia.

Dostoevsky's uncompromising championship of the individual even when considered a 'spiteful, vile, and useless louse' is a complete negation of the teleological justification for any action. Raskolnikov is hopelessly inept as an 'extraordinary man', and Dostoevsky is adamant and unequivocal in his belief that every human no matter how vile and apparently unproductive has worth which negates their removal at the prerogative of 'extraordinary' individuals. Raskolnikov's destructive error in judgment results in the murder of two people, his incarceration in Siberia, and the anguish of two families who must suffer the consequences of his theory.

Bad Barbara at Paramount: *The Strange Love of Martha Ivers*. Barbara Stanwyck made four classic Film Noir while under contract at Paramount in the middle 1940s: the murdering femme fatales in *Double Indemnity* (1944), *The File on Thelma Jordan* (1949) and *The Strange Love of Martha Ivers* (1946) and an invalid victim of gangsters in *Sorry, Wrong Number* (1948). According to Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites from *Movies: A Psychological Study*:

The title character of *The Strange Love of Martha Ivers* has a long list of crimes to her credit. She has murdered her aunt and let someone else hang for it; she has taken possession of the vast fortune of the murdered aunt; she has married a man (Kirk Douglas) she loathes in order to cover up her crimes and has driven him to drink by her contempt. When the hero (Van Heflin) appears she immediately wants to make love to him, a gesture which, according to an unchecked statement of her husband is habitual to her. And she attempts alternately to kill the hero and to get the hero to murder her husband.<sup>24</sup>

*Martha Ivers* concerns mistaken assumptions, actual motives in juxtaposition to appearance and the desire to maintain control of one's life and a luxurious lifestyle in contrast to the guilt of having achieved this material security through murder and perjury. All



attempts to drive Sam away (bribery and a 'working over' by some hired thugs) fails, and she is forced to admit her guilt in both the murder of her aunt and the perjury of testifying against the innocent drifter who was hanged for the crime. In an effort to solve the dilemma, Walter tells Sam to come to their home for a final confrontation—either Sam will be paid off for his silence or he will have to be eliminated.

Sam arrives and finds Walter already intoxicated to such an extent that he can hardly stand. After Walter falls down the stairs in a drunken stupor, Martha attempts to get Sam to kill him; to her surprise, he carries Walter into another room and confronts Martha about her past criminal deeds and her teleological justification for her actions:

*Scene: Night Sequence-Interior Ivers' home- Walter's Study (Medium Shot):*

**Martha:** You said I didn't know the difference between right and wrong. What's right for Walter and myself? For us to tell the truth?

**Sam:** I think so, yes.

**Martha:** And hang for it?

**Sam:** You wouldn't hang for it; not if you confessed. You'd do time, sure.

**Martha:** Sure, I'll rot in prison for the rest of my life. And for what? What am I guilty of?

**Sam:** ...of murder

**Martha:** [becoming angry] What were their lives compared to mine. And what was she?

**Sam:** A human being.

**Martha:** A mean vicious hateful old woman who never did any thing for anybody. Look what I've done with what she's left me. I've given to charity, built schools, hospitals given thousands of people work. What was he?

**Sam:** Another human being

**Martha:** A thief, a drunk; a someone who would have died in the gutter any way. Neither one of them had a right to live.

**Sam:** You didn't think Walter had either.

Although portrayed as a fairly rough man, Sam's continual reference to Martha's victims as 'a human being' accentuates his grounding in humanity and reasonable desire not to harm others without sufficient cause. Earlier Martha had questioned Sam by referring to his war record and self-defense charge as to his refusal to kill Walter, "You've killed. It says so in your record." Sam retorts flatly, "I've never murdered."

Similar to Albert Camus' philosophy of limitations, Sam does not shrink from legitimate ways to prosper materially, and he has and will certainly defend himself as demonstrated when he provokes and revenges himself on the leader of the thugs who had earlier beaten him. Yet, he will not transgress beyond certain limits. Martha's teleological argument, like Raskolnikov's, suggests only the strong and ruthless are allowed to survive and prosper; if murder is necessary to gain what one wants, then such behavior can always be justified. Like Dostoevsky, such transgressions must be punished: Sam leaves the house in disgust and Martha, in one final act of control, commits suicide by



placing her hand on Walter's .38 Browning and pulling the trigger herself. Unable to live without her, Walter soon follows by shooting himself in the temple as Sam watches horrified from the lawn.

Although there are several concepts for comparison and analysis among these works, two repeating patterns are especially significant for consideration. First, even though the goals sought by the tempters are within easy reach or have already been achieved, the tempted unequivocally reject the justifications presented and deprive them of final success: Neoptolemus has the bow, yet he returns it to Philoctetes and the 'skilled in craft' Odysseus is completely bested and cannot bully the youth into submission. Investigator Porfory has no real evidence for any conviction, yet Raskolnikov confesses to the murder of his own volition. Sam can easily kill the drunken and unconscious Walter, yet he rejects the seduction and repulses Martha's temptation.

Secondly, all the tempters use as their most significant justification for their actions the appeal of the greatest good for the greatest number. Odysseus sites the numerous and long suffering Greek host, Raskolnikov continually utilizes Napoleon's campaigns and war's carnage in juxtaposition with the death of a single old pawn broker, and Martha has given jobs to thousands in her factory. Although the tempters predicate their argument on the removal of present 'obstacles' in the belief of assured future success, only Martha has actually achieved material success with the inherited wealth from her aunt and Odysseus has the certainty (albeit divine assurance) of what will be the result of his actions—the fall of Troy. Raskolnikov, contrarily, is hopelessly vague in just how he will 'benefit all mankind' with the pawn broker's money.

Raskolnikov may praise Napoleon for having the courage to abandon his army in Egypt with a terrific loss of life and, yet when the teleological question is centered on a single individual as an 'obstacle;' for elimination—a lame castaway, an old woman, a miserly aunt—the situation alters from a nameless collective of faces to a single human facade. With the face of the victim clearly impressed on the mind, the tempter's arguments are unequivocally repulsed. As Charles Glicksberg observes:

Who indeed can compute the number of those who perished in Auschwitz and Maidanek, Dachau and Belsen—and what do figures alone matter? If we know that seven or fifteen or twenty-five million victims perished in these hellish camps, it still fails to create the reality that the suffering and death of one man has the power to evoke.<sup>25</sup>

Without necessary justifications of productivity or worth, Sophocles, Dostoevsky, and Lewis Milestone all conclude that the individual must be respected simply for what the single individual is—a human being—and no appeal to utilitarianism or 'the greatest good for the greatest number' can justify cruelty, deception or philosophical murder.



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Windelbrand. *A History of Philosophy: Greek, Roman, and Medieval*. (New York: Harper and Brothers; A Harper Torchbook, 1958.) p.42; see additionally Philip Wheelwright *The Presocratics* (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1966,) p. 166 for the exact quotation which fascinated Aristotle.
- <sup>2</sup> B. Jowett (translator). *The Dialogues of Plato*. (New York: The Random House, 1937): Volume I "The Phaedrus" p. 481-482; Volume II "The Timaeus" p. 13-14 and 47-48.
- <sup>3</sup> *The Metaphysica*. Book I, Chapters 2, 7,9; Book II, Chapter 2; Book III, Chapter 2; Book V, Chapter 2,4; Book XII, Chapter 7, 10.
- <sup>4</sup> Martin Ostwald (translator) . *Aristotle's The Nicomachean Ethics*. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merill Publishing Company, 1962) pp. 3-4 and 14-19.
- <sup>5</sup> Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood. *A History of Philosophy*; third edition. (New York: Henry Holt and Company 1914; revised 1957) pp. 542-543.
- <sup>6</sup> James H. Billington. *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith*. (New York: Basic, Inc., 1980) p.274.
- <sup>7</sup> Jacques Maritain. *Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical Survey of the Great Systems*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) p.257.
- <sup>8</sup> Arthur Koestler. *Darkness at Noon*. Translated by Daphne Hardy. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1941) pp. 155-156.
- <sup>9</sup> Albert Camus. *Caligula and Three Other Plays*. Translated by Stuart Gilbert. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960) p.259.
- <sup>10</sup> Germaine Bree. *Camus*. (New Brunswick and New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1959) pp. 53-54.
- <sup>11</sup> David Grene and Richard Lattimore (translators) *Sophocles II*. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1957) p.197.
- <sup>12</sup> Grene and Lattimore, p. 198.
- <sup>13</sup> H.D.F. Kitto. *Form and Meaning in Drama*. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1957) p.104.
- <sup>14</sup> Grene and Lattimore, p. 244.
- <sup>15</sup> Ostwald, p. 178.
- <sup>16</sup> H.D.F. Kitto. *Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study*. (3rd Edition). (London and New York: Methuen Publishers, 1984) p. 299.
- <sup>17</sup> Beniamino Stumbo "Il Filottete di Sofocle" (*Dioniso* 19, 1956 p.98 as quoted in Oscar Mandel *Philoctetes and the Fall of Troy*. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1981.) p.104.
- <sup>18</sup> Sydney Monas (translator) *Crime and Punishment*. (New York: New American Library; A Signet Classic, 1968). p.257.
- <sup>19</sup> Monas, p. 257.
- <sup>20</sup> Monas, p. 70.
- <sup>21</sup> Monas, pp. 72-73.
- <sup>22</sup> Monas, p. 404.
- <sup>23</sup> Monas, pp. 407.
- <sup>24</sup> Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites. *Movies: A Psychological Study*. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950) pp. 36-37.
- <sup>25</sup> Charles I. Glicksberg. *Literature and Religion*. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1960). p. 46.



## Classroom Bias

Rae Lynn Blake

In fifth grade sitting in her seat, Gina was raising her hand patiently waiting for the teacher to call on her. The teacher called on the boy who did not raise his hand. He was unable to answer the question, yet the teacher continued to wait for him. Finally, the teacher moved on, but then Tim was called on. Gina's arm got tired, so she put it down. And then again in twelfth grade, Gina was again waiting her turn to answer the question asked. Her hand was raised, but John just shouted out an answer without waiting to be called on. He had given the wrong answer. The teacher called on another young man. While he was thinking about what to say, Gina decided to be assertive. She gave the answer aloud. Although she was correct, the teacher reproached her for not waiting to be called on. During her junior year of college, the students were discussing an issue in class. Gina spoke after Steve had finished. Halfway through a sentence a male classmate interrupted her. She responded and was interrupted again. One time by the professor. Stories like these repeat themselves all over this country. These problems affect all students academically and emotionally; however, it is possible to change this problem by implementing new methods of teaching.

Laura, who is age 15 and lives in Cleveland, remembers how her teacher would praise the boys for good answers and hardly call on the girls. This is an example in an article titled "In the Classroom." She says that in the classroom it seemed to sit and let the boys dominate the discussions. Laura says, "I didn't understand something, I'd have to wait till a boy brought it up. The teacher was not intimidating" (Prufer 79). Both men and women, teachers may intentionally or unintentionally treat male and female students differently in the classroom and in outside activities, based on their genders.

Teachers will answer questions and may look directly at a male student expecting him to respond. The teacher may also look directly at a female student when asking a "lower order" form of a question, like a factual question (Hall 9). The teacher reserves the critical thinking for the men, which will require a more in-depth thought. Teacher may address the class as if there are no women present at all. For example a teacher may say,

## Women's Studies Essays



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Teachers will answer questions and may look directly at a male student expecting him to respond. The teacher may also look directly at a female student when asking a "lower order" form of a question, like a factual question (Hall 9). The teacher reserves the critical thinking for the men, which will require a more in-depth thought. Teacher may address the class as if there are no women present at all. For example a teacher may say,



"Suppose your wife..." or "When you were a boy..." (Hall 8). When waiting for a response to a question, a teacher may wait longer for a male than for a female before moving on to another student. The teacher may respond more extensively to a man's answer, and give him the credit for his ideas; however, that is not so with a woman. The result of these situations is that the female students are using up all their energy in their conflicts, so that their school work is ultimately affected. After this happens enough, the women end up just trying to find some self-confidence (Hall 12-13).

It is interesting to look at the language pattern of both women and men at the college level. Research shows that students' language is affected because of the biased treatment they received through the school system to that point. A report compiled in "The Classroom Climate: A Chilly One For Women?" done in 1993 from a Project on the Status and Education of Women has shown that men do talk more than women. Men also talk longer and take more turns speaking while taking control of the conversation ("How Schools: Executive 6). It has been observed that, "Not only do men talk more, but what men say often carries more weight" (Hall 8). Some people have suggested that these patterns of speech have developed as a response to the inequalities of the society as a whole (Hall 9).

When men are speaking, they are highly assertive, use abstract styles, and are competitive (Hall 9). The American Association of University Women (AAUW) points out that males will often call out their answers. If a female does, then she is told to raise her hand ("How Schools: Executive" 7). Females use excessive qualifiers, and "tag" their questions such as asking the person for an opinion. For example, a woman will start with, "This is probably not important, but..." (Hall 9). Women will hesitate and use false starts. In class discussions, some teachers will allow a female student to be interrupted or will even do it themselves (Hall 3). Men will interrupt women frequently with a personal comment or change the subject all together, bringing the woman's point to a quick close.

The body language teachers use when conducting a class can also be a problem. They may keep a distance from certain students, make more eye contact with the men, nod more often in response to the men's answers and comments, and even use certain tones of voice (Hall 7). The females who sit in the front will have a better chance of being spoken to. The posture of teachers can make a difference too. When talking to a man, they may lean forward. When talking to a woman, they may look at the clock or the chalkboard (Prufer 80). The most harmful damage is done when the teacher will give specific instructions to the men on how to complete an assignment, but show the women how to do it—or even in some cases do it for them. Research shows that women graduates are less likely to feel confident in the work they do than men are (Hall 2).

According to research compiled in the report by Hall, studies have shown that females



do not leave the school system with nearly the same degree of confidence and self-esteem as males (16). A female in Humanities at Berkeley told a story about how a professor would, when reading novels, make such comments as "Well, you girls probably found this boring" or "You would wouldn't understand this feeling that men have" (Hall 5). After a while, listening to his sarcasm toward women, she began to feel depressed while attending his class. "It inspires in one a feeling of worthlessness," she explained (Hall 5).

If the teacher expects a certain behavior and leads the women in that direction, then the teacher's opinion will be confirmed unrealistically. It is a stereotype that women are not good with numbers. When a male teacher says to a female student, "My God, you're as incompetent as my wife!" he is linking her academic performance to her sex. He obviously is not seeing her as an individual student, but instead as a member of the female population. He is classifying her as being like "all women" (Hall 9). He may intend this to be a joke, but it implies her intelligence has a limit, and if she tries to pass it she will fail. Sexist humor may create laughs and lighten the mood in the classroom, but only for the men. The women are not just being left out, but singled out to be laughed at.

Hall states, "Women students—unlike men students—are too often seen as anonymous members of a group from whom certain behaviors can be expected, rather than individuals with unique competencies" (5). Women, in some cases, get more attention by the way they look than by what they say. They get discouraged with their professors. "Without encouragement from their teachers, who may be too busy to notice a drop-off in achievement—or who subconsciously don't expect girls to excel—many female students lose interest in math and science by the time they enter high school" (Prufer 79). Even when the women do well in a math or science class, they will not receive the encouragement they need to pursue it. Women may get questioned about how serious they are with comments as, "I know you're competent. The question in our minds is, are you really serious about what you're doing?" (Hall 5).

Professors may have difficulty seeing women as their potential colleagues and may say something like, "You're so cute. I can't see you as a professor of anything." A male professor actually said that to his female student (Hall 4). "In fact, subtle and/or inadvertent incidents can sometimes do the most damage, because they often occur without the full awareness of the professor or the student" (Hall 5). Marriage is often seen as a disability to the woman, because it is possible she may not be fully committed to her school work. In most cases, people will counsel women to lower their goals or switch to something "easier" (Hall 10). Women students start to feel helpless and have no one to turn to for help or even discuss the problems (assuming they are consciously aware of



them). Hall points out that many of these situations go without conscious awareness by the professor or the student (8).

To help bring about a strong change, female students need to stand up for themselves and be heard. They should talk to a professor they trust, call the university organizations who are there to help (if any are available) like a Women's Club, and file a formal grievance or complaint. Everyone involved in the school system needs to raise the awareness that there is a problem. According to the AAUW, the key term here is "encourage" ("How Schools: Action" 2). People should encourage the schools to have in-service programs to examine the issues, workshops in math and science for women only, and have teachers research and peer review the teacher/student interactions ("How Schools: Action" 3). If schools sponsor math and science workshops for young girls, then they need to have women as role models. The women in the community, and those who work in education, should be encouraged to run in elections that make the decisions in education ("How Schools: Action" 5). It is necessary to have women on educational boards to fight against discrimination and bring change to the school systems.

The AAUW and other organizations have lists of things the teacher can do to help get rid of gender bias. Teachers should start by setting aside a class day and talking about discrimination, paying attention to all the interactions, responding equally to all comments and answers, asking equally difficult questions, giving the same amount of response time, avoiding any sexist comments including those about the student's appearance, and using the same tone of voice and type of posture regardless of who is being addressed. The teacher should also try to encourage the female students both in and out of the classroom.

It is important to remember that "the experiences, strengths, and needs of girls from every race and social class must be considered in order to provide excellence and equity for all our nation's students" ("How Schools: Action" 8). Everyone involved in education, with the help of organizations like the AAUW, is becoming more aware of the gender biases our students are facing. Slowly and surely, teachers, faculty, parents, and students are helping to make this change. All of these sources explain that discrimination takes place in our school systems from the beginning to the end of a student's education. They also all state the importance of change. The females of America need to know that they are just as good in math or any other subject as males are. Girls like Gina and Laura should not have to deal with the problems they are facing. Women need to get the self-confidence that has been so wrongly denied them. Now is the time to make sure that in future generations women can stand tall. Research has offered the school system solutions to gender bias. Women in America need to make sure these solutions are not only implemented, but carried through successfully. If intelligence has no dis-



crimination, neither should the people who have intelligence.

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# Love In The Time of Intolerance: Why Gay Marriages Should Be Legalized

*Shane Hunter*

Currently, gay weddings are talk show oddities associated in the public mentality with people who claim to be Elvis' love child, people who claim to have been kidnapped by aliens, or both. Gays brave enough to share their lives on national television have become the nineties' version of carnival sideshow freaks. Not surprisingly, gays have become weary of the exploitive, voyeuristic attitude society holds toward them, evidenced by the fact that the author of this paper was unable to find any gay couples willing to discuss their relationships with him despite the fact many of the couples asked are friends of the author, and all of them know him to be gay.

This trepidation could be part of the reality of small town gay life (where the gay rights movement is about thirty five years behind the rest of the country) (Enloe), but it also raises a larger issue. Gay relationships are a taboo subject because they are not validated by society, or even by the gay rights movement. Half the states, including Kansas, still have sodomy laws (Mohr 160); the only purpose of which is to "insult gays" (Mohr 160). The gay rights movement, concentrating on AIDS, has dropped the ball on the issue of legalizing gay marriages. According to Thomas Stoddard, a gay rights activist writing in *Out/Look* magazine, "As far as I can tell, no gay organization of any size, local or national, has yet declared the right to marry as one of its goals" (400). If gays are allowed to marry not only will the hesitation to discuss their relationships end, but gays will make a big step toward receiving other civil rights because the right to marry will give gays greater social acceptance than ever before.

The question underlying the debate over legalization of gay marriages is whether homosexual behavior is immoral. The only way that the continued discrimination against gay couples wishing to spend the rest of their lives together can be justified is if homosexuality is found to be immoral or unnatural. To answer the question regarding



the morality of homosexuality, it is necessary to examine the arguments given by various groups to justify the exclusion of ten percent of the population of enjoying the social and legal status of marriage.

The primary tool of groups seeking to deny homosexuals equal status as citizens is the Bible. These groups cite several examples from the Bible that supposedly condemn homosexuality as "sinful." According to these groups, the first condemnation of homosexuality in the Bible is the story of Adam and Eve. One often hears the cliché "God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve." Most Christians, to their credit, put this statement more genteely. According to Beverly Gerlach, a former seminary student, "By placing Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, God set the example he expected the rest of us to follow." When asked what people who do not feel so inclined to follow Adam and Eve's example should do about finding a mate, she replied, "they should remain celibate."

Other Biblical examples of the immorality of homosexuality include: the example of Sodom and Gomorrah (those swingin' cities of the Plain), and the ordinance in Leviticus to execute homosexual men.

Are these examples proof that homosexuality is inherently immoral? The answer, for any rational person, would have to be no. As far as Adam and Eve setting a precedent the rest of humanity was intended to follow, it should be remembered theirs was an arranged marriage and that they were banished from paradise for disobeying God. Their son Cain killed his brother Abel—was Cain setting an example of brotherly love the rest of us were intended to follow? As for the other examples mentioned, Leviticus also states witches should be executed and that pork is unfit to eat. Sodom and Gomorrah, according to many Old Testament scholars, is intended as a condemnation of inhospitality more than homosexuality (Mohr 155).

Fundamentalist Christians use the language of demonization to portray homosexuals as dangerous to the moral fabric of America. Biblical scholar Elaine Pagels, in her new book "The Origin of Satan," examines the evolution of Satan and the language of demonization in the Christian tradition. She makes the point that prior to the first century, Jews had no concept of Satan (Remnick 56). Early Christians saw themselves engaged in spiritual warfare with Satan, and demonized those who did not agree with them, in this case Jews (Remnick 56). This, Pagels argues, is the basis for anti-Semitism in Western culture—this notion that anyone not in agreement with Christians must be in league with Satan (Remnick 56). "What began as a minority sect's rhetorical strategy, a way of defining and asserting itself, became a majority religion's moral . . . and psychological justification for persecution . . . of all opponents, real or imagined" (Remnick 56). The language of demonization is used by fundamentalists in this century when speaking about gays to create the impression that gays are dangerous to the so-called "Christian



observe, and they would presumably be more open about their relationships since they would no longer be "outlaws."

Finally, two people who love each other and wish to spend the rest of their lives together should not be denied that right because they happen to be the same sex. It is intolerable that a nation which thinks of itself as a "melting pot" should deny to ten percent of its population the legal and social privileges that marriage brings. "No American jurisdiction recognizes the right [of gays] to marry one another, although several nations in Northern Europe do" (Stoddard 400). It is possible for gays to give their partners most of the legal rights of a spouse, through powers-of attorney, living trusts, and in San Francisco, domestic partnerships. However, gays should not be made to jump through these legal hoops, when they could be given all the legal rights of a spouse just by getting married. Some gays have even tried adopting their partners so they would be able to inherit property. Such an arrangement can only be called humiliating—that two equals; two adults in love should have to form, legally speaking, a parent-child relationship to receive legal benefits raises serious doubts about the humanity of our government.

In the early seventies, couples in three states—Minnesota, Kentucky and Washington—applied for marriage licenses and were turned down solely because the applicants happened to be gay male couples (Stoddard 400). This is blatant discrimination, even worse, the courts upheld this discrimination during one of the most liberal periods in the history of the American Justice system.

The law works to encourage and reward people who get married. Spouses are able "to reduce tax liability by filing a joint return . . . are given benefits such as those given surviving spouses through the Social Security program" (Stoddard 399). Spouses can also inherit money and property when there is no will. Spouses also are not required to testify against one another. Gays should be given these same encouragements and rewards for two reasons. First, as American citizens it is only fair they have the same rights as everyone else. Second, with the onslaught of the AIDS epidemic more gays are seeking monogamous relationships and should be encouraged in this endeavour.

In conclusion, seeking the right to marry should be at the forefront of the gay rights movement. Since marriage and family are the two dominant social institutions in the United States, it is only logical that gays would want to be part of these institutions. Getting the right to marry would give gays "insider status" (Ettelbrick 404). Gay marriages would become, if not an immediately accepted part of American society, a demonstration to the straight world that they are capable of serious commitments to one another. Imagine the predicament of a gay man, rushing to the hospital upon hearing his partner has been in a car accident, and is prohibited from seeing his partner or is denied information about his lover's condition because he is not a spouse or a family member. Legalizing gay marriages might not save his partner's life or accelerate his



way of life," and are therefore "sinful." The word "homosexual" has become a dirty word in the gay community because it is the word used by television evangelists (each syllable carefully enunciated in a denunciatory way—like an angry parent calling a child by his or her full name) in sermons with titles like "The Gay Agenda and the Destruction of the American Family" (the actual title of a Jerry Falwell sermon). "I would rather be called 'faggot' than 'homosexual' because it's the word people who hate us use," (Enloe).

The Adam and Eve argument hints at another argument used by people seeking to deny gays equality—homosexuality is unnatural. People who hold this view feel that because gay sex can not result in procreation it is unnatural. People who hold this view assume that the only purpose of sex is to reproduce, when sex also expresses love and the desire for intimacy, something gays are capable of.

If no logical argument can be made for homosexuality as immoral or unnatural, one must be prepared to accept gay unions as serious commitments, deserving of the same social and legal status as heterosexual unions. There are three reasons why gay marriages should be legalized: 1) legalizing gay marriages would lead to gays becoming more integrated with society and therefore becoming more secure with themselves and their sexuality, 2) legalizing gay marriages would improve straight marriages by eliminating the sexism inherent in marriage today, and finally, 3) legalizing gay marriages would end the discriminatory practice of denying one class of citizens a right that should be enjoyed by all.

Gays are not fully integrated into society because they do not receive the same socialization into society straights receive. The closest thing to socialization that gay youth get is the message that homosexuality is wrong. Gay youth are left entirely on their own as far as creating the personal moral universe that will guide their later actions. This in part explains why promiscuity is such an accepted part of the gay lifestyle. When a gay youth breaks through the wall of intolerance, he or she finds him or herself falling through space, eventually landing in a garden of earthly delights where anything goes. There is no self control within the gay community, therefore there is no social control.

The primary social institution of the gay community is the "bar scene." A gay bar on Saturday night is a grotesque parody of a church on Sunday morning. The bar is the altar: a bartender serves drinks like a priest conducts a communion service. Queers greet each other with hugs and kisses like blue haired grandmothers, while drag queens watch as omnipresent as cherubs and seraphs on a stained glass window. Rather than empower gays, as many gays would argue the bar scene has done, bars have served to isolate gays into a community whose only common thread is sexual orientation. When the author was first starting to live the gay lifestyle, he expressed his uncertainty about the bar scene to a gay friend and was told "You better get used to the bars, because that's all there is."



The primary social institution of the straight world is marriage. "Marriage is much more than a relationship sanctioned by law. It is the centerpiece of our entire social structure, the core of the traditional notion of 'family' "(Stoddard 400). People who would deny gays the right to marry claim gay relationships can not achieve the same level of commitment as straight marriages (Stoddard 400). Even if this is true, perhaps it is because gays face much greater challenges than straight people do in achieving stability in a relationship, due to the legal and moral policies of our country. However, there are indications that the gays who are able to overcome these obstacles are involved in successful relationships. Dan McPherson, Ph.D. studied 28 gay male couples and 28 heterosexual couples and found "When it comes to both child care and family tasks—like mowing the lawn or doing the budget—gay parents divide things up significantly more evenly than straight couples . . . gay couples declare more satisfaction with the division of labor than heterosexual couples" (Partners 14).

If gay marriages were legal, then young gays would be socialized into a more emotionally healthy community; they could see a gay lifestyle resembling the lifestyle of their families, only suited to their needs, and would not be terrified at the thought of coming out. If gay marriages are made legal, eventually gays would be accepted by society in general. "It could make us feel OK about ourselves, perhaps even relieve some of the internalized homophobia that we all know so well. Society will then celebrate the birth of our children and mourn the death of our spouses" (Ettelbrick 402). Being gay would come to be regarded as naturally as being straight.

Marriage is seen by many people, gay and straight, as a dangerous and oppressive institution (Ettelbrick 403). The traditionalists who are afraid gay marriages will destroy the conventional roles and mores of marriage are right. It is about time these roles were destroyed. "In its traditional form, marriage has been oppressive, especially (although not entirely) to women" (Stoddard 398). If gays are allowed to marry, the institution will be forced to adapt to this societal change. Marriage would cease to be a union of "husband" and "wife," but one of two people who are in love with one another, are dedicated to one another, and respect one another. Allowing gays to marry is the best way for "the institution to divest itself of the sexist trappings of the past" (Stoddard 401).

McPherson's study indicates straight couples could learn from gay couples. After the birth of a child, women in straight marriages end up shouldering most of the child raising burden (Partners 14). Among gay male couples who adopt children there doesn't seem to be this problem. "Gay couples negotiate tasks on the basis of interest, ability, or fairness, whereas heterosexuals have to choose to surrender to or counteract pre-existing social roles" (Partners 14). If gays are allowed to marry there would be more gay couples to



recovery, or even help the healthy partner deal with the anguish of a tragic situation—but legalizing gay marriages will allow these two to be together when they need each other most.

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Poetry



## Dawn

Dawn whispers into my ear  
Her heavy, husky dew  
Misty Mother Magic  
Awake, the morning view!  
A glowing spark  
She fuses the dark  
Her golden cloak appears  
Like the woeful weeping willow  
My eyes well up with tears  
Tender, temporal guest  
She yields extended stay  
"Do not cry, my child;  
"Till pain on morrow's day."

—Jennifer E. Janak

## The Orb

Take hold, the great glass orb  
Held tight in one sweet hand  
Sphere of clear cut crystal  
Beyond time space and sand  
Locked inside the great glass orb  
A gypsy story will tell  
Of men, women, and children  
And beasts of fire hell  
Expose the great glass orb  
Let it tell a story true  
It will reveal  
Beneath the peeling  
And broken

**Poetry**

—Jennifer E. Janak



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Dawn whispers into my ear  
Her heavy, husky dew  
Misty Mother Magic  
Awake, the morning view!  
A glowing spark  
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“Do not cry, my child,  
“I’ll return on morrow’s day.”

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Take hold, the great glass orb  
Held tight in salt sweat hands  
Sphere of clear cut crystal  
Beyond time capsule sands  
Locked inside the great glass orb  
A gypsy story will tell  
Of men, women, and children  
And beasts of fire hell  
Expose the great glass orb  
Let it tell a story true  
It will reveal  
Beneath the peal  
And bestow the strange and new

—Jennifer E. Janak



## Untitled

Arms of Hades men

Reaching up out of

The ground

Your feathery

Fingertips

Wisp and wither

Listen for

His voice

Under the

Great

Grey

Oaks

—Jennifer E. Janak

## Untitled

I feel a thousand years old—

As old as the sun, the moon,

As old as the stars twinkling from  
the all-seeing, yet blank, night sky

I feel like a cup overflowing—

Taking on more than it should

So it takes in its limit

And refuses the overbearing force  
struggling to make a place for itself

I feel like the lone tree in a  
wide-open meadow—

Standing alone, braving the constants,

The sun, the wind, the rain,

Even though it is slowly worn down  
it still stands firm and proud

I will make it through

as nothing lasts forever

—Amy L. Richard



# Wachter's World

Thomas C. Wachter

(1942-1995)

Donald Wayne Viney, Professor of Philosophy

One may gather the vital statistics of Tom Wachter's life from his obituary notice. However, these tell little about the man that Tom was: the things that filled his days with meaning. As Jorge Borges says, "Events far-reaching enough to people all space, whose end is nonetheless called when one man dies, may cause us wonder" (*Discussions*, University of Texas Press, 1964, p. 39). Although Tom and I called each other friend, there is more about him that I do not know than that I know. But what I know of him is worth knowing and sharing, —hence, I consider it of more than mere sentimental interest to set down these thoughts.

When Tom came to my office in 1989 to introduce himself, I suppose that he was looking for someone else in Southeast Kansas who shared his passion for philosophy. He had a B.A. in philosophy from Regis College in Denver and a degree in mathematics from the University of Colorado. He also studied at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas and did graduate studies in philosophy at Boston College. He had lived in Topeka, Kansas since 1987. Little did either of us know that our friendship would have far-reaching effects.

## In Memoriam

About the time I met Tom, a discussion group called B and B was being formed by Gary McGrath (a mathematics professor) and Paul Zenger (a professor of political science) which I was invited to join. B and B—as we called it—was an bi-weekly forum to discuss a book of our choosing, and to share breakfast. As I became aware of Tom's considerable knowledge of philosophy, I introduced him to the group. Until the date of his death, he would be a valued contributor to the group. Members of B and B came to appreciate his incisive intellect, his down-to-earth, and his gift for presenting difficult concepts in the simplest fashion. The group also looked forward to the cream of Tom's aunt, Ann Wachter, often present.



# Wachter's World

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About the time I met Tom, a discussion group called Books and Breakfast was being formed by Gary McGrath (a mathematics professor) and Paul Zagorski (a professor of political science) which I was invited to join. B and B—as we called it—met on a weekly basis to discuss a book of our choosing and to share breakfast. As I became aware of Tom's considerable knowledge of philosophy, I introduced him to the group. Until the time of his death, he would be a valued contributor to the group. Members of B and B came to appreciate his incisive intellect, his disarming wit, and his gift for presenting difficult concepts in the simplest fashion. The group also looked forward to the cream puffs that Tom's aunt, Ann Wachter, often provided!



Tom once compared his passion for philosophy to an infectious disease for which there is no antidote. The metaphor may have appealed to him for more personal reasons, for he was afflicted, during the last decade of his life, with diabetes and chronic pancreatitis. However, it may be more accurate to turn the metaphor inside-out, for as Susan Loar, Tom's sister, remarked to me, philosophy was Tom's way of dealing with his health problems. Even as he lay dying of cancer, his eyes lit up at the mention of Aristotle. At Tom's suggestion, the members of B and B were reading Thomas Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* (On the Soul)—including Aristotle's book itself—and he was looking forward to entering the fray once again.

Tom once characterized the members of B and B as interested in intelligent discussion and open to changing their minds (reported in Pittsburg's newspaper, *Morning Sun*, Dec. 26, 1991, p. 9). These qualities were evident in Tom; his ever-active mind was at once stubborn and open, and his own passion for learning was contagious. Once morning he argued forcefully against Marilyn Vos Savant's solution to a puzzle which appeared in her weekly column. However, later in the day I received a telephone call. "I'm wrong," Tom announced, "and I can prove it!" And prove it he did, elegantly and simply.

One may catch a glimpse of how his mind worked by considering his proof. The puzzle is this: A prize is hidden in one of three boxes. You choose a box. Rather than being allowed to look inside the box you chose, one of the empty boxes is opened. You are then given the chance to change your original selection. The question is whether you are more likely to get the prize if you change your selection than if you remain with your original choice. The answer is that remaining with your original selection gives you a  $1/3$  chance of getting the prize, but changing your selection gives you a  $2/3$  chance of winning.

Tom's proof begins by stating the conditions of the puzzle:

1. There are three boxes, one contains the prize, call it P, two are empty, call them E1 and E2.
2. The contestant, C, makes an arbitrary selection of a box.
3. One of the empty boxes (either E1 or E2) is opened.
4. C is then asked if he wishes to change his selection.

*Point to prove:* If C changes his selection then the probability that the game—not his second choice—will reward him with a prize is  $2/3$ .

*Proof:* Any of three boxes, P, E1 or E2 may be initially selected.

*Case 1:* if P is selected, then either E1 or E2 is opened and the remaining box is empty. If C changes his selection, then he chooses an empty box.

*Case 2:* if E1 is selected, then E2 must be opened (by 3). P is the remaining box. If C changes his selection, then he gets the prize.




Case 3: if E2 is selected, then E1 must be opened (by 3). P is the remaining box. If C changes his selection, then he gets the prize.

Consequently, when C changes his selection, he wins with two of the three possible cases (cases 2 and 3).

Tom put his pedagogical skills to work in the classroom. He taught philosophy on a part-time basis at Regis, Trinity, and finally at Pittsburg State where he taught Basic Philosophy in both the Spring 1992 and the Spring 1994 semesters. A student upon whom he had an important influence was David Greeley who studied under him at Pittsburg State. Tom took a special interest in David's education by coaching and tutoring him long after the course in which David was enrolled was concluded. David is presently doing graduate work in philosophy at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Tom published no philosophical papers, although this was not for lack of publishable ideas. I argued with Tom on many topics, from epistemology to metaphysics, and I learned a great deal from him. We rarely saw eye to eye on anything philosophical, although I remember two points of significant agreement. Once while we were traveling to a philosophy conference he told me that he believed that the human mind can understand the infinite. It seemed to me that he expressed himself in the manner of a person in a confessional. Thus, he was surprised to learn that I agreed with him completely. Trans-finite mathematics reveals at least part of the structure of the infinite. One could add that the really tough questions involve the nature of mind, free will, the nature of God, etc. In typical fashion Tom proceeded to explain to me the reason that  $1 = .99999$  (any decimal subtracted from 1 is less than  $.99999$  but any decimal added to  $.99999$  is more than 1).

We also agreed that philosophy is not simply a parade of theories, but that it makes real progress, often by finding dead ends. Sometimes the most important advances in philosophy



Tom Wachter with the logic crystal, December 11, 1992.



are discovering what is false rather than discovering what is true. The most recent example of progress is the failure of logical positivism. I came to these conclusions under the influence of Charles Hartshorne. Although Tom met Hartshorne while he attended school in Texas, I am certain that he came to these ideas by another avenue.

The most important things I took from my friendship with Tom, as far as philosophy is concerned, was an appreciation of the structure and beauty of logic and the value of cooperative effort in philosophy. Once, Tom tutored a student enrolled in my Introduction to Logic, and I asked him what he was teaching the fellow. He casually replied that he reduced sentential logic to a single page. I was incredulous until Tom explained his methods and ideas. Before long, we were working daily on his simplified presentation. One day he called and said, "Don, we can build this thing." Although initially I did not understand what he was talking about, I soon realized that he had hit on something novel—a three-dimensional model of sentential logic, loosely analogous to chemist's models of molecules. I accompanied him to Wal-Mart where we bought Styrofoam balls and wooden dowels. He later constructed the model—called the logic crystal—out of these simple materials.

One way to think of the crystal is to imagine that all declarative sentences, in the simplest logic, can be shown to represent one of sixteen truth functions (a four line truth table with a string of Ts and/or Fs).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
F	F	F	F	T	T	T	T	F	F	F	F	T	T	T	T
F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T
F	T	F	T	F	T	F	T	F	T	F	T	F	T	F	T

Those who know a little elementary logic will recognize table 1 as the table for contradictions and table 16 as the table for tautologies. The remaining fourteen tables are what the various forms of so-called contingent propositions represent. A fundamental question of logic is, given any two propositions (call them  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ), does  $\alpha$  imply  $\beta$ ? In terms of the sixteen functions, the question can be rephrased: Which of the tables imply which? The answer is surprisingly simple: Place any two tables,  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ , side by side;  $\alpha$  implies  $\beta$  if and only if there is no line that reads TF. Thus, table 7 implies table 8 because no line reads TF; but table 8 does not imply table 7 because the last line reads TF.


This is the way that Tom had reduced logic to a single page. Another step is needed in order to construct the crystal. One must map all of the possible implication relations among the sixteen tables. One way to do this is by constructing a 16 X 16 grid



with the tables lined up on two sides. Each of the 256 squares in the grid is a candidate for being an implication; but only 81 are genuine implications. Among the truths of logic revealed by the grid are the following: Every proposition implies itself; a contradiction implies any other proposition; and a tautology is implied by any proposition.

The most elegant way to represent the 81 implications is to construct the crystal. The diagram with 16 nodes is the crystal flattened out into two-dimensions.

Each node represents a table, and the lines connecting the nodes represent implications. The lines connecting the nodes are to be understood as “flowing” only one way. Thus, the diagram can be read either from top to bottom or from bottom to top, but not both at once—the diagram presented here is to be read from bottom to top. Self-implication (which accounts for sixteen implications) is left implicit. Also implicit are transitive relations. Thus, node 5 implies node 7 and node 7 implies node 8, hence node 5 implies node 8, but no line directly connects 5 and 8. One simply follows the lines of implication from 5 to 7 to 8 to learn that node 5 implies node 8 (transitive implications account for another 33 implications). The remaining 32 implications are represented by the lines connecting the nodes.



I have taught elementary logic for many years and from many different texts, but I have never seen the elementary principles of logic expressed so clearly or so elegantly as one finds in the crystal. I have used the crystal in my classes ever since. Eventually I was inspired to write an introductory text in logic, *Logic for Nonvulcans*, in which the crystal forms an integral part. In addition, I wrote a paper describing the crystal and its pedagogical uses, “Logic Crystallized” (which at this writing is under consideration by the journal *Teaching Philosophy*). There is a lot of Tom in those writings, although he would definitely not agree with everything I put in those works. I spoke above of the ramifications of my first meeting with Tom. The crystal, the book, and the paper are three of those ramifications.

Tom was the primary creative force behind the discovery of the crystal. Likewise, he played the dominant role in our development of a three-valued logic. We agreed that a multivalent logic should preserve, as much as possible, the standard bivalent truths. In



most trivalent systems the so-called “laws of thought”—the principles of noncontradiction (it is not the case that  $p$  and not- $p$ ), identity (if  $p$  then  $p$ ), and excluded middle (either  $p$  or not- $p$ )—are not tautologies, as they are in bivalent logic. In our system, noncontradiction and identity are tautologies, but excluded middle is not. It makes sense that the principle of excluded middle should not be a tautology in a trivalent system since the principle is merely a restatement of bivalence.

As Tom clearly saw, the key is in defining negation, for there are three meanings of negation (let  $T$  = true,  $F$  = false, and  $N$  = neither true nor false):

1. *Strong sense*—negation changes  $T$  to  $F$  and  $F$  to  $T$ .
2. *Weak sense*—negation changes the value of the variable.
3. *Semantic sense*—negation means “it is false that.”

Our system, unlike other trivalent systems, adheres to all of these meanings of negation. Thus, if  $p$  is  $T$  then not- $p$  is  $F$ ; if  $p$  is  $F$  then not- $p$  is  $T$ ; and if  $p$  is  $N$ , then not- $p$  is  $F$  (cf. N. Rescher, *Many-Valued Logic*, McGraw Hill, 1969, p. 123). Hence, in our trivalent system, a negated proposition must be  $T$  or  $F$ . We discovered that one of the virtues of our system is that there is a trivalent equivalent to excluded middle. Whereas “ $p$  or not- $p$ ” is not a tautology, “ $p$  or not- $p$  or not-not- $p$ ” is a tautology. Another ramification.

The syntax of a three-valued logic is one thing, developing a semantics—telling what it might mean—is something else again. Tom joked that since I was the metaphysician, I should be the one to provide our trivalent system with an interpretation. I never did. However, we both discovered that the excursion into multivalent logics shed new light on traditional logic. For example, in traditional logic, the expressions “never false” and “always true” are equivalent. In a trivalent system, on the other hand, the equivalence fails. A proposition that is never false may indeed be always true, but it may also be neither true nor false in all cases or true in some cases and neither true nor false in other cases.

Tom’s joke about my being the metaphysician indicates that he saw his own brand of philosophy as having a decidedly anti-metaphysical slant. For example, he accepted W.V.O. Quine’s criticisms of modal logic. In Tom’s view, concepts like necessity and impossibility are at best misleading ways of talking about tautologies, contradictions, or theorems. The modal logicians had, in Tom’s view, hopelessly confused what logicians call object language and metalanguage. Such confusions are material for jokes or clever sayings, but not for serious philosophy (the French say, “*Il n’y a pas de l’haine dans l’amour*”—literally, “there is no hate in ‘love’”—the word for love, “*amour*,” has no letter “*n*” in it; but “*n*” rhymes with the word for hate, “*haine*.”). Tom accepted Quine’s dictum that necessity is in the way we talk about things, not in the things we talk about. Tom also argued that there is no such thing as induction. What passes for inductive



argument, he believed, reduces to possibilities mapped in an abstract space (like the three door puzzle). On these issues, Tom and I found ourselves at loggerheads, arguing to a stalemate. He found my ontology too lavish; I found his too austere.

When the B and B group read A.N. Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*, Tom argued that a metaphysician is someone who makes the following suppositions:

1. There is a "fixed" totality of mind-independent objects.
2. There is a uniquely correct view of how things are.
3. Some form of the correspondence theory of truth is correct.

It is ironic that Tom proposed these criteria even as we were discussing Whitehead, for Whitehead, who may be this century's greatest metaphysical mind, would deny (1), find (2) to be nothing more than an ideal to be sought, and view (3) as a half-truth. Tom once expressed an interest in reading Whitehead more thoroughly, for he knew that my sympathies are with Whitehead's views. Be that as it may, Tom believed that each of these propositions is dubious at best, but it was the last one that seemed to bother him the most. Following Tarski, he believed that to escape the liar paradox one must define truth relative to some language; hence, truth is always "true in L," where L is the object language and "true in" is metalinguistic.

Knowing the truth was always the goal of Tom's intellectual activities. At one time in his life, he told me, he played a lot of chess, but he came to view it as a "monumental waste of time." It was, after all, a mere game of the intellect. He did find value in the creative aspects of the mind. His knowledge of music theory, for example, was impressive and in the last year of his life, he studied quantum logic and information theory. But always, his first loves were the *questiones disputatae* of philosophy. He could be blunt and aggressive in debate, a style of arguing that he said he learned from his Jesuit teachers at Regis. Nevertheless, there was no meanness in him that I could detect, and he figured that the falsehoods were not likely to survive his rigorous cross-examinations. Like Socrates, it was with falsehood that he contended, not with people.

In the final analysis, it was the mind itself that fascinated Tom and that he found so enigmatic. He was dissatisfied with the usual list of theories of the mind that one finds—dualism, panpsychism, behaviorism, functionalism. He forced me to be more clear about my own acceptance of panpsychism and to formulate it in two propositions: To be a substance is to be an experiencing thing; and, to be an experiencing thing is to be a substance. Tom contended, against this, that, in being self-aware, we are not aware of ourselves as being a substance. Tom was also fond of quoting Putnam's statement that "meanings are not in the head," and he found Searle's critiques of artificial intelligence more convincing than Dennett's evasions—Tom laughed approvingly at Ned Block's



claim that a more accurate title for Dennett's *Consciousness Explained* would have been "consciousness ignored." However, none of these denials uncover the secret of what the mind is.

Tom seems to have believed that the mind is an activity that is a mystery to itself. For it reaches out, by means of some of its most sophisticated creations, and rigorously *proves* via Kurt Gödel that truths are in excess of theorems. It further *surmises*, with the help of Church and Turing, that there is no recipe for rationality, no functions which say without qualification, "This is rational to believe and this is not." Finally, it *acknowledges* at once its own limitations and its greatness. The source of logic is also the source of geometry, mathematics, music, literature, poetry, and philosophy—creative imagination, the mind. On the other hand, I think he would have denied that the creative activity of the mind is incompatible with the discovery of truth. We discover truths through the systems of thought that we create. In this, Tom was a kind of neo-Kantian (Kant was a philosopher he much admired). I learned all these things from Tom, whose mind was a model of the human capacity for creative reason.



## About the Contributors...

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- Aaron Bruenger is a junior at PSU whose major is English Education. He has been a member of The PSU Philosophical Society for two years.

### Introduction

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### Articles

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- Jennifer E. Janak is a sophomore at PSU whose major is English Education. She is a Resident Assistant in Trout Hall and has been a member of The PSU Philosophical Society for two years. Jenny's poetry is also included in this edition.
- Russ Prophet is a junior at PSU whose major is Economics. He is a Resident Assistant in Nation Hall. Russ will be presenting two philosophy related papers at the Midwestern Honors College Convention at Emporia State University in April of 1996.
- Dr. Larry W. Ranney has been an instructor at PSU in the Department of English since 1991. He will be finishing his Ph. D. in Communicative Arts this May at the University of Ohio. He was formally a Major in the Army Infantry.

### Women's Studies Papers

- Rae Lynn Blake graduated from PSU in December 1995. She is now in the Army and is stationed in California.
- Shane Hunter is a senior at PSU whose major is English with an emphasis in Creative Writing.

### In Memoriam

- Dr. Donald Wayne Viney has taught philosophy at PSU since 1984 and has been faculty advisor to the PSU Philosophical Society since the society's inception in 1987.

### Layout and Design


- Amy Richard is a junior majoring in commercial graphics in the Department of Printing. She has also contributed a poem to this year's edition of *Logos-Sophia*.



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